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Abstract 
This thesis empirically contributes to extant debates over the relevance of indigenous peace-
making methods in modern African conflicts. Reliant on the on-going Darfur conflict as case 
study and contingent on the study’s two embedded units of analysis being: African Union-
United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Institution of the Native Administration 
respectively, the study advanced the notion of complementarity as propounded by authors in 
the field of conflict transformation.  The contended inadequacy of mainstream methods of 
intervention in civil wars across the globe was contextually investigated side by side John Paul 
Lederach’s postulations towards the adoption of the “reconciliation” component as the central 
focus of intervention in cases of prolonged violence.  
 
To corroborate or refute the propositions underlying Lederach’s comprehensive framework for 
intervention in protracted conflicts, the study, drawing from secondary as well as primary data 
derived from key informant interviews, group discussion and official UNAMID documents, 
employed the pattern matching technique to arrive at its findings: UNAMID does implement 
the authorised multidimensional mandate geared towards the actualization of durable peace for 
Darfur. The involvement of the Civil Affairs Section with the stakeholders on level 3 of the 
conflict, demonstrates a complementarity of efforts to douse tensions at all levels of the conflict, 
including on the level of intertribal rivalry on the grassroot. Darfur’s indigenous system for 
reconciliation and its custodians (Judiyya and Ajaweed) constituted the selected stakeholder for 
this study. These actors have been incorporated into UNAMID’s working framework for peace, 
albeit to the extent to which the GoS sanctions it. The thesis contends that regardless of a 
legitimacy crisis, indigenous methods maintain saliency at peace-making in a semi modern 
society like Darfur, notably, in the absence of reliable and effective formal peace-making 
arrangements. Nonetheless, the current politicised nature of the conflict constitutes an 
impediment to the effective use of indigenous methods on level three of the triadic conflict in 
Darfur. Accordingly, conflict transformation may be actualised based on the re-empowerment 
of contextual human resources and in conjunction with mainstream approaches, but most 
significantly also, contingent upon the unbiased support of the government of the day.   
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Preface 
 
In the year 2008, while studying for a master’s degree in my home country Nigeria, one seminar 
course attracted my keen attention. My unrivalled interest in that subject, might have obtained 
from the manner in which the professor in charge presented his seminars. His name was 
Professor O.B Olaoba, the course was titled: African Approaches to Conflict Management (PCS 
703). His lecture sessions exposed me to a part of the African peace-making heritage that I was 
indeed familiar with, but in a non-academic fashion. I knew that elders settled family issues 
back in the villages, but beyond that particular level of conflict, I was ignorant of the fact that 
elders, and particularly those of other African countries, demonstrated a certain capacity to 
settle conflicts on other related levels. I became excited about my newest reservoir of 
knowledge; I assumed that this must be the solution to Africa’s plethora of conflicts: To 
commence with an exploration of the African method of conflict resolution as my own 
contribution towards the search for durable peace for the African continent.  In fact, I became 
more captivated having become acquainted with the fact that the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict in 
the south-eastern part of Nigeria, as documented by yet another professor of mine, terminated 
only when indigenous peace-making mechanisms were applied. Incidentally, my master’s 
program coincided with that phase in international history when the war in Darfur made the 
headlines and most notably when news about the failed 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement kept 
people asking why? What went wrong? At that point, I was also compelled to ask myself one 
major question: “If these indigenous mechanisms were indeed efficacious as my professors 
portrayed them, why then the intransigent nature of the conflict in Darfur? Are indigenous 
peace-making mechanisms in Darfur still extant? 
 
 
  
 15 
Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the termination of the cold war, the international system, most prominently around the 
early 1990s, started to experience the escalation of a number of conflicts, the de-escalation of 
a few and the prolongation of a good number. The conflicts of Africa’s sub- Saharan region 
specifically those of the Great Lakes, and the Horn of Africa recorded some of the continent’s 
deadliest in the post-cold war era.1 Monstrous conflict occurrences like those of Rwanda, 
Uganda, Somalia and Liberia to mention a few, have left indelible imprints on the socio-
economic landscape of the continent to say the least. There is no gainsaying the fact that Africa 
needs a relief from endemic warfare as well as from the negative effects currently deriving from 
the conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic 
(CAR) and those of forgotten regions like the western part of Sudan.  
 
While analysts and policy makers continue to tackle the ubiquity of conflict in the most 
pragmatic ways. A number of other issues have constituted topics for earnest debate within the 
field of peace and conflict studies. By now it has become commonplace that violent internal 
conflicts such as the ones prevalent in Africa, ostensibly defy similarity with those of interstate 
characterising. Their intransigence and protractedness constitute food for immense thought. 
Violent conflicts nonetheless represent a more mind-boggling phenomenon when regardless of 
a plethora of intervention instruments war tends to prevail over durable peace.   
 
In 2005, the international community, contingent upon the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; 
stemmed Africa’s longest lasting civil war. Several decades of fighting culminated with the 
secession, in 2011, of the present day South Sudanese state from the hegemonic control of the 
North. In the lead up to the signing of the Naivasha Agreement in 2005, war erupted in Sudan’s 
western region. In early 2004 the international community hinted that the early 2003 Darfur 
crisis evinced a repeat of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In 2008 UNAMID (African Union-
United Nations Mission in Darfur) arrived the scene as the international actor tasked with the 
obligation to restore stability to the province. That unprecedented peace mission is emblematic 
of a synergy between the United Nations and the African Union. It is regarded as the UN’s 
                                                     
1  Lysias D. Gilbert, "A Retrospective Examination of Post-Cold War Conflicts in Africa: Ended, Abated, and 
Prolonged Conflicts," International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 4, no. 9 (July 2014): 154, 
accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_9_July_2014/16.pdf. 
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largest and most expensive deployed peace support operation on African soil. 2 In UNAMID’s 
nearly a decade outing, peace has almost eluded the region. Amid unremitted involvement, and 
the employment of a myriad of strategies, the region continues to experience the violent 
escalation of inter-tribal fights, as was documented in 2013. Small wonder that in May of 2017 
news of civilian displacement, triggered by renewed fighting between government forces, its 
Janjaweed militia and the rebel movements, has begun to filter in.3 The UN Security Council 
envisages the exigency for UNAMID’s continued stay in Darfur. It has therefore extended the 
mission’s mandate until June 30, 2018, albeit with modifications.4 Before the end of 2017 
UNAMID should commence with a two-phase transition from peacekeeping sanctioned with a 
multidimensional mandate to pure peace building.5 The new mandate will concentrate on 
grassroot peace building and probably engender greater prospects for indigenous peace-making 
in Darfur.   
 
1.2 Historical Background to conflict intervention in Africa  
The UN peace mission to Congo in 1960 was the institution’s first peacekeeping operation to 
sub-Saharan Africa. The organization had ventured into the conflict terrain against the backdrop 
of guiding principles underlying chapter 1 article1, of the UN Charter: to protect the fledgling 
Congolese state from the power tussle between the president Joseph Kasavubu and his Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba. 6 At this time, the cold war was underway and the blueprint for 
conflict intervention, still evolving, derived from an inter-state conflict environment where all 
threat to peace on the international system was addressed under a collective security 
arrangement.7  
 
The unsuccessful outcome of that UN response to a sub-Saharan African conflict nonetheless, 
served to debunk as well as challenge the UN’s intervention template, seemingly incompatible 
with Congo’s conflict of intra-state characterizing. It turned out that the organization was not 
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only ill prepared to confront the challenges emerging from that internal crisis, but also its 
underlying operational principle established in chapter 1 article 2(7), ostensibly placed a huge 
constraint on the institution’s ability to interfere in the domestic affairs of the host state.8  In 
any case, that initial attempt at performing functions beyond its normative capacity furnished 
the organization with the necessary experience. After an almost three-decade recess from 
intervention on the African continent,9 the UN re-emerged with an operational framework that 
seemed appropriate to tackle intra-state conflicts now prevalent in the cold war’s aftermath.   
 
When the bipolar rivalry receded in 1989, Africa almost immediately emerged as the prototype 
of a conflict arena.  A good number of African states began to implode for reasons that were 
not restricted to the withdrawal of super power interest in hitherto proxy states, but that included 
this factor. Post-cold war eruptions like those of Namibia, Angola as well as that of 
Mozambique, became the initial testing grounds for what ostensibly represented a novel model 
for addressing conflicts of internal bearing.  
By now peacekeepers, hitherto confined to activities of peacekeeping in its traditional form, 
assumed other functions as authorized within a UN intervention model. Such aimed towards 
peace building and post-conflict recovery. In Namibia for example the UN endorsed a mandate, 
that gave peace keepers the license to supervise demobilization and disarmament, assist the 
return of refugees and oversee a political transition through a UN monitored election. 10 
 
This innovative UN intervention approach sought to establish stable peace. Indeed, these 
extended functions became a reflection of peace according to the liberal peace thesis. 
Intervention efforts were intended ultimately, to prevent a resurgence of violence by addressing 
the recovery needs of war-torn societies.  Paris referred to this novel intervention style as the 
Wilsonian kind of peace building undergirded by the assumption that democratization and 
marketization can engender peaceful relations between states and most notably within states in 
the post-conflict recovery phase.11  
 
                                                     
8 Norrie MacQueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960 (London & New York: Routledge, 
2014), 9 
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10 Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 110 
11 See, Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009)  
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UN involvements on the continent prior to 1992 adopted this same “extended functions” pattern 
of peacekeeping, notably, on an ad hoc basis. It was not until 1992 that the UN officially 
unveiled its blueprint for peace building in a model tagged the “Agenda for Peace”. As declared 
by the then Secretary General: Boutros Ghali. The UN would from that point on, formally 
delineate peace building as:  
“Action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace 
to avoid a relapse into conflict.”12   
In practice, this novel “Agenda” would be analogous to the liberal peace thesis. In fact, when 
the Secretary General announced that the operationalization of the peace building Agenda 
would include: 
“…Monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or 
strengthening governmental institutions, promoting formal and informal processes of political 
participation,” 13 
It became evident that the Agenda for peace normatively originated from the liberal peace 
thesis.  
 
The outcome of peace support operations in the early aftermath of the cold war nonetheless, 
varied from outright success demonstrated in Namibia and Mozambique, to colossal failure as 
evidenced in the Angolan conflict and others earlier mentioned.  
Authors like Roland Paris emerged promptly with a seminal scholarly attempt, to refute the 
potentiality of the UN’s novel intervention framework, which beginning with the Namibian 
conflict, as earlier mentioned, projected the ideals of democratization and marketization as 
antidotes to lasting peace in societies emerging from conflict.14 Since 1989 nonetheless, this 
strategy has remained fundamental to peace building activities in conflict riven societies.  
 
With each unique conflict, the UN is noted to have adjusted these core peace-building principles 
to suit the needs of the society at war.  Therefore, if the Congo conflict informed this newest 
strategy towards conflicts of the post-cold war era, and specifically those of intra-state 
characterizing, the 1991 Somali conflict similarly added a new dimension to the aims and 
                                                     
12 Richard Jackson and Jacob Bercovitch, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, 
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and Approaches (University of Michigan Press, 2009), 172 & 174 
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objectives of peacekeeping. When the Somali conflict erupted in 1988 and the subsequent status 
of statelessness emerged in 1991, the singular task of the UN on that conflict terrain, 
concentrated on humanitarian relief for thousands of Somali citizens at the mercy of the war.15  
 
As the humanitarian approach to peacekeeping gradually unfolded and the Somali intervention 
also became a failure, Somaliland a seceded former British colony to the northwest of Somalia, 
commenced an inward assessment of its conflict resolution capacities, those from which it could 
derive peace and stability from the raging war16. Indeed “contextual resources” proved 
sufficient for positive peace and absolute stability in the land.  In the case of Somalia, the 
international community exited from the conflict, without direct influence on the eventual 
termination of that conflict.  
 
Around this time also, to the west of the African continent, the ECOMOG (The Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group) remarkably displayed gallant success 
in dousing the tensions of the Liberian conflict. That achievement drew new attention to the 
continent’s seemingly emerging security capabilities. In 1994 however, violent conflict erupted 
in the Rwandan state. That massacre lamentably occurred under the watchful eyes of the 
international community. Too overwhelmed by the bitter experience from the Somali conflict, 
international peace actors demonstrated ostensible incapacity in the face of ferocious 
bloodletting.  Sadly, these horrific acts of carnage transpired under the OAU’s nose. Deeply 
enmeshed in its principle of non-interference17 and therefore too incapacitated, the organisation 
offered millions of Rwandese, caught in the heinous genocide, nothing substantial beyond a 50-
member NMOG I (Neutral Military Observer Group) and a 130 personnel NMOG II18. It was 
probably at this juncture that, commentators, observers, policy makers and scholars reckoned 
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16 Tim Murithi, "African indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution," in Peace and 
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that the time was ripe to advocate for a fine tuning of the lenses that prescribed mechanisms 
and approaches of intervention in internal conflict eruptions on the continent.19 
 
 
1. 3 Scholarly perspectives 
These post-cold war occurrences in the sub-Saharan African region, fed into an emerging, 
western scholarly discourse around the1990s. Emerging debates questioned specifically, the 
sufficiency of conventional approaches in the kinds of conflicts prevalent since the end of the 
cold war.20 In fact this investigation traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, when initial insights 
drawn from a diverse pool of academic disciplines exposed, the deficiency embedded in the 
classical approach to peace interventions.  Indeed, prominent scholars like Galtung repudiated 
conventional approaches for its failure to take cognizance of the structural violence that 
increasingly precipitates the escalation of social conflicts in the first place21. He opined that the 
quest to achieve positive peace must supersede mainstream guiding principles attuned to the 
conceptions of peace in terms that strictly promoted the actualization of negative peace.22  
 
In fact, within the same field of conflict resolution, interdisciplinary research underlined the 
need to deconstruct the notion of conflict and peace-making from within the purview of a statist 
conception. Scholars asserted that conflicts no longer predominantly assumed an inter-state 
posture. They averred that the incompatible interests; underlying the inclination towards inter-
state rivalry, no longer aptly described the causes of a plethora of violent aggressions on the 
world’s conflict terrains.23  
 
Conflict resolution theorists therefore propounded the overarching causal connection between 
social conflicts and the un-assuaged basic human needs that tended to constitute the root causes 
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of contemporary conflicts. 24These new insights ostensibly, mirrored the exact presence of 
oppression in its political, economic, social and cultural forms. In furtherance of a paradigm 
shift, the field of conflict resolution advocated for the espousal of a people to people approach 
to peace. This was to elicit attention to the saliency of track II actors in the resolution of 
contemporary conflicts.  
 
In practice, this translated either to informal peace-making, as was the case with the conflict in 
Mozambique, where unofficial actors mediated, or to the facilitation of “Controlled 
Communication as expounded by John Burton,25. Subsequently also, Herbert Kelman’s” 
Integrated Problem Solving”26 dubbed as Problem Solving Workshops became applicable in 
1972, to a border conflict in Africa.27 In the light of theoretical evolutions the practice of 
conflict resolution also became mainstream. Accordingly, the international community’s 
response to conflict reflected the underlying principles of the field of conflict management but 
also of conflict resolution.  
 
In the post-cold war dispensation nonetheless, conflicts have been delineated as internal:  They 
ensue between parties located within the conflict setting and are characterized by intractability 
and protractedness. Beyond that, victims and perpetrators, in the aftermath of war, become 
coaxed into embracing a common future. More so, within the same society where heinous 
crimes have begotten traumatic conditions, and where animosity and deep pain have prevailed. 
This is the platform on which the field of conflict transformation emerged. Its line of thought 
projects a trajectory of peace-building that articulates peace and conflict in a different light. 
Scholars like John Paul Lederach motivated by these occurrences, underscore the need to focus 
on structural change but most significantly underline the essence of relational change in 
societies embroiled in protracted conflicts. He avows that fear and hatred have bored deep into 
the coherent order of groups and communities, therefore the exigency for apt readjustments in 
models for intervention. 28Lederach assumes that severed relationships can be rebuilt on the 
platform of reconciliation and that the apparatuses and actors relevant to relationship building 
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lay within the society itself. On that note, the conflict transformation scholars not only endorse 
a bottom-up approach to peace but also advocate for the integration of track III actors into 
intervention processes geared towards peace and stability in protracted internal conflicts.  
 
1. 4 African debates/ State of the Art. 
On the African divide, the Somali and the Rwandan conflicts evoked the exigency for change 
in scholarly perspectives on the continent, as well as propelled decisive policy action.  Durable 
peace for example as demonstrated by Somaliland’s innovative feat, tended to ignite the initial 
flame towards the rediscovery of pragmatic aspects of peace-making within the African 
conception of it. Accordingly, African debates ensued that traced Somaliland’s relative stability 
to its “hybrid political system”29 That process evinced the “Council of Elders” as a constituent 
part of the state’s political formation and ultimately drew recognition to the prospects of an 
“inclusive”, bottom up approach to peace in Africa. In fact, Menkhaus later delineated the 
impact of Somaliland’s success story in this manner:  
“Nowhere in Africa has the debate over the utility of traditional conflict 
management mechanisms been more pronounced and consequential than in the 
Somali crisis30 
In similar vein, the Rwandan incidence ostensibly provoked the AU’s demonstrated capacity to 
effect monumental changes in its guiding policy. The principle of “non-interference” was 
reversed to avert the future re-occurrence of genocidal tendencies in conflict eruptions on the 
continent. Now operating from the standpoint of “non-indifference” the AU underscores the 
essence of self-reliance, responsibility, pride, ownership and indigeneity,31 to correspond with 
an emerging “minimal external interference” discourse geared towards promoting the initiative 
to adopt “African solutions to African problems.”  
 
Scholars on the continent have also sensed the significance for profound research into peace-
making methods across African societies.  Analysts have become motivated by on-going 
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western debates, but also perturbed by the endemic nature of conflict across the regions of 
Africa. The gruesome atrocities meted out on innocent civilians have become worrisome, but 
even worse, have precipitated mass displacements and triggered the emergence of gross 
humanitarian emergencies. The enormous loss of lives and the devastation that accrue from 
violent eruptions are better imagined than witnessed. As mentioned elsewhere, the Central 
African Republic, the eastern DRC and Mali, are fresh cases of escalations amid intransigent 
and prolonged conflicts like Darfur. These calamities beg for urgent attention and appropriate 
intervention tools. There is therefore the exigency for fresh empirically driven scholarly 
contributions towards the vision to create a more peaceful and stable continent.  
 
In addition to the prevailing discourse, there is a budding perception among African authors to 
‘rectify the asymmetrical growth of knowledge within a conflict intervention industry 
seemingly dominated by western thought32  
Omeje for example posits that:  
“Conflict resolution in practice is actually arbitrary contraptions and devices 
emanating from mainstream conceptions” 33 derived from seemingly incompatible 
worldviews.    
Thus, the need for in-depth knowledge into what the continent has to offer with respect to 
mitigating conflicts originating from within the frontiers of Africa. Furthermore, analysts 
contend that specific aspects of indigenous peace-making methods stand a chance at impacting 
positively on the post-conflict recovery stage of internal conflicts and therefore should be 
incorporated into processes designed by the international community for peace in Africa.  
Osaghae corroborates this stance by asserting that: 
“The incorporation of traditional systems helps to contextualise conflict management 
and facilitates the participation of local people”. 34  
Following in this line of argument Tim Murithi in his analysis of three cases of peace-making 
methods in modern African societies asserts that: 
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“Indigenous and endogenous peace processes are endowed with valuable insights that 
can inform the rebuilding of social trust and restoration of the conditions for communal 
coexistence” 35 
The author therefore argues for the adoption of a “hybridised system” of peace-making on the 
continent. In so doing, both western and indigenous methods become relevant to contemporary 
kinds of conflict eruptions in Africa.  
 
Conversely, other academics argue that the kinds of conflicts that have prevailed on the 
continent in recent times differ from the feuds, which existed between communities in pre-
modern times.36 The question therefore arises as to whether indeed indigenous methods can 
become applicable to vicious conflicts of this present age. In response, analysts concur. There 
is, a palpable transition: from pre-modern to semi modern societies. In like manner, societal 
progression has precipitated incompatibilities that diverge from conflict causalities associated 
with traditional societies. Correspondingly, peace-making mechanism have evolved but 
maintained its substance.  
 According to Murithi: 
“Customs and traditions are not static but dynamic and change overtime…as far as peace-
making processes are concerned there is continuity and change”37 
 
Mutisi substantiates the viewpoint on harnessing hybridised peace-making processes, by 
showcasing the role of “Abunzi” mediators in the post conflict reconciliation phase of the 
Rwandan conflict. As part of its policy to decentralise justice, the Rwandan government 
institutionalised the role of indigenous actors like the Abunzi, to promote restorative 
approaches to peace, and ensure the affordability and accessibility of conflict resolution. 38 
 
The liberal peace project is another topic currently subjected to intense scrutiny on the 
continent. Critics question the compatibility of the project’s normative guidelines with the 
delineation of internal conflicts in the region.  Albert for example contending in favour of a 
bottom up approach to peace, states that: 
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“The objective of the liberal peace project, which promotes retributive/ punitive justice, 
is the protection of the hegemonic and economic interest of the Western world in 
Africa… he adds that …the emphasis of academic and policy analysts regarding peace 
in Africa, should in the continent’s interest, focus on how Africans provide peace for 
themselves”.39 
 
Albert aligns his argument with previously mentioned authors. He avows that the current scope 
of tasks assigned to peacekeepers and civilians operating within the ambit of peace support 
missions in Africa, can be satisfactorily accomplished in conjunction with “local partners using 
indigenous knowledge”.40   
Kaarbo wraps up the debate by contending that: 
“The fundamental guiding principle in peace and peace-building activities in the 
African context is the precondition of relationship-building for effective peace-
building.”41  
The African notion of peace building he avers, offers the point of exit from liberal peace 
approaches that prioritize the formula of: liberal democracy, good governance and economic 
liberalization and hinges on the logic of inclusion and exclusion. The liberal peace logic as it 
were, contradicts the African conception of peace, where the primary concern is to rebuild 
social relations and communal harmony. It is therefore conceived of as an “imposition” of 
peace-building and development intervention mechanisms on African conflict terrains.  42 
      
Indeed, all of these happenings seem to have propelled the current burgeoning of externally 
bolstered institutional research into African indigenous conflict resolution and peace-making 
mechanism. It is worthy of note that the studies conducted by establishments like the United 
States Institute of Peace, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and the University of Peace to 
mention a few, demonstrate vividly the level of institutional involvement in the in-depth 
analysis of African indigenous conflict resolution and peace-making mechanisms.43 Such 
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investigations have illuminated on the purported capacity and unexplored potentials of 
indigenous methods and the continued reconnoitre for durable peace in on-going African 
conflicts. These studies capture and project the notion of a preserved peace-making legacy as 
evinced in a good number of investigated African societies. They underscore the merits of 
culturally defined mechanisms in confronting the enormous challenge of reconciling 
adversaries in post conflict scenarios and confirm the efficacy of age-old practices in the goal 
to reinstate societal coherence. Interestingly also the diluted nature of so-called indigenous 
mechanisms, their inherent limitations and irreconcilability with contemporary discourses 
notably around the issue of human rights, gender, conflict and intervention have not been 
overlooked. 44 In the light of the foregoing there is no gainsaying the exigency for unremitting 
in-depth research that ushers in new understanding and knowledge.     
 
1. 5 Statement of Problem and Purpose 
The Sudanese state, like the aforementioned post-cold war conflict afflicted states, is no 
stranger to war. As mentioned elsewhere, prior to gaining independence in 1956, the 
predominantly Muslim north of Sudan became embroiled in a war with the Christian dominated 
south. That war prevailed over peace and stability for more than a dozen years. The second civil 
war broke out shortly afterwards, also consuming a little over two decades of fighting. It 
terminated in 2005 and subsequently culminated with the independence of the south on July 9, 
2011. While these major civil wars were yet on-going, Musa Abdul Jalil noted that to the west 
of Sudan, between 1932 and the year 2000, 41 major conflicts had occurred. Fighting was either 
intra-nomadic or intra-sedentary, but also inter group in nature, as exemplified in the ferocious 
war between the Fur and the Arabs in 1989. 45 Remarkably and notwithstanding a long history 
of nomadic/sedentary confrontations in the western region of Sudan, these conflicts never made 
international headlines. By some means inter and intra tribal rivalries received the necessary 
local response and were thus squelched out of the international spotlight.   
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In 2003 nonetheless, intense fighting erupted. All eyes focused on Darfur, as rebel movements: 
SLM (Sudan Liberation Movement and JEM (Justice and Equity Movement) cited years of 
inequality and marginalization as the underlying motivation for rebellion against the centre. 
The government responded by launching a counter-insurgency operation against the armed 
movements, who in February attacked government installations in northern Darfur.  Between 
2003 and late 2004 a complex humanitarian condition had emerged. The odious genocidal acts 
perpetrated by government backed Arab militias on villages of African descent could no longer 
be concealed. The debilitating carnage had precipitated a mass displacement of Darfuris and an 
appalling death toll exceeding tens of thousands by late 2004.46 New waves spread across 
Africa and beyond: A devastating war threating regional peace and generating international 
concern had been unleashed, to the west of Sudan. 
 
The reinvigorated African body now going by the novel appellation: AU emerged promptly to 
quell the fighting and restore peace. That attempt at stabilizing Darfur failed. Consequently, in 
2007 contingent upon resolution 1769, the UN Security Council replaced AMIS (African 
Mission in Sudan) with the African Union- United Nations hybrid peace support mission. 
(UNAMID). It has been 9 years since that robust deployment. Darfur has remained in active 
conflict and has become the recipient of a plethora of intervention strategies. Amidst the raging 
war, the international media seems oblivious of the status quo and the world probably heaved 
a sigh of relief with UNAMID’s arrival in 2008. Nonetheless, analyst and observers conversant 
with current events within the region, recognize that peace has continued to elude Sudan’s 
western region. This thesis asks the question: Why? 
 
In developing this study’s overarching research question, I connect to the incidence narrated in 
the preface of this book. Those unanswered questions have informed my scholarly adventure, 
but beyond that, deep research undergird sub questions as these:  if between 1930 and year 
2000, a number of 41 conflicts had occurred in Darfur without attracting international concern, 
what was the stemming force behind it?  Also, why was there a need to deploy a robust hybrid 
operation to supplant the AU’s response in Darfur? And what differentiates that initial style of 
intervention from the current approach to peace?            
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 These questions and indeed Darfur’s conflict, still on-going for nearly a decade, have inspired 
the thesis main research question below: 
• What are the prospects of Darfur’s indigenous peace-making methods in the current 
conflict?  
It is also the objective of this dissertation to understand with respect to the tools applied:  
 
• How international community has responded to the exigency for durable peace in 
Darfur, since the conflict erupted in 2003 
And lastly:  
• To garner insight into the practicability for conflict transformation, contingent on the 
formation of a synergy between the international peace actor and Darfur’s indigenous 
peace-making institutions 
 
The last objective accordingly, derives from the propositions underlying John Paul Lederach’s 
“comprehensive framework” for intervention in protracted internal conflicts. His assumptions 
will be tested for validity and level of operationality in Darfur’s conflict.  
 
 
1. 6 Justification and Significance of the study 
This work, in the light of afore highlighted discourses, engages in a contextual analysis of one 
of Africa’s protracted and intransigent conflicts: Darfur. It is a scholarly adventure that obtains 
from the academic boundaries of peace and conflict studies and therefore seeks to contribute to 
existing body of knowledge in the field. The thesis boarders majorly on the fields of conflict 
management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. In this regard, the dissertation’s 
contribution will be:  
1. To reveal the extent to which conflict management assumptions and attendant 
intervention approaches have contributed to the terminations of Darfur’s conflict. 
2. To disclose the relevance of identified conflict resolution strategies applied in the 
mitigation as well as the search for durable peace to the conflict. 
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The study also investigates the activity of building peace in Darfur, within the purview of the 
assumptions underlying the conflict transformation approach to building peace in protracted 
conflicts. Conflict transformation in a nutshell, underscores: 
• The reconciliation of adversaries as the most significant theme in a peace building 
agenda.  
• That sustainable peace may be attained contingent on human and material resources 
available within the conflict setting; and specifically, on re-empowered human 
resources. 
• Human resources may be incorporated into the peace actor’s working framework, so 
that local actors’ function in partnership with conventional actors utilizing the most 
appropriate methods for peace.   
Against this backdrop, the research will contribute to knowledge on conflict transformation by 
providing empirical evidence that either validates or negates these salient underpinnings.  
 
The thesis also contextualises the notion of “indigenous empowerment” with the aim of 
unearthing its significance to the transformation of Darfur’s prolonged conflict.  The 
operationalization of grassroot peace-building is examined dependent on efforts to prioritize 
the component of “reconciliation,” reliant on a synergy that transcends the formation of hybrid 
organisations, to effectuate ultimately, a hybridization of peace-making mechanisms. 
Proponents of the field also claim that mainstream intervention strategies have become 
inadequate to the transformation of contemporary conflicts. This thesis checks to validate or 
debunk this assumption based on Darfur. 
  
Furthermore, this research is an empirical contribution that aligns with the debates specifically 
documented in a book titled “Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts. That book, edited by I 
William Zartman, was the researcher’s (me) initial encounter with debates around African 
indigenous peace-making institutions. It pools together authors from Africa and beyond, 
towards a deep reflection on the relevance of traditional peace-making in modern conflicts. 
Without going into further details about that study, this thesis without doubt, can be viewed as 
an endeavour to bridge the gap in the knowledge, which that book exhibited. I have provided 
based on Darfur, illumination on some of the research questions stated below, which guided 
that study:  
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1. What kind of conflicts did traditional conflict management practices handle best, and 
how do these kinds compare with contemporary conflicts. 
2. Can traditional methods yield insights that can enrich the work either of African or 
international peacekeepers?47 
A section of that book by Francis Deng48 examined conflict management practices in Sudan, 
but focused on mechanisms and actors associated with the Dinka people of the seceded South 
Sudan. This research investigates the peace-making institution of Sudan’s ethnically diverse 
western region. Indeed, beyond the limits of Zartman’s edited volume, this is an investigation 
that seeks empirical insight into an on-going contemporary conflict beyond extant literature.   
 
Finally note must be taken that this research concentrates on the international community’s 
response to conflict in Darfur, as directly linked to level three49 of what Lederach delineates as 
the affected population. Analysts like Adam Azzain have outlined the Darfur conflict as triadic 
in nature. This denotes unhealthy relations on the national level, as exhibited in the centre 
periphery conflict between the government and the rebel movements. On the communal level 
between communal elites and on the grassroot level as evidenced in inter and intra-tribal 
conflicts. Tribal conflicts have putatively formed the basis for the other two conflicts.50 Since 
the commencement of the war, a plethora of literature has fixated on detailing intervention on 
the political level, i.e. on either the mediation process or peacekeeping activities.  There is 
therefore an ostensible paucity of documentation on the international community’s response to 
Darfur’s conflict on the grassroot level of inter-tribal wars. This research coalesces scholarship 
about intervention approaches in Darfur on the top level as in mediation and peacekeeping, on 
level 2 as in problem solving workshops and on level 3 as in tribal confrontations, into a single 
reader. It serves as a rare contribution into the status quo of Darfur’s forgotten war.  
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1. 7 Chapter roadmap 
The rest of the thesis will be structured into two major sections: A theoretical and an empirical.  
Chapter 2 delves into the discourse of war and conflict from pre-colonial Africa to 
contemporary times. The objective behind this investigation, is to expose some of the 
underlying motivations for conflict in Africa, while simultaneously outlining the kinds of 
conflict that have prevailed specifically on the sub-Saharan region of Africa. The main concern 
is to systematically introduce post-cold war conflicts for their internally configured nature, their 
features of intractability, as well as the longevity that characterize them. The chapter introduces 
Edward Azar’s framework on protracted social conflicts. His hypothetical considerations 
constitute the basis for the study’s analysis of underlying factors responsible for prolonged 
fighting in Darfur.     
 
Chapter 3 examines underpinning theoretical assumptions of the fields of conflict management 
and conflict resolution. The conception of conflict and intervention according to proponents of 
the conflict management field tends to differ from those of conflict resolution scholars. This 
has in-turn influenced the kinds of tools and actors that each field of inquiry deems appropriate 
in the handling of protracted social conflicts.  In this chapter, the researcher (I) presents 
attendant tools for intervention from each field with the aim to understand the extent to which 
these instruments have become relevant to peace within the context of the Darfur conflict.  
 
In Chapter 4, I probe into the emerging field of conflict transformation. I intend to identify the 
point of divergence when placed side by side other aforementioned fields of inquiry. I contend 
that added value may be derived from the conflict transformation’s approach to peace in 
protracted conflicts. These merits are traceable to a recommended inclusive approach to peace 
and the emphasis placed on complementarity. I introduce one of conflict transformation’s 
prominent scholars, whose “comprehensive framework” is adopted in the study as an 
investigative tool into the operationalization of UNAMID’s mandate in Darfur.  
 
Chapter 5 explores into peace-making institutions of three selected cases on the sub-Saharan 
African continent. Chapter five is critical to the entire thesis as it the foundation on which the 
empirical chapters will be developed. The selected cases serve the purpose of substantiating 
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conflict transformation views on reconciliation, track III actors, and cultural sensitivity to 
mention a few. 
The chapter introduces the Acholi people’s mechanism called Mato-Oput, employed in the 
reintegration of defaulters into the society. I Specifically pay attention to the tensions between 
western (ICC) and indigenous (Mato-Oput) trajectories for eliciting justice and accountability 
for victims in that conflict scenario.  
 
The case of the Aguleri and Umuleri of south east Nigeria is introduced to corroborate the 
growing assumption of African scholars now accentuating the exigency to revive pragmatic 
aspects of peace-making in African societies.51 The third example being the Somali experience, 
lays bare the case of an African state where homogenous indigenous practices have engendered 
varied outcomes. The main objective for delving into the Somali case is to underscore the merits 
of a synergy between indigenous actors, their strategies and conventional tools and approaches 
of peace-making. 
 
Chapter 6 illuminates on the methodological trajectory of the research. First and foremost, the 
dissertation relies on the single case study design to achieve its main objective. Nonetheless, it 
is a single case study, which examines two analytical units within the selected case. The Darfur 
conflict represents the case. The embedded unit one and two are UNAMID, with special focus 
on Civil Affairs Sector North and Darfur’s peace-making institutions respectively, with 
emphasis on the Judiyya. The research tools applied to data sourcing included key informant 
interviews and focused group discussion with Darfuri youths and staff of CAS SN. A relevant 
technique in the data collection phase was: snowballing. It is important to state that the selected 
case consists of five states. The researcher (I) relied on the northern Darfur state as the main 
study location. The findings going by the homogeneity of the analytical units may therefore be 
relatively generalised. Finally, the chapter discusses the dissertation’s major limitation.  
 
I commence chapter 7 with an analysis of the underlying causes of the Darfur conflict reliant 
on Edward Azar’s framework. I argue that his framework suffices in providing illumination 
albeit insufficiently. Underlying his “Genesis”52 pre-condition for the emergence of protracted 
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social conflicts are four components. His assertions on the communal content pre-condition 
cannot be applied to the Darfur conflict. My standpoint is rested on the fact that the ethic 
configuration of Darfur cannot be traced to its British colonial experience.  Furthermore, I 
engage in the analysis of the peace-making tools and actors associated with the different fields 
(management, resolution and transformation), which have been applied to the Darfur conflict. 
I examine the relevance of state-centric approaches to peace in Darfur and argue that the 
outcome derived from a purely military response and those elicited from administering formal 
mediation in Darfur, largely buttress assertions from the conflict transformation school. They 
suggest that the employment of mainstream approaches in internal conflicts have left a void 
which the conflict transformation approach intends to fill, based on the notion of 
interdependence.  
No intervention method claims to be the panacea to protracted internal conflicts however in this 
chapter I contend that the incorporation of track III actors can be conceived as validating the 
concerns of the marginalized population and elevating attendant peace actors into a peace 
process that directly affects their future and well-being. In this manner, a wide variety of 
mechanisms become available to the search for durable peace. This chapter also introduces 
UNAMID’s peace building structure for level 3 interventions in Darfur, as evidenced in the 
partnership between CAS and the numerous stakeholders on the grassroots.  
 
Chapter 8 narrows down completely on Darfur as the case study of this research. I delve into 
the region’s indigenous peace-making institution as christened Native Administration by the 
British colonial master. The main point that I set out to advance here is that Darfur evinces a 
competent institution for governance and peace-making traceable to era of the sultans.  I 
maintain that in the post-colonial era, regardless of an evident diminishing authority, indigenous 
actors and methods have remained germane to Darfur’s rural configuration specifically within 
the context of conflict resolution and peace-making. My line of argumentation hinges on 
empirical data gathered during my research visit to northern Darfur. The rare opportunity to 
discuss with Sudanese in Khartoum and with Ajaweed mediators, addressees largely the 
growing controversy over the diminishing potency of the Judiyya reconciliation mechanism in 
modern day conflicts like the on-going one. 
  
Against the backdrop of Lederach’s three propositions outlined in chapter 4 and validated as a 
constituent aspect of UNAMID’s operational strategy in fulfilment of the mission’s 
“multidimensional” mandate captured in chapter 7, I seek in chapter 9, to develop on these 
 34 
established analytical discussions, by testing for the applicability of Lederach’s model in five 
cases of inter-tribal confrontations within the selected study location. These are conflicts that 
have erupted on the terrains of northern Darfur since 2003. I have also selected cases of fresh 
tribal violence between 2012 and April 2013 because they substantiate the emergence of 
renewed inter-tribal conflicts, but also reveals the additional dimension of recent intra tribal 
fights on Darfur’s grassroots. These conflicts have occurred under the jurisdiction of the 
authorized external peace actor: UNAMID.  I focus on determining the extent to which CAS 
seeks to actualize the task of “indigenous empowerment”, “space creation” “ cultural 
sensitivity” and ultimately “ reconciliation” which according to Lederach demonstrates the 
external actor’s endorsement of the host state’s contextual resources but also as in the case 
under scrutiny, discloses the magnitude to which sustainability based on the partnership 
between CAS and Darfur’s indigenous actors: Ajaweed and reconciliation mechanism: Judiyya 
may be deemed feasible and efficient .  Contingent on this line of probing I will be addressing 
the study’s third question. Ultimately, I will rely on findings from the analysis of the five 
conflicts to reveal some of the factors that have militated against experiencing both the full 
potentials of the Native Administration and its integral parts and the merits of the partnership 
between CAS and indigenous actors in the search for peace and stability in a modern conflict 
like Darfur.  
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Chapter Two 
2.1 African Conflicts: Focus Sub-Saharan Region 
Introduction: 
The main aim here is to provide background knowledge of conflicts in Africa dating back to 
the era of decolonization. However, I shall be focusing on those wars occurring in the aftermath 
of the war on ideology: Post-Cold War Conflicts.  These wars occurred from the 90s onwards. 
They continue to elicit major concern, as analyst and theorist alike, remain bereft of theoretical 
understanding and panacea to these conflict realities.  Although the termination of the cold war 
had in many ways brought to a halt some of Africa’s violent conflicts, it simultaneously ushered 
in a phase in which Africa experienced some of its bloodiest conflicts. It was a period in its 
history where the continent counted the cost and attendant consequences of grave violence, 
some of which continue to hunt its current pace of development. The complexity arising from 
a combination of triggers and underlying factors, have further engendered the protraction and 
intractability of these wars as evidenced in a number of conflicts still ongoing in the African 
sub-Saharan region. Delving into the typologies of African wars provides illumination on some 
underlying drivers. The investigation touches on some perspectives projected as viewpoint on 
the root causes of African conflicts. I conclude with Azar’s theoretical framework on 
“Protracted Social Conflict”. The major objective here is to understand the underlying factors 
responsible for prolonged violence especially in the developing world. His early insight on 
protracted conflicts is adopted to guide our understanding of why conflicts linger on for years 
often without a foreseeable end. 
 
2.2 Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa 
An early analysis of wars in Africa categorized them into three major periods:  Pre-colonial, 
colonial and postcolonial,53 prompts the investigation into wars according to these 
classifications. 
 
2.2.1  Pre-Colonial Wars: West Africa  
The pre-colonial era constituted wars between ancient African empires. Robert Smith provides 
insight into the nature and characteristics of Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-colonial West 
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Africa. Although his account cannot be construed as a representation of warfare throughout 
pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, it nonetheless provides some comprehension of warfare 
among West Africans and some of her neigbours.   From his analysis, wars of the 18th and 19th 
centuries differed to some extent from those of contemporary times.  War etiologies were driven 
by vast motives that included “territorial expansion, competition over scarce resources, access 
to trade and the control of trade routes”.  For example, it was Morocco’s motivation to dominate 
the source of gold and salt that precipitated its invasion of Songhai at the end of the 16th century. 
Others like the Ijaiye wars of the 19th century were occasioned on the premise of furnishing the 
slave markets.  The after effects of these wars were usually minimal to the extent that people 
could go about their daily business unperturbed by the goings on of war.   
 
A “formal declaration of war”54 usually signalled the onset of war. Surprise attacks were 
avoided, so as to give the enemy room for discussions and for sending weak citizens to safe 
havens.  In like manner, an army never ventured into war except by some assuredness of victory 
as pronounced by the spiritual ancestors.  Warfare notably became revolutionized around the 
17th century when West Africans began importing arms from Europe. Also, wars were avoided 
during the rainy season. This allowed soldiers return to their farms to cultivate food for their 
families.  Protracted wars were less frequent, some rare examples of long-term wars occurred 
between the Kagoro and the Ibos over “ill-treated travellers, stolen women and hunting 
accident”55.  Be that as it may, wars of pre-colonial Africa had attracted less attention. They 
were regarded as primitive and posing no threat to international peace and security. 
 
2.2.2 Colonial wars 
With the scramble for Africa came the occupation of vast areas of the continent by European 
colonizers. The partitioning of Africa occasioned the creation of African states and cleared the 
pathway towards its initiation into the international system of states.  Some of the consequences: 
the drawing of international frontiers, have remained an albatross around the continent ‘s neck, 
even long after the colonizers exit.  During colonial rule Africans either fought against any form 
of colonial occupation or fought for freedom from years of colonial domination. Dependent 
upon guerrilla warfare, a number of both state and stateless societies were known to have put 
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up tough resistance against colonial rule and indeed resolute in the fight to surrender to any 
form of defeat.  
 
Others persevered till the only option became to cede their homelands.  Emperor Menelik II in 
1896 battled and defeated the Italian intruders in Adwa.56 Although Ethiopia came under Italian 
rule for a short period between 1935 and 1941, Ethiopia succeeded in retaining its independence 
and regaining complete freedom from colonial domination.  Similarly, Samori Toure of the 
Wassoulou Empire, in what is today known as Guinea, using the scorched earth strategy, was 
accounted to have put up a gallant and long resistant fight against French occupation. 57 Other 
wars in the West African region transpired between the British and the Yoruba kingdom 1892-
189358 and the Sokoto Caliphate59 that capitulated in 1903 both in present day Nigeria, and the 
Benin Kingdom in 1897. In similar vein, both the British and French engaged in long duration 
battles to gain control over acephalous societies such as those of the Ibo of South –eastern 
Nigeria and the Tiv of Benue60 and Cote d’lvoire respectively. Other colonial wars of resistance 
in regions such as those of Angola and Somalia lingered on for yet another decade from 
commencement until defeat became imminent.   
 
2.2.3 Africa’s Liberation Wars  
By the time Africa was fully partitioned, another set of wars began to brew.  They were the 
wars of liberation from colonial conquest and exploitation.  For the most part, the transition 
from colonialism to African leadership, for many African states proved to have been a smooth 
one. Nonetheless, for a few others, independence could not be achieved on a platter of gold. 
Former Portuguese colonies Angola and Mozambique clinching on a decade later, Zimbabwe, 
Algeria, Kenya and South Africa were all to pay the price for independence on a platter of brutal 
and atrocious wars. 61Prior to European invasions, Africans possessed a distinct manner of 
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living: politically, socially, culturally and as already mentioned elsewhere, Africans had a 
pattern to warfare; those that to a large extent dictated the warriors conduct in times of war. 
Africa was endowed with culturally rich and diverse ethnic groups.  From as early as 16th 
century, it had exhibited trading skills with traders from across Europe.  Politically Africans 
coexisted either as confederated or decentralized societies. The coming of colonial rule 
introduced a way of life inconsistent with the values, norms and tradition known to indigenous 
African societies.   
 
Colonial leadership was most of all characterized by authoritarian rule, a system which 
disallowed for indigenous participation in most sectors of government.  Africans became 
educated in a new manner. They mirrored the mentality of their colonizers and relegated 
traditional knowledge to the background. it was the clash of two divergent political, social and 
cultural systems and the challenge to imbibe a new way of life coupled with years of 
exploitation and oppression which precipitated the nationalist quest for freedom. In Zimbabwe 
for example, years of oppression by white settlers triggered an armed struggle by both ethnically 
polarized Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU). Both movements had from 1964 fought against colonial oppression contingent upon 
guerrilla tactics. These attacks targeted white peasant farmers as well as settlers destroying both 
lives and property. Finally, in 1980 Zimbabwe embraced its freedom.62  
 
Algeria on its part had experienced complete marginalization and deprivation in the hands of 
French settlers.  By 1954 agitated nationalists began the push for freedom from colonialism. It 
resulted in Algeria’s war of liberation. It was organized by the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
and ended in 1962. After six long years, sovereignty was finally achieved but not without 
gruesome bloodletting.  The war, which was financially boosted by Algerians in Diaspora, had 
in exchange for the supposed joy of freedom, witnessed the extermination of about a million 
Algerians. 63  
 
In Similar manner, armed resistance for liberation from colonial rule in Kenya64 took the form 
of guerrilla warfare, it was popularly known as the 1952 Mau Mau uprising and lasted eight 
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long years till colonial military counter attacks caved in to pave way in 1960, for its 
independence. By the 1960s, the entire decolonization process had been concluded, with the 
exception of Portuguese colonies like Angola and Mozambique    
 
In Angola,65 it was complete war fought for 14 years against Portuguese rule.  The joint input 
of 3 major independence movements: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA)- Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, the Front for National Liberation of 
Angola (FLNA) and the National Union for Total independence, had produced the fruits of 
liberation in 1975. Armed resistance was similarly replicated in the case of Mozambique’s 
struggle against colonial rule. In 1964 precisely on the 25th of September, FRELIMO (the Front 
for the Liberation of Mozambique) began the war which led to its national freedom on the 25th 
of June 1975. It is the eruption of these kinds of wars around the 50s, in the African part of the 
third world, which prompted “new world” analyst to describe them as “guerrilla warfare” i.e.:  
Battles located in underdeveloped regions, which tend to amass local support for the task ahead 
and relies on the external to finance its mission of war.  
 
2.3 Post-colonial African conflicts  
With the decolonization phase of Africa’s history concluded, the continent made its supposed 
gallant entry into the post-colonial era and its first debut on the world stage of an international 
system of states. However, it seemed that the air of freedom had not yet come to stay, as Africa 
began to prepare itself for another round of conflicts. Commentators have argued that the 
continent had witnessed a derailing of the visions nursed in the battles for liberation.  Some 
claim the obvious was to be expected from the very nationalist who received grooming under 
the mentorship of its colonial masters. Kieh, in line with this assumption re-echoes Onimode 
as contending, that  
 
“The nature of the colonial disengagement from most of Africa… ensured that the 
independent state would become a neo-colonial state, in order to preserve the same basic 
colonial relationship of dominion and exploitation”.66  
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Africa seemed to be living in the shadows of the colonial era, cuddled to and driven by the 
models, which defined the era of colonialism.  Kieh confirms in Mbakus reflections, that  
“The rules adopted at independence were weak, inefficient and not designed to reflect 
African realities, needs, aspirations, interests and values”67  
 
thus, as Zeleza rightly observed:  
      “Independence had brought little respite from the ravages of war”.68   
Ellis corroborates this assertion, as he observes that a couple of years into independence a 
number of African states had commenced another kind of liberation struggle, these conflicts 
were hinged on armed resistance. Citing examples from the Chadian and Ugandan experience, 
he recounts the manner in which violence had engulfed the Chadian state up until around the 
early 80s when FROLINAT a local resistance movement led by Hissene Habre finally usurped 
power from Francois Tombalbaye, Chad’s first independence leader.  In like manner, Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda on the platform of the (NRA) National Resistance Army in Uganda was 
known to have been on the frontline to liberate the Ugandan state from the clutches of Idi 
Amin’s dictatorship.  The initiators of this second phase struggles he argues sought: 
“Freedom from the set of relationships known as neo-colonialism”69. It was a renewed struggle 
to gain national liberation from internal oppression effected by the visionless governance of the 
very nationalists who secured the freedom from colonial rule. 
  
Norrie MacQueen projects two fundamental underlying arguments that may have precipitated 
the unleashing of the spate of wars in post-colonial Africa.  These are embedded first in the 
arguments pioneered by dependency theorists.   While the dependency theory explains itself in 
a configuration where Africa as a result of western policies remains latched onto the economic 
garments of the global north, a separate underlying argument may be associated with the 
challenges of statehood.  Underlying assumptions depict statehood as a “western construct” 
vehemently opposed to African patrimonial systems, a system which supports patron clientele 
relationships. MacQueen posits that “these interconnected factors – economic dependency and 
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friction between underlying political culture and imposed form of governance produced a 
propensity for conflict throughout post-colonial Africa.”70   
 
The post independent scenario seemed to present a clash of two governing systems, one in 
which patrimonial arrangements proved inseparable from the tenets of genuine state building.  
Other analyst of both African and western orientations have argued out several other underlying 
factors responsible for the decades of conflict which besieged the continent in the aftermath of 
its independence.   Be that as it may, the objective of this chapter is to examine the context in 
which these conflicts may have erupted as well as explore some typologies of conflicts or wars 
that defined the post-colonial conflict terrain in Africa. 
 
2.2.5 Post- Colonial Conflict: Typologies 
By now it has become common knowledge at least to those conversant with peace and conflict 
studies that internal intra-state conflict has been on the increase since the end of the Second 
World War. A number of datasets give credence to this assertion. The Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research for example, documented the number of ongoing inter and 
intra-state conflicts in the year 2012. “The amount of intra-state conflicts increased from 303 
to 314, while the number of interstate conflicts decreased from 84 to 82. While five intra-state 
conflicts had ended in 2011, sixteen new domestic conflicts erupted in 2012, thereby marking 
an increase by eleven. “71 It concludes by suggesting that there had been an 80 percent increase, 
which was nothing short of the statistics from the previous years.   
They equally reported about the two most recent occurrences of inter-state conflict on sub-
Saharan soil, between Sudan and South Sudan majorly over the oil region of Heglig and those 
between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda contesting the control of Kivu.  
However, as catalogued by them, the same 2012 saw the conflict between the two Sudan de-
escalate from a full-blown war to violent crises. 72 There is therefore no gainsaying the fact that 
in contrast to the 17th and 18th centuries, the late 20th century has recorded an upshot in internal 
crisis.  
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Africa has indeed catalogued its own fair share of terminated and on-going internal conflicts. 
As I have narrated in preceding sections, the African continent whether directly or indirectly 
affected by war, cannot boast of knowing sustained peace, neither have the unabated 
occurrences of war helped to accelerate the level of development on the continent. The costs 
and consequences are burdening to the extent that it is hardly possible to turn a blind eye to 
their prevalence. In terms of the number of displaced persons, the flow of refugee, the outbreak 
of sickness and disease, and worse still, the spill over effect on neighbouring countries, leave 
enough to be imagined.  Observers would have thought that the breath of freedom from pre- 
independent oppression, spelt peace and stability. The reverse has since then been the case.  It 
is therefore in line to unearth the source and causes of these conflict eruptions or at least the 
underlying factors which unabatedly sow the seed of conflict within tribes, communities, 
societies or states, to the extent that they escalate and therefore precipitate international concern 
and third-party intervention. 
  
 Post-colonial wars have been internal in nature. They may be categorized as follows: a. 
secessionist wars, b. wars of devolution, c. irredentist wars, d. wars of regime change, e. wars 
of social banditry, f. armed Intercommunal insurrection.73 
 
2.2.4.1  Secession wars   
There have been a handful of African states- Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia to mentions a 
few, with the experience of war, that results from the strong desire of a group of people to 
disengage from an amalgamation initiated under colonial rule, to independence. Of them all, 
the most recent has been the secession of South Sudan from Sudan on July of 2011. Paul D. 
Williams has argued that the lumping of people together to create the forced coexistence of a 
heterogeneous group cannot be seen as accountable for the number of secession wars in Africa. 
74 Certain proximate factors tend to contribute to conflict eruption. However, on the ground 
experience in some cases indicate the reverse, as such forced living pose serious difficulties for 
a people with disparate orientation, culture, religion, norms and values. In other cases, it has 
provided the enabling environment for unruly leaders to exploit ethnic loyalties.  
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2.2.4.2  Irredentist wars   
In this case, it is not the intention of a group of people, who have found themselves citizens of 
a particular nation, to seek sovereignty nor become independent from an already existing state. 
Such people’s motivation is to be reunited to lost tribes or clans in a different country from the 
one in which they are habiting. These wars majorly accrue from issues of boundary. Although 
in 1964 there was a unanimous consensus by African leaders to accept each frontier as drawn 
since colonial times, some ethnic groups remain haunted by the very thought of being separated 
from their ancestral linkages in other countries. The yearning of Somalis in both Ethiopia and 
Kenya, to be reunited with their tribes in the Somalian state, evidences a typical example of 
irredentist wars. 
 
2.2.4.3  Wars of devolution  
These wars have occurred in Africa when a discontented and aggrieved group of people within 
a state, seek improvement in its general well-being and existence.  Under the circumstance 
access to power has more or less been denied them, to the extent that they seek political redress 
and equity in wealth distribution. A typical example was Sudan’s protracted conflict with the 
South, which at its height resulted in the secession of South Sudan from the north.  Long years 
of marginalization and deprivation culminated in renewed resurgence of conflict between the 
north and the south in 1983. It lingered till 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
was signed. This helped create quasi peace between the two adversaries till the South broke 
away in 2011.  
 
2.2.4.4  Wars of regime change:   
The manifestations of these kinds of wars in Africa can be ascribed to the contestation of an 
incumbent government’s legitimacy.  The resistance movements who initiate these wars as was 
typified during the initial years into the independence of both Chad and Uganda, seek liberation 
from what they perceive as internal oppression by the leaders to whom the state was bequeathed 
at independence.  Probably taking a cue from the success stories of Chad and Uganda, a host of 
other resistance movements have emerged in Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, in Somalia 
as well as in Ethiopia.  Contingent upon varied grievances, these movements seek the deposition 
 44 
of their country’s leadership.  However, as in the Somalian case, state disintegration and failure 
became the consequence of such resistance battles. 
Other kinds of violent eruptions manifesting tendencies to blow out of proportion have accrued 
from social unrests.  
 
According to Zeleza, the underpinning motivation is not that of  
“capturing state power… but of creating chaotic conditions that are conducive to 
predatory accumulation”75.  
Although such social disturbances hardly degenerate to complete warfare, if unchecked may 
result in unnecessary mayhem.   
 
2.2.4.5  Intertribal wars 
In similar manner, Intercommunal rivalries or as many prefer to address them, intertribal wars, 
have been on the increase especially since the early 90s. Rwanda, Darfur, Nigeria and a number 
of other African states have been witnesses to these kinds of wars. Like in the case of both 
Rwanda and Darfur, these kinds of violent rifts, are capable of effecting critical humanitarian 
conditions that attract international attention and military intervention 
 
2.3 Perspectives on the causes of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State  
Ethnic Diversity, a blessing or a curse? 
 
“There are no simple and easy explanations for the conflicts in Africa, and the theories that 
have been advanced are both numerous and contradicting”.76  
 
With these opening words from Ali Mazuri, I proceed to examine some underlying factors that 
have contributed to unstable times in postcolonial Africa. As will be examined subsequently, a 
host of commentators both Western and African alike, attribute conflicts of Post- colonial 
Africa to a number of causes. 
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A slew of scholarly works provides detailed analysis of conflicts in the postcolonial era. One 
school of thought surmises that the sources of Africa’s postcolonial wars accrue from its 
heterogeneous ethnic composition. This claim proved somewhat correct as a number of ethnic 
groups in the wake of Africa’s occupation, either became physically disconnected from their 
roots, i.e. ancestral homesteads or became lumped together. Being forced to co-exist within a 
single territorial space with groups possessing disparate customs and values. Arguing in line, 
Ali Mazuri posits that such arbitrary amalgamation, bound together diverse groups who had no 
“tradition of shared authority nor shared a similar system of dispute settlement”77.  
Interestingly, advocates of this line of argument postulate two underlying factors to corroborate 
the claim of a causal link between ethnic dissimilarity and violence in the post-colonial state. 
One the one hand, a high conflict propensity seems ineluctable under instances where 
contrasting ethnic groups coexist. On the other hand, historical explanations, presumably pre-
colonial ethnic hatreds substantiate the ethnic rivalry discourse.  Africa’s sub-Saharan ethnic 
configuration seemed to pose a significant example, especially as occurrences of ethnic rivalry 
became prevalent in the early postcolonial years. In the early 90s, ground evidences clearly 
portrayed acute ethnic contestations, also considering the lethal magnitude of their occurrence. 
Be that as it may, inverse proposition of this framework of analysis tends to debunk these views 
as utterly shallow and myopic. Analysts refute extreme provocations as derivatives of social 
diversity. In their opinion, they may be depicted as products of imperialist construction.  Havlik 
for example, perceived this as a colonial ploy. Re-echoing Snyder he holds that the strategy of 
pitting one ethnic group against the other, became tantamount to the advancement of imperialist 
goals. This was the case especially when certain ethnic groups posed some foreseeable threat 
to the colonial minority.78 Collier and Hoeffler on their part, suggest that the tendency for 
violence under heterogeneous configurations largely depends on the numerical strength of one 
group over the other. This interprets as 45 to 90 percent of the entire citizenry. 79 Henderson 
citing the two authors and illuminating on the above assertion further, holds, that the African 
states which may be predisposed to conflict eruptions on the platform of ethnic cleavage, may 
be identified as possessing:  
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“two relatively equal but distinct cultural groups accounting for most of the state’s 
population”. 80  
Moreover, they perceive a more compelling causal link between poverty and conflict; I.e. 
poverty may be a more exacerbating factor for the eruption of conflict in Africa, than the claims 
against its social diversity. They conclude that “social fractionalization, measured as religious 
and ethnic diversity lowers the risk of conflict”. In conclusion, Elbadawi and Sambanis found, 
that under the right economic and political atmosphere, the seeds of conflict might not have 
germinated on Africa’s soil in the first place. For them, Africa’s diverse composition is more 
of “a deterrent rather than a cause of civil war”81 
 
2.4 Africa’s weak institutional capacity 
The next school of thought blames violent eruption of conflicts in the early decades of the post-
colonial era, on the institutional legacies bequeathed to African nationalists on acceptance of 
leadership from the imperialist regime. This line of thinking traces Africa’s poor leadership 
sense and attendant instability and underdevelopment to colonialist selfish and exploitative 
policies of both exclusion and political repression and to a legacy characterized by a paucity of 
governing structures needed to bolster the emerging African states. These commentators insist 
that although pre-colonial African societies aligned more towards patrimonial tendencies, the 
idea of authoritarianism for example, may have stemmed from its colonial experience.  Thus, 
with the demise of the imperial regime, African leaders were abandoned without the self-
sufficiency to construct the real image of the Westphalian state.82 Araoye for example, claims 
that “the African state was designed by its foreign creators as an instrument for the articulation 
of the interest of hegemonic forces” arguing further, he stated that the lack of appropriate 
governing institutions on the part of the African state derives from the “patterns of engagement 
imposed on the state by their original colonizers”. He assertively concludes:  
“The major institutions of the post-colonial African state were designed to protect the interest 
of their colonizers rather than to serve the new state”.83   
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Commentators posit for one, that the idea of statehood and its management had proved to be a 
huge challenge with which African leaders had grappled in the early years. The idea of state 
building became a new phenomenon to which African leaders were found playing the games 
of trial and error. Leadership of the state was therefore carried out in the manner perceived by 
these new leaders to be most fitting.  George Klay Kieh, Jnr confirms in line with Araoye’s 
reflections, suggest that the colonial state was characterized by authoritarianism.  Colonial 
administrators had resorted to the use of coercion to achieve its parochial objectives. Africans 
were marginalized out of leadership positions while laws enacted where meant to be adhered 
to without considerations for the colonized. 84The mere exclusion of Africans from running the 
affairs of the colonial state could have been an indicator that the state was inherited by a bunch 
of inexperienced hands with a partial sense of state management. In reality, little was to be 
expected from these fledglings.  As they in turn, began to exert the same manner of brutal force 
on its populace, in order to maintain leadership status. The battle for legitimacy further 
precipitated the use, in Kiehs words of “divide and rule,”85 a tactics probably acquired during 
imperialist regime. He noted further, that this strategy was explored to foment trouble between 
constituent groups helping to exacerbate the already fragile nature of the new states.  
 
The pervasiveness of warfare more than four decades into independence stands to question the 
validity of these assertions. The saddening reality that long after the exit of colonialism the 
continent remains a zone of gross underdevelopment and instability seems to corroborate such 
claims of inherited weak or lacking institution.  In the unfolding decades, the hopes of onlookers 
may have been dashed when the continent failed to evolve into a near stable region, considering 
the existence of a number of African states with up to five decades experience of self-
governance. It seemed that the continent grappled with the creation of consistent and 
appropriate democratic institutions and processes to facilitate the full experience of statehood. 
Indeed, almost a farfetched venture with hope on the brink of collapse. Analysts have added 
that most African contemporary conflicts have remained some sort of “unfinished business” 
initiated right after the years of independence.  
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The aforementioned perceptions assume a more balanced form when Masilela recounting 
Fanon’s ideas, contends that African leaders themselves lacked the knowledge to pursue the 
appropriate “ideology”86. A clear ideology constitutes an important ingredient in building 
nations from societies characterized by diversity. It may probably suggest the reason why 
Henderson contends that independent African governments not only faced the challenge of 
building suitable institutional apparatuses for state governance, but also seemed deficient in the 
relevant skills and expertise required for the additional task of nation building.87 This burden 
which may have outstretched the capability of the newcomers in the arena of the international 
system of states, proved also to be a tough terrain for today’s developed nations. Nonetheless, 
reference is made to the fact that these conflicts were precipitated as well by “domestic factors.” 
Citing Stedman Henderson concludes that the origin of these conflicts may be traced to “the 
policies pursued by elites to gain and consolidate power”. Araoye further suggest that the 
inability of nationalist to realize the significance of the binary task of “nation and state building” 
engendered a sense of regional consciousness over national loyalty and in turn precipitated the 
use of ethnic identity as a platform for the creation of societal instability.  Although the 
aforementioned assumptions of conflict etiologies in Africa’s early postcolonial landscape 
cannot be totally dismissed as irrelevant and unsubstantial to the entire discourse, they equally 
represent over simplistic views of why independent African states imploded in the early decades 
of post-colonialism.  
 
A plethora of authors have further investigated thoroughly into these matters. They conclude 
that ethno-linguistic or political factors in isolation of other causal factors cannot exhaustively 
encapsulate the underlying sources of post-colonial conflicts. On the platform of further probing 
therefore, other conjectures connecting to political and economic factors88 provide a near 
comprehensive analysis and a deeper understanding especially of the salient issues associated 
with civil conflicts in African states in the aftermath of colonialism.  It is against this backdrop 
that I intend to examine, in the next section, some of the pertinent considerations in the entire 
rhetoric of post-colonial African conflicts.  
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2.5 Reflections within the context of Post-Colonial Conflicts 
 
“…The crisis in the post-colonial states began almost immediately as these political 
units emerged by fiat in the global inter-state system as independent political actors 
claiming the attributes of statehood and its implied sovereignty”89 
In this section I intend to rely on the intellectual reflections of a number of authors, to delineate 
those significant aspects surrounding African conflicts in the early decades of post- colonialism.   
The opening assertion from Araoye confirms assertively that Africa has since known no respite 
but continued to ravage in gruesome internal complexities, identified to have commenced 
immediately after, and extending into the years of independence. A number of African states: 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Liberia, and 
Ethiopia for example, had begun to experience intense violence in the unfolding years after the 
exit of their respective colonial administrators.  
Angola: 
The conflict in Angola for instance, which had basically flourished on the platform of 
superpower rivalry, had not fully terminated in the aftermath of the cold war and subsequent 
withdrawal of both America and the Soviets support to respective ideologically coupled armed 
movements. The conflict had lingered into the early years after its liberation from Portuguese 
administrators effectuating a deeper corrosion of relations among the diverse ethnic groups 
extant in Angola’s newly created independent state.  Angola had remained entangled in such 
prolonged internal instability orchestrated by its two warring factions: MPLA and UNITA. 
Both adversaries had become submerged in a heated contest over power, one that endured for 
nearly three decades into its early years of sovereignty.  
Nigeria: 
Seven years into independence, Nigeria became engulfed in a civil war lasting three years. 
Claims of marginalization by the Ibos in the southeast had culminated in the desire to seek the 
sovereignty of the “Biafran” people from the newly created Nigerian state.   
Insurgent rivalry in Chad was to be held accountable for the long years of unrest in the aftermath 
of its independence from French imperialism.90   
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Ethiopia: 
The Ethiopian state also struggled to keep its head above troubled waters, as the region of 
Ogaden bequeathed to Ethiopia by the British in 1954 generated violent confrontations. The 
conflict emerged over territorial ownership between both Somalia and Ethiopia and intensified 
with claims of ethnic affiliations.   
DRC: 
The Democratic Republic of Congo in the wake of its independence experienced similar inter-
ethnic violent aggression stoked by Belgian manipulative strategy towards selfish 
aggrandizement. The conflict had persisted three decades into its Independence 91.  
Sudan: 
The Sudan, whose western region: Darfur, remains the analytical focal point in this thesis, for 
its history of prolonged violence, is not forgotten among the number of African states recorded 
to have experienced turmoil in the early years of independence. In fact, starting from the end 
of colonisation in 1956 and predicated on a number of complex realities, the Sudan has failed 
to embrace complete stability regardless of the secession of the southern part from the north in 
July 2011. By the early 1990s the Sudan had witnessed two catastrophic wars. Darfur’s war has 
intermittently gained momentum since its initial eruption in 2003.To a large extent, these 
examples portray the turbulence that had characterized and engulfed the African terrain shortly 
after independence.  A number of the afore mentioned African states remain polarized along 
ethnic and religious lines. However, as examined in previous chapters, propositions linking the 
eruptions of violent conflicts in Africa to ethno-linguistic or political fragmentations have long 
been debunked. The question as to why these states imploded at the very time they did, remain 
multifaceted and beyond the scope of this study.   
 
Unearthing a number of root causes 
Henderson amongst other authors has conducted a study into the underlying roots of conflicts 
in Africa. Against strong empirical observation, Henderson tested a number of salient variables 
strongly associated with the outbreak of internal conflicts in the post-colonial era. Causative 
factors range from excessive military spending and semi-democratic governance to 
underdevelopment, colonial legacy and cultural cleavage.  The author avers that Africa’s 
internal wars are traceable largely to the political colonial legacy inherited by her leaders in 
wake of independence.  His model tests the propensity for war in African states colonized by 
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the French, British or Portuguese. His conclusion: “non-French colonies were less prone to 
conflict in comparison to other colonies. This argument hinged on the system of governance of 
each of these colonial administrations. The British indirect rule for example, precipitated deep 
ethnic consciousness. In most cases, fractionalized societies were transferred to leaders bereft 
of sufficient experience to produce successful and viable independent states. Colonial legacy 
he avers: 
“Left a destructive legacy that had a deleterious impact on African state building and 
nation building initiatives”.92  
 
African leaders faced the dual challenge of building a cohesive state from amongst its extant 
diversity, and in a number of states experiencing colonially instigated fragmentized ethnic 
groups, it was confronted with the responsibility also, of instituting functioning state 
machinery, to put in check activities of dissent groups or aggrieved parties. The required 
instruments for the resolution of conflict were notably found lacking.  Although a number of 
emergent states across third world countries had experienced similar challenges, Henderson 
posits that African leaders were specifically saddled with the obligation to actualize this task 
“simultaneously” 93The incapacity to concurrently conquer the dual obligation and buttressed 
by failed policies became the fertile soil on which the seeds of internal wars geminated.  Even 
after the departure of the colonial regime, a number of African states maintained a somewhat 
exploitative relationship with their former colonizers, an action that plunged the state into 
deeper decadence.  
   
Fondo Sikod found that in the early post-colonial years a number of African states witnessed 
an intense period of coup d’état more often traceable to the prolonged stay of power drunk 
leaders in office and the attendant:  
“lack of freedom and opportunity for the people to express themselves and  
change leadership through the ballot box”. 
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The consequence according to the author was the formation and proliferation of rebel activity 
or the performances of coups that positioned the military at the centre of authority. 94  The 
militarization of several African states thus contributed to gross internal instability. Military 
leaders ostensibly deviated from the vision of actualizing a progressive state.  Clearly, such 
leadership was characterized by myopic and dictatorial ideology and exacerbated by excessive 
military expenditure, usually to secure and maintain their most often corrupt grip on the mantle 
of leadership. The resultant effect: a decaying economy, downward turn towards 
underdevelopment and an upsurge in the poverty levels of its citizenry.  
 
A large number of African states have continued to suffer under the burden of huge debts 
accrued during these military regimes. The poverty level of its citizenry and most especially of 
youths whose hope for a decent means of survival usually come crashing as a result, has equally 
given room for the easy conscription into insurgent groups whose involvement have either been 
described as quest for equity or the selfish desire for personal gain.  In similar vein, the already 
conflagrant terrain was seen to have taken a turn for the worse as African states suddenly 
assumed geo-strategic importance to hegemonic ideological power rivalry. Most times the 
Super power support for such repressive leadership heightened tensions and with their 
withdrawal, reignited a hitherto suppressed discontent against the governing authority and 
violent aggression, construed as ethnically motivated. 
 
In furtherance of considerations within the postcolonial context, I shall at this juncture rely on 
Ademola Araoye, author to the 2014 published literature titled “sources of conflict in the post-
colonial African state.”  
He provides in-depth background information to the root of Africa’s dilemmas.  However, the 
main reason for identifying his study as significant to this work stems from the fact that his line 
of argumentation aligns with the underlying causal factors associated with the ongoing conflict 
in Darfur. 
Araoye’s tends to re-echo the opinion of authors already mentioned in this chapter. His views 
nonetheless are presented from a slightly diverging angle.    He reaffirms in the following 
statement that: 
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 “the crisis in the post-colonial African states began almost immediately as these 
political units emerged by fiat in the global interstate system as independent political 
actors claiming the attributes of statehood and its implied sovereignty”. 95  
 
The inference, which may be made from this statement, is that African societies were hardly 
ready for a “western model” of statehood and therefore lacked the requisite for state success.  
The disorderliness and concurrent devastation in which the African state found and continues 
to find itself traces back to its acceptance into the international system of states, and as he 
reemphasizes originates from “the pattern of engagement imposed on the state by their original 
colonizers” 96such institutions as already highlighted were geared not towards the advancement 
of the African states but became nurtured for the benefit of imperialist activity.   
 
The author discovers the missing brick in the series of assumptions surrounding the discourse 
on post-colonial African conflict and argues that the over flogged state centric 
conceptualizations of the characteristics of conflicts in the post-colonial state, tends to blur a 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play on the African conflict terrain, especially 
since the state assumed the status of independence.  He illuminates the readers mind beyond 
the usual perception which causally links African conflicts to internal political deficiencies 
exhibited by the state and its corollaries.  
It seems that the defining features of the postcolonial state poses great challenges to the state 
as well as impedes its natural development.  The African state which had thrived for centuries 
on its unique and distinct systems for social co-existence and cohesion, is confronted with the 
challenge to merge pre-existing (pre-colonial) “indigenous” structures with those imposed on 
it by the international system of states. One the one hand, pre-colonial African states are 
deficient in those characteristic features superimposed on the international system of states by 
the Westphalian conception of statehood and the  
“ very nature of the post-colonial African state is under theorized… The post-colonial African 
state is treated just like every other state in the global inter-state system, even if most of its vital 
attributes and internal dynamics, including the logic governing its internal and external 
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security and role in the international system, deviate significantly from those of the original 
Westphalian state” 97.  
 
One the other hand the “interconnectedness of conflicts” which derives from the nagging reality 
of ethnic and cultural affiliations spread across the frontiers of a number of African states plays 
a salient role in the explication of Africa’s post-colonial conflicts.  This line of thought tends 
to reemphasize the impact of colonial frontiers on the entire postcolonial African history. 
Amidst efforts to downplay the consequences thereof, the repercussions accrued from such 
actions have continued to resonate.    His study stresses the imperativeness for postcolonial 
conflict causative factors to be interfaced with “extra-territorial or transnational linkages.  These 
linkages capture those ideas embedded in the “tribes, clans or religious faiths” phenomenon 
which tends to defy the sacredness of sovereign territories to meddle in the affairs of states 
where known loyalties of “tribes, clans or religious faiths” are evident.   Some examples are 
evident in Sudan’s neighbouring Chad or of Somalis spread across Ethiopian and Kenya.    
This hitherto missing aspect he opines tends to provide clarity and deep comprehension of 
conflicts in the postcolonial African state.  Such that post-colonial conflicts are no longer 
construed as merely internally driven but as bearing in Araoye’s words an “intermestic” 
character understood as the interplay of internal and external issues as reflected in the exact 
words quoting the author: 
 
“The conflicts in Angola, linked communities and elicited partisan influences if not 
interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville and Zambia. The Crisis 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo implicates active interested parties in Rwanda, Burundi, 
Angola, Uganda, Congo Brazzaville, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The irredentism in Casamance 
in Senegal cannot be treated in isolation of developments in the Gambia, Guinea Bissau and 
Guinea Conakry. The transnational complexities of the conflicts that, on the face of it look 
internal to post-colonial African states points at the structural incongruities of the post-colonial 
state as well as of the inter-state system constituted by those states”98 
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In precise terms therefore, post-colonial conflicts have derived from two major sources -
domestic actors working in tandem with actors of perceived shared identity across territorial 
sovereign frontiers and external international actors seeking to maintain dominance over 
erstwhile territorial domains. 
 
The post-colonial African state also found itself plagued by a number of conflicts emanating 
from issues of disparate religious inclinations.  Worldviews originating from either Islam or 
Christianity and handed down to the post-colonial state, has more often plunged the African 
state into periods of instability and unrest, as adherents dwelling within what Araoye calls the 
same “political space”99 lack the needed tolerance to appreciate and respect each groups values, 
thus resulting in a “dissonance of values”100.  Where each group views its own values as 
superior to the other and in most cases, seek to forcefully proselytize members of other believes 
or superimpose on them codes of conduct or values that are counter to those of the other group. 
Such issues if inadequately handled have the propensity to disintegrate whole states, as 
witnessed by nations like the Sudan prior the South’s secession in 2011 and Nigeria viewed to 
be on the brink of disintegration. The northern regions of both nations have been historically 
predominated by Muslims compared to a larger Christian population in the south.  In like 
manner, the unity of the Nigerian state seems threatened by a “dissonance of values”101 deriving 
from divergent worldviews observable between the north and the south.  
   
2.6 Post-cold war conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
In preceding sections, I attempted an examination of those salient issues which tended to 
dominate the discourse on violent escalations of conflicts in the sub- Saharan African region, 
specifically in the early years of post-colonialism. This section delves into another significant 
phase in African history. Analyst, scholars and commentators delineate an era where during the 
apogee years of the early 90s, conflicts were characterized as some of the bloodiest of internal 
conflicts ever known to the continent. 102  Did the kinds of conflicts experienced in the post-
cold war era mutate when compared with those of early post colonialism? Did they display any 
unique features?  The myriad of scholarship in this regard attests to a continuum in 
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contemporary postcolonial years, of those underlying factors that contributed to violent internal 
conflicts in the immediate aftermath of colonial imperialism. 103 This highpoint in conflict 
eruptions lasted for a few years. It then gave way to a declining tendency, so that analysts and 
scholars documenting that phase, describe the occurrence of conflicts in for example Ethiopia, 
Angola, the Congo, Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia as a period in African history where the most 
heinous crimes, such as the one in the Rwandan state in the early 90s, had been committed. 104 
The nagging question remains nonetheless, as to why that era became the climax point for the 
occurrence of violent internal conflicts in a good number of states on the continent.   
 
Scholars like Collier and Hoeffler had attributed them to political causes. They maintained, that 
Africa’s daunting conflict scenarios were causally linked to economic causes. The authors 
dismiss blatantly, claims of ethnicity and religious diversity as undergirding factors with the 
propensity to engender conflict. I will explore the claim which based on the “greed grievance” 
thesis assumes that conflicts are conducted on the basis of greed as opposed to propositions 
from political scientists whose grievance thesis embedded in underlying inequality, political 
repression, discontentment provides the causal relationship between grievance and the eruption 
of conflicts on the continent.  
   
2.6.1 A plethora of conflicts in post-cold war Africa: Economic causes? 
Around the late 1990s while the flames from escalated conflicts across Africa continued to rage, 
two World Bank economists sought to deviate from the popular scholarship surrounding the 
causes of internal conflicts. They examined diverse motivations for the endemic outbreak of 
conflicts on the continent. Against the assumption that African conflicts-with special emphasis 
on the sub-Saharan region, were invincibly rooted in political underlying factors, the duo tended 
to underscore the need to recognize what for them were substantial indications that the 
emergence of the region’s conflicts was undoubtedly linked to economic factors.  Specifically, 
they negated political scientist postulations assuming a higher proclivity to conflicts in 
ethnically diversified societies than homogenous ones.  
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Theirs was a thesis that demonstrated a complete rebuttal of ethnically induced conflicts. It 
basically drifted towards economically underpinned motivations. Both authors underscored a 
reduction in the propensity towards conflict in societies with palpable ethnic and religious 
divisions.  They averred similarly, that there are interactions between a country’s moderate to 
high dependence on natural resources and the outburst of conflict. Also, rebellion becomes 
appropriate based on the underlying revenue, which ostensibly accrues from the initiation of 
rebel activity.  Given the asymmetrical characteristic feature of conflicts since the end of the 
Second World War, both writers insist that rebellion against a sitting government may occur, if 
compared to the costs which accrue from rebellion, higher benefits of “secession or state capture 
“are foreseen.   
Secession for example became a most plausible motivation for rebellion when the state was 
seen as rich in resources. Having tested their thesis upon four variables of income, population, 
amount of natural resources and ethno-linguistic diversity, their conjectures presumably 
provided the missing link as enumerated below and perhaps policy recommendation on the best 
approach to international intervention in Africa and the search for a sustainable end to wars on 
the continent. 
1. Civil wars were overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low-income countries  
2. Countries with larger population have a higher risk of war and these wars last longer 
3. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization poses no greater risk of conflict to its societies. 
4. They indicated a higher inclination to conflict especially based on resource wealth. 
In summary, they contended that Africa’s hideous wars were traceable to the level of abject 
poverty extant on nearly the entire continent.  
 
In 2000 and 2006 the dyad made even greater claims to prior assumptions of discernible 
linkages between African conflicts and underlying economic causes. At the time of a 
subsequent update on their initial findings, intra-state conflicts had become more of the rule 
than the exception. The sub-Saharan region now played host to a number of escalations in 
several locations across Africa.  
 
In a developing update, they introduced the” rational choice model of greed-rebellion 
model”105. Based on their investigation, a greater propensity to conflict as predicated on greed 
factors of financial and military gain can be envisaged. Rebels tend to conceal their greed-
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motivated rebellion under some forged grievance. When such groups eventually capture power, 
they may turn out worse than the government they intend to depose. 106  In like manner, there 
is almost zero correlation between the grievance factors, corollary undergirding assumptions of 
inequality, political oppression, ethnic cum religious polarity, and the outburst of conflict.  The 
presence of a certain amount of primary export commodity became for them a high motivator 
towards the readiness to conduct conflict.107  Recruitment into rebellion is enhanced in poor 
countries with high rates of unskilled persons and particularly young men between the ages of 
15 and 24 years of age.108 Should such countries lack the capacity to provide an attractive 
substitute to deter the preference for involvement in violent activities, a higher risk towards 
rebellion cannot be overruled.  
 
Collier and Hoeffler made recommendations towards achieving a sustainable end to conflicts 
on the continent: the pursuit of economic development. Their thesis appeared to have become 
creditable among policy makers, as African countries grew more and more dependent on loans 
and aid from the west.  In similar vein, the greed theory seemed to have found strong 
endorsement in the African sub-Saharan region as the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, 
Angola and Darfur manifested the purported features of greed motivated violence by jobless 
youths, whose activities palpably negated the quest for social justice. David Keen agrees with 
Collier and his colleagues when he quotes Carl von Clausewitz as stating that war “has 
increasingly become the continuations of economics by other means, on his part; he confirms 
the quotation by positing:  
“… war is a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection”  
The validity of the “ancient hatreds” argument and its linkage to “the violent eruption of conflict 
is therefore questioned.  Keen disputes arguments that allude to the outburst of conflict among 
“a people who have lived in peace for longer periods.” 109  
Soysa reinforces the argument further by contending that countries experiencing scarcity would 
be less prone to conflict than those endowed with some proportion of abundance. In his opinion, 
conflicts re-emerge on account of the underlying and perceived opportunities for financial gain, 
regardless of the grave accompanying humanitarian catastrophes by which define these 
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conflicts.110 Although the author claims to corroborate his argument from a social science 
perspective, it leaves his readers wondering what to make of the “human needs theory”. How 
do you explain human response to deprivation? How do humans react when forced to languish 
under distributional inequality and a total disregard cum insensitivity to the basic human needs? 
This is not to suggest that all grievance triggered by deprivation must lead to violent conflicts, 
yet humans require some channel to be heard.    
 
A case in point is that of the Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria. There is no gainsaying the 
obvious trend that multinational oil companies constantly derive profit from the natural 
endowment of the region, which is oil. These profit-oriented corporations make little returns to 
the community in terms of development. At the same time and on account of their drilling 
activities, the means of sustenance available to able-bodied young men is sabotaged. Sadly, the 
entire situation is aggravated by government’s gross insensitivity and failure to protect the 
community against external exploitation, coupled with the incapacity to provide social security 
to serve as some form of cushioning effect. Under the scenario what would be expected of 
young energetic men whose means of survival is under jeopardy? How best do the youth 
respond to disenfranchisement in an environment where elite aggrandizement is equally the 
order of the day? After all an entire community cannot seek greener pastures in foreign lands. 
Should rebellions that accrue from such inconsideration be swiftly dismissed as motivated by 
economic agendas, or more precisely by criminal agendas, greed or the opportunity to loot oil?   
 
Regardless of whether these postulations hold an iota of fact or not, the issue remains that 
deprivation and discontent have the tendency to beget violent manifestations of various forms, 
and these do not exclude conflict and rebellion.  After all, Gurr two decades before the upsurge 
of the 90s, expounded the “relative deprivation theory” Defining it as the:   
“The discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they actually think 
they get.”111  
He alluded to the probability of violent expressions based on “prolonged” deprivation. Indeed, 
a number of the escalated conflicts on the continent, record long histories of one form of 
discontentment cum grievance or the other. Some grievances over decades of 
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disenfranchisement were traceable to the years of imperialism, they further stretched into 
present day autocratic and repressive regimes.  Seen from a divergent angle nonetheless, it 
should also be established that when some writers commit to paper, they project arguments 
nicely put together from an outsider perspective. In so doing, they demonstrate scant knowledge 
of the web of complex dynamics that precipitate the outbreak of the conflicts.  
 
2.6.2 Counter Perspectives…  
Arowobusoye for example, provides a divergent opinion based on occurrences in the West 
African region. The arguments underlying the greed thesis are in his view “reductionist” and 
utterly undermine the realities of those involved in conflicts.112  
His position aligns with Ballentine and Nitzschke viewpoint.  The writers suggest an inherent 
inappropriateness in conjecturing combatant motivation based on mathematical theories. The 
entire political economy analysis seems to remarkably concentrate on rebel activity, while 
neglecting the role of government as is evident in a number of cases.113 Arguing accordingly, 
Murshed and Tadjoeddin cite Humpherys analysis of the greed thesis.  He insists that Colliers 
postulations linking rebel activity to some form of hidden economic agenda, has failed to 
critically examine greed from yet another angle. The floodlights tend to exonerate the greedy 
outsider.  He states as follows:  
“The existence of natural resources may be an incentive for third parties-states and 
corporations -to engage in or indeed foster civil conflict”.114  
In fact, for the duo, neither of the two main underlying factors putatively responsible for African 
conflicts, seems sufficient to justify the eruptions of violent conflicts. Arowobusoye does not 
see it differently, in fact he underscores the importance of factoring in the “international 
dimension”. In his opinion, scholars have paid greater attention to the “supply side” of natural 
resource while overlooking the “demand side”.  He caps it up by insisting that diamond 
consumption is minimal on the continent and Africa produces less of the arms with which it 
fights its wars.115  
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Grant, examining the Sierra Leonean context insists on an analysis that delineates the so called 
underlying financial agendas in Africa’s civil wars, as efforts towards societal transformation, 
and in search of liberations from political oppression, economic inequality and marginalization 
traceable to the era of imperial administration.  A rebel-centric analysis of Africa’s war 
causality amounts to a complete misrepresentation of the interconnected factors at the root of 
its wars.  Deviating from Colliers stance on heterogeneous societies and a lesser risk of 
conflicts, Grant maintains that within the Sierra Leonean context “the ethnicity factor cannot 
be ignored”. More so, a closer examination of the Sierra Leonean situation, indicates the 
interplay of diverse actors; this evidently vitiates a central focus on greed motivated rebellion, 
which is purportedly made feasible by the opportunities rebels perceive may be derivable from 
the availability of lootable natural resources. 116 In fact, an explanation of the causes of conflicts 
in sub-Saharan Africa especially after the termination of the cold war, which consistently links 
violent eruptions to some group of criminals seeking to trigger conflicts within naturally 
endowed states, based on the accumulation of some envisaged financial benefit, seems far from 
the truth.  Findings based on qualitative research showed that between 1946 and 2005, of the 
twenty conflicts putatively linked to diamonds around the world, only the conflicts in Sierra 
Leone (1991-2002) and Angola (1993-2002) occurring after the 90s and in sub-Saharan Africa, 
were depicted to have had compelling links to diamonds. 117   
 
Investigating closely, Paul Williams insists that it is misleading to describe both conflicts as 
originating from either RUF (Revolutionary United Front) or UNITA’s rapacious motives to 
amass wealth from diamonds.  In actual fact, diamonds did not cause either of the wars; instead 
they served the dual purpose of sustaining an already erupted war, as well as provided 
justification for the expression of grievance traceable to the unequal apportionment of 
diamonds-accrued revenue. Substantiating the grievance claim, Grant draws attention to the air 
of resentment and discontent, which had beclouded the Sierra Leonean state especially tracing 
back to the colonial era.  Subsequent years of autocratic and corrupt leadership were equally 
said to have instigated the violent eruptions of the 90s. As it were, this was literarily 
comprehended as the long overdue expression of anger and frustration on the part of its 
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citizenry. At the most, predatory interests far from depict the core motivation for war in Sierra 
Leone, instead the country’s lootable natural resource, (diamond) had contributed the 
protraction of that conflict.118 
  Indeed, in the case of Angola, the detection of diamonds since 1912 and its exploitation dating 
back to the 1930s, had remained inconsequential to the understanding of conflict, until 
protagonists of the fresh conflicts of 1992, began seeking new avenues to sustain their violence. 
The Cold War’s termination had engendered Angola’s geo-political irrelevance, spawned the 
corollary withdrawal of all political and economic support and set in motion an alleged self-
financing mechanism.119  
 
Abdalla Bujra arguing from his standpoint contends that the surge in cases of internal conflicts 
could not have occurred in a void; he observes some major issues as enumerated below. He 
posits that these underlying factors, prepared the ground for the conflicts of the 1990s. If indeed 
his claims are to be counted as valid and strong, then the arguments from the World Bank 
economists may not be easily regarded as unfounded.  The eruptions of conflicts and corollary 
rebellion may have been a backlash against the untold economic hardship that befell the African 
people on account of stringent programs introduced by western financial institution to 
supposedly enable African states to surmount the threats of complete economic collapse.   
Put differently economic hardship effectuated by declining economies may have produced 
more jobless people and probably the larger number being youths, who as suggested by Collier 
et al, become easy prey for recruitment into rebellious groups.120   
 
Although the first issue observed by Bujra has overtime become a readily acceptable argument 
linked to the occurrence of conflict after the cold war, items 2-7 suggest other issues that should 
be seriously considered.   
1. The withdrawal of financial and military support that had bolstered authoritarian 
African governments. 
2.  The rapid globalization of the world trade, the tightening of loans, the dependence of 
African countries on private investment and the non-competitiveness of most African 
economies 
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3. The imposition by the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund) on African 
economies of tough political conditionality: democratization and good governance. 
4. The increasing role of many different types of organizations, both foreign and local, in 
monitoring the governance and human rights record of African governments especially 
in situations of tension and conflicts.  
5. The effects of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the attendant rise in poverty 
in both urban and rural areas. An increase in population and a resultant heightening of 
tensions deriving from competition over depleting resources.  
6. The proliferation and easy access to small arms. Small arms acquired from international 
arms dealers and or from the rebellions of the 70s and 80s of for example Uganda and 
Mozambique as well as from African arms dealers. 
7. The unresolved issues of the 80s, emerging ones from the 90s all contributing to a 
volatile environment in the aftermath of the cold war. 
 
In reaction to item 3, African scholars in particular, insist that the relationship between African 
economies and the aforementioned western financial institutions have engendered greater levels 
of poverty on the continent. While the objective was to facilitate a declining tendency in the 
rate of poverty, the reverse seemed the case as nations sunk into deeper penury. The 
mismanagement of such loans by a number of African head of states was allegedly to blame.  
Unfortunately, the citizenry has borne the brunt of such mismanagement, as economic adversity 
tends to define and over burden the everyday life of the ordinary man.  The tendency to produce 
resentment and discontent and the propensity towards volatile environments and subsequent 
implosion under the circumstance cannot be entirely ruled out.   
 
Ohanwe insists similarly, that the ordinary Congolese continues to suffer hardship on account 
of Mobutu’s squandering of IMF and World Bank loans amounting to $8.5 billion. 
Mozambique in its early post conflict phase also exemplifies the level of poverty that may 
accrue from the strain of repaying IMF loans. As documented by the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Debt Initiative in 1998, Mozambique’s debt accumulation had reached $ 5.62 billion. 
Similarly, as at 1998, the country according to UNDP documentation, ranked 166th out of 174 
countries in terms of Human Development. Yet at that level of poverty, the country continued 
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to languish under the intense heat of a 20 percent debt repayment, which it generated from 
exportation.121  
 
A closer look at item 5 suggests the creation of conflict prone environments based on austerity 
measures such as the SAP (Structural Adjustment Policy) as introduced to developing third 
world nations like those in Africa, by the IMF and World Bank. Attendant policies such as 
privatization, currency devaluation and deregulation aimed basically at a total restructure of the 
economy as well as a reduction in inflation and standard of living, have inadvertently but 
certainly contributed to increased levels of hardship, poverty and instances of uprisings which 
although have not been documented as degenerating into violent armed conflicts, but which 
exhibited discernible tendencies to blow out of proportion and into high level security 
dilemmas.  For example, it was noted that during the tenure of Kenneth Kaunda, between 1985 
and 86, Zambia’s mining region also known as its Copperbelt province, witnessed a number of 
riots on account of IMF introduced policies. In 1981 uprisings that were in some ways an upshot 
of such austerity measure was noted to have occurred in the Central African Republic and 1988 
and 1989 in the West African region of Nigeria 122   
 
That been said, other writers have taken a near emphatic stance to attest to some correlation 
between the introduction of austerity measures in Africa and the onset in some ways, of the 
violent eruptions of the 1990s in Africa.  For example, Arowobusoye refers to Chossudovsky 
as suggesting, against the popular belief of an underlying “ancient hatred” some linkage 
between IMF and World Bank economic reformations policies and the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. The removal of economic bolsters was accounted to have adversely affected the 
Rwandan economy and coinciding with the period of a drastic decline in the international coffee 
market. The entire economic crisis resulted in the devaluation of the country’s currency as well 
as created for its citizenry harsh living conditions, which the author believes, contributed to and 
engendered the hatred upon which the genocide was conducted.123  
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Andrew Grant observes some link between SAP’s negative impact, gross mismanagement on 
the part of Strasser’s government and the war in which the country became embroiled around 
the 90s. The discontent that ensued had initially encouraged local support for what became one 
of sub-Saharan Africa’s most notorious rebel group- RUF.  The resultant domino effect, cannot 
be attributed majorly to some underlying vested interest on the part of RUFs hardliners but as 
Grant opines occurrences as evidenced by the implosion of the Sierra Leonean state, are in 
many ways ascribable to the “political and economic marginalization of the Sierra Leonean 
people, languishing under the weight of a colonially inherited repressive and clientelistic 
system of governance.”124 The implosions of the 90s were most probably a sign that the 
continent was ripe for a “ reordering of its societies”125 or as transformation scholars prefer to 
envision, ready for some transformative “change”.    
 
Conclusion 
In recent history, writers have become overly polarized on the underlying causes of conflicts in 
Africa at the end of the bipolar rivalry around the late 80s.  The larger majority contends 
nonetheless that the conflicts, which occurred in the aftermath of the cold war, were being 
induced by a number of issues. They were a combination of political, social and economic 
factors. In concrete terms scholars surmise that they included the struggle over depleting 
resources, they were conflicts among religious identities, inequality, ethnic intolerance and 
repressive governments to mention a few.  While these conflicts became similar in nature, 
having originated from within the frontiers of these nations, they also possessed unique 
features:  they were fought on different terrains on the continent, for a myriad of contrasting 
underlying factors and divergent triggers, seen to have uniquely distinguished one from the 
other.  On account of such development, a number of scholars have disproved the scholarship 
in the habit of stereotyping   post-cold war African conflicts and therefore lacking the academic 
prowess to take into cognizance contextual underlying motivations, which as is historically 
evident diverge in most of the conflict scenarios across the African continent.  To this effect, 
scholars like Adedeji have stressed that: 
“…Africa is a vast and varied continent made up countries and specific histories and 
geographical conditions as well as uneven levels of economic development. The causes 
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of conflicts in Africa reflect the continent’s diversity and complexity. While some causes 
are purely internal and portray specific sub-regional dynamics, others have a 
significant international dimension. …”126 
As a final note, suffice it to say that the domestic constitution of conflicts occurrences within 
the African state was seen to be in alignment with the rising trend of intra-state conflicts in 
regions around the world. Report in the year 2000 of the trend in major armed conflicts by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, showed that out of 25 major armed conflicts, 
23 where intra-state while two met the description of interstate rivalry.  Also, of the 57 major 
armed conflicts recorded between 1990and 2001, all excluding 3 were described as internal 
conflicts.  In its year 2002 Yearbook, it was quoted to have said: “…Africa is the most conflict-
ridden region with the greatest number of conflicts” 127 Although the conflicts of the 1990s 
were unequivocally internal to their host state, they in addition, displayed the ferocious 
tendency to engender regional insecurity based on across border spillages, constituting huge 
refugee problems and in some cases attracting international concern on account of human 
violations and complex humanitarian conditions.  
 
Be that as it may, there is no gainsaying the fact that Africa recorded tumultuous times in the 
aftermath of the cold war. The search for stable peace continues to elude it. Although Collier 
and other rational theory scholars remain adamant about an apparent correlation between 
African conflicts and the greed thesis, scholarship prior to the end of the war on ideology, drew 
conclusions from divergent perspectives such as have been depicted by Edward Azar’s 
analytical framework on Protracted Social Conflict.  
In delving into the author’s thesis, the dissertation underscores one nagging feature of conflicts 
in sub-Saharan Africa: prolonged violence, protractedness or intransigence as the case may be. 
The discussion is significant to understanding the characteristic feature of the dissertation’s 
case study: Darfur and the underlying causative factors that may apply to the conflict in 
question. 
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2.7 Protracted Social Conflicts: Reflections according to Edward Azar 
Edward Azar never lived to witness the unfolding events that occurred on the world’s conflict 
terrains. His work nonetheless, received much attention for its contribution to the discourse on 
the conflicts that resemble those of the African sub-Saharan region. He presented an analytical 
tool that explains why prolonged conflicts may occur within a society. Unlike scholarship from 
a decade after the cold war and beyond, which attributes Africa conflicts to some predatory 
motive and by inference blames Africa’s whores strictly on economic factors generated by 
actors from within the conflict terrain; Azar’s reflections seem to have diverged so much as to 
have understood the handwriting on the wall. Azar perceived the evolving characteristics of 
conflicts just as we began to see them after the termination of the cold war.  
 
First, he discerned some salient aspects of conflicts. For example, the emerging conflicts he 
posited, were:  
“Characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and 
actors, actors and targets.” 128  Secondly: 
 “these conflicts showed no clear starting or terminating points” 129 
and thirdly that the one feature which characterizes a number of conflicts in the sub-Saharan 
African region was the issue of “prolonged violence”, also dubbed intractable conflicts. Most 
importantly also, he understood that such conflicts could not be linked to a single causal factor 
but emerged as a result of “multiple causal factors and dynamics”130. Similarly, Azar had 
observed how conflicts most inappropriately received attention at the level of escalation. He 
observed the total disregard on conflict inclinations at the latent stage, where the dreaded 
consequences of violent eruptions can be averted.   
  
Edward Azar’s analytical framework covers a wide terrain within the prolonged violence 
discourse. His contribution nonetheless may not be comprehensive enough to explain each and 
every underlying basis for the eruption or sustenance of prolonged violence. While this study 
as earlier indicated, employs his reflections as an investigative tool into Darfur’s prolonged 
conflict, it refrains from projecting his framework as exhaustive. Indeed, no two prolonged 
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conflicts will exhibit the exact same dynamics of war. This study nevertheless, finds his work 
largely adequate in explaining the conflict dynamics of Sudan’s war in the western province.  
 
Contingent upon the theoretical framework on Protracted Social Conflicts, Azar identifies three 
components:  Genesis, Dynamics and Outcomes. He presents detailed insight into nature of 
protracted social conflicts. This study will rely on the first component (Genesis) to examine 
Darfur’s conflict. For Azar, the Genesis component: 
 
" identifies a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual 
situations into conflictual ones”131  
 
The Genesis component is regarded as most relevant because it tends to provide comprehension 
into a number of issues which set the stage for the eruption of Darfur’s conflict in 2003. In 
developing sections I shall examine the four clusters of variables (communal content, needs, 
governance and the role of the state, and international linkages) that underpin the Genesis 
component.   Azar considers them to be the preconditions for Protracted Social Conflicts to 
occur. 
 
Defining Protracted Social Conflicts 
At this point, an understanding of Protracted Social Conflicts as presented by Azar would 
suffice. According to the author, PSC represents  
“the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as 
security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic 
participation “132 
Some basic characteristics of what Azar referred to as PSC may be deduced from his definition. 
These kinds of conflicts are violent. They persist for a long period of time. They depict rivalry 
between identity groups, over needs that are basic to the survival of such groups. Azar beyond 
providing a concise definition drew his reader’s attention to four clusters of variables. Once 
present, especially in the political configuration of a state, these variables: communal content, 
human needs, the state’s role and leadership style and international linkage, became 
preconditions for the emergence of violent and prolonged conflicts.   
                                                     
131 Azar, “The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts “, 7 
132  Edward Azar, “The analysis and management of protracted social conflict”, in J. Volkan et al., (eds) The 
Psychodynamics of International Relationships, vol. 2. Lexington, M.A: D.C. Heath, P. 93 
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2.7.1 Communal content 
The communal composition of a state is the central point around which other variables revolved. 
Heterogeneity based on ethnicity, religion, language or cultural identities tended to fuel or 
create the enabling environment for all other variables to manifest. To this extent, “non-
conflictual situations become transformed into conflictual ones”.  According to Azar, the 
distorted nature of the state’s communal composition-” the state’s artificial incorporation of a 
multitude of communal groups”133 is traceable to the colonial era. Communal rivalry is being 
attributed to imperialist style of administration: the “divide and rule”, and, to long histories of 
contestations among groups. The precipitated domino effect hinges on an imperialist 
constructed mismatch of diverse groups.  In fact, according to Azar, the amalgamation of groups 
into a single territorial space, precipitates a “disarticulation between state and society”134 and 
equally leads to the state being “dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of 
groups”135 More so, as evidenced in contemporary times, such constructed diversity tends to 
reinforce an undiluted loyalty to ethnic groupings and undermines the state’s path towards 
nationhood.  Azar suggests that, ethnic ascendancy engenders an “unresponsive” disposition 
towards the needs of other groups within the society. It therefore: “strains the social fabric and 
breeds fragmentation,” all of which culminates in the eruption of protracted social conflicts. 
 
2.7.2 Human needs 
The human needs theory tends to play a significant role in Azar’s framework for understanding 
the underpinning sources of Protracted Social conflicts. Azar notes that central to the physical 
survival and wellbeing of individuals and groups, is the satisfaction of material needs.  
Unfortunately, most heterogeneous societies are characterized by uneven and unjust 
distribution of physical needs. Marginalized groups are thus compelled to air their grievances. 
In most cases the demand for change falls on deaf ears. Prolonged insensitivity to the demand 
for change may precipitate violent action. However, as Azar maintains, the deprivation of 
physical needs, do not necessarily induce conflict. It is the denial of access to the means of 
satisfying that need that engenders conflict. When groups are denied access to political and 
                                                     
133 Azar, “The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts “, 7 
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135 ibid 
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economic power, they are more or less disconnected from the means through which to assuage 
their basic needs.  
In addition, communities participate in the political authority of the state, if they at least enjoy 
some measure of acceptance by the dominant group. It is this participation that may provide 
the link to “economic decision making” Azar contends as follows: 
 “If the ruling political elites were to recognize and politically accommodate alienated 
communities, then discords over the distribution of political and economic power could 
be managed satisfactorily. 136 
Having identified different kinds of developmental needs: access needs, acceptance needs and 
security needs, the author has identified that “acceptance” is pivotal. Contrary to this, the 
physical needs of estranged groups within PSC prone societies remain unfulfilled. 
 
2.7.3 Governance and State’s role 
 It is in the state’s right to “regulate society” “protect citizens” and “to provide collective 
goods”. In that light, the state is obliged to assume an intervening role, to ensure the delivery 
of equity and fairness in the distribution of state resources. However, countries prone to 
Protracted Social Conflicts fall short of achieving successful and fair governance because a 
single identity group or a coalition of groups, whose major focus is tilted towards its own 
people, monopolizes the polity for group aggrandizement.  The lack of neutrality in mode of 
governance and the domination of state by certain groups tend to undermine the state’s capacity 
to exhibit the qualities of an ideal democratic state, known to function as the “impartial arbiter 
of conflicts among constituent parts “137. Based on palpable variation in modes of governance, 
Azar posits that societies prone to PSC tend to be “characterized by incompetent, parochial, 
fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs”. Furthermore, 
Azar contends that dominant groups circumscribe other groups “access to social institutions”, 
thereby effectuating crises of legitimacy.138 Moreover, Azar finds some significant causal 
relationship between regime type and an attendant contested legitimacy on the one hand, needs 
and protracted social conflicts on the other. 
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2.7.4 International linkage: 
The last of the four variables indicates that protracted social conflicts are not entirely a product 
of internal engineering.: “of political power configuration underlying the authority structure 
and regime type.” In the view of Azar, it is likewise connected to the influence exerted on the 
internal by the international system. Azar suggests two factors: economic dependency and 
political cum military clientele relationship. These factors underlie the international linkages 
variable and may set the scene for prolonged conflicts to occur within societies. In both cases, 
the autonomy of the state is encroached upon, to the extent that the state demonstrates greater 
insensitivity to the needs of its citizens while ample attention is diverted to cementing 
economic, political and military relationships with “stronger” states.  
Even though Azar identifies the already elucidated four variables as preconditions for the 
occurrence of protracted social conflicts, he indicates that overt conflict may not occur until 
certain other factors underlying the “process dynamics” are triggered.  
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Chapter Three 
3.1 International Third-Party Approach to African Sub-Saharan Conflicts 
Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to investigate two major approaches of third-party intervention in intra-state 
conflicts. It highlights the utilization of these approaches in past and ongoing conflicts on the 
African continent and examines the strengths and weaknesses of such approaches in 
contemporary African conflicts. The preceding chapter captured the nature and characteristics 
of contemporary conflicts as waged on the African continent and most specifically since the 
demise of the cold war.  This chapter develops on the discourse by examining salient concepts 
largely undergirding efforts at conflict intervention. In focusing on the applicability of 
mainstream approaches on sub-Saharan African conflicts, I introduce two trajectories in 
international intervention: Conflict Management and Conflict resolution. They represent two 
fields of inquiry that for decades, have informed international third-party efforts at limiting 
violence as well as stabilizing and preserving international peace and security.  Both fields will 
be critically examined in terms of historical origin. Core elements and underlying assumptions-
guiding operations on conflict terrains will be analysed 
 
What is the core objective of this chapter? I seek to establish whether vacuums have been 
created by each method, which may have imposed on scholars the exigency to pursue the re-
conceptualization of intervention methods and probably the comprehension of conflict itself. I 
intend to unravel those normative deficiencies, that may have precipitated the search for other 
strategies to complement the current peace building activity. An examination of the underlying 
theories guiding the practice of conflict management and resolution is seen as pertinent to this 
study. This is especially so because the writer understands the extent to which theory dictates 
the lenses through which conflicts are discerned.  More so, they determine the choice for tools 
and methods for intervention and conflict handling.  Much of conflict management 
understanding and strategy as will be discussed in this chapter traces its roots to International 
relations realist thinking. Its underlying assumptions revolve around the statist understanding 
of security as emerging under the Westphalia kind of arrangement. Based on such realist 
assumptions, conflict is understood as originating from the strong motivation of the state to 
pursue its national interest.   
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3.2 International Conflict Management  
 In speaking of international conflicts management, I will be focusing on the management of 
such conflicts that have attracted international recognition and concern. By this I mean those 
conflicts, which have concurrently magnetized concerted third-party efforts that seek to 
stabilize conflict behaviour that manifest diverse conflict zones of the world 
 
3.2.1 Conflict Management as a Sub-field 
A plethora of literatures tend to interchange concepts within the field when explaining the 
processes and approaches employed in contemporary conflicts. Such terms as conflict 
settlement and conflict management have either delineated the classical model of conflict 
intervention, also known as the statist approach or have been adopted by a few others as a 
generic term which encapsulates the ideas captured by all other mechanisms for intervention 
known to the field of conflict and peace research.  
 
For the purpose of this study, conflict management will be conceptualized as one of the existing 
models of third-party intervention. It will be conceived as a statist official approach, guided by 
its unique principles of intervention in conflict situations and possessing approaches and 
underlying theories exclusive to it. It will be presented as synonymous with Track I diplomacy 
and as drawing strong motivations from realist line of thoughts 
 
3.2.2 What is Conflict Management? underlying assumptions for conflict intervention 
I begin with an investigation into conflict management as a concept and framework for the 
analysis of conflict.  I cull from definitions of three selected authors as captured below. 
Butler:  
He describes CM as:  
  All efforts of third parties in concert with disputants to limit the spread or escalation 
of a conflict, to minimize suffering, and to create an environment for interaction without 
resorting to violence 139 
His description basically depicts a form of third-party consensus directed towards restraining 
the negative effects of a conflict, to ameliorate the suffering meted out on the population 
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affected by the conflict, and with a view to eliminating violent behaviour among the parties in 
conflict 
  
In the same vein, Miall terms CM as, “an art of appropriate intervention” whose ultimate goal 
is focused on the attainment of a “political settlement.” In his definition, eligible intermediaries 
in a conflict require “power and resources” which they employ in the exertion of a certain 
amount of “pressure” on the adversaries. These intermediaries are guided by the sole purpose 
of “inducing a settlement”. His definition tends to shift attention to the display of some form of 
coercion toward the conflictants aimed at achieving the desired result.140 
  
Bloomfield and Reilly’s definition is aligned in some ways with that of Butlers. They view CM 
in this light:  
Conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of differences and 
divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, (it) addresses the 
more realistic question of managing conflict: how do deal with it in a constructive way, 
how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a 
practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of 
difference. 141 
For these two authors, the seemingly feasible approach to conflict situations would be: to 
channel more energy into exploring appropriate ways of “managing” disagreements in contrast 
to venturing into the rigor that might be associated with a “removal”. Butler holds that the focal 
point of conflict management efforts is to manage the deleterious effects of a conflict. The 
author describes it as being “less ambitious in objective” and as remaining closer to the surface 
of issues regarding the conflict. 
  
Some of the defining features of this model of third- party intervention have been captured in 
the aforementioned definitions. They confirm that the major focus of the statist approach to 
conflict is that of “managing” and “limiting” the negative effects of war and conflict. The next 
section traces its origin and effectiveness in the conflicts of the international system. 
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3.2.3 Origin of the traditional approach to intervention 
Conflict management has basically been a mechanism of state and its attendant actors. It dates 
back to the treaty of Westphalia in the year 1648, when the terms for state sovereignty were 
defined. The state had become identified with the role of Chief Security Officer. Its resources 
and military stamina were channelled towards the defence of the state against foreseeable 
threats and employed in the pursuit of its national interest.  On account of this, the state became 
the sole institution with the legitimate power to wield “violence” on levels it so decided. Butler 
termed this kind of violence “organized”. Violence as established by Butler, was used to “thwart 
potential internal challenges to the ruling elite. In addition, it served to crush dissent or avert 
potential challenges to government” 142 
 
With the demise of the First World War, world leaders began to conceive of strategies geared 
towards curbing all aggression to world peace. The emergent resolution was the creation of the 
League of Nation. The establishment of such an organization signalled coalesced effort to tackle 
wars that emanated from incompatibility between states in their pursuit of interest.  The 
formation of the League of Nations became an event in history. It was defined by a positive 
agenda that ostensibly failed to deliver on its promises. The challenges that bedevilled the 
organization proved insurmountable. In the course of time, signs of incapability began to 
emerge. Japan´s incursion into Manchuria in 1931 and in 1935 the aggression on Ethiopia, were 
two occasions evident of its frailty143.  
 
Since providing security had become a shared responsibility of a conglomeration of states, it 
also followed that the modus operandi captures theoretical underpinnings consistent with the 
style adopted by independent states. A set of approaches for addressing international conflicts 
therefore began to emerge. Practices such as classical peacekeeping, mediation and the use of 
extreme force became ready tools in the hands of the League of Nations. In the years following 
its demise, its successor the UN and subsequently in the unfolding centuries, other organizations 
on regional levels in Europe, Africa and Asia, took a cue from its parent body, to employ such 
approaches for the containment of international conflicts  
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3.2.4 Theoretical assumptions… 
Theoretical assumptions, which underlie the classical model of intervention in modern 
conflicts, as already mentioned, largely borrowed inspiration from the realist school of thought. 
Its assertions underscore the centrality of state. That conflict is delineated as ensuing from 
incompatible interest, and a reliance on economic and military strength as a defence against all 
security threats. In the same vein, Weber, a protagonist of sociological writings further 
strengthened the field’s theoretical base. He in line with Butler, delineated the state as 
possessing the singular authority to employ “organized violence” within its territorial confines 
as well as on an international terrain. Such monopoly as conferred on the state, simply accords 
it with the legitimacy to utilize violence in “defence of national interest, in the advancement of 
national objectives”, or other areas it deems fit. 144 
 
Therefore, the analysis of conflict was based on the understanding that conflicts were not only 
driven by the security demands of the state and by its perceived obligations to uphold her status 
but also by the state’s strong inclination to actualize its foreign policy aspirations.145 Such were 
the underlying motivations of single nation states in war scenario. They equally informed the 
Supers Powers inter-state interventionist activities during the cold war era and more recently, 
tend to underlie governmental third-party interventionist efforts in modern day conflicts. Under 
such arrangements, a return to status quo achieved through negotiated settlements was viewed 
as the best possible outcome in any conflict situation. Some examples of settlements which 
have been achieved based on realist principles are Sinai I (1974), and Sinai II (September 1975), 
the Camp David accord whose actualization was contingent upon cease-fire agreements 
(September 1978) in addition, the Egypt- Israel Peace Treaty (1975) 146  
 
As the study proceeds, the reader is drawn to the understanding of how this inter-state approach 
for conflict intervention filtered into the twenty first century and how it became a vital method 
geared towards the curbing intra-state aggression, especially in the African region. 
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3.3 Selected tools of Conflict Management applied to African Conflict: Peacekeeping, 
Mediation and Peace-enforcement.  
 
This section seeks to examine some of the conventional apparatuses of conflict management: 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and formal mediation. An attempt will be made to provide a 
historical background to their emergence. These selected conflict management tools will be 
situated within the context of past and ongoing conflicts on sub-Saharan Africa. The objective 
is to analyse the efficacy and relevance of these strategies in the search for solutions to 
protracted violent conflicts on the continent. While a larger portion of peacekeeping missions 
after the Second World War occurred under the aegis of the UN, some others were initiated and 
operated by regional and sub regional powers like the AU and ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African States) for example. It is the focus of this study nonetheless, to 
concentrate analysis on the role of the UN body as the intervening international peace actor in 
the plethora of conflicts manifesting on the continent’s conflict terrains. 
 
3.3.1 Military Intervention, a tool of Conflict Management 
Introduction  
This sub section on peacekeeping examines the role of military intervention as a conflict 
management approach in pursuance of peace in zones of conflict. It traces historical origins in 
the form of multilateralism under the different forms of security arrangements as far back as 
the concert of Europe. Beyond probing into the underlying principles guiding peacekeeping 
missions across zones of conflict, selected definitions of the peacekeeping concept will also be 
delved into.  
 
3.3.2 A historical evolution of the peacekeeping activity 
Though peacekeeping has become synonymous with the United Nations, the interposition of 
contingencies aimed towards the management of international relations predates the formation 
of the UN.  Multilateral interventions had been evident under the auspices of institutions such 
as the defunct League of Nations. A number of its functions paralleled those of what in the 
years of UN establishment became referred to as peacekeeping. It had become apparent at each 
point in world post war history for the international system to seek ways of managing excessive 
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aggression seen as detrimental to the entire system of states. Pockets of military interventions 
trace back to the period of the thirty years of war and the Napoleonic wars. Both wars had 
terminated with the Treaty of Westphalia and the Concert of Europe respectively.  Post war 
arrangements such as these, were tailored towards managing international relations, albeit 
devoid of multilateral security agendas at conflict management. Their very emergence in the 
aftermath of each of the war scenarios nonetheless, were perceived to have set the precedence 
for ideas to what in the years of the League became known as collective security.  
  
The League of Nations had introduced the concept of collective security. Under such 
arrangement conflict was conceived as ensuing from without the territorial confines of a state, 
while a parochial perception of security defined around statist understanding of defence against 
territorial integrity prevailed. To a large extent this arrangement underscored principles of non-
interference and state sovereignty and most specifically heralded the emergence of combined 
military intervention for curbing all forms of excesses accruing from interstate relations. 
Regardless of the League’s unsuccessful outing most of its institutional structures became 
foundations for its successor years later.   
 
Dating as far back as the 1920s and 1930s, traces of what would eventually map out the path 
for today’s conceptions of peacekeeping had emerged.  Plebiscites conducted in a number of 
territories around Europe to determine future boarders had triggered new security challenges. 
As such, military interposition to monitor activities and ensures stability had gone underway. 
A number of such activities had been conducted under the supervision of the League of Nations.  
In the Saar territory for example an international force was interposed to monitor the plebiscite 
and maintain the peace.  The Saar mission eventually comprising 3,300 military forces became 
the League largest ever-peacekeeping venture.147  Peacekeeping emerged a significant tool of 
conflict management, its utility turned even more imperative, on account of the effectiveness it 
displayed at preserving the peace and stability of the international system.  As I probe further 
the reader is illuminated on how peacekeeping was employed in the dampening of tensions 
erupting across the globe, at the end of the Second World War and especially in Africa in the 
aftermath of the cold war.  
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By the 50s the UN had completely assumed responsibility over the world’s security concerns. 
The organisation was the most recognised under which peacekeeping may be conducted.  It 
also manifested its central objective as stated in Article one of its Charter to “maintain 
international peace and security” through “effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of all threats to peace”. The 1956 deployment of the United Nation Emergency Force 
in Egypt’s Suez was its very first attempt at peacekeeping. Some scholars nonetheless, cite two 
prior observer missions in both Palestine and Kashmir, conducted under the UN in the late 40s 
as the organisation’s premier attempt at curbing international aggression.  The Suez mission 
nonetheless was known to be its first experience at troop deployment and may have further 
informed the development of other principles guiding peacekeeping activities in the years that 
followed.  
 
3.3.3 Peacekeeping 
Over the years scholars began to assemble together some of the activities of collective security, 
traditional peacekeeping and peace support operation. The underlying objective was tailored 
towards the formulation of a nutshell conception of peacekeeping at first glance. Although 
collective security is quite different from both peacekeeping and peace operations, they tend to 
exhibit one uniting factor which is; military intervention.  Collective security may therefore be 
viewed as a precursor to the other two methods of conflict management. To provide a concise 
and clear comprehension of what peacekeeping entails, I shall proceed to examine selected 
definitions of the activity of peace keeping. I identify some of its defining features and probe 
into core underlying principles. It is imperative to discuss the underpinning tenets of 
peacekeeping, especially because they have determined the mode of operation in past 
peacekeeping mission of the UN. These principles have also dictated the operational line of 
action exhibited in the course of armed intervention organized by African regional bodies from 
the late 1980s and into the early 1990s. The continued relevance of these principles in twenty 
first century peacekeeping activities cannot be undermined. Military intervention in the form 
of peacekeeping basically remains an activity of conflict management linked to the Westphalia 
construct of states  
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3.3.4 Defining peacekeeping 
Adebayo defines peacekeeping as  
“one mission that brings peace and stability to a particular case by implementing the 
key tasks of its mandate (e.g., ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization and 
rehabilitation; elections) even if these are not fully completed before the mission 
concludes”.148  
Examining this definition, the reader becomes cognizant of the fact that a peacekeeping mission 
operates mostly in conformity with framework of its mandate. Similarly, one is familiarized 
with some of the functions of a peacekeeping mission. The functions captured in the definition 
have been identified as extended function of peacekeeping since the early 90s. However, the 
definition propels us to question the extent to which peacekeeping may claim, based on its 
history, to be an instrument which has successfully brought about peace and stability to conflict 
zones where it has been applied. If peacekeeping is tantamount to the provision of peace and 
stability to a particular case, then to what extent will it be correct to refer to both Operation 
Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and the International Security Assistance Force deployed to 
Afghanistan as peacekeeping in the pursuit of peace and stability.   
 
The mode of operation associated with these deployments both defied the notion of 
peacekeeping as an instrument tailored towards peace and security. It exposes the ambiguity of 
the concept and questions the accuracy in pronouncing peacekeeping as a non-coercive 
instrument of conflict management. Yet in the real sense of it, peacekeeping in its traditional 
form as depicted by its guiding principles: the minimum use of force, presents this approach as 
a non-coercive one. The “peace” phenomenon under the circumstance remains questionable, as 
scholars have identified it as negative, especially when administered in its traditional form.  
 
Similarly, Diehl has defined peacekeeping as:  
“The imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of 
armed hostilities and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are 
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deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment 
under which the underlying dispute can be resolved”149. 
 
Diehl’s definition introduces some of the underlying principles of peacekeeping.  First, 
Peacekeepers are under the obligation to maintain a neutral stance in the conflict to which they 
are deployed. Simply put, side taking undermines the initial credibility bestowed on the 
contingent at the time of consent.  Secondly peacekeepers are required to be lightly armed. 
Since their duty, as traditional peacekeeping dictates, is to monitor or implement a ceasefire 
agreement after hostilities have ceased. An interposition between adversaries, of heavily armed 
peacekeepers would tend to portray a peace mission in converse light. As such forces remain 
lightly armed. Diehl’s definition further suggests that an interposition is based on the consent 
of the state. The state as it where, may decide to adhere strictly to its rights of non-interference 
and state sovereignty. To this we again question, at what point the R2P (Responsibility to 
Protect) clause comes to play in the event of a state’s complete failure to guaranty security to 
its citizens in the face of violence. Is it politically correct to give way to the principles of 
peacekeeping, so that they supersede the urgency for intervention under instances of grave 
humanitarian emergencies?  
 
 
Bellamy and Williams tend to project what seems to be the right answer to that question, they 
assert that the  
“post-Westphalian understanding of international security recognizes the sovereignty 
of a state only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens” the most significant of 
these obligations being the “protection of civilians against arbitrary killing”150  
 
The Post-Westphalian order however remains an issue of debate as much as peacekeeping 
missions have largely remained driven by the tenets of the Westphalian state formation. The 
concluding line of definition under analysis, presents peacekeeping as a tool, which makes way 
for other forms of third-party strategies. We may infer, that peacekeeping cannot and does not 
resolve conflict, but controls it to the extent that durable solutions are achieved using other 
mechanisms. 
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This last definition culled from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
defines peacekeeping as: 
 “A technique designed to preserve peace. However fragile, where fighting has been 
halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over 
the years peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing 
ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars to incorporate a complex 
model of many elements-military, police and civilian working together to help lay the 
foundation of sustainable peace”151 
From this definition, it may be extrapolated that:  An evolution has occurred. This evolution 
ostensibly demonstrates the transitioning from a traditional form (that initially engaged mainly 
the services of the military) to the current activity of peacekeeping, involving other forces like 
the police. Similarly, other duties have been introduced to attract civilian competence.  As 
already observed in Diehl’s definition, and further corroborated by this definition, 
peacekeeping in its traditional form was not created to delve into the resolution of the conflict 
for which it is interposed. As rightly observed by Bercovitch, peacekeeping remains “an adjunct 
process to the diplomatic efforts-negotiation, mediation…”152 Finally “it is a technique 
designed to preserve peace, however fragile…” we decipher, therefore, that peacekeeping is a 
technique which strives towards that peace which does not address underlying structures 
perpetuating the conflict, but seeks the negative peace (cessation of violent attacks) to pave way 
for positive peace. It implies thus: if the peacemakers are unable to achieve a favourable 
compromise or if underlying structures remain conflict prone and root causes are left 
unaddressed, peace achieved is fragile and the likelihood of a re-eruption of conflict may not 
be farfetched.  
 
The definitions highlighted above have allowed for an initial glimpse into what peacekeeping 
operations especially in its traditional form, may constitute. Diehl’s definition especially, 
encapsulates three important principles associated with traditional peacekeeping. Although the 
evolution of peacekeeping unto the third and fourth generations tend to have challenged some 
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of these guiding tenets, they have remained at the base of any attempt at keeping the peace in 
zones of conflict, even in contemporary times. 
 
3.3.5  21st century peacekeeping 
In its traditional form and as a tool of interstate rivalry, peacekeeping activities when place side 
by side its role in the 21st century, seemed to include a narrow range of responsibilities: 
Overseeing a cease fire, acting as an interposition force and supervising the demarcation of the 
international border between two states .153 Since 1989, peace operations have included 
extended functions such as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, maintenance of law and 
order, election monitoring, human rights protection and the repatriation of refugees and, conflict 
resolution and reconciliation, to mention a few. Although peacekeeping has for decades 
remained the sole prerogative of the UN, traces of peacekeeping conducted independent of the 
UN have been evident since the 70s. Organizations other than the UN carried out similar 
functions of traditional peacekeeping often with the authorization, and sometimes under the 
supervision of the parent body.  
 
Between 1979 and 1980, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) was deployed to oversee 
the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe and between 1987 and 1990, an Indian Peacekeeping 
Force (IPKF) was tasked with the responsibility of implementing the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan 
Accord on Sri Lankan soil.154  Peacekeeping operations have also been conducted as joint 
efforts between the UN and other regional security apparatuses such as the AU. An ongoing 
example would be the presence of both AU and UN personnel under the UNAMID mandate 
(UN-AU joint mission in Darfur.) Similarly, sub- regional organizations like the ECOWAS 
have made positive incursions into war zones of the West African region. That mission operated 
outside of UN tutelage. Interventions on this level have been motivated by the occurrence of 
gross humanitarian emergencies and the exigency to suppress violent aggression. Most 
probably, an amateur regional alertness to forestall the replication of the Rwandan experience. 
Regardless of what motivations linger behind each regional or sub-regional action, there is a 
palpable re-awakening to heed the call for human security according to the order and nature of 
the 21century kind of conflicts. 
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3.3.6 Peace Support Operations in Africa: A brief overview of the UN experience…  
This section provides succinct investigation into four conflicts in Africa’s sub-Saharan region: 
Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia. Some significance has been attached to these UN 
interventions for the manner in which they influenced the modus operandi of what came to be 
referred to peace support operations. The term “peace support operations”155 has been adopted 
to showcase the activity of peacekeeping in Africa but also to demonstrate the gradual transition 
from traditional peacekeeping to the period after the cold war when the activity of 
peacebuilding became more pronounced on the African continent.   
3.3.6.1      The Congo Mission 
 
A sub-Saharan African experience of peacekeeping commenced in the early 60s. That peace 
mission was intended to douse political tensions (on an inter-state capacity) originating from 
within the frontiers of the newly independent Democratic Republic of Congo. The fledgling 
state had become enmeshed in conflict with its erstwhile Belgian colonizers and on that basis 
sought the assistance of the UN.  Unprepared for the trajectory of conflict that would be evoked 
as a result, the UN soon headed the call to respond to the growing insecurity on Congolese soil. 
Unfortunately, the organization became confronted with the exigency to interfere in the internal 
politics of the state. This unprecedented line of action precipitated the UN’s entanglement in 
the web of cold war politics and imprinted on the organization one of its grimmest experiences 
in military intervention since its inception.  
 
The complexities surrounding the conflict on ground, left the ONUC (United Nations Operation 
in the Congo) mission entrapped in the conflict, while compelling the UN to embrace 
intervention on a level that negated the underlying peacekeeping principles it had hitherto been 
acquainted, as well as associated with and over years committed to uphold. As such an interstate 
mission as it seemed metamorphosed into an activity of intra-state bearing. 156 The Congo 
mission vigorously challenged the phase in international politics, where traditional 
peacekeeping had effectively curbed interstate rivalry on the international conflict terrain.  
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Reflecting on that UN mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it might be correct 
to assume that the arduous task of quelling the conflagration as well as the bitter experience it 
engendered, leveraged the organization’s almost three-decade recess from peacekeeping 
activities on the African continent. A recouped UN nonetheless re-emerged in the post-cold war 
order, fortified with a redefined approach towards tackling the kinds of conflicts that were to 
prevail on the continent following the termination of the war on ideologies. As a number of 
conflicts soon began rearing their ugly heads, it was time for the organization to showcase its 
refurbished self.   In Namibia, Angola and the Mozambique the growing instability soon 
attracted the organization’s renewed interest for peace intervention in Africa, one that unveiled 
a reworked framework for intervention in conflicts characterized by acts of insurgency, 
intransigence and longevity.   
 
3.3.6.2      The Namibian experience  
 
The deployment of UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group) for example, mandated to 
monitor elections in Namibia and accomplish the liberation of the future independent Namibian 
state from South Africa’s over seven decades firm grip, became the UN’s first multidimensional 
task. A redefinition of the UN’s underlying assumptions tended to match emerging realities, 
especially as the Security Council authorized intervention on a level that superseded traditional 
peacekeeping. It also licensed peacekeepers and civilians alike, to engage in activities that had 
never been associated with tradition peace keeping.  That is to say, that it became legal going 
by the new order, for the mission to be involved in supervising the demobilization and 
disarmament of the belligerents and also to engage in the repatriation of refugees and in 
monitoring elections that were tailored towards the political freedom of Namibia.157  
 
UNTAG became a successful venture. Nonetheless, that mission in hindsight, happened to be 
“a welcome on board” experience for the organization in the era of post-cold was politics. 
Unknown to it, grave and unfamiliar challenges, were in the offing, as the Angolan conflict 
began to gradually emerge. In some way, the Angolan conflict as it unfolded, proved to the 
international peace actor that the panacea for intervention in African internal conflicts remained 
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a work in progress. It demonstrated that no two conflicts are akin to each other and that the 
framework for a successful outing in Namibia would become inapplicable in Angola’s own 
version of internal strife. Ultimately it exposed the exigency for the in-depth and meticulous 
analysis of the kinds of conflict occurring on the continent and provoked the quest for the most 
viable and efficient intervention tools and strategy in conflicts now began to exhibit dissimilar 
dynamics.  
 
The Angolan crises erupted fully around the same post-cold war era. Dos Santos’s MPLA and 
Savimbi’s UNITA had become embroiled in what ostensibly manifested as a ferocious struggle 
for political supremacy. 158An earlier UN contingent specifically concentrated on the ejection 
of Cuban troops from the Angolan soil. This initial deployment assumed the responsibility of 
peacekeeping in its vey pristine form. UNAVEM I (United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission) as this initial deployment was dubbed, came into existence on the basis of peace 
settlements, which aimed at stripping both warring parties of their respective international 
alliances. UNAVEM I successfully accomplished its task. According to MacQueen:  
“UNAMVEM succeeded because the basic elements of ‘host-state consent and prior 
commitment by the parties to the maintenance of peace they had already established 
were fully present”   
Subsequent UN mandates: UNAVEM II and III deriving ratification for intervention from both 
the Biscesse Accord and the Lusaka Protocol came into existence on Angolan territory. Both 
deployments ultimately targeted the reinstatement of order and stability adopting almost the 
same blueprint for envisaged success from the Namibian experience.  UNAVEM II was 
authorized to monitor the elections and accomplish the demobilization of MPLA fighters as 
well as Savimbi’s armed group.  Unfortunately, the mission’s under resourced nature, served 
to expose its efforts to tough insurmountable challenges. UNAVEM II gave way to UNAVEM 
III. The numerically upgraded contingent attempted to match the realities on ground. That 
mission sadly concluded without accomplishing the agenda to restore sustainable peace in 
Angola.  The intractability of the conflict was to precipitate a fourth deployment: The UN 
Observer mission in Angola (MONUA). The mission’s outing proved ineffective in halting the 
conflict, leaving the UN with no option than to exit the conflict terrain admits continued fighting 
between the belligerent groups. It seemed that the UN had exhausted its tools; so that the 
organisation could not be linked to the conflict, which eventually terminated in 2002. It was 
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certain, nonetheless that the organization had gleaned a lesson from that mission, as it 
proceeded to curb another threat to international peace, emerging from the warring parties in 
the Mozambique.  
 
 
 
3.3.6.3      The UN in Mozambique 
 
The experience in Mozambique could be regarded as the cooling effect for the complex conflict 
dynamics that posed as an impediment to accomplishing the envisaged task in the Angolan 
conflict. Like the UNITA in Angola, the RENAMO (REsistencia NAcional de MOzambique 
rebel group struggled to unseat the incumbent FRELIMO government, which it considered 
illegitimate to the vision of the independent state of Mozambique. Ostensibly, the initial effort 
to intervene in the conflict on the platform of unofficial mediation, (See chapter 3) proved 
effective in transforming the conflict to the level where the deployment of a peace support 
mission sufficed. That peaceful settlement allowed for the effective conduct of elections, the 
disarmament of armed groups and the transition to peace, which also remained sustained long 
after the deployed peace mission: ONUMOZ (Operagao das Nagoes Unidas em Mogambique, 
in English: United Nations Operation in Mozambique) exited in 1994.  
 
3.3.6.4       
The Mission to Somalia 
 
A fourth conflict presented the organization with yet another hard nut to crack. The Somalian 
conflict159 had gained momentum around early 1991 leaving its political terrain devoid of any 
form of central configuration. When the UN arrived, its mission to the millions of Somalis at 
the war’s mercy, was purely humanitarian. Contingent on a ceasefire agreement, UNOSOM I 
(United Nations Operation in Somalia) was authorized to monitor the truce, but most 
significantly to effectuate the smooth passage of relief on grounds marred by intensified gun 
battle between clan war lords: Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah. The escalating conflict 
unfortunately overwhelmed the capacity of the mission’s 500 men observer group, as both 
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belligerents continued to hijack relief material for economic aggrandizement.160 Once again the 
UN’s deployment failed to match with the realities on ground. This in any case necessitated the 
deployment of a larger contingent with the anticipated objective to tackle the war’s complexities 
as well as bolster UNOSOM I’s dwindling impact on the conflict.  
 
It was amid the rapidly unfolding on-ground complications that the United States intervened 
with the force it tagged: Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF (United Task Force) arrived with 
fortified manpower albeit with strict orders that confined its operation to the distribution of aid 
within a limited period of time, and an obscure mandate that seemed to have shunned the 
exigency to disarm warring parties. 161   Regardless of the restraining nature of the mandate that 
underlay the operation, a good measure of success was initially recorded to the glory of 
UNITAF.  Adekeye noted that: 
“The mission started well enough with the presence of peacekeepers ensuring the 
delivery of food, reducing looting and banditry, rebuilding roads and bridges and 
facilitating the repatriation of Somali refugees from neighbouring countries”162 
Identifying the non-disarmament agenda nonetheless, as one of the mission’s lapses, Norrie 
MacQueen observed similarly, that: 
“While the initial ‘shock’ of UNITAF’s deployment had…beneficial effects, there was 
an inevitable erosion of its impact…” “This gained pace” as the author, mentions further 
“when it became clear that, however provoked the intervention force would not 
undertake the disarmament of the various warlords’ militias” 163 
 
The continued disinclination on the part of the authorizers of UNITAF, to take weapons out of 
the hands of the perpetrators of the heinous acts, tended to furnish the intransigent warring 
parties with the unabated impetus to advance with the perpetuation of brutal aggression. 
Heightened tensions and ostensibly the lack of any foreseeable improvements to deteriorating 
security conditions, was to subsequently occasion the transition back to peacekeeping operation 
under UN tutelage.  UNOSOM II afterwards, was upgraded with the mandate for disarmament 
and fortified with chapter VII of the UN charter, authorizing the use of “all necessary measures 
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against those responsible for the attacks… including those responsible for publicly inciting 
attacks” …164.  
Despite UNOSOM II’s level of reinforcement, the protagonists on ground (with specific 
reference to the Aideed camp) continued to hamper the delivery of aid, attack peacekeepers as 
well as thwart the disarmament process.  The aggression on peacekeepers ostensibly reached 
its crescendo with the attack on and killing of eighteen Americans whose leaders in Washington 
now began to develop cold feet over the mission to bring peace to Somalia. The gruesome 
incident ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the American contingent and precipitated the 
exit as well of other western contingents. On the flip side, Somalis also began to lose confidence 
in the mission, as civilians now became casualties in the hands of the ones assigned to protect 
them.165  Finally, UNOSOM II followed suit and took a bow without any trace of positive peace, 
to say the least a termination of the violent aggression, which had attracted international 
intervention in the first place. 
Once again and in the similitude of the experience in the Congo, the Somalian ordeal seemed 
to have taken its toll on the organization’s continued interest in peace intervention on the 
African continent.166 This waning interest would be evidenced by the lackadaisical handling 
and feet-dragging attitude towards the exigency of deploying a formidable interposition force, 
to quell the aggression that ultimately resulted in the annihilation of millions of Rwandans in 
1994. 
 
Concluding reflections 
Some undermining factors as noted by Chris Alden167 have continued to plague the UN’s 
effective intervention in conflicts on the African continent. These have hampered the 
anticipated impact of the organization’s peacekeeping deployment primarily in areas where the 
nature of the mandate was ostensibly enabled to serve as a multidimensional and/ or 
humanitarian variant of peacekeeping. Ranging from the lack of sufficient funds to actualize 
the mandate and inadequate mandates incapable of terminating violence, the African continent, 
despite the above-delineated experiences in the immediate aftermath of the cold war, has 
remained a recipient of peace support missions till date. 22 UN missions have been completed 
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on the continent while 9 are on-going including the peace support mission under investigation 
in this study. 168 
Notably, the end of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, presented the world of conflict intervention 
with a gradually unfolding trend to share the responsibility of peace support operations between 
regional and sub-regional organization. While is its still in it embryonic stages, this innovative 
approach to security on the continent is definitely   beginning to gain momentum, a motivation 
that may have derived from ECOMOG successful intervention in the Liberian conflict of the 
1990s.  In like manner, such emerging gravitation towards burden sharing may have informed 
the current hybrid mission to the conflict in Darfur. While echoes of the mission’s inability to 
secure civilian lives continue to filter in, it is indeed premature to characterize UNAMID’s 
presence in Darfur as an outright success or failure.  
  .  
3.4 Mediation in Internal Conflicts 
3.4.1 A brief historical journey… 
It is crucial to consider this next apparatus of conflict management, especially for its 
fundamental role in seeking settlements between or among warring parties in contemporary 
internal and protracted conflicts.  Mediation according to Bercovitch et al enjoys a long history 
dating back in time to (2000 BC.) A myriad of countries in Asia as well as Africa relied on 
mediation as the preferable way out of most of its conflict.169 Such reliance on mediation was 
based on the argument that only compromises achieved on the basis of free volition, 
understanding and the agreement of parties in conflict may well possesses the capacity to pave 
the way for durable and sustained peace. 
  
Butler provides historical insights into the relevance of Mediation among “Greek City States” 
whose predilection for mediation outweighed the option for military hostilities.170 Likewise, 
Mediation secured some measure of importance during the renaissance as well as during the 
tumultuous times encountered in many parts of Europe. Crocker et al suggest that mediation 
has been on high demand since 1945. This may have been an upshot from the apparent changes 
in conflict trends on the international scene, occurring under the auspices of the United Nations 
and consistent with the dictates of Article 33(1) of its charter, in which mediation is 
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recommended as one of the strategies to be given utmost priority in the settlement of disputes 
among members.171 Furthermore, mediation was considered applicable in instances of disputes 
among the Superpowers during the cold war as prompted by ideological cleavages. 
 Within the context of modern international conflicts, mediation has similarly become relevant 
in abating and containing conflict in deeply polarized societies. The complex nature of 
contemporary conflicts, characterized by longevity, squabbles over identity and intractability 
seem to promote an inclination to mediation as a non-violent third-party approach to the 
settlement of conflict. Such new developments as determined by “the new order”, further 
contributed to the use of mediation outside the confines of the UN. As such, mediation became 
prominent under the tutelage of regional, sub regional state and non-state actors. 
Having entertained a brief historical journey into the significance of mediation as a tool for 
addressing conflicts, a definition, which outlines or portrays its defining features would suffice.  
 
3.4.2 Defining Mediation 
Oran Young defines mediation as 
 “Any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to 
reduce or remove one or more of the problems of bargaining relationship, and therefore 
to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself”172 
Young’s description presents the scenario of a conciliator. His status is ostensibly detached 
from those of the parties to the conflict. This third actor does not share the adversarial status of 
the other two actors.  His definition elucidates the efforts by an intermediary to facilitate a 
complete termination of conflict.  
 
In another definition by Moore, he delineates mediation as:  
“The intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral 
party who has authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in 
voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.”173  
 Some of the defining qualities of a mediator become explicit in Moor’s definition: 
acceptability, impartiality and neutrality.  His definition suggests acceptability on the part of 
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the parties in conflict. I.e. adversaries have the right to decide on a mediator with whom they 
are content, in addition, a right to one who enjoys the confidence of both parties. Neutrality and 
impartiality demand a high level of objectivity and the ability to circumvent the taking of sides 
during negotiating session. 
   
Bercovitch provides a more expansive summary of what he refers to as mediation. He holds 
that mediation: 
 “Is a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own 
efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or 
accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect 
or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to physical force or 
invoking the authority of the law.”174 
 
His definition reveals that efforts at altering the negative image created as a result of conflict, 
may supersede the intention to terminate the conflict, or may simply be a means to an end. 
Bercovitch’s assertion is akin to one of the central themes embedded in the conflict 
transformation paradigm, which will be discussed subsequently. The model captures the 
unforeseeable change in a conflict situation without psychologically recasting the conflictants. 
A second dimension from his definition, points to mediation as a non-coercive form of conflict 
intervention. 
 
Outside the ambit of the UN, diverse actors may be seen to undertake mediation. The players 
may range from private persons and government representatives to regional intergovernmental 
representatives emerging for organizations like the EU, AU, OAS or sub-regional like the 
ECOWAS. Interest tends to play a major role in mediation. With respect to individual 
governments, the fervour for mediation may either be borne out of an undeviating quest to 
accomplish foreign policy objectives or driven by the motive of maintaining stability within or 
outside of its geographical boundary.  Libya’s for example, maintained consistent mediatory 
efforts in conflicts of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998-1999, the Eritrea- Ethiopia 
crisis from between 1998 and 2000 and the on-going Dafurian conflict since 2003.175 .  
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Touval points to the US as ranking highest on mediatory intervention dating back from 1945.176 
While mediatory proceedings by individual persons are graced with the desire to satisfy 
personal interests, the objectives, of non-state actors: civil society groups or other groups 
operating on the basis of track two diplomacy, may be founded on much more favourable 
intentions for peace and stability within the conflict.   Mediation becomes central to 
international conflicts under instances of prolonged aggression embroiled in multifarious 
dimensions, under circumstances of the disputants’ incapability of a self-engineered 
compromise, i.e. parties have reached a deadlock, where the negative impact of the conflict has 
attained unbearable points for either sides and under conditions of a displayed readiness to view 
the conflict from other perspectives and consequently find solutions to them. Zartman 
buttresses these points in a concept of “ripeness”. He states that accurate timing is crucial to the 
success of third-party mediation in any conflict. Such accuracy in timing is measured by the 
evidence of “a mutually hurting stalemate.”  According to Butler, this is  
“a point in which neither sides perceive it can win; the conflict appears to both sides as 
if it will stretch out indefinitely into the future, with no possibility of escape and no hope 
of victory” 177 
 
3.4.3 Strategies in formal mediation 
Mediation may be approached in various ways.  It involves traversing multiple conflict areas 
for an opportunity to meet with each side of the parties in conflict and to act as go between. It 
includes facilitating initial efforts to re-establish broken down communication. Shuttle 
Mediation for example is conceived as the prerogative of top-ranking government officials, 
albeit derived from diverse levels of the civil society groups such as practitioners, prominent 
men and women of the clergy, relief organizations e.tc, whose initiatives may be to the 
detriment or to the advantage of the entire process.  One example of such back and forth 
movements in line with obligations accrued from mediation, may be derived from the India and 
Pakistan dispute which saw former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, former US 
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and others 
deeply engaged in Shuttle Mediation. In similar vein, the power aligned to such notable men 
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and woman who involve in mediation becomes relevant at certain stages of mediation: where 
it is apparent that the obduracy of either party may thwart mediation efforts. Mediators 
endeavour to coax such parties into some measure of flexibility. 178 
 
Mediation in conflict may be conducted by series of actors in succession of one another or at 
coinciding periods. This was the case when a plethora of nations: South Africa, Kenya and 
Canada in conjunction with the UN and the then OAU sought to douse the effects of the civil 
unrest in Zaire, by bombarding an already splintered conflict terrain with chains of seemingly 
unattainable targets using mediation. In addition, the strategy employed by each mediator is 
seen as pivotal to the conflict. Touval and Zartmann have captioned such approaches as 
“communication-facilitation; formulation and manipulation”, all of which tend to influence or 
alter the entire conflict. One significant element entrenched in the communication and 
facilitation procedure, has been identified as the implicit capacity to make room for conflictants 
interests to be aired and deliberated upon, while laying the foundation on which seeds of trust 
may be sown. Such activities tend to engender an unperturbed atmosphere during the entire 
process.179. 
 
3.4.4 Formal mediation in African conflicts  
Whether administered by international or regional actors, formal mediation has consistently 
found relevance in a myriad of conflict on the African soil. Nonetheless, how effective have 
the attempts at a mediated settlement elicited durable peace in African conflicts characterized 
by protraction and intractability. Authors like Bercovitch have recorded a number of 
international third-party attempts at settling a notable number of African conflicts facilitated on 
the leverage of a track I inspired mediation.  Ostensibly, official mediation either led to a truce 
connoting fragile peace or attained mere settlements.  In 1992 fresh conflict resurged in Angola 
undermining the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord. The conflict persisted and only ceased with the 
demise of Jonas Savimbi the then UNITA Chief.  The US and the UN also conducted frequent 
mediation sessions between 1993 and 1994 to reinstate peace for the people of Somalia. 
Bercovitch notes that this attempt at peace “collapsed in ignominy”180. In like manner, the 1993 
Arusha Accord documented a colossal failure owing to its incompetency in averting the 
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extermination of millions of Rwandans in its early 1990s crises.  Between 1993 and 1995, three 
detached agreements had been signed, in Cotonou and the two others in Abuja, (I and II). The 
initial two were considered absolute failures, while the third was noted to have resulted in 
fragile peace.   
 
Mitchell in like manner observed that mediated settlements organized according to international 
relations theorizing hardly engenders a final end to conflict and as such cannot be termed 
“genuine resolution”. Under such circumstances, underlying causes have remained unaddressed 
and relationships remain antagonistic.   Conflicts defined either by a cessation of hostilities or 
mere settlements have in most cases documented resumed aggressions. Mitchell perceives such 
conflicts as “arrangements, which involve a compromise and abandonment of goals” in which 
parties remain somewhat unsatisfied.181  He asserts further that in such circumstances 
adversaries operate under the assumption that a settlement will, to an extent produce better 
relationships among parties. Nonetheless such hopes turn out dashed in the final analysis.  
The mediated settlement geared towards the termination of the 1972 Sudanese conflict that 
subsequently resumed, corroborates instances of resurgence after settlement. Despite numerous 
failed attempts at resolving African conflicts contingent on formal mediation, this mechanism 
of conflict management has found significance with international peace actors in Sudan, whose 
resolve it has been to achieve stable peace for the people of Darfur. This has been the case for 
a decade and counting.    
 
3.5 Peace Enforcement  
Peace enforcement is understood to be a modern technique of conflict management. It is 
employed in contemporary intra-state conflict with the major purpose of dousing the 
debilitating effects of violent armed conflicts. Peace enforcement is designed to forcefully 
achieve the cessation of aggression and for the central purpose of ensuring the safety of the 
populace directly affected by a conflict.  Prior to the 21st century, the conduct of peace-
enforcement was premised on defining features that formed the bedrock for accomplishing the 
elimination of escalated violent conflicts. The forceful imposition of peace aided by heavy but 
authorized arms was conceived on the premise of the restrictive guiding principles underlying 
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the peacekeeping theory. Where a nation fails to secure the lives of innocent citizens at the 
mercy of an ongoing war, the international community may rely on peace enforcement as a 
means to reinstate order and safe lives. This assertion draws specifically from the 2005 World 
Summit where the state’s overriding responsibility to protect its own citizens against all forms 
of atrocious crimes was solidly underscored. In a firm statement, World leaders confirmed their 
stance in this manner: 
“The international community has a responsibility to act when governments neglect to 
protect the most vulnerable members of state” 182   
 
Peace Enforcement conceptually overrides the precondition of seeking the consent of parties in 
conflict, legitimizing a high level of combat readiness for troops operating under such mandate. 
Peace-enforcement becomes relevant in violent conflicts to impose security in conflict terrains 
exhibiting obvious threat to human life. Combatants operating within the defining lines of an 
imposed operation are duly equipped with arms for the purpose of protecting weak citizens of 
war, as well as in self-defence.  
  
Similarly, the legitimacy associated with peace-enforcement intervention have been clearly 
defined under Article 42 of the UN Charter and further accentuated in Boutros’s Ghali’s 
“Agenda for Peace”.  
“The Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore 
international peace and security”.  
It basically alludes to a Plan B action under circumstance of failed peacekeeping attempts. 
Articles 43 and 44 of that manuscript explicitly delineate some of the defining features of 
“peace-enforcement”. It suggests that troops:  
“Would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to 
undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and 
operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and 
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would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-
General.” 183  
 
Under the peacekeeping framework, combatants became susceptible to violent attacks 
perpetrated by hostile and intransigent belligerents. On the basis of this, it became pivotal if the 
tenet of its mandate were to be accomplished, to prioritize the security of contingents and to 
view such as being tantamount to the enhancement of its capacity to terminate the depredation 
and atrocious crimes perpetrated on fragile victims of war. Butler posits that the Agenda for 
Peace may have clearly diagnosed some of the blatant deficiencies within the framework of UN 
Peace Operations; nonetheless, it failed to adduce effective solutions to them. 184 Two of some 
of the major hindrances that militated against its effectiveness in eliminating violent aggression 
within a peace enforcement framework, was the shortage of resources and the lack of political 
will. Such incapacity became most evident in the early 1990s.  When UN operations such as 
UNOSOM (1991) (United Nations Protection Force) UNPROFOR (Feb 21 1992) and (United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) UNAMIR (October 1993), commissioned to address 
extreme hostility in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda respectively, recorded humongous failures, 
it became explicit that the concept of enforcing peace needed proper definition.  Following from 
the infamous occurrences marked by UN incapacity to deliver, it was time again to re-
conceptualize the idea of imposing peace.  
  
During the year 2000 “UN Millennium Summit” the Brahimi report noted that peace operations 
was an integral function of the UN and as such had become a “the yardstick with which the 
Organization is judged”.185 It stated in effect that those challenges, which contravened the 
organization’s proper, timely and effective intervention, needed urgent attention. On this note 
it called on members to embrace the challenge with the vigour to surmount the obstacles in a 
manner that can engender prompt solutions especially under the conditions where they serve to 
be decisive. It further redefined some of its guiding principles to the degree that prioritizing the 
safety of victims of war above an adherence to its norms became imperative.  
 
When in 1989 the guiding principles of peace keeping failed to terminate the violent eruption 
of the Liberian war, the (The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) 
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ECOMOG with the firm objective to avert the occurrence of the Rwandan genocide, launched 
what it called “a limited offensive”.186  Though this intervention was void of a clearly defined 
mandate, and became undermined by a display of nonchalance on the part of francophone 
Africa, coupled with the lack of sufficient funds, this counter attack on aggression, which 
transited from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement became capable in the final analysis of 
eliminating the atrocious acts meted out on the victims of that war. It also signified an evident 
ripeness for regional organization to take on the responsibility of conflict intervention in the 
face of an ostensible dwindling involvement on the part of its international boss. Following 
from this, it becomes evident that not all peace-enforcements missions of recent times fall under 
UN operation; nevertheless, missions outside UN tutelage would require UN sanctioning. 
 
Conclusion 
Africa has experienced and continues to experience her fair share of the “novel conflicts” 
known to our modern world.  Protraction and intractability have found unending comfort on 
the African soil. Accordingly, conflict management tools examined in this section, have found 
profound relevance in their mitigation. Coercive and non-coercive methods alike have become 
apparatuses for quick solutions to the eruption of conflict on the continent.  International and 
regional bodies have relied on actors and their attendant instruments and methods with the aim 
of securing a cessation of hostilities as well as mediated settlements.  Notwithstanding efforts 
aligned with the field of conflict management, a palpable vacuum seems evident in renewed 
escalations that have prevailed on the continent.  For this reason, I am propelled to proceed 
towards a close examination of the efficacy that may be embedded in the next approach to 
conflict intervention. I ask the question: to what extent have citizen-based approaches 
successfully addressed protraction and intractability on world conflict terrains.  
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3.6 Conflict Resolution:  Theories, assumptions, historical evolution and methods 
3.6.1 Introduction 
This sub-section intends to capture some of the basic ideas, theories and assumptions known to 
differentiate conflict resolution from the methods of conflict handling consistent with the field 
of conflict management. Most of these assumptions have translated to normative principles 
known to dictate the field’s practice in modern day conflict. I seek to historically trace its 
growth and development over a period leading up to the 21st century. As well as provide an 
analysis of the perspectives from which its views of conflict diverge from the traditional or 
classical international approach already discussed in the preceding section. It considers theories 
by major theorists, whose works have greatly impacted on the field. Some contributions from 
founding fathers in the field would be acknowledged. Their scholarly work as well as 
established institutions forms the basis on which the (Conflict Resolution) CR field finds its 
scholarly bearing in discourses concerning the nature and characteristics of conflict, the sources 
of conflict as well as its mitigation.  I further provide a clear definition of conflict resolution as 
a field of enquiry and introduce some of the methods it employs in resolving conflicts. Conflict 
resolution also termed “track II diplomacy”, will be analysed as an international, non-statist, 
unofficial, citizens-based approach to modern conflicts, backed by interdisciplinary dimensions 
to conflict understanding and discerned as possessing exceptional, distinctive and pragmatic 
methods known to the practice of conflict resolution  
 
3.6.2 From Management to Resolution: A new perception of conflict  
In seeking to design a novel approach to handling conflict, scholars of the field of CR initially 
influenced by perspectives from the international relations field but not confined to it, sought 
to discern the nature and source of conflicts from divergent notions. CR became inspired by the 
various disciplines from which these initial progenitors emerged. Major concerns tilted towards 
underscoring a shift in focus from realist inspired traditional understanding of conflicts: 
wherein conflict was conceptualized on the basis of power politics, was seen to emerge due to 
incompatible interests of states governed by symmetric relationships and where negotiated 
interests engendered zero-sum outcomes to conflict expressions triggered on the basis of unmet 
needs. Such were manifest on interpersonal, intrapersonal, intergroup organizational and 
societal levels.  
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Bercovitch observed that the new approach to conflict is founded upon “the shortcomings of 
the traditional methods”187. Statist apparatuses operating from a framework employed in the 
mitigation of objective causes, have displayed extensive insufficiency in the multiple 
complexities associated with modern day conflict. Coercive methods are fastened to achieving 
negative peace yet the expected message for positive peace undermined by unfulfilled needs, 
has created the vacuum which conflict resolution from inception intended to fill. It sought to 
operate from a paradigm that gave competence to a critical examination of the root causes and 
with the objective of providing the methods for its resolution.   Tidwell opines that coercive 
methods have never stood in the way of hardliners ready to shed blood in the mere pursuit of 
its needs.188 Meaning that regardless of the international community’s commitment to coercive 
action in conflict intervention, humans desperately seeking the fulfilment of their needs would 
eschew the consequences of violent aggression to pursue a change in the status quo that 
sponsors the denial of basic needs.  
 
Following from this, conflict management was construed as neither possessing strategies 
adequate “to address intangible issues,”189 now originating on the basis of identity, nor did its 
methods take cognizance of underlying causes of conflict.  It failed to provide solutions to 
deeply entrenched, intractable and protracted conflicts. In the light of this, conflict resolution 
searches out a path void of traditional thinking to carve out an interdisciplinary perspective 
towards the understanding of conflict. Governed by a wide conception regarding the human 
behaviour, the emergence of conflict based on that, will take root from unmet human needs as 
captured by theorist like Maslow, Sites and Burton, or be viewed as an innate characteristic of 
human nature as propounded by the likes of Thomas Hobbes and Edmund Burke or expressed 
on the basis of external interaction as explained by theorist like Karl Marx and John Dollard et 
al. 190 Conflict may also be determined on the basis of rationality following explanations from 
game theorists or conceived as either constructive or destructive or spawned by subjective 
causes and seen as a functional tool for constructive societal change. In a nutshell, conflict 
resolution theorists observe conflict as having the capacity to erupt from divergent sources, for 
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a multiplicity of causes and occurring on the micro as well as the macro levels within social 
formations. 
 
3.6.3 Defining Conflict Resolution 
To provide an all-encompassing and suitable definition of what conflict resolution entails, I 
draw inspiration from a number of scholars whose extensive intellectual work is capable of 
presenting some clarity to theories, techniques and practices consistent with the field. 
Against the backdrop of delineating some of the basic features of conflict management, those 
as earlier mentioned: limitation, management and containment, Miall projects some of the 
principles guiding conflict resolution thinking, as culled from the work of Azar and Burton 
(1986). 
“Conflict resolution theorists, in contrast, (to International Relations thinking) reject 
the power political view of conflict, arguing instead that in communal and identity 
conflicts, people cannot compromise on their fundamental needs. They argue that it is 
possible to transcend conflicts if parties can be helped to explore, analyse, question 
and reframe their positions and interests. Conflict resolution therefore emphasizes 
intervention by skilled but powerless third-parties working unofficially with the parties 
to foster new thinking and new relationships. They seek to explore what the roots of 
the conflict really is and to identify creative solutions that the parties may have missed 
in their commitment to entrenched positions. Conflict resolution is about how parties 
can move from zero- sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive 
outcomes. The aim is to develop „Processes of conflict resolution that appear to be 
acceptable to parties in dispute, and effective in resolving conflict” 191 
 
In analysing the above definition, we are confronted with a striking contrast between the two 
fields of enquiry.  I elaborate on some of the highlighted elements. The scope of observation 
here is confined to communal conflicts and conflicts which are triggered by the desire to 
actualize the needs of identity. Such needs though not elaborated upon, may be identified as 
ethnic, religious or resource based.   Needs bordering on identity is viewed as crucial and non-
negotiable. Parties in a bid to find ways of addressing unmet needs sometimes display 
aggressive behaviour. When unchecked such aggression may progress to violence eruptions 
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and most times to a full-blown war.  Conflict resolution in contrast to traditional statist 
diplomacy, confronts such conflicts, with optimism:  believing in the ability of parties to rise 
above the matters at stake. Under the circumstance, unofficial practitioners assist adversaries 
to the level of realizing that continued aggression may not presuppose a win –lose, or a lose 
win outcome rather chances of a loose-loose outcome were higher if parties shunned co-
operative avenues for resolution.192   
 
Unofficial diplomacy operates under the assumption that cooperative strategies promise a 
higher probability of attaining a positive sum payoff.  Sequel to such assumptions, they seek to 
unearth the underlying root causes, which for them is a prerequisite for a deep running 
resolution.  In addition, suggested methods become applicable towards the realization of the 
goal for durable peace. Some of such methods as Burton’s controlled communication also 
known as problem –solving workshops suffice as opportunity for the airing of grievances under 
less tensed unofficial atmospheres. I would expatiate on such methods subsequently. If parties 
in conflict find some form of assistance, it engenders a re-examination of parties’ perspectives 
of the conflict and pushes for a possible shift from tightly held standpoints, those which abet 
the conflict. Furthermore, an alteration of false perceptions is likely to emerge to the extent that 
atmosphere for new relationships are created. In similar vein, the emphasis placed on skilled 
but powerless in the definition, presents the case of a non-coercive strategy conducted under an 
unofficial guise and motivated not by selfish interests but by a somewhat genuine drive to 
terminate conflict.  
 
According to Carolyn Manning,  
“conflicts resolution can be viewed as a problem-solving process, which is designed to 
offer parties an opportunity to resolve their difference collaboratively, it is a process 
which involves third parties, who employ techniques and methods that are aimed at 
facilitating communication between parties engaged in conflict.” 193 
This second definition depicts the resolution field as one whose major preoccupation is that of 
solving problems which emerge from conflict. It suggests further, the need for a central focus 
on facilitating joint ways (parties and third-party) of mitigating the issues on ground as much 
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as seeking ways to restore communication among adversaries.  This definition sheds little light 
on exactly what these techniques and methods may be. I.e. Communication 
 
From Wallensteen’s point of observation, conflict resolution presents the forum for “the 
conflicting parties to enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, 
accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against 
each other”.194  
From his perspective, a resolution of conflict is contingent upon an agreement between parties. 
Such agreements quoting him:  
“Refer to situations in which the fighting parties accept each other also as parties in 
future dealings with one another. He goes further; it means that nobody wins all that 
there is to win, but nobody losses all that there is to lose either.” 195  
 
His idea further underscores an available incompatibility, which triggers competition to the 
extent that parties adopt measures and display behaviours that interfere with the continued 
existence of each party. His definition connotes a different dimension to the other two 
definitions earlier examined.  Here, conflict resolution strategies seem to only become effective 
or applicable on the basis of agreements facilitated by the traditional/ statist methods of 
intervention. In a further analysis of what conflict resolution entails, Wallensteen states that 
conflict resolution is not analogous to peace described as the absence of war. 196 Meaning that 
conflict resolution is not satisfied with just “war termination” but seeks peace in the positive 
sense, where peace is defined beyond an end to direct violence, but conceived also, as an end 
to structural and cultural violence.  
 
For Bercovitch, conflict resolution is  
“a range of formal and informal activities undertaken by parties to a conflict, or 
outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in conflict, and to achieve 
some understanding on the key issues of conflict, a political agreement, or a jointly 
acceptable decision on future interaction and distribution of resources. Conflict 
resolution is about accepting a conflict, recognizing that there are ways out of it, and 
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engaging in some tacit or explicit co-ordination, without which none of these goals can 
be achieved” 197 
From Bercovitch viewpoint, conflict resolution approaches and strategies may be 
complementary to some of the techniques from the power-politics approach.  First, the aspect 
of achieving a political agreement is seen as being consistent with conflict management 
strategies. On the other hand, “accepting a conflict so as to establish ways out of it” realized 
not by violent means but involving “explicit co-ordination” This remains within the theoretical 
framework of the resolution approach by which explicit coordination may also be construed as 
interdependency between conflict management and resolution.  In similar vein conflict 
resolution here addresses conflict from objective causes. In such instances problems arising 
from disparate resource distribution viz a vie the key issues are tackled     
  
3.6.4 Conflict Resolution: Historical evolution, ideas, assumptions and theories 
 The evolution of the field of conflict resolution, owes its vastness, multidisciplinary base, 
repertoire of knowledge and theoretical foundation to the consistent and tireless intellectual 
involvement and established institutions of a plethora of scholars and practitioners and 
founders, whose ideas, works and understanding, have formed the basic theories, concepts and 
approaches associated with the field. These have been catalogued over a period of decades, 
preceding the Second World Wars and into the 21st century. Initial considerations towards 
advancing the field stemmed from a strong propelling to avert the reoccurrence of war.  
Subsequent activities in the course of actualizing the goal to halt wars, culminated in the 
development of intellectual trajectories for understanding war and enabling peace. These initial 
foundations were laid by academic influences from the International Relations, political 
science, economics, psychology and sociology that capped with the development of the robust 
field and practice of conflict resolution.  
 
 3.6.5 Developments in the First and Second World War Era 
 Early contribution from the field of political science came from Crane Brinton’s scholarly 
work. His research centred on four revolutions: English, American, French and Russian. 
Brinton analysed some of the stages that lead up to a revolution. Drawing from his analysis was 
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an early insight into causes of conflict. 198Similarly, the well-known Frustration –Aggression 
theory as propounded by John Dollard, Neal Miller and Leonard Doob in 1939 enabled conflict 
analysis from the perspectives of psychologists.  They elaborated on the link between 
frustration and aggression, suggesting, that the expression of aggressive behaviour is contingent 
upon an existing frustration.199 
 Also, Kurt Lewin (1890- 1947) a psychologist who helped to found the social psychology 
discipline, left his mark on the field of conflict resolution.  From his perspective, behavioural 
expressions are contingent upon external forces. His assertion negated notions of conflict as 
understood by mainstream psychology. His “Field Theory” principle explains conflict 
expressions in terms of how a person perceives himself and his environment, he suggested that 
a proper understanding of human behaviour rested on discerning the entire “life space” such as 
family, school, work, within which a person operated.200  Mary Parker Follet was one of the 
pioneering academicians in the field of management who advocated for a positive sum solution 
to conflict. Her early contribution to the development of the organizational theory and 
organizational behaviour promoted early insights into conflicts that occur within 
organizations.201 
Furthermore, contributions from German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel and 
American Sociologist Lewis Coser provided a strong influence on the field.  Their work 
projected a contrary opinion of conflict usually conceived of in negative terms.  Conflict had 
the capacity to produce evil as well as good. Similarly, conflict could be put to functional use 
within a society. According to Simmel, “conflict integrates disparate members of a group into 
a group and is a source of social cohesion and creativity”.202 For Coser, conflict was integral to 
preserving human relationships.  
Morton Deutsch contributing to the field delineated and categorized conflicts into constructive 
and destructive types. While destructive conflicts were characterized by escalation, constructive 
ones were perceived as less expressive and probably latent.  Elaborating on competitive and 
cooperative relationships in conflict he suggested the ability on the basis of such relationship 
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to predict conflicts with the destructive and constructive potencies “In similar vein, Morton 
emphasized a subjective view of conflict. As much as conflicts originate from objective causes, 
conflict emanates for subjective reasons, such as perception, cognition and values.203 
 
3.6.6  Post World Wars Proponents and Contributions 
The ideological repository of the conflict resolution field found further nourishment from 
traditions whose values underscore non-violence. Structural violence may be contested albeit 
by peaceful means. In like manner, such traditions of peace as consistent with those of the 
Quakers and Mennonites strongly support the mitigation of conflict as reliant on pacifist 
conception, which countermand coercive strategies. Furthermore, inspirations from Gandhi’s 
peace advocacy, more precisely the “satygraha” have been spurred within the conflict resolution 
framework of understanding.  Such ideas have deeply impressed upon Burtons “Needs based” 
principle for conflict analysis as well as aligning conflict mitigations techniques like the 
“problem solving workshops” tailored towards cooperative payoffs as propounded by the likes 
of Burton, Doob and Kelman.204 
 
As the field continued to record immense development, global politics witnessed the tragic 
decimation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Following closely in 1945 and prompted by that 
occurrence was the establishment of a Laboratory for Peace Research by Theodore Lenz, whose 
motivation was premised upon his believe that findings from an in-depth study of human 
behaviour could engender strategies tantamount to human peaceful co-existence.  While this 
development may be viewed as a milestone to the credit of the field’s continued growth, it also 
heralded in the subsequent establishment of institutions for further research into the analysis of 
human behaviour as well as an investigation into plausible means for averting wars.  
In the light of this Kenneth Boulding and his team of academicians at the University of 
Michigan founded a Centre for Research and Conflict Resolution in 1959. Included in the list 
was mathematician cum biologist Anatol Rapport whose assumptions bordered on game 
theories, also social psychologist Herbert Kelman who later introduced the “integrative problem 
solving” tactics to the field and Robert Cooley.  Preceding the establishment of that centre was 
their 1957 publication titled the “Journal of Peace Research” which was induced by a longing 
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to prevent wars as well as conceptualize them outside the confines of realist perceptions. They 
assumed that facts accumulated from such scientific research would aid the prediction of 
hitherto unforeseeable threat to global peace and stability. 205 
 
In examining contributions to the development of the conflict resolution, the immense impact 
of Norwegian philosopher, sociologist and mathematician Johan Galtung cannot be 
overemphasized. He was widely known for conceptualizing peace in negative and positive 
terms, delineating negative peace as an absence of war characterized by an underlying structural 
and cultural violence. Conversely positive peace was construed on the basis addressing 
structural deficiencies. His distinction between direct and structural violence viewed the former 
as inflicted on the physical human body, while the latter is rooted in inadequacies of social and 
institutional structures. 206 
 
3.6.7 Theorists, Theories and Tools 
3.6.7.1      John Burton: Human Needs Theory and the surrounding discourse 
 
John Burton the 1915 Australian born scholar is regarded as a significant contributor to the field 
of CR.  His rich repository of knowledge left an indelible mark on the advancement of the field. 
The myriad of his scholarly contributions is today understood as a major component in the 
analysis and resolution of stubborn and prolonged conflicts. Having concluded a fruitful career 
at the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Burton is today 
recognized as the most prominent proponent of the Human Needs theory in line with 
predecessors Abraham Maslow and Paul Sites. His extensive study of the Human Needs 
approach, as a means of understanding the sources of most deep seated and prolonged 
international conflicts has engendered renewed understanding that conflicts whose underlying 
causes have been identified are assumedly a step away from being resolved. Such assumptions 
tend to ridicule those from the field of International relations.  According to Burton: 
 “Deep rooted” conflicts are those which tend to resist conventional efforts at finding 
a solution”.    
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With time, they protract because improper strategies for resolution have been employed. 
Furthermore, the incapacity to provide concrete solutions to any conflict in Burtons view is 
largely traceable to:  
“An inability on the part of both protagonist and third parties to recognize that deep 
rooted conflicts are caused by the denial of basic, inalienable values or the frustration 
of basic human needs” 207 
 
Burton made the case of a paradigm shift in which he identified the loopholes created by 
traditional diplomacy as opportunity to rethink the resolution of conflict, based on approaches 
which facilitated a reassessment of parties’ perception, enhanced communication and supported 
efforts to facilitate mutually acceptable conflict outcomes. 
3.6.7.2   The Human Needs Theory 
 
The theory of human needs within conflict resolution theorizing is viewed as a generic theory 
aiding the analysis of most international conflict. Knowledge inspired by such assumption tends 
to contradict Hobbesian perception depicting man as hostile and barbaric.  Human behaviour 
as already examined, may be triggered by the denial of its basic needs, so that human behaviour 
is best ascertained on the basis of a causal link between unsatisfied basic needs and aggressive 
expression. Such assumption negates all assertions of aggression being an innate feature of the 
human organism. According to the Hobbesian line of argument, humans are better christened 
“necessitous”. Mitchell endorses this claim by observing that “man’s natural and universal 
needs are the fundamental, first causes of conflict and dispute” regardless of whatever level 
conflict is considered. 208  
 
Needs of identity, recognition security, which are fundamental to man, though intangible play 
an important role in the wellbeing and development of the human being as much as the need 
for food, clothing and shelter.  Burton as confirmed by Tidwell listed a set of “knowable basic 
needs”. They include recognition, security, role defence, control and meaning. Burton 
conceives of these needs as vital to the extent that they provide insight into human behaviour. 
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They serve as a guide toward the realization that undermining the basic human need can be 
tantamount to advancing conflict. Therefore, polices should be enacted with much 
consideration and sensitivity so as not to counteract the fulfilment thereof.  He further 
corroborated this assertion by contending that institutions will be confronted with enormous 
challenges if the needs of the masses are denied. Such institutions rarely enjoy the support of 
its people. In his opinion assuaging everyone’s needs are synonymous with averting conflict 209  
 
However, the question remains, can all human needs be fulfilled? How can we determine needs 
in order of the most pressing priority? Are there some needs that are unimportant? Which can 
wait momentarily?  Mitchell identifies the need of “identity” as an addition to the list, stating 
that Burton views this need as superseding, all other human needs on his list. Furthermore, it is 
paramount to the proper resolution of any conflict to identify those needs which have remained 
neglected as much as “deduce what alterations in structures, institutions and policies are 
required to enable the fulfilment of needs”210.  
 
Social psychologists whose concern it is to explain intra as well as inter-group behaviour insist 
that such groups crave both physical and psychological need such as identity, participation and 
adequate control over their own destiny211. On the basis of this, human beings tend to hold fast 
to their identity as a source from which they derive meaning to their very existence. Group 
identity is seen to enhance self-confidence, as much as provides some form of emotional 
stability to its members. Identity may be defined along the lines of nationality, religion, or even 
ethnicity. During the cold war lines of identity were drawn on ideological assumptions. 
Klineberg in studying group behaviour suggests, from a social-psychological perspective, a 
clear element of universality embedded in gratification derived from the satisfaction of the 
identity need. His analysis depicts a clear causal link between deprivation experienced within 
a group and the emergence of a myriad of social conflicts. People generally encounter the 
longing to identify, and be identified with a group. The need for identity therefore becomes 
extremely vital to the wellbeing of a group to the extent that:  
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“Human beings are willing to suffer immeasurably and to sacrifice even their lives in 
the struggle for the protection of their identity”212  
 
Similarly, the need for identity propels group relations on varying levels, such that the tendency 
for conflict not to ensue becomes improbable and inescapable.  
Burton and Azar213 have buttressed this assertion by arguing that the needs for recognition, 
identity, security and participation form vital facets of a group’s wellbeing. An attempt thus, 
to prevent its fulfilment tends to precipitate a push for redress and satisfaction.  Intergroup 
conflicts in addition, are triggered on the perception that an opposing group poses a threat to 
the satisfaction of its needs, especially when the satisfiers for such needs are somewhat scarce.  
In the light of this, the analysis of intergroup aggression based on human needs theorizing, is 
perceived as possessing the propensity for conflict.   
 
Fisher contends that while the need for security and freedom present the case for national 
responsibility, the satisfaction of the “identity need” is exclusively achieved through identity 
groups, by which he infers an inextricable connection between the individual and the group 
with which it identifies. And since group identity tends to promote the self- confidence of its 
members as underscored earlier, an attack on the group’s identity is naturally transferred to its 
individual members and may be construed negatively. Thus, the viewpoint that individual and 
groups are ready to die in the defence of their identity becomes validated. Sequel to the 
aforementioned considerations, a conclusion may be established on the assumption that a 
myriad of group conflict tends to originate from a denial of the need for identity. To this extent 
it becomes valid and coherent to suggest that such conflicts may begin to portray signs of 
intractability and protraction as a result of prolonged denial or unsatisfied needs. 
 
 The field of conflict resolution seems to lack coherence when it comes to a consensus of what 
may be conceived as the universally acceptable list to which conflict resolvers may refer to 
when identifying those needs to be met for peace and harmony to be restored to any given 
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conflict. Previously I enumerated some of the needs on Burton’s list.  Burton is however not 
alone in capturing some of the needs perceived to be paramount to the social and physical 
advancement of human beings.  Scholars like Johan Galtung, James Davis, Banks214 and a host 
other have from their perspectives presented a list of their own, which they believe constitutes 
the basic needs important for the full development of any individual.  In like manner, Abraham 
Maslow a progenitor in “Human Needs” theorizing notes that a list of human needs is similarly 
defined in a certain order. He therefore presented a hierarchy of human needs from the less 
important to the most important. Below is a version as compiled and explained by Ronald 
Fischer 
• Self-actualization needs: the ultimate motivation, involving the need to fulfil one’s 
unique potential 
• Esteem needs: the need for achievement, competence and mastery, as well as motives 
for recognition, prestige and status 
• Cognitive needs: the desire to know, to understand and to satisfy one’ curiosity 
• Belongingness and Love needs: needs that are satisfied by social relationships 
• Safety needs: needs that must be met to protect the individual from danger 
• Physiological needs: basic internal deficit conditions that must be satisfied to maintain 
bodily processes215 
One may extrapolate from his assertions, a greater emphasis on the lower need; even though he 
made it quite clear that both higher and lower needs play a significant role in the total wellbeing 
of the individual. Lower needs may be grasped in terms of material satisfiers.   
 
Abraham Maslow216 was a psychologist, therefore his analysis focused on understanding 
individual behaviour in connection with unsatisfied need. This excluded an analysis of group 
or intergroup relations. He identified higher needs as posing no fundamental threat to human 
survival; they are those needs whose fulfilment may not be regarded as craving urgent attention. 
He held that between the need for food and safety for example, the necessity tag would 
definitely be placed on the food need, albeit the safety need if satisfied affords the individual a 
greater sense of “relief and relaxation”. He argued that “the deprivation of higher needs does 
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not produce so desperate a defence and emergency reaction as is produced by lower 
deprivation”, nonetheless people whose needs have managed to transcend those of the basic 
needs, to the extent of craving higher needs as “love” and “respect” for example, such persons 
display enhanced physical and psychological contentment and produce fruits of “ loyalty, 
friendliness, civic consciousness, they even become better parents, husbands, teachers, public 
servants etc.”. Placing the need for “safety” over “respect”, he stated that “Respect is a 
dispensable luxury when compared with safety” therefore the fulfilment of the higher need may 
be realized on a later basis or may just fade away. 
Maslow nonetheless is perceived to have been guided by Western thinking, his arguments of 
what may constitute the human need have been regarded as falling short of the universal human 
need margin and therefore cannot be considered comprehensive.  They however serve a 
significant purpose in the analysis of a myriad of international conflict. 
 
Some scholars posit that unmet needs may not necessarily engender conflict. By which they 
suggest that conflict occurs, when satisfiers of needs are perceived to be scarce or insufficient. 
Therefore, the conflict emerges out of a scramble for satisfiers with limited availability. On the 
premise of this argument, it may be inappropriate to project “A theory of Human Needs” as 
platform for identifying the underlying causes of all conflicts. In a conflict between famers and 
herders as exemplified in the Darfur crisis, what may be understood as the conflict trigger as 
postulated by this school of thought is not the frustration arising from the inability to farm on a 
land occupied by herders, but the scarcity of land as provoked by the conflict. In this context, 
the resolution will be to address the land scarcity by other solutions as suggested in Fisher’s 
book “Getting to Yes”. The author elaborates on a different conflict resolution strategy he terms 
“principled negotiation”. However, one begins to wonder how this argument may be reconciled 
with the argument from John Dollard et al.217 in which an obvious link between frustration and 
aggression is underscored.  
 
In light of the context under discussion, aggression is discerned as emanating from a frustration 
(the inability to farm or graze). Therefore aggression (conflict) is triggered from a state of 
frustration.   In Mitchell’s version of this assertion, he opines by arguing from the viewpoint of 
other scholars: the phenomenon of Basic Human Needs as the starting point for a theory of 
conflict resolution might be erroneous.  A theory of conflict resolution should begin with the 
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satisfiers available to fulfil those needs and overtly pursued by individual, groups and hence 
parties in conflict, therefore it is not the needs themselves but the choice of means for fulfilment 
(satisfiers) that can create the conflict. 
Following the analysis of the one generic theory which informs the analysis of a plethora of 
conflict on several landscapes, I proceed to elaborate on some of the methods and approaches 
applied to the resolution of conflicts.  
 
3.6.7.3    Tools of Conflict Resolution 
Problem Solving Workshops:  
Controlled Communication and Integrative Problem Solving (Analytical Problem 
Solving) 
 
Burton’s controlled communication and Kelman’s integrative problem solving have become 
prominent through the various “Problem Solving Workshops” organized by them. Other 
scholars like Leonard Doob, Stephen Cohen, Levi and Benjamin have either themselves 
organized Workshops in conjunction with other partners or served as invited scientist on other 
workshops.  Extant literature documenting experiences from Workshops refer back to the ones 
organized between the 60s and early 90s. The ideas, assumptions and style adopted in the 
Problem-Solving approach back then remain consistent with those organized to solve the 
problems of present-day conflicts albeit with slight difference.  
 
3.6.7.3a    Controlled Communication 
 
“Controlled communication is primarily a social-psychological device for altering the attitudes 
and perceptions of the representatives of states in conflict, so that on the basis of reduced 
hostility and tensions they may be able to come together for serious and productive negotiations. 
It may be employed academically as a means of generating hypotheses about the analysis and 
resolution of international conflict.”218 
One element of this definition (coming together for serious and productive negotiation) 
suggests that Problem –Solving is not directly a tool for the resolution of conflict but serves as 
a complimentary process to official negotiations.  Kelman terms it a transfer of the changes 
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facilitated during the workshop. A transfer of enhanced communications altered perceptions 
and changed attitudes, which help to hasten the more official processes. Kelman interactive 
approach to problem solving will be examined in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
In 1966 John Burton and his associates conducted a Problem-Solving Workshop at the Centre 
for the Analysis of Conflict at the University College London. It was administered to initiate 
the resolution of the conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Conducted 
in a purely academic setting and consisting of participants who enjoyed some measure of 
closeness to foreign policy decision makers. The workshop demonstrated in terms of structure, 
process and content, some approaches for dealing with conflicts resulting from collapsed 
communication.  Burton’s “Controlled Communication” received much inspiration from the 
systems theory. Within that framework, conflict is basically analysed on the macro level and a 
deficiency on the part of international capacity to sufficiently and satisfactorily address conflict. 
In this regard, states are perceived as demonstrating minimal contribution to the emergence of 
conflict.   
 
Regardless of foundational ties to the Systems theory, Burton was able to carve out his own 
conception of conflict. Burton conceived of international conflicts as spill overs from internal 
or communal strive219. Based on Burton’s conception, it is in line, to infer that conflict triggers 
are embedded within the state.  Similarly, Burton argued, that the seeds of conflict may be 
found within the decision-making process of the state.220  He inferred that states usually exhibit 
a deficient capability in appropriate decision-making and organization to the level of 
perpetuating conflict. Consequently, decision-making, the selection of foreign policy goals and 
the assessment of the means to achieve these goals engender distorted perceptions and 
perspectives of decision makers.221 This assumption is understood to have influenced his 
criteria for selecting participants who participated in the London Workshop organized on behalf 
of the conflict between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus.  For him the selection of 
participants, who enjoyed strong ties with decision makers on foreign policy matters, played a 
decisive role in the final analysis of official negation. Some of Burton’s assumptions played a 
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decisive role in the defining structure and principles for organizing future workshops.  
Workshop proceedings had to clearly negate the application of soft coercion manifested in 
conflict management strategies of mediation and conciliation.  
 
Traditional diplomacy involved some measure of imposed solution by the intervening third 
parties. They are conducted on official capacity and characterized by diplomatic formalities.  
On the basis of this, workshops were convened on an unofficial capacity, in an academic 
environment and by scholars who were knowledgeable in conflict theory, but whose role 
excluded the imposition of solutions on participants.  Burton’s sheds light on the extent of social 
scientists’ involvement in problem –solving workshops by referring to his controlled 
communication approach. He states that their duty is to “explain conflict, its origin, and its 
escalation… within the context of a continuing discussion between the parties…” 222 Problem 
Solving Workshop’s therefore provides the enabling environment for face to face 
communication participants also to become knowledgeable in conflict theories to the extent that 
such insight provides a clearer understanding of their own conflict.  
 
On the basis of improved communication, participants become capable of discerning mutually 
acceptable outcome and other ways of achieving their objectives without having to bear the 
high cost a continued aggression.  Chardwick Alger one of the organizing participants in 
Burton’s workshop had this to say, “it was remarkable to see how quickly…insights about 
conflict escalation processes helped parties to understand more deeply the ways in which they 
had unwittingly escalated the conflict in which they were involved”223.  Similarly, controlled 
communication affords participants the opportunity for self-engendered mutually acceptable 
solutions to the conflict. Kelman in his 1972 analysis on Burton’s (Problem Solving 
Workshops) PSW underscored the effect of organizing such workshops in isolation of the 
public or official glare.  He states: “the environments were designed to create an informal 
atmosphere in which participants were free to express their views openly and to get to know 
and respect each other as individuals. Ultimately, the atmosphere fostered mutual trust, a sense 
of shared values and commitment to a common task”224 - joint problem solving. 
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Levi and Benjamin have provided some insight into the proceedings of typical workshops.  It 
commences with a definition of conflict from the perspectives of the parties highlighting the 
key issues associated with the conflict. Secondly information is gathered and dispersed 
regarding processes in general and processes of the particular conflict under scrutiny.  The third 
stage consists of an evaluation of the options for a mutually acceptable outcome, available to 
the parties.  Flowing from the three stages will be a redefinition of the conflict, fact finding and 
the search for best possible solutions.225 The main crux of Burton’s PSW was directed towards 
enhanced communication among parties whose level of communication was low or completely 
non-existent. He opined that conflicts might be close to resolution if effective communication 
can be restored among conflicting parties.   
 
The emergence of conflict for him, is also predicated on the assumption that communication 
between parties in conflict has collapsed.  A resolution thereof should therefore emerge from 
processes with the capacity to enhance as much as re-establish such communication.  As such 
controlled communication serves as an apparatus, which facilitates the restoration of 
communication through the process of an unstructured agenda in which parties air their 
perceptions of the conflict of themselves and those of their adversary.  In Burton’s opinion, 
controlled communication is not to be conceived as a procedure for the resolution of conflict 
between adversaries; they are viewed more as preparatory to official negotiation.   
Considering the changes in perceptions and attitudes that have already occurred in the parties 
during these pre-negotiation sessions, parties are better prepared to negotiate mutually 
acceptable outcomes.  He clearly asserted that the major purpose for facilitating controlled 
communication among parties was to “expose their perceptions of each other, their motivations 
and goals, their internal political problem… Not for the purpose of settling the conflict but on 
the assumption that such communication would be helpful to the parties in providing a basis 
for resolution”226 Also Burton saw these workshops as added value to the academia. Scholars 
were afforded a chance at analysing the drivers of an on-going conflict. Nonetheless, one thing 
remains unclear, since the participants of his workshop were not policy makers themselves but 
enjoyed close ties to them, one begins to wonder to what extent these participants were able to 
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transfer the changes which occurred in them to the conflict at large or to its final resolution. 
There is however a high probability that the experience, information and insights would be 
passed on to the decision makers, at least as a way of feedback.  Burton had this to say regarding 
the outcome of his workshop  
“All that can be said is that communication was established were previously it did not exist, 
perceptions and attitudes of participants were altered during the exercise”227  
 
Some of the discrepancies observed, and experiences gathered from Burton’s problem-solving 
workshops, later aided Kelman, who was one of the academic participants, to fashion out his 
own conception of problem-solving workshops which he tagged interactive problem solving.  
 
3.6.7.3b      Evaluating Controlled Communication     
 
Yalem has gone ahead to criticize Burton on a number of issues. He argued that there has been 
no evidence of the use of controlled communication since the London workshop in 1966, nor 
does the approach provide any concrete proof of its efficacy in the resolution of international 
conflicts. He dismisses Burton’s assertions regarding the positive impact of controlled 
communication as a mere hypothesis, which needs testing.  He further contended that not all 
conflicts can be resolved on the basis of enhancing communication among parties especially 
when the emergence of conflict is attributed to “objective incompatibilities and subjective 
distortions”228. Controlled communication may further fuel hostility than make a positive 
impact.   The author goes on to suggest that in such cases, a resolution of conflict via effective 
communication, may be achievable only on the premise that parties have realized that their 
interests are better achieved by a resolution than by continued aggression. He argues further, 
that not all compromise result in zero-sum outcomes especially, when such conflict is defined 
along lines of symmetric relationships.   
 
A certain level of compromise is required to attain the level of mutual satisfaction; both parties 
under such condition tend to realize that a little compromise of interest on each side is likely to 
yield a win-win payoff.  Yalem questions Burton’s underlying assumptions for the application 
of controlled communication in international conflict as “Analogous reasoning”229 and lacking 
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in empirical evidence and proof enough to validate his propositions. He holds that controlled 
communication may proof effective to a larger extent if participants constituted the decision 
makers themselves. On the basis of this, resolution of conflict stood a better chance, if changed 
perceptions would occur in the very individuals who possessed the power to influence a de-
escalation of conflict.   
 
Yalem’s critical analysis of the efficacy of controlled communication as a vital unofficial 
instrument to achieving a mutually acceptable settlement in the final analysis of official 
negotiation propels further testing and investigation. Yalem however argued from a standpoint 
of interstate conflict. Within such framework of understanding parties involved operate on 
symmetric relationships, where the national interest of state is at stake, where a focus on 
enhancing communication may more or less be dismissed as irrelevant to the grand purpose, 
and where parties can afford to consider compromise especially when it serves the purpose of 
mutual satisfaction in the final analysis.  Considering Yalem’s point of departure, the relevant 
and significant argument would be, to examine the efficacy of controlled communication in 
intra-state conflicts.  To what extent can controlled communication be found applicable in 
modern day conflicts whose emergence is connected to subjective causes? Is controlled 
communication effective where compromise and dissatisfaction is likely to precipitate a 
resurgence of conflict? More so, how effective is controlled communication in conflicts 
characterized by asymmetry, where it becomes a serious challenge for the stronger party to 
yield to any of its objectives.  The stronger party hardly thinks rationally especially when guided 
by the perception that it possesses the power to achieve a win. On the basis of this, conflict as 
much as progresses without a consideration of cost incurred.  
 
The faulted assumptions underlying Burton’s controlled communication, may have informed a 
restructuring and change of perspective and approach in Kelman. He considered that his 
interactive format for workshops are applicable to conflicts of modern-day characterizing.   Till 
this day, problems solving workshops remain an integral part of conflict resolution. Small 
wonder the George Mason team from the USA, found it relevant to the on-going crisis in 
Darfur.  Whether problem-solving workshops manifest in form of controlled communication, 
interactive problem solving or as a synthesis of both, the point remains that its application has 
found consistency in internal conflicts of international concern.  However, it is still somewhat 
impossible to validate its relevance in contemporary kinds of conflicts. 
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Having examined the controlled communication approach to problem-solving workshops, I 
now recount the first attempt at applying problem solving to an African conflict. 
 
3.6.7.4c Interactive Problem-Solving: An approach to Conflict Resolution 
 
Herbert Kelman became the proponent of “interactive problem solving”. His workshops 
provided participants with the fora for an analytical analysis of the opposing perspectives, 
which may be sustaining conflict aggression. After a critical analysis of Burton and Doob’s 
approach to Problem-Solving Workshops, Kelman designed his own unique method of 
applying PSW to real time conflicts. He personally admits that most of the basic defining 
features manifested in typical PSW, form part of the structure of his own approach. However, 
the point of divergence is evidenced in the assumptions underlying his own approach to some 
of the PSW he organized. In his opinion, not all types of conflicts were suitable for the 
application of “interactive problem solving”.  
 
3.6.7.4d Examining the Interactive approach to Problem Solving 
 
Kelman defined interactive problem solving as “an academically based, unofficial third-party 
approach, bringing together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication” 
This definition depicts clearly an approach conducted on unofficial capacity, which facilitates 
“direct” communication between party representatives. It nonetheless presents a certain level 
of ambiguity in the sense that it is difficult to detect one element of differentiation between his 
approach to problem-solving and those of his predecessors.  Therefore, an elaborate 
examination of the underlying assumption, which inspires his approach, becomes relevant at 
this point. 
Kelman and Stephen Cohen organized three preliminary workshops at the Harvard University.  
The first one investigated the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, while the 1972 and 
1979 workshops examined the Bangladeshi conflict, and the conflict between the Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots respectively. These workshops were basically one-time events until 1990 when 
Kelman and Rouhana conducted follow- up workshop, which according to him hosted high 
level, politically influential Israelis’, and Palestinians.230  
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 At this juncture, an insight is gained into Kelman’s criteria for the selection of participants in 
his workshop. His suggestion on the calibre of workshop participants is perceived to be in strict 
opposition to the stringent and compulsory criteria for the selection of participants exhibited in 
Burton’s Workshops. As already highlighted in the previous sections, Burton underscored a 
distinct connection of participants to the decision makers of their home countries. For Kelman, 
it was significant that participants were politically involved individuals, who at the same time 
enjoyed popularity and credibility in their communities and whose active involvement in 
political debates and perhaps movements can positively impact on the given conflict.231.   
Kelman disputed the assumption that most international conflicts emerged from ineffective 
communication. As such his workshops were not tailored toward the mere achievement of 
enhanced communication but towards the broader picture of an effective transfer of changes to 
the political landscape and most especially towards a transformation of the underlying broken 
relationships, which define the kinds of conflict he proposed.  Kelman suggested that his 
workshops were characterized by an analytical approach to problem solving which afforded 
the participants the opportunity to acquire an improved and changed understanding of their 
opponent, and provided a forum for the tabling of concerns, needs, fears, priorities and 
constraints.232  Similarly his workshops provided “opportunities for the parties to interact, to 
become acquainted with each other and to humanize their mutual images, not as ends in 
themselves, but as means to producing new leanings that can be fed into the political 
process.”233 
 
 A maintained level of confidentiality and the non-binding characteristic of such workshops 
engendered a relaxed atmosphere and a freedom to air grievances. Participants maintained the 
calmness of operating within an “off the record” framework, which is more likely to facilitate 
the desired result for change. 
Problem-solving workshops in its interactive form is meant to progress on a “no fault” 234 basis. 
By which the organizing participants assist parties to refrain from apportioning blame, and 
organizers themselves refrain from proposing or imposing a solution to the conflict under 
scrutiny. Such interaction is therefore geared toward engendering self-produced solutions to the 
problems the participants have before them.    Kelman conducted workshops up till the early 
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90s, when the world scene had started to record evident changes in conflict dynamics and 
features. At this point, conflicts began showing signs of intractability and protraction. Conflicts 
as already discussed earlier, became more of internally generated which triggered international 
concern and action. It is no wonder that Kelman suggests that his approach to workshops 
focused on solving identity-based conflicts using the interactive approach.  
 
Appropriate conflicts in his opinion constituted those, where official negotiations have reached 
a deadlock, such that there are slim chances for continued negotiation. Therefore, he stated that 
interactive problem solving is irrelevant “if there are no profound barriers to negotiations,”235 
these barriers he opined were more of psychological. If they were non-existent, then interactive 
problem solving became irrelevant. However, he noted that “psychological barriers” are more 
often than not manifested in protracted identity conflict. On account of this, interactive problem 
solving becomes relevant as a preparatory exercise to facilitate improved official deliberations. 
The Workshop concept was therefore not construed as a method that has a come to supplant 
official mechanisms.  Kelman corroborates this with this assertion:  
 
“Our work on the Israeli –Palestinian conflict during the pre-negotiation and early 
negotiations phases helped lay the groundwork for the Oslo agreement by contributing 
to the development of the cadres, the ideas, and the political atmosphere required for 
movement to the table and productive negotiations” 236 
 
The focus of interactive problem solving therefore facilitates a smooth transfer as much as 
creates new relationships among participants who need to learn not only to relate better on the 
official negotiating table but to peacefully co-exist in their various communities, regardless of 
the damaging effect a war may have inflicted on them. 
   
Since one of the characteristics of modern conflicts is the problem of imbalance in power; 
evidenced by asymmetrical relations, interactive problem solving tends to induce participants 
to interact on an equal basis. In Kelman’s opinion, “Participants from the stronger party must 
be able and willing to deal with the other on the basis of equality, while the participants from 
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the weaker must be able to deal with the other on the basis of equality.” Therefore, willingness 
and ability on the part of the stronger and the weaker participant is seen to play a vital role in 
achieving the purpose of such an exercise.  
 
3.6.8 Applying PSW to African Conflicts 
In 1969 Leonard Doob and William Foltz organized a Problem-Solving Workshop (Fermeda 
Workshop) to investigate the border conflict between Somalia and two of her neigbours: 
Ethiopia and Kenya. The organizing participants were experts in the area of group dynamics, 
sensitivity training and third-party conflict resolution. They similarly demonstrated sizable 
knowledge about a number of issues concerning Africa.  Representatives from Kenya and 
Ethiopia were scholars drawn from a wide range of academic disciplines. Somalis were picked 
from within and without decision-making. The 18 participants from the three countries were 
divided into two groups of 9. Each group had a participant from each of the three representing 
countries. This analysis is based on Walton who was one of the social scientists on that 
workshop. According to Walton, the organizers aimed “to achieve a consensus for some 
proposal to solve the border dispute”237.  
 
As with Burton’s workshop, the session followed an unstructured agenda. Discussions were 
held, which included the role of the OAU (now AU) in the dispute under consideration.  Some 
participants perceived the organization as powerless in the de-escalation of the conflict; a 
separate group countered the opinion. Participants were educated in the area of politics and 
culture of each country. The session progressed on a learning mode and exhibited a 
consolidating undertone that reinforced interpersonal relations among parties.238 The organizers 
interfered in proceedings when it was evidently called for. In instances such as when 
communication seemed to derail from the focus or when the atmosphere seemed heated up due 
to conflicting opinions and ideas. The workshop initially progressed without any form of 
chairmanship. It was a deliberate effort to engender group cohesion, which almost became 
detrimental to the organizer’s efforts.  With time however, the group learned of its own to 
manage discrepancies resulting from the structure of the workshop. Walton notes: “there was a 
discernible increase in the ease with which participants interacted with one another”239.  
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At some point participants began to freely voice out their fears and concerns. This was greeted 
with empathy by other members and in-turn triggered mutual respect and understanding. In the 
course of the session’s discussions, participants gained ideas into each country’s perception, of 
the common concern: the conflict. Each country’s representatives had the chance to air its views 
of the conflict while other country representatives took notes of what they perceived to be the 
issues of contention as expressed. It was later given as a presentation to the whole workshop 
group. The idea of the exercise was to stimulate the capacity to view conflict from an 
opponent’s perception as well.  
Issues to be discussed followed a more structured mode. It also saw the creation of committees 
from among the participants and organizers, and an agenda tailored towards the discussion of 
major issues.  The idea was for each committee headed by a chairman, to preside over issues 
for discussion as well as to facilitate a smooth transition into the discussion of the more sensitive 
issues regarding the conflict. 
At this point, the participants deliberated over issues concerning the conflict in the format below 
as provided by Walton: 
1. What is?  
• A nation? 
• A nation –state? 
• The principle of self-determination? 
• What is the nature of the problem 
• What are the implications of redrawing the map of northwest Africa? 
2.  How do these disputes hinder 
• Internal development? 
• Regional development? 
3. External influences on these disputes: 
• Role of “great” powers 
• Role of other nation states 
4. What is the significance of the disputed areas to the parties concerned?240 
These issues were intensely discussed, and the house sought joint solutions to them.  
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As discussions progressed it became clear that the participant’s perspective of the conflict was 
largely diverse and most of them held doggedly to their views without signs for a shift. In the 
course of events the Biafra war that was on-going at the time, was examined and joint solutions 
to it were sought using the technique of “brainstorming”. The idea was to help participants 
apply the same technique, to finding joint solutions to their own conflict. When finally, the 
technique was applied to the issue of contention, (their own conflict) the group according to 
Walton, came up with 150 ideas to be developed. At this juncture, smaller working groups were 
created to seek concrete solutions under different topics: Political, Economic, Military and 
social. Afterwards, all proposals gathered from the groups were collated and deliberated upon, 
arousing sentiments and disagreements from parties with opposing perspectives and in some 
instances name-calling. It may be important at this point, to add that this workshop was 
conducted as an experimental exercise, in the hope that some unofficial method for addressing 
future conflicts emerges from it.  Even though according to Walton, the workshop ended on a 
distasteful note and lacking a unanimous proposition for solutions to the conflict, posterity 
stood to glean some lessons from its strengths and failures.  
 
3.6.8.1            The Outcome  
The effect of the workshop may be viewed from some positive angles; it no doubt made an 
effective impact on the participants. Walton finds it somewhat impossible to ascertain the effect 
of any workshop on a conflict in the short term. However, the organizers were able to make 
some deduction from questionnaires filled out by participants at the conclusion of the workshop 
as well as from loopholes and discrepancies made by mere observation of the entire process.  
The two weeks Workshop organized in a secluded area became for the participants a platform 
for learning. New and fresh insights were gathered about the conflict from other perspectives 
and perceptions. Novel techniques and skills for collaborative problem-solving and 
brainstorming were learned and acquired. Cross-cultural understanding and sensitivity became 
enhanced, so that participants were able to discern an opponent’s perception from a cultural 
standpoint.  Based on the location, participants displayed an ample freedom of expression and 
also shared personal perceptions to a level that negated a representation of their government’s 
views, opinions, beliefs and concerns. Openness was enhanced, albeit varied from participant 
to participant. Mutual trust and interpersonal relationship was fostered as a result. The 
organizers criteria for the selection of participants in the Fermeda workshop, was clearly 
different from Burton’s. The organizers seemed to have achieved more than a mere enhanced 
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communication in the parties. Their style tailored participants towards the path of learning how 
to solve problems via interactions.    
 
3.6.8.2  The Impact of PSW on the Conflict 
Whether these changes became relevant to the official negotiations is something there is hardly 
any information about. However, Walton confirms that the workshop representatives were 
debriefed by the officials of their various countries.  
“Also, during the month following the Workshop a meeting occurred in Addis Ababa between 
the Prime Minister of Somalia and the Emperor of Ethiopia”241 The was no documented direct 
impact of PSW on the conflict especially since such workshops were basically created to serve 
the purpose of transferring changes to the official negotiations. Walton nonetheless suggested 
that future workshops should concentrate on producing a document instead of effecting a mere 
change in attitudes and perceptions. In this way, workshops are able to contribute meaningfully 
on the level of official negotiations and on the conflict, itself in the final analysis. Future 
workshops can learn from the consequences of splitting nationals into groups consisting of other 
nationalities, as this move tended to undermine subsequently, the final outcome of success of 
the entire exercise. Participants had developed relationships with other nationals, when 
however, participants were brought together on the basis of their different nationalities; an air 
of avoidance and distrust became obvious to the organizers. That tactic according to Walton 
sent the wrong signals when participants returned to their home countries. In conclusion, the 
Workshop seemed to have laid the foundation on which future workshops will build. Lesson 
from it may even produce newer and more innovative approaches to problem solving.  
 
In the empirical chapter of this study, I shall briefly examine the role of Problem-Solving 
Workshops within the context of the war in Darfur, as organized by the Sudan Task Group  
 
3.6.8 Track Two Diplomacy (unofficial Mediation) 
The courage exhibited by the progenitors of the workshop approach to solving problems of 
international conflicts, shows the extent to which actors in the field of conflict resolution seek 
to create state of the art approaches as well as incorporate hitherto excluded actors into the 
handling of conflicts of the dimension exhibited in contemporary times. The strive towards non-
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coercive methods of mitigation in modern wars and the firm conviction in the ability to produce 
mutual acceptance and cooperative outcomes in any conflict has propelled the search for more 
and more methods to drive home that point. It is paramount to underscore, that the concept of 
Problem-Solving Workshops and its attendant actors is not to be viewed as the sole approach 
available to the conflict resolution field and applicable to the mitigation of conflicts. Also,  
efforts to resolve international conflicts on unofficial basis have not remained the solitary effort 
and contribution of scholars and practitioners.  
 
On this note, this next section on track II diplomacy, introduces the one framework which 
encapsulates the activities of actors operating on unofficial capacity. It introduces other 
informal actors working to sustain what Joseph Montville tagged track II diplomacy.242  Within 
the field, authors have designed other tracks and christened them Multi-Track Diplomacy.243 In 
like manner other writers suggest the possible hybridization of tracks II and I. This may be 
referred to as track I.5 diplomacy.244 Ostensibly, actors within this framework operate on 
unofficial capacity and refrain from promoting the interest of any government while exercising 
their conflict intervention skills.  
Joseph Montville has defined Track II diplomacy as:  
“Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that 
aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material 
resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict245   
 
Other scholars like Bercovitch have described track II diplomacy as:  
“Activities of private, non-governmental actors, seeking to prevent, resolve, or 
ameliorate violent political conflicts.” 246  
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From the two definitions, it is possible to deduce some of the defining features and 
characteristics of track II actors, as much as gain some insight into their functions in 
international conflicts. As delineated in the definitions, the role of track II actors includes the 
creation of strategies and the provision of human and material resources that will assist in one 
way or the other in abating the debilitating effect of the conflict. This description tends to fit 
into the characterizing features of humanitarian and conflict resolution NGOs.  
  
NGOs as track II actors… 
NGOs have become increasingly relevant in conflict intervention. Their unflinching role in 
modern day conflicts cannot be overemphasized. They have remained an integral part in 
alleviating the suffering of war victims as well as in some cases served on levels that hitherto 
surpassed the ambit of their operation. NGO activities have basically included the provision of 
humanitarian relief, mitigation in cases of human rights abuses and efforts tailored towards 
post-conflict reconstruction. However most recently NGOs are being established with the sole 
purpose of conflict resolution.  Since the 1980s, there has been a rise in NGO intervention in 
conflicts on the globe. According to mid-1990s records from the Carter Centre based in the US, 
over eighty international NGOs are preoccupied with the prevention and resolution of 
international conflicts. Similarly, 100 non-governmental organizations putatively engaged in 
the conflict prevention as well as peace building in Africa.247  
 
Most NGOs enjoy the advantage of being stationed on ground of conflict zones. Their timely 
intervention therefore prevents the eruption of violence and even facilitates urgent relief in 
cases of humanitarian emergencies.  NGOs have therefore become significant actors in several 
conflict settings around the world. At the onset of the Rwandan crisis in 1994 for example, there 
were 3 international NGOs engaged in humanitarian activities.  By the time the war intensified, 
the number shot up to 106 the same year.248 This indicates the level of urgency with which 
NGOs respond to conflicts requiring prompt attention. Unofficial diplomacy also enjoys the 
efforts of actors within civil society. Actors range from retired civil and military officials, 
journalists, religious groups, elders etc. One significant case in point is the Pope’s249 
intervention in the Beagle Channel dispute. President Jimmy Carter’s mediation on unofficial 
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capacity in the Haiti, Bosnia and the Sudan Conflict also comes to mind. The interventionist 
activities of journalists in the Vietnam War and in the Cuban Missile Crisis are more examples. 
 
Track- Two informal actors were found useful in some prominent intervention cases in the early 
1990s.  Informal mediators in 1992 secured the Rome Agreement between the Mozambique 
rebel groups RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional de Mozambique and the FRELIMO government.  
Similarly, the Oslo Accord between the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) and the Israeli 
government and the Inter-Tajik Dialogue in 1993 and 1994 respectively, were facilitated on 
unofficial capacity.250 The efficacy of the unofficial form of mediation as demonstrated In the 
Mozambique crisis also successfully attracted much recognition for the application of track-
two diplomacy (unofficial mediation) in the resolution of contemporary prolonged intra-state 
conflicts. This is especially so because mediation in that form warrants the incorporations of 
several other elements which conspicuously contrast it from the official form of mediation.  In 
Jackson’s 2005251 account of the significance of unofficial diplomacy in current kinds of 
conflicts, the role of unofficial mediators in the Mozambique crisis was strongly highlighted. 
The peace actors (The Community of Sant’Egidio) who had been stationed in Mozambique 
since the 1970s facilitated renewed dialogue between the adversaries, following an 
unsuccessful Track-one attempt to intervene in the conflict. The involvement of Track-two 
actors engendered peaceful deliberations and was in October 1992 capped with the signing of 
the Rome Peace Agreement. 
 
 In this scholarly write-up for the Journal of Conflict Studies (The GREGG CENTRE For the 
Study of War and Society), Jackson underscored a certain kind of wisdom associated with the 
inclusion of mediators of unofficial capacity, into frameworks for peace.  Unofficial mediators 
assumedly enjoy some prominent level of conversance with the adversaries and over time due 
to their prolonged presence on conflict terrains, become furnished with the trust and confidence 
of the belligerents. It may not be out of line therefore to argue that mediators are inclined to 
demonstrate a learned knowledge of the conflict. This attribute affords them the upper hand 
over official mediations plunged into the scene from the outside.  
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Posterity stands to learn from the Mozambique experience with Track-two actors. The 
relevance of unofficial diplomacy in modern types of conflicts cannot be over-emphasized. 
Since their debut at resolution in intra-state conflict, Track-two actors have left an indelible 
mark on the search for solutions to violent conflicts. Actors tend to exhibit some of the most 
appropriate qualities and skills needed to adequately permeate the stubborn conflicts of our 
contemporary times. Track-two actors demonstrate an edge over official actors, as the weaker 
conflict party may perceive them as more reliable and neutral. It is assumed that their focus is 
to pursue an agreement of mutual benefit to the parties without favouritism.   
 
Track-two actors also possess other strategies which are paramount to achieving lasting peace 
and which do not include coercive methods in the forms, manifested by Track-one actors.  
Track-two actors are presumably better positioned to access both Track-one and Track-three 
actors in a combined effort at resolution. Track-two actors better connect to what Jackson refers 
to as “insider intermediary”252 or grass-root actors, to engender the collaborated effort needed 
to help the parties’ re-open communication and to effectuate the transformation at the least of 
the distorted perceptions and attitudes underlying the conflict.  As was the case in the 
Mozambique crisis, Sant’ Egidio’s established links with the local Catholic Church and 
provided the platform for its intervention in that conflict. In similar vein, unofficial mediators 
usually operate on high-level secrecy; this affords them freedom to navigate their genuine 
opinion back and forth mediatory sessions without the fear of being accountable to anyone. On 
the other hand, a relaxed atmosphere provides the appropriate mood for parties to freely air 
their perceptions and grievances.  
 
 
 
Challenges… 
The exceeding relevance of Track-two actors cannot be seen as properly painted without 
mentioning some of the challenges they are confronted with, working within this particular 
framework of operation. One of the problems facing Track-two unofficial actors, as noted by 
Bercovitch, is the unavailability of guiding normative principles of operation. This compels 
mediators to carry out their functions on the basis of personal discretion. Similarly, unofficial 
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players tend to face the problem of been perceived as operating within the defining lines of 
what Lederach described as the „prescriptive model”253. Training of locals and grass root actors 
has become a familiar strategy for ensuring local participation in conflict resolution.  Under the 
circumstance when a trainer adopts the prescriptive model of training participants, he or she 
suggests a superiority of ideas and values, which he passes on to his participants as good 
knowledge to be applied to their conflict situation, yet such trainers are discerned, as somewhat 
imposing their cultural orientations on trainees. Similarly, the provision of aid relief tends to 
either aggravate the conflict or reduce it. In terms of resource transfers, for example the 
provision of aid can reinforce and prolong conflict through the looting of aid supplies by 
combatants or through an inconsistent method of distribution.254 Other challenges facing the 
Unofficial form of intervention in modern conflict, is a palpable deficiency in diplomatic ability 
and experience, the lack of physical resources, zero diplomatic immunity and the lack of good 
financial capability, especially on the part of NGOs, torn between accepting governmental 
funding and standing the risk of showing allegiance on the basis of such provision255 
 
3.6.9 Building Peace in the aftermath of war. 
The preceding sections have afforded an acquaintance with some of the methods of third party 
conflict intervention consistent with both the fields’ conflict management and conflict 
resolution. At this point, and prior to an assessment of the concept and underlying assumptions 
of conflict transformation, I shall examine the idea of building peace in societies emerging from 
war. Conflict and Peace are two sides of the same coin. The ability to subdue conflict allows 
for the entrance of peace. Each of the approaches we have examined seeks to achieve the goal 
of peace. Whether through initial efforts made on the bargaining table towards a negotiated 
settlement, the interposition of troops to separate warring factions and the implementation of 
peace accords or a total reconstruction of the ruins from war, all of these efforts have been 
tailored towards the actualization of a certain kind of peace. The question is, what kind of peace 
can hinder the re-eruption of conflict?  The ability to achieve negative peace on the platform of 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement is a much welcome step towards efforts at positive peace. 
Nonetheless, the sole dependence on negative peace approaches makes the vision towards 
sustained peace exceedingly farfetched and unrealistic. The kinds of wars fought in the 
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aftermath of the cold war coupled with its attendant consequences, have set apart the instrument 
of inter-state rivalry especially in its traditional form, as most inadequate and deficient in the 
search for sustainable peace. 
 
 Since 1989 therefore and with its initial debut on African soil the practice of peace building is 
understood to be the final stage of the evolution of traditional peacekeeping. Its proposed 
activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to security and development according to 
erstwhile UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan, was “to create the conditions necessary for 
sustainable peace in war-torn societies” 256 Although peace building is carried out by a wide 
range of actors who go about the business of building peace the way that they best understand, 
the one uniting factor is the objective to halt violent internal conflicts and to achieve peace.  
 
The controversy as to whether the peace envisaged by the myriad of actors involved, leads 
towards a sustainable one remains to be determined by the vision, perception and principles 
guiding each of the intervening actors.  When peace is construed as negative, in which case 
such outcome is viewed as desirable but arguably insufficient to restrain a resurgence of war, 
analysts insist that such peace regardless, helps facilitate the needed transition from war to that 
kind of peace that is positive and sustainable.    
 
Edward Newman for example argues in line, by pointing to the conceptual construction of the 
actors, as playing a significant role in the objectives to be pursued in a particular peace building 
activity. In many cases, the achievement of a truce was thought to be the most realistic venture 
and purpose for engaging in peace building activity. When actors however envisioned peace 
building beyond the cessation of hostilities, it encompassed additional functions tailored 
towards a more constructive vision of sustainable peace and reconciliation.257 Be that as it may, 
the objective and motivation behind stretching the functions associated with traditional 
peacekeeping beyond its precepts, as highlighted by Boutros Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for 
Peace, was to undertake:  
“Action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order 
to avoid a relapse into conflict”.   
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Prior to this pronouncement, and during the cold war, the UN, the major international 
organization responsible for curbing all threats to international security, played the very neutral 
role of adhering strictly to its principles of non-interference.  In more contemporary times 
though and as the cold war terminated, peace operations as it was dubbed, became an 
embodiment of two-fold activities: peace-making, peacekeeping, and culminated with the 
activity of peace building. While peace-making and peacekeeping fall under activities of the 
field of conflict management, peace building may be perceived as an approach newly 
introduced and consistent with the field of conflict resolution. It is identified as an approach of 
conflict resolution because it sets out to address underlying grievances and injustices perceived 
by the adversaries. 258 
  
This sub-section deals with the search for positive peace in internal conflicts as predicated on 
the activity of building peace in societies just emerging from conflict.  It investigates into the 
origins of peace building, introduces some of its tasks especially in contemporary times as well 
as probes into the underlying principles and assumptions guiding the peace building activity. It 
then proceeds to examine the manner in which the search for positive peace has been conducted 
in the post conflict phase of Africa’s conflicts, specifically in the aftermath of the cold war 
when post-conflict peace building began to gather full momentum as an integral part of UN 
missions across the world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa.  The section sheds light on the 
liberal peace building as that singular model, whose guiding principles dominates and dictates 
the activities pursued by collateral actors in the search for peace in post conflict societies  
 
3.6.9a  Peace Building: Tracing the origin and defining the Peace Building activity 
Even though authors like Paris have identified the Namibian war as the first UN peace building 
mission,259 others have preferred to mark out the UN Congo mission as the one mission 
conducted between 1960 and 1964 to have presented peacekeepers as performing other 
activities not associated with traditional peacekeeping.  
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“In some ways, ONUC was a precedent setting operation. It established that the United 
Nations could intervene in civil conflicts and that UN peacekeepers could perform 
functions far beyond those connected to ceasefire monitoring”260  
Dielh similarly tracing the initial deployment of actors to pursue peace building functions, 
argues that although the Namibian mission preceded the Somalian peace building intervention, 
peacekeepers were involved in a lot more activities identified today under dimensions of peace 
building, than the situations demanded in the Namibian crises. He maintains further, that the 
Namibian war could have passed for an inter-state rivalry, while the “Somalian crisis was purely 
internal “, requiring troops to engage in activities such as the maintenance of law and order and 
the provision of humanitarian assistance.  However, establishing the location of initial peace 
building activities, does not yet answer the question as to why it became pertinent to introduce 
additional tasks to those the peacekeepers had hitherto performed and were confined to, going 
by the doctrine of traditional peace keeping.  
 
Scholars have pointed the end of the cold war as paving the way for an increased involvement 
of peace actors in the internal affairs of warring states. With the demise of the cold war, 
erstwhile super power opponents: USA and Russia’s withdrawal of hegemonic and ideological 
control over client states around the world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, seemed to have 
precipitated as already discussed in chapter two, the onslaught of a number of latent internal 
conflicts while terminating a good number as a result.  The erupted conflicts, which were 
predominantly internally fomented, left behind signs of huge devastation as evidenced in the 
colossal destruction of the host country’s infrastructure. These catastrophes also engendered a 
breakdown of governing institutions and unleashed an enormous number of internally displaced 
persons in need of reintegration and rehabilitation. They equally precipitated a gross 
humanitarian crisis that in addition created a massive security dilemma.  To this end, post-
conflict peace building could not have originated for any reason other than to aid states 
emerging from conflict, so as to enable it stand on its feet again. Even though a number of 
commentators view the idea, based on initial experiences, as renewed form of western intrusion 
and subtle imposition of its values, the fact remains that its initial motivation was to prevent a 
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relapse into conflict as well as an action to deter possible threats to international peace and 
stability. 261  
 
In contemporary times, the initial activities associated with post conflict peace building 
continues to contrast greatly with the mere monitoring of a cease fire and corollary activities of 
cold war peacekeeping. Also, the aftermath of interstate rivalry did not seem to warrant any 
deeper engagement with the states involved in conflict, since the style of warfare also usually 
followed certain internationally defined rules of engagement that contrasted it from the 
debilitating humanitarian disaster accrued from these new kinds of wars. An upsurge in internal 
conflicts as associated with the post-cold war era prompted the imperativeness for a deeper 
involvement of peace actors. Such were tuned to supporting post-conflict societies with efforts 
tailored towards surmounting humanitarian, security, development and governance challenges.   
 
In line, Boutros Ghali announced that, UN activities in post-conflict societies would include:  
“Disarming previously warring parties, the restoration of order, the custody and possible 
destruction of weapons, the repatriation of refugees, the provision of advisory and 
training support for security personnel, monitoring of elections, efforts at protecting 
human rights, a reformation and strengthening of governmental institutions and the 
promotion of formal and informal processes of political participation”. 262 
 Sub-Saharan African countries like Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Somalia, the Congo and Sudan have experienced such peace building activities 
performed majorly by the UN body. A number of the aforementioned African nations can attest 
to some form of peace elicited on the platform of a peace building agenda, yet in some other, 
conflicts have prevailed or re-erupted after a supposed consolidation of peace. The question is 
why? Critics have faulted the modus operandi and the guiding principles of the entire peace 
building activity, associating its practice with underlying assumptions aligned with the liberal 
peace theory. This form of peace building focuses majorly on the promotion of both democracy 
and an open market economy and perceives the pursuit of these and other of its values as 
panacea to the incessant civil wars on the African continent. In the light of such assumptions 
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scholars like Tony Karbo contribute to the discourse especially as it touches on the African 
continent by arguing in this light: 
 
“Peace building should be much more than designing interventions as the political and 
economic levels; peace-building must be designed with a view to addressing the 
fundamental causes and conditions of the conflict”. 263 
 
He caps his assertion with a closing contending statement:  
“The ultimate goal of peace-building in the African context, or in any context… is the 
rebuilding of relationships, asserting communal responsibility and solidarity”.264  
  
In the next section I shall touch on peace building as a concept, however in unfolding sections 
I propose to provide insight into the liberal peace kind of peace building and the manner in 
which its normative principles have played out in a number of sub-Saharan African post conflict 
and conflict societies mentioned elsewhere in this section.      
 
3.6.9b  The Peace Building concept 
As mentioned elsewhere, the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for 
Peace, summarized the concept of peacebuilding as:  
 
“action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace 
in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”265  
 
He went further to suggest that peacebuilding is that one activity amidst preventive diplomacy, 
peace-making and peace keeping, which wraps up the whole idea of third-party intervention in 
violent conflicts. Prior to Ghali´s pronouncement on peacebuilding, prominent sociologist and 
peace researcher Johan Galtung had conceived of peacebuilding as:  
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“The practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic 
reconstruction and development”.266  
 
He identified peace-making and peacekeeping as efforts to be combined with peacebuilding in 
order to achieve that peace which supersedes the mere absence of physical violence. 
Subsequently, other scholars have sought to provide conceptual insight into the idea of 
peacebuilding. For example, Mullenbach’s definition provides a good summary at first glance 
of some significant components of a large number of peacebuilding missions. He delineates 
peacebuilding to be:  
 
“Efforts by third-party actors during crisis phases or post-conflict phases of intra-state 
disputes which are initiated to deal with underlying problems or basic needs of the 
parties to the dispute, to foster conditions that enhance the likelihood that dispute will 
not escalate or re-escalate to military hostilities, and to enhance the likelihood that the 
dispute will be peacefully settled by the parties”267 
From his definition, we are able to deduce, that peacebuilding is a tool for intervention in intra-
state rivalry and is not an activity restricted to the aftermath of war. Similarly, we gather that it 
is most probable that the risk of slipping back into war is reduced especially when peacebuilding 
sets out to address “the basic needs of the parties” 
In similar vein, The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee explains peacebuilding 
from a different perspective. For them, peacebuilding refers to:  
 
“The effort to promote human security in societies marked by conflict. The overarching 
goal of peacebuilding is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict 
without violence, as a means to achieving sustainable human security”268  
 
This definition introduces the element of humanitarian assistance as one of the functions of 
peacebuilding.  In their opinion, this dimension should be considered central to any 
peacebuilding mission. 
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Lastly, Bercovitch and Jackson have propounded a much more encompassing conception of 
peacebuilding. They hold that:  
 
“Peacebuilding entails concerted actions by international third parties working in both a 
military and civilian capacity, employing a hybrid of short-term and long-term political and 
development activities that are aimed at recovery from war, preventing a relapse into violent 
conflict, strengthening local capacities for peaceful conflict resolution, and creating the 
conditions for genuine long-term human security”. 269 
 
From their definition, it is clear that unlike peacekeeping, which was majorly a military affair, 
peace building employs the services of civilians.  This helps to tone down the preconception of 
an all-combatant activity, to one that may simultaneously provide the opportunity for a softer 
non-coercive engagement involving non-uniformed personnel.  Similarly, as a deviation from 
initial criticisms which had depicted the peace building venture as not investing enough time to 
actualize its mission in totality, the duo suggests from their definition, the possibility of some 
form of adjustment in timing, probably based on more contemporary attempts at consolidating 
peace in post conflict societies. Although some of the components in their definition do not 
exactly suggest anything unfamiliar, one element tends to stand out as strikingly different. 
Bercovitch and Jackson indicate as part of the tasks of building peace, the “strengthening of 
local capacities for peaceful conflict resolution”. This assertion seems to refer to the capacity 
for peaceful resolutions reliant on a synergy between external peace actors and the custodians 
of indigenous peace-making institutions.   
In developing chapters, I shall examine the prospects of incorporating local actors in activities 
tailored towards durable peace and harmony as demonstrated in the hybrid peace operations 
carried out in Darfur by the African Union and the United Nations. 
 
3.6.9c  Liberal Peace building in Africa  
The African continent among others seemed to be the initial testing ground for the peace 
building agenda. With its initial involvement on the Namibian soil in 1989, peace actors were 
found executing other duties as stipulated within a framework for peace building in post-
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conflict societies.270 From that time on, peace building has continued to play a pivotal role in 
the search for lasting solutions to Africa’s incessant wars and in the desire to effect sustainable 
peace on the continent. Regardless of a seemingly benevolent gesture of total reconstruction by 
the international community towards societies emerging from war, the peace building activity 
has steadily and especially in its initial years, come under immense scrutiny.  
 
Commentators insist that the behind the curtain is a ploy to impose both democratization and 
free market economies on societies whose internal arrangement lacked the capacity according 
to western standards to uphold the underlying elements of the liberal kind of peace building. 
271The liberal peace theory from the point of view of the international community, held the 
answer to Africa’s nightmare of endless wars. The institution of the liberal peace agenda was 
intended to translate into sustainable peace for states emerging from violent conflict. It upheld 
the application of its underlying tenets as the viable means towards the complete termination 
of internal conflicts, to the extent that the chances for a resurgence of conflict were either 
completely ruled out or became minimal.  
Roland Paris in his book titled: “At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict,” 
272provides a good starting point for comprehending the discourse on liberal peace building as 
it obtained on the Sub-Saharan continent in the initial years. The author acknowledges that 
liberal peace played a role in the case of both Namibia and Mozambique.  Ostensibly, these 
nations continued to experience stable peace in the aftermath of the ‘liberal kind’ of peace 
building. Paris nonetheless, was quick to remind his readers that: while one of the actors 
associated with the Namibian conflict was external to it, the Mozambique liberal peace 
experience attracted economic and political liberalization but escaped renewed violence on the 
premise that the conflict did not originate from actors within the conflict terrain. The reverse 
was nonetheless the case for instances of resurged conflict recorded in Angola and regrettably 
Rwanda. The experiences in these examples imprinted an unforgettable memory of genocide 
on its citizens as well as the continent at large.  
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Tony Karbo turned to criticize the manner in which the liberal peace activity has so far been 
conducted in Africa using the following words as culled from Robin Luckham he states that: 
“… Reforms tend to be conceived in terms dictated by the major donors and the 
international agencies, prioritizing the usual formula of liberal democracy, good 
governance and economic liberalization. Whilst elements of this formula are desirable 
in themselves, the entire package, and the manner in which it is promoted or imposed 
from the outside, tends to inhibit the fundamental rethinking that post-conflict states 
require the nature and purpose of political authority.”  
He argues that the trajectory towards initiating the peace building agenda in Africa must be one 
that recognizes the imperative to target significant underlying components such as “rebuilding 
broken relationships and ensuring harmony”273 
In similar manner, Albert corroborates Karbo’s stance arguing that the liberal peace agenda as 
demonstrated on terrains of conflict in Africa, tend to be motivated by normative assumptions 
and objectives that diverge from the African conception of peace building as represented in the 
norms and culture of African societies. In his opinion, the liberal peace agenda promotes a top-
down approach to peace to the extent that the local ownership and indigenous participation 
becomes undermined.274   
The underlining approach to sustainable peace in Africa cannot independently emerge from 
either side of the divide. As will become evident in the developing chapters.  
The trajectory towards sustainability may derive from a fusion of the underlying salient 
components associated with each of the available external and internal mechanisms for peace. 
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Chapter Four 
4.1 From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: what prospects? 
This chapter sets out to examine the “state of the art in the conflict transformation model”. I 
shall be exploring current literature from authors whose perception of durable solution in war 
ravaged societies, are hinged on a thorough investigation into the possible gains and prospects 
of seeking a transformation of conflict above its resolution or management. I shall identify some 
of the premises on which they tend to argue in favour of the transformation model. I shall 
conclude with a deep examination of the central message of conflict transformation based on 
core elements underscored in the seminal contribution of the field’s major proponents: John 
Paul Lederach. The author contemplates his position on the transformation approach from his 
religious background as an Anabaptist- Mennonite. Such religious convictions as well as years 
of experience on the field, place him at the vantage point from where he conceives of justice, 
mercy and reconciliation as vital and integral parts of his conceptions of transformation. In the 
final analysis, the chapter should furnish the reader with scholarship of the conception of 
conflict according to the school of conflict transformation. Central elements and actors 
perceived to possess the capacity to play vital roles in the realization of the vision towards 
durable peace will be identified.  
 
As delineated in earlier sections, the field of conflict resolution emerged out of the vacuum 
created by the field of conflict management. Corroborating this assertion, Ryan drives home 
this point with this emphatic statement from Leatherman: 
 
“The limitation of diplomacy to achieve durable peace outcomes to contemporary conflicts and 
to prevent others from turning violent, means there needs to be innovation in traditional ideas 
and practice. We need to go beyond the containment of violence and negotiation, to transform 
social injustices, perceptions, cultural tensions, deep rooted hatred and issues of institutional 
legitimacy”275 
.  
As discussed in previous sections the field of conflict resolution contingent on the Human 
Needs theory, deviated from classical statist methods involving coercive mechanisms, to pursue 
a distinct conflict analysis tactics, which to its progenitors, should serve to solve the problems 
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of contemporary kinds of conflicts. Yet, the whole idea of addressing modern conflicts from a 
different perspective, seemed insufficient in addressing other vital issues embedded in modern 
conflicts as captured in the last two lines of Leatherman’s argument.   
 
This state of affairs further compelled other scholars to view available methods as blinded to 
the need for deep structural and relational change.  Small wonder Ryan contributed to the 
discourse by stating: 
“Some bitter conflicts appear to be so immune to existing tried and tested approaches 
to peace that only a radical change seems likely to jolt the parties out of their destructive 
interactions”276  
 
It is the palpable destructive energy that continues to define modern day conflicts that the school 
of conflict transformation views as the motivation for that deep change that may be engendered 
on the basis of a transformative approach to sustainable peace.  
With respect to African conflicts and its attendant problems of identity: ethnic and religious 
cleavage, prolonged and stubborn types of conflict are seen to have defied strategies from the 
conflict resolution model. As a result, the resolution model seems likewise, to have left a 
vacuum, which the transformation model proposes to fill.  
I shall subsequently examine why the transformation model tends to emphasis healthy 
relationships 277 as paramount to averting a resurge in conflict. The researcher is of the opinion 
that the transformation model especially as put forward by Lederach, presents a framework 
which has created “space” for the incorporation of a set of disenfranchised actors (Track III 
actors) their wisdom and resources. These hitherto inconsequential indigenous peace actors, 
who also happen to be the direct recipients of the war, have remained in the background, 
probably perceived more as the problem than prospective contributors on matters directly 
involving their own well-being and development.   
 
The researcher further assumes that the transformation model mirrors two important elements 
of conflict resolution and peace-making in traditional societies of Sub-Saharan Africa. In pre-
colonial traditional societies, inter and intra group feuds saw a transformation of underlying 
disputes after the ritual of reconciliation. As such reconciliation was seen as tantamount to 
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absolute peace and constituted a significant and ineluctable aspect of the peace-making process 
in traditional societies. Within other societies, the obligation to pay compensation as a way of 
avoiding acts of vengeance from victims of conflict, tended to mark the conflict as completely 
resolved. Compensation was therefore a tool of transformation applied within the context of 
restorative justice.  
  
Ryan argues that the move towards transformation is usually guided by several peace traditions 
ranging from Liberalists to Feminists; as such transformation connotes for each peace initiator 
something different.278 The transformation model from a religious perspective is ultimately 
linked to reconciliation and justice paralleling also the end goal of conflict resolution in 
societies of sub-Saharan. The transformation model according to Lederach preaches 
“constructive change”279 via justice and reconciliation as is defined along religious lines of 
Christianity.  It advocates deep changes in the relationships, which have gone sour during the 
process of pursing change through destructive means.  The need to pave way for the 
reconciliation of parties becomes imperative in internal violent conflicts, where victims and 
perpetrators require in the aftermath of conflict to return to their communities and be 
reintegrated into a society of mutual coexistence. The sub section outlining Lederach’s work 
investigates this stance further.  
 
A true transformation of individuals and relations therefore involves the healing of deep hurts 
and traumas.  After forgiveness has been asked and received the reconciliation process initiated 
by the intervening parties and concluded according to the community’s conception of 
reconciliation, allows for brothers torn apart by conflict to move past grudges and grievances 
to become brothers280again.  Going by the assumptions of the transformative approach, 
conflictants are taught to accept one fact:  that co-existence under peaceful conditions in the 
same old communities, with renewed and restructured minds is imperative to lasting peace.  At 
the same time, distorted perceptions require the transition from foes to friends. As much as 
conflict holds the potential for change, change may not be achieved through the use of violence.   
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Lastly, the transformation model as a framework for the analysis of and intervention in conflicts 
seems to have set the ball rolling based on propositions that suggest a somewhat clearer path 
towards the vision for durable peace on the African continent.   
Durable solutions may be in the offing should Africa make the move to resuscitate its 
indigenous methods and institutions as well as empower its custodians to swing back into 
action, maintain peace, prevent and resolve conflicts on the grass-roots, most notably in semi-
modern societies, where traditions and norms continue to dominate the state of affairs in times 
of peace and conflict. To this end, Africa might be on the verge of breaking free from the strong 
grip of endemic wars and the debilitating effects of prolonged and stubborn conflicts.   
  
Although track lll grass-root actors have been identified as significant players complementing 
the role of top level and middle level actors in any peace initiative, it is not quite clear within 
the African context of conflict resolution and peace-making who these group tagged “grassroot 
actors” might specifically refer to. Would they be local NGOs whose stamped presence have 
manifested in the several efforts at resolution and peace? Would they be local religious leaders? 
Or probably a set of prominent players tasked with the sole responsibility to restore peace and 
harmony in traditional African societies?  We shall seek answers to these questions as an 
investigation into the transformation model progresses. 
   
Transformation is perceived as thorough and absolute when major changes have occurred on 
the structural and relational levels.   This study tends to concentrate on those results that are 
likely to occur if reconciliation in the African context is introduced as a significant element 
towards sustainable peace. What has prompted the strong advocacy for the revival of 
indigenous structures and strategies of peace-making and peace keeping in traditional African 
societies? Do indigenous structures still possess the capacity to hold together societal harmony, 
as was the case in numerous societies in pre-colonial Africa? How reliable are assertions such 
as “If given the chance, Native Administration 281may still manifest those capabilities to uphold 
peace, prevent, as well as resolve conflicts in today’s traditional Sub-Saharan African 
societies”.  
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Having examined these important points, what exactly does conflict transformation bring to the 
table? What distinguishes it from the conflict resolution model? What concepts, principles and 
assumptions underlie the call to seek the transformation of protracted intractable conflicts rather 
than the resolution thereof? What should the transformation model be doing better than the 
conflict resolution approach, with respect to modern conflicts? Diana Francis book titled 
“People Peace and Power, Conflict Transformation in Action”, challenges the supposed 
distinctness of the conflict transformation approach to peace. She submits: 
“If conflict transformation is to be worthy of its name, it must address the limitations of 
conflict resolution and must have something radical to offer in conflicts where power 
asymmetry in not incidental but of the essence.”282 
 
In the light of Francis’s assertion what should be construed as that “radical something” which 
the transformation model has to offer? 
 
4.2  Understanding Conflict Transformation: An assessment of scholarly 
contributions to the transformation concept 
In previous sections, I attempted to provide definitions to conflict management and conflict 
resolution. Both definitions provided insight into the basic characteristics of these approaches 
to internal conflict. I delineated some consistent underlying assumptions, provided each field´s 
perception of the origins of conflict and rendered a glimpse into the methods it applies in the 
mitigation of conflict. 
In the light of this, it becomes pertinent, also, to seek an elaborate understanding of the concept 
and a perception of “conflict based on ideas projected from the conflict transformation 
framework of analysis via authors whose established preference for the transformation model 
have been evidenced in scholarly articles and literatures.   
In the early 1990s a number of authors contributed to the development of the transformation 
discourse however in recent times several others have attempted to contribute their unique 
perspective for an enhanced comprehension of what the transformation approach has to offer. 
 
 
Contributing to the Transformation discourse, 21-century author Miall opines that,  
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“A theory of conflict transformation is emerging”283.  
 
The author elaborating further, seemed less convinced about any novelty attached to this 
emerging theory. His conclusion is founded on the premise that some underlying assumptions 
and conceptions from the Management and Resolution perspectives are analogous to those from 
the transformation’s perspective.  As such for him, the transformation model is better conceived 
as:  
“A re-conceptualization of the field in order to make it more relevant to contemporary 
conflicts” 284 
 
Mitchell views the concept of transformation as:  
“Involving some kind of major change- a qualitative shift, as opposed to a quantitative 
alteration in degree”.  
He however seemed to have corroborated Maill’s assertion by illuminating the work of John 
Burton and Frank Duke. In that book titled “Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and 
Resolution”, the goals of the resolution model were conceived as being in consonance with 
those proposed by the transformation model.  That notion may have occasioned the 
pronouncement that the supposed shift from resolution to transformation might just be a change 
in terminology. Mitchell wrote: 
 
“John Burton and Dukes in the early 1990’s wrote about conflict resolution processes 
as being those that seek to also examine needs and options, and reach agreements that 
not only satisfy those needs but which can also bring about changes in existing systems 
and patterns of relations giving rise to the conflicts in the first place”   
  
Miall may have perceived the transformation model as a mere re-conceptualization.  Major 
proponents nonetheless, confirm the transformative approach as a significant motivation 
towards the adoption of efficient and effective strategies capable of addressing the protraction 
and intractability characterizing modern day internal conflicts.  The protagonists of the 
transformation model insist that the concept constitutes processes, which are geared towards 
the contemplation of deeper levels of change in contrast to antecedent approaches of conflict 
mitigation.  Such emphasis on profound change seeks to pay unabated attention to the 
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transformation of conflict predicated on the restoration of party’s relations to the state of 
peaceful and balanced.   
 
 Lederach, who has since become recognized as its principal proponent, approaches the 
transformation discourse from a much more optimistic stance. His work will be thoroughly 
examined in the concluding part of this section. This slant however, culled from one of his 
scholarly contribution delineates some of the core elements of the transformation model, and 
emphatically projects an axiomatic shift in paradigm, necessitated by the current nature of 
contemporary conflicts. He states:  
 
“The conceptual paradigm and praxis of peace building must shift significantly away 
from the traditional framework and activities that make up statist diplomacy…. This 
pragmatic shift is articulated in the movement away from a concern with the resolution 
of issues toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of 
relationships”285  
 
While underscoring the “restoration and rebuilding of relationships” as relevant components of 
the transformation model, he emphatically proposes the occurrence of a shift and the emergence 
of a novel strategy that will address conflicts beyond the limits of the other two approaches.  
”286 
 
Christopher Mitchell further summarizes the aim of the transformation model in a manner that 
tends to negate insinuations of a mere shift from one terminology to the other. He postulates in 
favour of a strategy capable of engendering change far beyond the existing conventional 
approaches to conflict. 
Transformation he suggests:  
“Takes the business of coping with destructive protracted conflicts beyond the cessation 
of violence, the achievement of a compromise settlements or even the joint creation of 
an acceptable solution to the issues currently in conflict between the adversaries-in 
other words” he concludes… “Beyond resolution”  
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I shall subsequently view some of the contrasting features between the resolution and 
transformation model as expatiated on by other writers. 
 At the core of the transformation model as already indicated, is the emphasis on relational 
change. It accentuates the assumption that relationships un-peaceful and peaceful play a 
decisive role in the formation and transformation of conflicts. This anticipated state of 
“peacefulness in unequal relations between adversaries, construed as the end-state; 
“transformed relations” is what Adam Curle defines as a state in which “neither domination 
nor imposition exist, but where there is mutual assistance, mutual understanding, mutual 
concern and collaboration founded on this mutuality”. 287 
 
In 1990 Adam Curle adduced some tools for the transformation of conflicts based on his 
experience as a mediator in Nigeria’s Biafra War. They included mediation, development and 
education.  
 In an earlier 1971 publication, he corroborated the field’s emphasis on relationships by arguing 
that: 
“The process of peace-making consists in making changes in relationships so that they may be 
brought to a point where developments can occur”288.  
 
Development here is understood as the growth of relations in “harmony and productiveness” 
He further suggest a few ways in which vertical relationships may be altered; by promoting the 
transmutation from unbalanced to balanced relationships, contingent on six elements including 
confrontation and development.  
 
Bush and Folger,289 in the early 1990s, expounded the transformative approach to mediation. 
They contend that constructive change can be achieved within the society when conflict is 
approached through the lenses of the transformation model. In contrast to the consciousness of 
“solving problems” which has informed mediation in modern conflicts, these scholars suggest 
that change may become imminent when a mediator’s expectation is majorly focused on 
achieving the transformation of parties against a mere solving of the issue at hand. By their 
judgment, change is confirmed by a transformation of the parties from “fearful or self-centred 
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beings into confident responsive caring individuals”. Transformative mediation sets out to 
engender individual change.  
 
Bush and Folger interpreted this change in individuals as a step towards or akin to change in 
the society at large.  A full grasp of the tenets of transformative mediation tends to spur the 
mediator into “bringing out the intrinsic goodness that lies within the parties as human being” 
According to the two authors, conflict may be perceived as an opportunity for “moral growth 
and transformation” Their study points to the gross inadequacy inherent in the job of mediators 
whose approach to conflict and mediation is hinged upon the problem-solving perspective, 
where conflict is construed in terms of problems requiring solution. In their opinion, mediators 
who are guided by the problem solving “orientation” “tend to steer parties in a certain direction. 
Such mediators remain clued to their own values and biases and tend to pursue a settlement 
they perceive to be satisfactory.  
 
Such influence putatively produces “dissatisfaction or unfairness in parties”. A faulty 
“orientation” to conflict tends to induce in the mediator, the dire need to find solutions. 
However, considering the nature of current conflicts, such perception of conflict only leaves 
the parties discontented. In contrast to problem-solving mediation, transformative mediation is 
meant to engender empowerment and recognition in the parties. To this extent, parties become 
aware of their own capacity to deal with conflicts and are able to find a genuine responsiveness 
to the opponent’s situation and humanness. Bush and Folger underscored that the 
transformative approach to mediation leaves room for proper articulation. Their optimistic 
stance regardless provides a platform on which the inadequacies of current approaches to 
mediation in internal conflicts may be re-examined. A more efficient approach may be 
embedded in the transformative model. It may demonstrate the capacity for constructive 
change. 
 
In 1996, the Institute for Multi- Track Diplomacy headed by Notter and Diamond, summarized 
conflict transformation in a paper using the following words. 
“Conflict transformation refers to the process of moving from conflict –habituated 
systems to peace –systems. This process is distinguished by the more common term of 
conflict resolution because of its focus on systemic change. Social conflicts that are 
deep-rooted or intractable get these names because the conflict has created patterns 
that have become part of the social system. With the social system as the unit of analysis, 
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the term “resolution” becomes less appropriate. Transforming deep-rooted conflicts is 
only partly about “resolving” the issue of the conflict-the central issue is systemic 
change or transformation. Systems cannot be “resolved” but they can be transformed, 
thus we use the term transformation”290 
 
The above assertion may be understood both as a clear definition and an emphatic statement of 
preference for the transformation model. It clearly presents one of the major differences 
between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. While the resolution model 
underscores the fulfilment of basic needs, the transformation approach emphasizes systemic 
change. By this we understand that certain changes precipitated by conflict have occurred on 
the social, political and economic terrains within society. These adverse effects emanating from 
within a conflict environment, have burrowed so deep, so that conflicts as these, solely witness 
deep levels of positive change if a gradual transformation and a re-learning from conflict-
habituated systems to peace-systems is introduced contrary to the pursuit for a resolution 
thereof.  
 
Galtung who has written extensively in the broader field of conflict studies presents the 
Transcendence model of conflict transformation.  Transcendence depicts the “creation of a new 
type of reality and an opening of new landscapes”291 Conflict transformation as interpreted by 
him, means:  
“To transplant conflict to that new reality”292 created by the concept of Transcendence. He 
further opines that “to transform a conflict would mean to transcend the goals of the conflict 
parties, defining some other goals, lifting a conflict (“disembedding”) out of the bed the parties 
have prepared for that conflict, including the discourses to ensure that the incompatibility looks 
insurmountable (the contradiction non-transcendable) embedding it at a more promising 
place.”293 
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By this Galtung suggests that the contradictions (conflict), which emerge from incompatibilities 
between parties, are surely transcendable.  This perception tends to negate the concept of 
Management where such contradictions are discerned as better managed in order to ameliorate 
its depredating effect.  Attitudes and behaviours that are the products of unhealthy and unjust 
relations are better tackled from a transformative perspective, where a change in parties’ 
relations in central. 
 
Similarly, Kumar Rupesinghe has argued for the application of a more appropriate approach in 
the search for answers to the complexities associated with modern day conflicts. His assertions 
also suggest an axiomatic contrast between a resolution and a transformation approach to 
conflict. He reaffirms that the transformation model holds better promises for the analysis and 
mitigation of protracted internal conflicts. 
 
“I would suggest that a more promising approach for deep-seated internal conflicts 
could be a predominantly transformative process, where coming to an agreement on 
outstanding issues as quickly as possible is of secondary importance to addressing the 
overall conflict process and coming to terms with the temporal aspects of conflict.”294 
 
Furthermore, he contends that the conditions for structural and attitudinal changes must be 
fulfilled, to enable transformation in its totality. His contribution to the transformation discourse 
touched on several other aspects that will be discussed in subsequent chapters where the 
emphasis will be on assessing some of the vital elements playing an integral role in the 
formulation of a framework for durable peace in deeply polarized societies.   
 
Raimo Väyrynen295 sees the conflict transformation as a framework suitable for the analysis of 
the dynamics of conflicts. He has provided four categorizations in which transformation may 
occur within the course of a conflict. He states:  
 
“Conflicts are continuously transformed even if efforts to resolve them explicitly have 
not made any visible progress. As a matter of fact, many intractable conflicts of interests 
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or values may find their solution only through the process of transformation. Conflict 
transformation happens in several different ways” 296 
  
Väyrynen’s understanding of conflict transformation initially depicts transformation as a 
continuous process occurring within the life cycle of a conflict and depicts changes that have 
manifested in the dynamic of a conflict.  His standpoint is suggestive of a conception of 
transformation contrasting those of other writers on the transformation model who view the 
model of intervention also as an end-state to be achieved over a prolonged period of its 
initiation. Transformation as enumerated by Väyrynen may occur in the following areas: 
1. Actor transformation may occur when “there are internal changes in major parts of the 
conflict or the appearance and recognition of new actors” 
2. Issue transformation is evidenced by an “alteration in the political agenda of the 
conflict” on this level of transformation, a shift occurs to make manifest a redefinition 
of issues and an emphasis is placed on issues enhancing mutuality. Furthermore, a link 
between actor transformation is connoted with the following statement: 
“The issue transformation means that the political constellation supporting the previous 
agenda will have to change; in other words, the transformation concerns simultaneously 
several actors and connects issues and actors with each other” 
3. A third transformation is presented in the area of “rules”. It denotes a change in the 
actor’s modus operandi. “A rule transformation may be associated with a re-
examination of the norms guiding actor’s common relations” 
4. The fourth level of transformation delineated by Väyrynen constitutes one of the core 
elements of the transformation perspective. As well as a point of convergence for the 
majority of the writers on conflict transformation: “structural transformation” Although 
his perception of structural change differs from that of Lederach, it undoubtedly re-
echoes Curle’s recommendation for a transformation in the structure of relations 
between parties; from unbalanced to balance and a corollary transition from un-peaceful 
to peaceful.  
 From Väyrynen point of observation, structural transformation is evidenced by a change in the 
relations between conflictants. By which the author suggests a qualitative change in the party’s 
mutual relations or a reduced or enhanced level of communication. Finally, Väyrynen refers to 
transformation which may be intended as well as unintended. 
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In like manner, Spencer and Spencer have contributed their quota to the thinking on conflict 
transformation. In their scholarly piece, which addressed the role of third-party mediation in 
conflict transformation processes and the effects of a new strategy for intervention in internal 
wars, their viewpoint on the transformation model is made explicitly clear. They have based 
their argument on experiences gathered in three African conflicts: Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan and 
Liberia. Following in Väyrynen’s footsteps they assert: 
“Conflict transformation is a continuous process which may be enhanced by third 
parties having the capacity to create conditions to develop political will” 297 
 
They contend further, that the transformation process may involve the following elements: 
cultural, political, economic, psychological, regional and international, which may be combined 
and focused to empower parties to reframe their differences” 
Going by their assertion and a general analysis of their scholarly contribution, it may be inferred 
that the job of transforming rests majorly on third-party mediators and as it seems “outsider” 
third parties. However as opined by Rupesinghe who underscores the relevance of the “insider 
partial” kind of third-party mediation:   
 
“Outsider neutral model of third-party mediation has proven invaluable in resolving 
many conflict situations, it has also demonstrated serious flaws and clearly is not 
applicable in all circumstances”. 298  
 
By this the author cautions that an overreliance on external mediators tends to undermine the 
whole peace process and therefore suggests the inclusion of “insider partials”.   Each of these 
actors cannot deliver the desired end-state of transformation in isolation.  What is advised is a 
synergy between insiders and outsiders in a long-term framework for sustainable peace. 
  
Even though Spencer and Spencer had attempted to contribute to the discourse on 
transformation, their modus-operandi in the three conflicts demonstrated the same third-party 
form of mediation captured by Bush and Folger which emphasized on a shift from a “problem 
solving orientation” to a focus on changing or transforming individuals.  In the final analysis, 
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the authors make the conclusion that “there is not only one “right way” to manage or resolve 
conflict, the psychological dimensions of conflict and the changing nature of circumstance on 
the ground in internal wars preclude the development of such generalizations”.299 They have 
also stressed that part of their failure especially in the Sudanese war may be attributed to the 
challenges facing the transformation model. They underscore a flaw in its strategies and 
methodologies, these they contend, may need future attention if the model is to be found 
applicable to modern kinds of conflicts.  
 
Kriesberg300 has further elaborated on what he perceives to be some of the challenges facing 
the transformation approach to conflict. He underscores the inappropriate employment and the 
underutilization of its ideas and illuminates some of the errors and grey areas in the approach.  
He contends that the approach seems applicable to very few conflict scenarios. Furthermore, he 
stresses that the ideas for transforming any conflict should emanate from “the people on the 
contending side”, rather than allow external intermediaries to impose their own perception of 
transformation on conflicts, which they discern from an outsider perspective.  It may be the 
reason why some authors like Lederach, stress the importance of cultural sensitivity and local 
empowerment. We will look deeply into those concepts in subsequent chapters. 
 
In this section, an attempt has been made to examine some contributions to the developing 
discourse of applying a transformative approach to modern day conflicts.  Spencer and 
Spencer’s contributions seemed to raise some doubt about the appropriateness of transforming 
in contrast to managing and resolving. To this end one may wonder what the merits are that 
may accrue from the transformation model as an embodiment of some of the ideas needed to 
initiate durable peace in Darfur’s on-going war. Writing in early 1990s, could it have been that 
Spencer and Spencer missed out on some important elements?  Or was the Sudan conflict one 
of such cases as suggested by Kriesberg, where attendant assumptions became inapplicable? 
Why has this work chosen some of the components from the transformation model as captured 
by Lederach as suitable for initiating peace in a protracted ten-year on-going internal war like 
that of Darfur?  What are those significant elements that may be relevant in the transformation 
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framework for peace in Darfur?  Subsequent chapters would attempt to provide answers to these 
questions.  
 
4. 3 Conflict and its Transformation:  ideas and perspectives according to John Paul 
Lederach. 
This study chooses to reflect deeply on John Paul Lederach´s contribution to the transformation 
model. Why is this so? The author’s perceptions on conflict are especially insightful. They 
highlight some core elements that may contribute to the occurrence of structural and relational 
change within societies experiencing protracted internal conflicts. Thus, his work would guide 
investigations seeking to understand the prospects embedded within a transformations 
framework, which may precipitate relational change within societies marred by long years of 
conflict.  
 
Contingent upon a peace process which demonstrates a significant measure of sensitivity to the 
local Peace-making mechanisms, Lederach recommends the inclusion of “grassroots actors”, 
especially the local custodians of such methods whose central focus it is to reconcile both 
victims and perpetrators of conflicts alike. It is assumed that a peace process that ignores the 
imperative for reconciliation, with time may be inclined to contend with the reoccurrence of 
violence. In developing subsections i shall examine the significance of reconciliation within the 
transformation framework for durable peace.  
 
It must be clearly understood that the adoption of this model does not suggest the endorsement 
of a panacea towards the problem of internal violence but serves to illuminate the essential 
ingredients in the quest for lasting peace.  It seeks to underscore the relevance and supposed 
importance of a set of actors it has dubbed “indigenous actors”.  His reflections have boarded 
on a number of important aspects that have hitherto remained inconsequential to the entire 
conflict intervention agenda. I intend to embark on this assignment with a view to explore the 
efficacy of the underlying principles of the transformation model when applied to Darfur’s 
decade old conflict. John Paul Lederach happens to be that scholar and practitioner lauded for 
his seminal contribution to the development and practice of the transformation approach. 
Several of his ideas, which have already received our attention in preceding sections, form the 
bedrock on which the empirical chapters of this thesis will be developed and analysed. 
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Lederach opines, that interventions inspired by a transformation perspective, better enhances 
the chances for durable peace. He suggests a fusion of the transformation strategies with 
mainstream approaches for intervention in modern day conflicts. In an initial comparison with 
the resolution approach, in which the author delineates conflict resolution strategies for 
intervention as focused on addressing “presenting issues”, he summarizes his understanding of 
the transformation approach with the following words: 
 
“Not satisfied with a quick solution that may seem to solve the immediate problem, 
transformation seeks to create a framework to address the content, the context and the 
structure of the relationship. Transformation as an approach aspires to create 
constructive change processes through conflict. Those processes provide opportunity to 
learn about patterns and to address relationship structures while providing concrete 
solutions to presenting issues”301 
 
Some defining characteristics of the Transformation approach to conflict intervention may be 
inferred from the statement above. Peaceful and balanced relationships are tantamount to a 
harmonious co-existence, both on international and national levels.  The approach tends to 
unravel escalated conflicts beyond those immediate issues, which may have triggered its 
outbreak. It seeks to investigate into deeper relationship patterns existing between parties to a 
conflict.  
  
“The issues over which people fight are important and require creative response. 
However, relationships represent a web of connections that form the larger context” … 
Deeper than what is manifested, lays underlying issues which are as well embedded in 
long histories 302 
 
The approach embraces conflict as a relevant ingredient in the stew of change. “It is a normal 
and continuous dynamic within human relationships” 303 Rather than regard conflict as a source 
of menace to whatever it comes in contact with, from a vision to transform, it may be perceived 
as a catalyst for constructive change. The transformation perspective therefore provides the 
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suitable platform for addressing the content as well as the context of conflict, with the major 
objective of engendering profound change.    
 
 In pre-colonial Africa, peaceful relations played a significant role in preserving peace and 
harmony at all levels of the society,304 from the lowest to the highest of levels of interaction; 
either within a family, among group of families, within or between communities. Peace-making 
institutions and practices became relevant to this effect. In the light of this, we see embedded 
in the transformational approach an inherent connection between core component-emphasis of 
relational patterns and those essential elements underscored during the process of conflict 
resolution in indigenous pre-colonial African societies.  
 
From a transformational perspective, the focus on relationships may be analysed from dual 
angles: A restoration of broken relations on an interpersonal level, and intervention aimed at 
precipitating change in social, political cultural and economic relations (Structural or Systemic 
Change) On the personal level, Lederach holds that the focus of the transformational approach 
would involve:  
“grief and trauma work, as well as dealing with deep feelings of fear, anger and 
bitterness” 305  
associated with all forms of loss experienced in prolonged violent conflicts 
 
From Lederach’s definition below, we are further able to draw on other important aspects 
considered in an analysis and response to conflict defined by the transformation approach.          
 
“Conflict Transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social 
conflict as life giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that 
reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and 
responds to real –life problems in human relationships.”306 
 
Although the transformation approach seeks to concentrate on conflict as possessing the 
potentials for change, it strongly abhors the use of violent means. Therefore, as the above 
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definition captures, included in the transformation agenda is the objective to set in motion the 
processes for tackling violence and addressing injustice both at structural and relational levels. 
Justice as an integral part of peace-making connotes the following: 
“Doing justice is the pursuit of restoration, or rectifying wrongs, of creating right 
relationships based on equity and fairness, advocacy for the harmed, facilitating the 
forum for an open acknowledgement of the wrongs committed and for making them 
right…”307 
 
The focus on justice tends to connect with the need to show mercy and forgiveness. These 
elements are found to exist within the context of reconciliation. Hence, we highlight the 
preference for, and an emphasis on restorative justice in contrast to retributive justice.   
 
“Reconciliation is focused on restoring broken relationships between adversaries.  
Seeing reconciliation as an integral part of peace-making involves, creating time and a 
place within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate, and 
embrace the painful past and the necessary shared future as a means of dealing with 
the present”308  
 
4. 4  Levels of transformation 
It is commonplace understanding that conflict has the capacity to engender some form of 
change on different levels.  These changes have been identified as unpalatable and most times 
undesirable. Yet the manifestation of such changes in any conflict characterized by violence, 
are often times unavoidable.  Ryan has identified as negative transformation: altered 
perceptions and attitudes, negative images, distrust. To this he adds changes on the economic, 
social, and political terrains. Knowledge of the occurrence of negative transformation in 
conflict terrains, occasioned by violence, has received the scholarly preoccupation of several 
authors. Deutsch for example, extensively discussed such negative changes in terms of 
“destructive processes”.309 Pruitt and Fry in like manner, catalogued five types of such changes, 
which may occur in a conflict situation.   Ryan captures them in the following manner: “from 
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light to heavy, from doing well to hurting the other, from small to large issues, from specific to 
general issues and from few too many actors”.  
 
Lederach has developed on the discourse further by describing some levels on which negative 
transformation may occur.  He analyses these levels of change from a prescriptive and 
descriptive perspective.  We observe his unremitting emphasis on those changes occurring in 
relationships and structures. As has been underscored in several aspects of this work, these two 
levels constitute the core message of the transformation approach. The incapacity of any 
process of change to incorporate these cardinal levels of change into its operational framework 
can be seen as tantamount to the resurgence of any conflict.  Since the process of transformation 
can only be initiated when these areas have been identified where negative transformation has 
occurred or is evident, it becomes important to examine some of these levels of transformation 
as delineated and inspired by Lederach. 
 
In his opinion, the escalation of a conflict may occasion changes on the following levels. These 
changes help to illuminate the path on which constructive transformation may be initiated. 
1. Personal: A conflict may negatively affect the physical well-being of an individual, and 
their capacity for accurate perception. It may trigger a decline in self-esteem as well as 
emotional stability. Positive transformation would entail a restoration of the human 
individual to the level where the full potential for physical, emotional, and spiritual 
growth can be maximized. 
2. Cultural: Is conceived of as changes that as a result of the conflict have provoked 
changes in the cultural behaviours of a people. The transformation process seeks in this 
regard, to resuscitate and revive those resources and mechanism possessing the capacity 
to effect the positive transformation of conflict. In a conflict like that of Darfur, a 
transformation-oriented intervention, would seek to identify the destruction induced on 
its cultural life with the emergence and protraction of its conflict.  
3. Structural changes: Structural changes include those changes, which have occurred in 
the political, social and economic environments, which have affected the entire 
wellbeing, development and growth of a society. Most often, changes on this level are 
envisioned in connection with how governments have built political and economic 
structures, which have, either infringed on the basic needs of its populations or exhibited 
inequity in resource distribution. The evidence of structural decay within a society also 
constitutes one of the root causes of prolonged strife. As such a transformation approach 
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strongly underscores changes in social, political and economic structures as tantamount 
to durable peace in societies experiencing deep-seated cleavage. An emphasis on 
structural change suggests that the re-occurrence of the same conflict is averted, and the 
future of a people is completely altered for good. It connotes the manifestation of deep 
level change. 
4. Relationship changes: Relationships can be manifested on different levels: interpersonal, 
intergroup or even international. They involve some demonstrated interaction between 
two parties and an exhibited pattern of exchange, which may be measured in terms of 
content and quality. Relationships are also connected to memories and often include an 
assessment and reassessment of parties’ expectations from a relationship.310  
 
When relationships are confronted with conflict situations, those relationships are transformed 
negatively.  Friends become foes and even brothers311 begin to see each other as enemies. 
Communications is broken, while negative perceptions begin to sprout, and attitudes change. 
A number of writers have underscored a change in the subjective causes of conflict, usually 
embedded within parties’ relationships, as relevant to effective and enduring change. Similarly, 
within the transformation framework, it becomes paramount to seek changes in relational 
patterns which underlie a conflict, without which a conflict is threatened by re-eruption.  Thus, 
the transformation approach set in motion change processes to improve communication, as well 
as help parties transcend distorted relations and more importantly help parties overcome deep 
seated grievances, fears and hurts evident between parties and precipitated by aggression.  
 
Mitchell has hinted on the difficulty involved in changing distorted perceptions and enemy 
images created over a long period of time, and probably passed on from generation to 
generation.312 It may be for reasons like this that the transformation approach insists on 
developing change processes within a long-term framework and underscores the wisdom in 
indigenous mechanisms of peace and resolution. Theorist within the field contend that such 
measures will endure long after the external actors of conflict transformation have exited the 
conflict domain.  
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In developing chapters, we shall understand how pre-colonial African societies maintained and 
reconciled inter-communal relationships on the platform of indigenous institutions and its 
custodians. From the outset, attendant actors have come to terms with need to reconcile parties 
and groups, as a way of preventing the re-occurrence of the same conflicts. We shall understand 
the wisdom behind processes of reconciliation and attendant reconciliation ceremonies as a 
means of mending broken relationships and reinstating peace and harmony within the 
community 
 
4. 5 A transformation framework:  building peace in protracted African conflicts. An 
overview of Lederach’s comprehensive framework 
 Somewhere in this study, Edward Azar’s theory of protracted social conflicts will be adopted 
in the analysis of some underlying conditions, which accounted for fresh violence in Darfur, 
more than a decade ago. In like manner, Lederach’s “comprehensive framework for 
intervention in protracted internal conflicts”313 will provide the investigative elements which 
this study will depend on to examine the manner in which the international community has 
responded to Darfur’s conflict on the track III level of intervention.  Specifically, the framework 
will aid the enquiry into the role of UNAMID as sole international peacemaker currently 
supporting the transformation of violent conflict in Sudan’s western region. In the empirical 
chapters of this study, I shall examine the extent to which the propositions underlying the 
author’s framework can become operational in real time protracted conflicts like that of 
Darfur’s. This section however introduces the reader to these propositions and forms the basis 
on which the findings from the field will be analysed. Although some of the elements 
underpinning his comprehensive framework have been mentioned elsewhere in preceding 
sections of this chapter, this section outlines these components in ways that seeks to delineate 
more deeply the essence of incorporating these factors into mainstream approaches geared 
towards sustainable peace in protracted internal conflicts.  
I underscore the relevance of three salient elements found within Lederach comprehensive 
framework for intervention in protracted internal conflicts’ 
                                                     
313 John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive 
Framework," in Conflict Transformation, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 
201-222 
 
 
 161 
 
4.5.1 Adoption of longer time frames for intervention in protracted internal conflicts. 
Lederach accentuates the basis on which a peace process must have to incorporate broader 
timeframes. This is to accommodate a number of other tasks that should in the long run 
engender an internally engineered process that targets the sustainability of an externally 
initiated peace process. Aside from the focus on attaining short-term goals, which basically set 
out to achieve a truce between warring parties, a longer timeframe according to Lederach allows 
for deeper involvement with the host society. This tends to propel efforts tailored towards 
“broader transformation, reconciliation and social reconstruction”  
 
In developing sections, we shall explore much deeper, the concept of reconciliation. The 
concept is viewed as the core assumptions underlying of the transformation framework. The 
idea of embracing the task of reconciliation is perceived as cardinal to the reengineering of 
society. This may engender peaceful co-existence between victims and perpetrators. It presents 
the platform on which local peace-making mechanisms may be integrated into modern 
approaches for peace.  A synergy between both conventional and indigenous methods of 
conflict handling may hold the prospects for sustainable peace within societies riven by 
protracted internal conflicts. It should be noted that at the core of Africa’s peace-making efforts, 
lies the significance of capping conflict resolution with attendant rituals or ceremonies for 
reconciliation, intended to symbolize the end of war and the acceptance of lasting peace.  
 
4. 5. 2 Fusing multiple approaches and actors within a single framework for peace. 
The idea behind merging together different forms of peace-making tools within societies 
marred by the protractedness of a conflict, cannot be over emphasized, especially because it 
allows for the application of multiple instruments within a working framework of peace, and 
blends in actors from different levels of society, ranging from top to bottom. Lederach suggest 
the creation of an infrastructure of peace. It represents the hybridization of peace-making 
methods and principles inherent to the fields of conflict management, conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation, emblematic of strategies such as ceasefire negotiations, problem 
solving workshops and for example “Judiyya, within the Darfur context, respectively. An 
infrastructure of peace should enable a fusion of top, middle and grassroot actors “mutually 
dependent” and aligned towards the search for durable peace.  
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4. 5. 3 Building on Cultural Resources314 
Lederach avows that it is imperative for the international peace actor to “build on the cultural 
and contextual resources for peace and conflict resolution within the setting” In his opinion 
the international community may be on the right trajectory towards peace with the adoption of 
“a new mind set” as it conducts intervention on terrains of violent aggression. He illuminates 
further on the notion of a new mind-set with a reflection cited from Anderson: 
 
That it rests on the shoulders of the international community to “move beyond a simple 
prescription of answers and modalities for dealing with conflict that come from the 
outside the setting and focus at least as much attention on discovering and empowering 
the resources, modalities, and mechanisms for building peace that exist within the 
context”315 
 
Contingent on this assertion the author underscores the relevance attached to the role of local 
custodians of peace-making mechanisms, such as those of the elders, and local conflict 
mediators, who within the African context are recognized as the repertoire of that knowledge 
guiding the resolution of conflict and peace-making in traditional African societies. Lederach 
posits:316 that the motivations of a culturally sensitive approach “is based on the idea that all 
cultures and groups develop ways for handling conflict” Therefore the exigency to tap into the 
cultural repository within the conflict setting, for “resources and roles”, which tend to activate 
the ownership and concrete involvement of a people affected by war.  To this end the “setting 
and its people” ceases to be perceived as the “problem” but through an inclusionary framework 
for intervention, become part of the solution to the problem.   
 
In the light of this, a culturally sensitive approach should in addition, take the step to assist and 
encourage the revival of indigenous strategies capable of effecting positive change within 
societies burdened by conflict.  Finally, Lederach contends that peace actors must steadily 
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demonstrate the readiness to deviate from a biased perspective, such as assumes that enduring 
peace lies solely within the outsider’s conception, approach or tools for durable peace. 
 
4. 5. 4 The Propositions: 
The propositions utilized in this study are those, which underpin Lederach’s “comprehensive 
framework.” They border on the knowledge already highlighted above. However, when 
presented as “propositions” they expatiate on the said ideas and assumptions to develop the 
analytical framework employed by this thesis to investigate into their practicability in Darfur’s 
conflict. 
 
Proposition one makes the case for “establishing an Infrastructure for Peace”317.  
In Lederach’s words: 
“The comprehensive framework builds on the view that an infrastructure is needed, an 
infrastructure that legitimates and integrates multiple levels of the population affected, in 
terms of both input in the peace process and its implementation…”  “An adequate 
transformative framework must explicitly and intentionally devise mechanisms for 
integrating and coordinating high- middle- and grassroots level strategies, ensuring they 
are given space and are legitimated and coordinated”318 
 
The diagram one ( see prefix) represents members of the affected population in a protracted 
internal conflict as expounded by Lederach.  The empirical section investigating the validity of 
the framework will identify Darfur’s affected population based on this example. 
 
Proposition two: Building a Peace Constituency 
Lederach avers that: 
a. “Most of today’s armed conflicts are carried out between groups with longstanding 
animosities and mistrust. The division and polarization are often so sharp and deep between 
these groups that most observers of the conflict, whether within or outside the setting, share the 
belief that peace efforts can emerge only if outsiders are involved. There is an inclination in 
international peace endeavours to seek help from the outside, especially in terms of mediators 
and peacemakers…”319 
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b. “A comprehensive transformative perspective on the conflict must raise a number of 
key concerns around the issue of who participates in peace-making, how various actors are 
understood and coordinated, what unique resources each brings, and when they are to be 
incorporated into the peace process”320 
 
Proposition 3: Long-term and short-term perspective 
Lederach states: 
“A comprehensive framework for peace builds from a vision for both long-term transformation 
and pragmatic short-term steps…. In other words, even from the beginning we recognize that a 
peace process is not merely the short-term challenge of getting people to the ‘table’ nor of 
achieving a ceasefire, but must include task like a broader transformation, reconciliation and 
social reconstruction”321  
 
4. 6 Reconciliation, the core element in protracted internal conflicts? 
Having examined some of the salient assumptions underlying Lederach’s analytical framework 
for intervention in protracted internal conflicts, I proceed to elucidate the concept of 
reconciliation.  Reconciliation in its broader understanding is viewed as the kernel of the 
conflict transformation approach to conflict. Lederach describes reconciliation as the place 
where “Truth, Mercy, Justice and Peace meet. It is a social space, a locus where people and 
things come together. 322 Mapping out the path towards achieving durable peace, contingent 
upon the components underlying the concept of reconciliation as highlighted by Lederach, 
means to address as well, the subjective aspects of the aftermath of any conflict. Adopting the 
reconciliation approach, serves to prepare victims and survivors for the process of internal 
healing, from trauma, hatreds, and fears. It embraces the reintegration of perpetrators into 
society.   
 
Truth is understood as: “the longing for the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and the 
validation of painful loss and experiences” However when associated with the “Mercy” 
component, an avenue for “letting go” is created, which may precipitate a renewed 
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consciousness.323   The need for Justice cannot be overlooked; as such it forms part of the 
underlying elements aligned with the idea of reconciliation. For many, the ability to achieve 
justice for wrongdoing brings closure and the ability to move on with their lives.  The legal 
approach to justice would be to seek the prosecution of the perpetrators of injustice.  Retributive 
justice seems most ideal especially since it tends to be compliant with international standards 
for investigating and eventually punishing the offender.  Such approaches are adopted with the 
hope that future atrocities can be prevented.  However, some analysts are of the opinion that 
such an approach has the tendency to focus more on the perpetrator denying the victims and 
survivor the much needed to time to undergo inner healing and transformation.324 As opposed 
to retribution, Lederach addresses the notion of justice from an angle that focuses on restoring 
broken relationships:  
 
“Doing justice is the pursuit of restoration, of rectifying wrongs, of creating right 
relationships based on equity and fairness.  Justice involves advocacy for those 
harmed… for making things right”325  
 
His definition of justice tends to tone down the aspect of punishment for the offender, to seek 
to the revival of right relationship based on equity and fairness.  
 
Also, Assefa recognizes that “there cannot be reconciliation without justice” he insists that both 
justice and equity form important aspects of reconciliation. Most important to the idea of 
carrying out justice is the manner in which justice is conducted. He argues that justice must be 
carried out in ways that will eventually restore the broken relations existing between parties. In 
conclusion, therefore justice is understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
reconciliation.326  
 
Desmond Tutu is also quoted as corroborating the essence of Justice within the context of 
reconciliation, but from an African perspective. He contends that justice is aimed at “healing 
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breaches, redressing imbalances and restoring broken relationships”.327  Finally the peace 
element in conjunction with the above elucidated, represents: harmony, unity well-being 
security and respect, which form integral parts to be considered in the pursuit of reconciliation 
between parties.   
The conception of reconciliation according to Lederach, as both a focus and a locus, is seen as 
synonymous with the African approach to reconciliation as we shall see subsequently.     
Furthermore, Assefa posits that the objective of reconciling adversaries is to ensure that a 
transformation occurs in the antagonistic attitudes and relationships of adversaries. That is, 
from negative to positive. The essence of reconciliation lies in the willingness of both parties 
to acknowledge their responsibility as well as their guilt. Furthermore, their ability to confront 
the truth and recount the hideous events of the past, straightens out the path towards a healthier 
co-existence. Reconciliation therefore follows a process: of an honest acknowledgement of the 
harm or injury each party has inflicted on the other; a sincere regret and remorse for the injury 
done, a readiness to apologize for one’s role in inflicting the injury as well as a readiness of the 
conflicting parties to let go of the anger and bitterness caused by the conflict and injury. The 
offender must similarly show commitment not to repeat the injury. There must be sincere effort 
to redress past grievance that caused the conflict and also compensate the damage caused to the 
extent possible; finally, reconciliation should make way for parties to enter into a new mutually 
enriching relationship.328    
 
Unlike the case of interstate conflicts where adversaries may remain territorially distanced from 
each other, internal conflicts tend to deny both victims and perpetrators the comfort of evading 
one another, as both parties seem compelled, by virtue of extant ties, to a relearning of 
harmonious and peaceful living regardless of the experience of a painful past.  Bercovitch citing 
Hartwell indicates the probability of a deadlock, on the part of both parties in conflict to achieve 
reconciliation should either one refuse to tow the difficult path of surrendering past hurt, on the 
platform of forgiveness.     
 
In the African context, reconciliation is perceived as synonymous with the act of resolving 
conflict. It is the end target of all efforts aimed at achieving societal harmony. At every level of 
                                                     
327 Desmond Tutu, Chair of South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, cited by Luc Huyse in Luc 
Huyse and Mark Salter ed., 5 
328 See, Hizkias Assefa, "Reconciliation: Challenges, Responses, and the Role of Civil Society," in People 
Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 637-653 
 167 
human interaction within traditional African societies, reconciliation becomes central to the 
pursuit of enduring peace. It serves as an avenue for mending and restoring broken 
relationships. The traditional African society tends to hugely underscore the notion of healthy 
relationships, viewed as pivotal to peaceful co-existence on all levels within the society.  Citing 
Assefa, Witty and Deng, Malan asserts that priority is given to restoration, whenever kinship 
or social relationships are disturbed by dispute.  
  
“When the disputing parties, their supporters and the elders concerned engage in 
talking a matter through, it is usually the issue of relationship which receives prime 
attention. The relationship of the past is reviewed, the tense relationships of the current 
conflict are investigated, and the settlement is sought that would improve future 
relationships” 329 
 
This means that the endeavour to mitigate conflict naturally ends with reconciliation. In seeking 
to reconcile a victim and a perpetrator for example, the process of reconciliation may involve 
entire family members. In line with the principle of collective responsibility, the guilt of one is 
usually seen as the guilt of all. Also, reconciliation may take the form of ceremonies or rituals 
conducted according to ancient beliefs and practices, which the people can relate to.   
 
As much as traditional African societies strongly underscore the need for reconciliation, there 
is scarcely any attempt to water down or diminish the gravity of offenses committed. Assefa 
contends that reconciliation “does not mean that offenders are just pardoned”330 the focus is 
for the offender to realize, acknowledge guilt and show remorse. A process, which is tailored 
towards restoration more than it, seeks to punish or apportion guilt or blame.  In contrast to 
international standards where punitive actions are taken against perpetrators of human rights 
atrocities in internal conflicts, the predominant African indigenous approach would be, to focus 
on reintegrating and rehabilitating not just victims but offenders back into society.   
 
Assessing local reconciliation in Sierra Leone, Joe Alie arrived at the conclusion that:  
 
“local reconciliation activities are often focused on the return of ex-combatants” 
                                                     
329 Jannie Malan, “Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa”. (Durban: African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes, 1997), 21 
330 Ibid  
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 In Mozambique, similar practices of reliance on indigenous reconciliation is identified in the 
traditional healing powers vested on the “Curandeiros” whose duty it is to:  
“conduct reintegration rituals for ex-soldiers”331 . In like manner, the Mato Oput as I shall 
examine in the first empirical chapter of this thesis, is a peace-making mechanism associated 
with the people of northern Uganda. At its core is the reconciliation of both victims and 
perpetrators.332     
  
As indicated elsewhere in this section reconciliation therefore serves as the bridge between 
conventional conflict handling methods and indigenous strategies extant within a conflict 
setting. It serves as the platform on which indigenous peace-making actors may be incorporated 
into an initiated peace process, especially those on whom the power to mediate and reconcile 
has been bestowed. And specifically, in the handling of conflicts that occur in traditional 
societies where mechanisms and underlying elements continue to prevail and integral aspects 
of peace-making. Once reconciliation is adopted as an important aspect of a peace process, it 
should, according to Assefa “stop a cycle of violence and hatred that sometimes transcends 
generations”333.   
 
In developing chapters, I shall venture into providing an overview of some peace-making 
mechanisms across sub-Saharan Africa. A number of such practices date back in time and may 
be understood as part of the cultural heritage of a number of African societies. These practices 
have been relied on to maintain peace and harmony and to restore sanity and cohesion within 
their societies. Although a number of commentators334 have argued that owing to colonialism 
and modernization a number of such practices have lost originality, it remains a fact that these 
strategies still exist and have remained an indispensable part of Africa’s traditional and semi-
modern societies.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter’s central theme examined the prospects of a transformative approach to peace over 
the conflict resolution framework for intervention in cases of protracted internal conflicts. I 
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333 Hizkias Assefa, “The Meaning of Reconciliation” in People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from 
Around the World. ( Amsterdam: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999) 
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state that there are clear similarities between the resolution and transformative approach to 
peace. It would be largely improper to dismiss the resolution approach as blinded to the needs 
for structural change as a precondition for durable peace. In fact, Lederach and several other 
authors have emphasized the inability of the transformation approach to initiate change in 
isolation and calls for interdependence and complementarity between the three approaches.  
Nonetheless, I contend, that the transformation approach holds more for cases of protraction 
and intractability as evidenced in today’s conflicts. With respect to structural change, I see a 
striking difference in the level of emphasis for a change in economic and political structures. 
Mitchell reinforces this opinion stating that: 
  
“For transformationist, the central objective is structural change…” “However, within 
a conflict resolution framework, it is also quite conceivable for a resolution to be 
achieved without necessarily involving major structural changes” 335 
 
An intervention predicated on a transformation approach is driven by the vision to move beyond 
the immediate issues to unearth underlying patterns as well as stress the fundamental need for 
change on structural and relational levels.  
Similarly, Lederach observed, that the orientation of a resolution approach to conflict is to seek 
ways of ending a conflict, while the transformation approach in contrast, views conflict as 
natural and a catalyst for change and development. On one hand, the resolution approach, within 
a conflict situation asks the question  
 
“How can we end what is not desired “. The transformation approach in contrast will 
seek to answer the question “how do we end what is not desired and build what is 
desired”336  
On the other hand, the process of transformation examines the content as well as the context of 
the conflict and investigates them in terms of long histories of aggression.337 Lastly, a 
transformation process seeks change at multiple levels and includes hitherto marginalized 
actors as fundamental to the success of an initiated peace process. I perceive this point to be 
less salient within the resolution framework.    
                                                     
335  Christopher Mitchell, Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform? 
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336 Lederach, “The Little Book of Conflict Transformation”, 33 
337 ibid 
 170 
Chapter Five 
5.1 An Overview of selected indigenous Peace-making Methods across sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Introduction 
The empirical part of this thesis commences from this chapter (five). It specifically develops 
on and provides the connection between the framework’s (conflict transformation) underlying 
elements as highlighted in chapter four and the empirical analysis. The chapter renders accounts 
of specific cases of real-time conflict terrains and recounts the process of peace-making in the 
aftermath of conflict. The overarching motive is to buttress and lend weight to the assertions 
that relational change actualized on vehicle of reconciliation, may in many ways be perceived 
as tantamount to stable peace.   
 
The three selected cases furnish the reader with insight into peace-making mechanisms across 
sub-Saharan Africa. The selected cases, which are not chosen randomly, include narratives from 
authors who have performed in-depth research on the selected cases and tell their stories first 
hand. This chapter draws on these accounts to introduce specific tools and practices, in most 
cases a pre-colonial heritage is described, traceable to societies within the region, which have 
remained burdened by or have emerged from protracted conflicts. These peace-making 
practices relied upon in pre-colonial times, for the preservation of law and order seem to have 
acquired some relevance in contemporary efforts at making peace.  
 
In preceding chapters, this study examined some of the theoretical assumptions that inform 
conventional approaches to conflict intervention around the world and specifically as applied 
to conflict occurrences on the sub-Saharan African region. Correspondingly, it becomes 
significant to delve into knowledge about non-conventional methods associated with the people 
directly affected by conflict. Such an inquiry sheds light on extant practices that continue to 
play a significant role both in conflict resolution and the preservation of law and order. It is also 
enlightening for readers not conversant with African indigenous methods to understand that 
merits may accrue from indigenous practices when applied to contemporary conflicts. This 
notion tends to correspond with on-going propositions to advance and adopt a track three 
method of intervention in internal conflicts-one that creates space or incorporates hitherto 
marginalized peace actors and processes, into a working framework for durable peace. 
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The conflict transformation approach to internal conflicts is regarded as the singular field of 
inquiry to have initiated considerations for an extensive approach towards sustainable peace. 
Over the years proponents of the field have solicited for and supported the notion of an 
"inclusionary approach” as a way of complementing the management and resolution of internal 
conflicts occurring across the globe.  As the chapter on conflict transformation has evidenced, 
the current nature of contemporary conflicts, begs for the adoption of a culturally sensitive 
approach to internal conflicts. That view ultimately underscores the inclusion or 
acknowledgement of the positive role of “local actors” “contextual resources” or what 
commentators may refer to as “insider involvement” or “indigenous processes”. It is a 
perspective that takes cognizance of the subjective aspects that have endured in the course of 
the conflict and focuses on other adverse conditions that threaten the restoration of societal 
harmony. Such unaddressed conditions have the propensity to reignite those conflicts that seem 
non-existent.  
 
The Mato Oput is a peace-making practice associated with the people of Acholiland. It was 
accorded reasonable significance when it became almost indisputable that the ICC’s debut task 
of investigating into the long-standing conflict between the government of Uganda and the LRA 
in the northern part of the country would aggravate the conflict instead of dousing tensions.  
The case of the Acholi’s people’s reconciliation mechanism especially within the context of the 
yet ongoing war is germane to the task this chapter sets out to achieve. It captures the essence 
of “cultural sensitivity”. In which case the international community, learns to approach peace-
making within the region, as a process that acknowledges the inclusion of pragmatic aspects of 
indigenous practices associated with the people directly affected by conflict. This assumption 
ostensibly lies in stark opposition to approaches whose underlying convictions underscore the 
sole reliance on punitive measures associated with the likes of ICC and its affiliates.   
 
In similar vein, the oath system is examined for its effectiveness across a number of societies 
within the sub-Saharan region and specifically for its efficacy in the conflict between the 
Aguleri and Umuleri people of southeast Nigeria. Historical accounts substantiate the failure to 
achieve peace via conventional means, ostensibly dating back to colonial times. The oat taking 
system proved to be an efficient mechanism in the reconciliation of both communities and a 
platform on which societal harmony became re-established. This study adopts this example 
with the intention to corroborate the existence of peace-making tools that foster reconciliation 
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in sub-Saharan Africa. The selected case in question equally aims at bolstering assumptions 
from the conflict transformation scholarship, which suggests that reconciliation may indeed 
hinder the resurgence of conflicts within societies emergent from war. Especially when such 
processes generate inner healing and mend broken relationships. 
 Examining these selected practices should not be misinterpreted as an effort to romanticize 
African peace-making mechanisms, to this end, the chapter includes an account from the Somali 
experience in the south-central region, where the desired results hardly engendered the much-
desired reality or even translated to peace of some sort. The chapter will briefly delve into the 
conflicts for which these mechanisms became relevant.  
 
5. 2 Contextualizing the term ‘Indigenous’  
 At this point it suffices to illuminate on the chapter’s usage of the term ‘indigenous’. A simple 
definition of the term as offered by the oxford dictionary defines the word to be anything 
‘originating or occurring naturally in a particular place’. When the chapter refers to ‘indigenous 
practices, institutions, processes and actors’ it is suggesting that such mechanisms, strategies 
and actors originate from within the contexts focused on in this chapter- those of northern 
Uganda, southeast Nigeria and of the Somalis in their various regions and they occur naturally 
within these stipulated regions. Therefore, whether or not such practices or mechanism assume 
an adulterated, transformed or restructured and/ or reorganized form, due to colonization or 
modernization, neglect or other factors as the case may be, so long as they are known to have 
originated from within, they are occurring naturally within the locus of its origination and are 
not considered as an import on the context in question, such strategies in this chapter, will be 
regarded as indigenous to a people.   
Indigenous because a people employ and rely on such strategies and may genuinely relate to 
such practices in their search for peace, reconciliation and the ultimate goal of societal harmony.   
 
5. 3 The conflict between the government of Uganda and the LRA (Lord’s Resistance 
Army) 
Without going into full details of the complexities surrounding the Ugandan conflict, it is 
important to note that this nearly 30-year-old conflict is understood to be causally linked to 
issues of ethnic domination, regional marginalization, underdevelopment and a host of other 
complex issues. Since Uganda’s post-independence era, aggrieved groups have sought redress 
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contingent on aggressive and violent means. Such overt expressions of discontentment were 
not unconnected to the legacies of divide and rule (north and south) inherited from the British 
colonial era.   Successive leaderships beginning with the country’s first prime minister, Milton 
Obote and leading up to the current administration had witnessed one form of resistance after 
another, successfully changing the country’s leadership to its current one. Yoweri Museveni 
the incumbent, is also known to have ascended power on the platform of a resistance movement 
known as the NRA (National Resistance Army). 
 
Since 1986 the Museveni administration has remained in power and in conflict with the last 
rebel group standing known as the LRA. Emerging after 1988, the LRA had initially portrayed 
itself as a voice representing its people to speak up against the gruesome acts meted out on 
innocent citizens of the Acholi region of northern Uganda. In the unfolding years however, the 
LRA and its commander in the person of Joseph Kony, have engaged in hideous crimes of all 
kinds, ranging from killings, abductions and maiming of varying degrees. The history of the 
past 29 years has been that of searching for justice and peace via the most appropriate means.338  
Strong controversies had ensued in the academic world over the most suitable approach to peace 
in the conflict of Northern Uganda. 339The debate gained significance given the unyielding 
coercive means adopted by the government in her quest to crush rebel activity. A military option 
had become detrimental to the lives of innocent citizens and also began to undermine the entire 
peace process.  
The Amnesty act of 2000 and the referral of the conflict by Museveni, in 2003 to the ICC, 
seemed to have complicated issues further and added a new dimension to the quest for peace, 
one that had remained farfetched even in the negative sense of it. 340 It was the desperate search 
for viable tools and the vociferous call for peace that engendered both the propositions to 
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incorporate indigenous tools and the quasi-international recognition of a reconciliatory 
mechanism associated with the Acholi people of northern Uganda.341  
 
5. 4 The people of Acholiland 
Acholi’s are located in the northern Ugandan districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Padar, Amuru, Nwoya, 
Lamwo and Agago. The people of Acholiland take pride in a cultural heritage responsible for 
preserving the social fabric of its entire communities. Although its traditional structures had 
been rearranged to suit colonial purpose, indigenous peace-making mechanisms had played an 
important role in maintaining the peace and stability of its people back then. Acholi’s have also 
been described as a people who basked in the constructed glory of the colonial era. This was 
specifically evidenced by their huge representation in both the military and civilian service.342 
When the implosion of northern Uganda occurred, the Acholis became the worse known 
recipients of the legacies of that war. Hate and prejudice had become traceable to the era of 
colonial favouritism.   
 
5. 5  The peace trajectory for northern Uganda 
In April of 2007, the LRA had acceded to continued talks. In the previous year, peace talks 
between the Ugandan government and the LRA had been underway in Juba, South Sudan. This 
however ended in a deadlock. 343 The growing humanitarian crisis also began attracting 
international concern, and the call to end the suffering of innocent lives became even more 
forceful.  On the one hand, the conflict had grossly degenerated even with the adoption of 
seemingly appropriate tools for intervention. On the other hand, the propositions to incorporate 
indigenous mechanisms had begun to resonate especially on the grass root levels. 
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The 2007 renewed deliberations had seen a reawakening of those initial calls for the 
empowerment of indigenous methods available to the people of Acholi in times of conflict. One 
of such vehement statements calling for the consideration of other options of peace emerged 
from Ruhakana Ruyanda. He was the minister for internal affairs and also the head of 
delegations to the Juba talks. Ruhakana Ruyanda allegedly alluded to the Mato Oput, as a 
substitute to ICC trials.344 In giving credence to such indigenous peace-making mechanisms, 
he underscored the following:  
 
“The traditional methods are both symbolic and real. They have worked. Instead of 
rushing for Western solutions, it is good we revived them”345.  
 
Nonetheless, he pointed out that such methods should be revived to comply with international 
standards. By the end of the second quarter of 2007, the LRA and the Ugandan government had 
agreed among other things to utilize available traditional mechanisms in the search for lasting 
peace to the conflict.  Article 3.1 of the memorandum stated as follows  
 
“Traditional Justice Mechanisms such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc and 
Tonu ci Koka and others as practiced in the communities affected by the conflict, shall 
be promoted, with necessary modifications, as a central part of the framework for 
accountability and reconciliation”346  
 
Such recommendations had equally assumed a bottom up approach. In the grassroots, highly 
spirited local and religious leaders had been actively involved in advocating for the 
incorporation of the Mato Oput, into existing strategies for peace. In the opinion of one of such 
local leaders, the strategies of the ICC connoted sheer insensitivity towards a people who had 
the right to exercise their beliefs in the ways that best suit them. After all they have been the 
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direct recipients of the conflict and all that came with it.347 To superimpose strange conceptions 
of justice on communities who themselves operated under their own unique cultural beliefs, 
norms, and understanding of justice tended to promote injustice of a certain kind.  
 
Below, a documented interview with the Acholi Paramount Chief Elect Rwot Onen David 
Acana II. His opinion on the conflict of approaches captures a number of significant issues.  
“…We have the traditional culture. When someone kills we have the system to stop the killing. 
That is why we did not have death as a punishment. Nor did we have jail sentences. Rather we 
had reconciliation- Mato Oput… Does the ICC not value community values of people? Does 
the ICC override all other systems? Even if Kony is taken to The Hague, that will not be a 
punishment. The prisons there are air-conditioned! Rather he should be in the community. He 
should see the suffering he has caused. Here people look in your eyes and say I forgive you. 
Then he will understand and recognize what he has done.” 
  
His strong assertions explicitly underscored the essence of a culturally sensitive approach to 
peace, and made allusions to a salient principle of the Acholis, one that totally repudiates the 
death sentence, while embracing forgiveness as a vital element of complete reconciliation. The 
Mato Oput seemed to have elicited international recognition for the purported principles 
underlying its conception of justice. Such embedded elements of acknowledging wrong doing 
and granting forgiveness became integral aspects of the journey towards the reconciliation of 
victims and perpetrators. Mato Oput specifically aimed at the re-integration of ex-combatants 
into their various communities. It sought the revival of societal cohesion.  
 
5. 6 Understanding the Mato Oput approach to peace 
The Mato Oput has always been an Acholi way of dealing with instances of both intentional 
and unintentional killing within the community. The Acholi’s are said to be a people deeply 
ingrained in their religious customs and beliefs. Although the war had taken its toll on the 
people of Acholiland, a number of its cultural practices, like the spilling of an innocent blood 
have remained repugnant to community life. A crime as the spilling of innocent blood promptly 
severs cordial ties between the families of the victim and those of the offender, one that required 
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the performance of the Mato Oput reconciliation rites to reinstate harmonious co-existence 
between the affected families.  
 
The characteristic nature of the Acholi’s is believed to be that of possessing a high capacity to 
forgive.348 Such inclinations derive from their cultural believes. As much as the Acholi people’s 
capacity to forgive might remain inconceivable to the outside world, it should not be 
misconstrued as condoning injustice nor misinterpreted as portraying a people with the capacity 
to be superhuman. The emphasis here is on relational change and the revitalization of communal 
order. The Acholi’s for example believe in Jok, the divine spirit of ancestors who guide the 
Acholi moral order. When a wrong is committed, it is the Acholi believe that the ancestors send 
cen, the spirit of the dead person in form of misfortune. Unless the elders and offender take 
appropriate action to restore the broken relations the conflict prevails.349 In similar vein, 
relevant actions are undertaken once an act of killing has occurred. The offender is promptly 
banished from his community probably as a way of averting reprisal attacks. This symbolizes 
disassociation from the evil act of killing until the spirit of the dead has been appeased and the 
land cleansed. Ancient believes allude to the altering in the realm of the spirits, of some 
harmonious bond, shared by both families, only to be corrected by compensating the loss. 350   
5.6.1 Mato Oput: The process of reconciliation  
 
The reconciliation ceremony and the path towards peace commence with the payment of the 
blood money. However, like many observers reiterate, such payments and ceremonies are to no 
avail and do not achieve its full purpose without the mental preparedness of the receiving 
community, the victims and the perpetrators alike. Wasonga echoing one of his interviewee’s 
notes that the Acholi base the cleaning process on certain fundamental values like reconciliation 
and acceptance of responsibility, repentance, forgiveness, and compensation, these values tend 
to hold the fabric of the Acholi society together. 351Perpetrators accordingly are enjoined to 
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acknowledge their guilt in conformity with the presented evidence. Before the eyes of the 
gathering community called Kacoke Madit, and the mediating elders, the perpetrator 
demonstrates a readiness to proceed by exhibiting genuine remorse for the atrocity in question. 
It is then followed by a plea to the victims for forgiveness and mercy. Victims are usually 
encouraged to let go and grant forgiveness in order to experience the true healing power of the 
Mato Oput.352  
 
Once that stage is successfully completed, the process is allowed to advance to the level of 
payments. The blood money is payment made by the family members of the perpetrator. While 
these payments may take the form of cash, the blood money does not in any way suggest 
compensation for the loss of life.  It is a necessary requirement to be fulfilled prior to the onset 
of the ceremony. It signifies the readiness on the part of the paying community to partake in the 
restoration of cordial relations and societal harmony. According to Latigo:  
“The payment of blood money is preferable since the money paid to the bereaved family 
can be used to marry another woman who, in turn will produce children to replace the 
dead person- a form of reparation”353  
 
In preparation for the reconciliation rites, certain items were required to be provided by both 
families. Representatives from the victim’s family provided a goat. The killer himself was to 
provide a ram and a bull. New bowls and beer were also a requirement for the ceremony. The 
ceremony was attended by family members of both the offender and the victim as well as by 
mediating elders; a local master of ceremony anchored the ceremony.354 Once the invocations 
355 were completed the killer and a representative from the victim’s family both kneel facing 
each other the new bowl is placed in between them. Both parties are then made to share a bitter 
drink, made from an alcoholic brew and the roots of the Oput tree.356 Some versions describe 
the concoction’s mix to include the blood from the animals provided. According to Menanga:  
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“Drinking the bitter potion symbolizes the acceptance by the two communities of the 
bitterness of the conflict they had gone through, and their resolution not to taste such 
bitterness again. The red colour of the potion, coming from the blood of a slaughtered 
lamb… symbolizes the blood shed during the conflict.”357 
  
After the symbolic rites have been performed, both families then share meals together, which 
had hitherto remained estranged from each other as a result of the killing. The hugs as well as 
the shared meals thus represent the commencement of peaceful and harmonious relations 
between them.  
 
5. 6. 2  The significance of Mato Oput 
Since the Acholi culture rejects the penalty of death for an offender, regardless of the crime, 
the performance of the Mato Oput ritual maintains its potency as the community’s symbolic 
way of finding closure under such circumstances.  To the people of Acholi, restoration of 
communal harmony was and remains paramount. Regardless of the fact that an individual 
commits the crime, the entire community as well as the family members of the perpetrator 
gathered together to assume collective responsibility. One offender’s group acknowledged guilt 
and showed remorse while the other accepted and granted forgiveness. To this end the notion 
of accountability in the eyes of the Acholi, was accorded its due position while the ultimate 
goal for peace and reconciliation was achieved. The Mato Oput afforded offenders the 
opportunity of being reintegrated into society, and to pick up the pieces of their lives in pursuit 
of fresh beginnings.   
 
Contentions over Mato-Oput 
The efficacy of the Mato Oput is highly contested.358 Such contentions have become even more 
prominent since the Ugandan conflict and the demand to seek justice for its victims. The ICC 
indictments and the exigency to prosecute offenders and perpetrators of injustice exacerbated 
an already tense situation. The controversies over the proposed synergy of methods have further 
generated heated debates along the following lines.  Commentators contend that the Mato Oput 
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ritual may be applicable to conflicts of a lesser scale and not to the massive killings by which 
the conflict is characterized. Mato Oput, they contend lacks the capacity to deliver 
accountability for the victims of the atrocities committed in war. 359 Can a mere ceremony ease 
the pain of the bereaved? How much blood money is able to compensate for all the dead?  How 
can such rituals bring healing under conditions of trauma? How is Mato Oput able to conform 
to international standards of justice and to what extent can such mechanisms address salient 
issues like impunity and finally, to suggest that the Acholi people have an extra ordinary 
inclination to forgive defies theoretical thinking. It is hardly conceived as practicable. 360 
 
In response, advocates for the revival of African indigenous methods, African scholars and 
commentators alike, seek to shed light on the potentials of the Mato Oput and its guiding 
principles, while lending voice to the significance of an approach which best suits the 
worldview of the direct recipients of that war. 
 Menanga avers: 
“The preoccupation of justice with reference to the African worldview is the restoration 
of the broken relationship, and the search for the harmony with all beings. It is a 
restorative justice, which is concerned with victims, survivors and the entire community, 
in the quest for repair, trust building, reconciliation, and reintegration of the offender 
within the community. This means restoring one’s humanness, be s/he victim or 
perpetrator, rendering back to both the perpetrator and victim their dignity as human 
beings.”361  
 
Hear Latigo:  
“Mato Oput embodies the principle that society and perpetrator contribute to 
the extents possible to the emotional restoration and repair of the physical and 
material well-being of the victim. The embedded principles underlying it, which 
the Acholi have used successfully in conflict management for generations, are 
actually the very principles of transitional justice mechanisms now paraded in 
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modern studies as ‘models’, encompassing the same principles of truth, 
accountability, compensation, and the restoration of relationships.”362 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
The Uganda experience became one case in point where an insensitive approach to peace 
proved to counter all efforts to achieve any kind of peace at all. Within the larger framework of 
post conflict peace building in African, such examples as evidenced by the Ugandan case 
highlight the benefits, with respect to sustainable peace, which may accrue from incorporating 
effective and positive aspects of indigenous peace-making strategies into working frameworks 
for peace. Evidence from accounts of conflict and peace-making within African pre-colonial 
societies and a good number of African transitional societies, reveal a substantial preference for 
justice and peace via reconciliatory methods. This may not be unconnected to the fact that such 
methods continue to constitute an essential part of a community’s daily life. A number of 
African semi-modern societies tend to relate naturally to such practices regardless of the gravity 
or magnitude of offences that may accrue from the conflict. This was the case among the people 
of Acholi. Predispositions as these tend to supersede the putative imperativeness for retributive 
justice. To this extent one is able to discern the community’s strong desire to return to status 
quo, which is akin to the revival of societal harmony.  
 
In like manner, outsider perspectives may obscure the true meaning of a people’s indigenous 
practice. This does not diminish the potentials such practices may possess. However, the 
outsider’s ability to assume a broad mind, allows for the entrance of knowledge and the 
conception of certain realities, which may exceed one’s horizon of knowledge. To this end it 
remains a fact that all humanity identifies with a unique world view, one that guides its 
conceptions of war and most importantly of peace. Mato Oput may not satisfactorily address 
justice according to international standards, yet in the eyes of most Acholi sometime in its 
history it owned a peace-making heritage with the capacity to mend broken relationships, heal 
wounds, reconcile parties and restore the social fabric of its communities   
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5. 8 Examining the efficacy of the oath system in Sub-Saharan African societies and 
investigating a selected case in Nigeria’s southeast.  
Introduction 
This section commences with a close investigation into the practice of oath taking, as is the 
case in a number of Sub-Saharan African societies. It then continues with a detailed description 
of how the oath system became instrumental to the termination of an age long conflict between 
rival groups in the south-eastern part of Nigeria.   
 
5. 8. 1 The oath system: An instrument of conflict mitigation in sub-Saharan African 
Societies  
The oath taking system has been widely spotted as a mechanism of conflict resolution and peace 
keeping among diverse societies of the African sub-Saharan region. Its efficacy is linked to an 
unabated allegiance towards the people refer to as the ancestors.  It is purportedly effective 
whenever employed because it is a phenomenon ingrained in the people’s belief system. Such 
beliefs are demonstrated by the continuous interaction between the living members of society, 
and what Olaoba363 refers to as the living dead (ancestors). Before going further into the essence 
of oath taking among African societies, it is paramount to establish here, the significant nexus 
between African societies and their ancestors. This makes a comprehension of the efficacy of 
oath taking a lot easier especially for readers from divergent worldviews. 
 
Most African societies are believed to maintain strong connections with their ‘living dead’ 
members of society. The strong affinity towards the ancestors exists on a continuum. This may 
be discernible in the way that communities underscore the significance of maintaining 
relationships, and the emphasis placed on reconciliation when conflict occurs among its living 
members. The cordial ties between the members of the community and their superiors, 
facilitates the transition to closely knitted ties between deceased members of one’s lineage, who 
have successfully transformed to the status of an ancestor.  
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The ancestors are believed to wield strong authority over their living members. This conception 
is presumed valid to the extent that entire lineages or communities were at the risk of affliction 
should its members ignore or treat its ancestors with disdain.  Misconducts listed as taboos of 
society are carefully avoided to avert the anger of the gods. 364 In like manner, the living dead 
may be called upon to oversee the smooth running of community events.  An invitation to the 
ancestors as spiritual witnesses and partakers of occasions like a marriage, a naming ceremony, 
a new yam festival, initiation to adulthood or the likes, is believed to contribute to successful 
proceedings.   
 
Communities beckon upon the wisdom of their ancestors in delicate matters concerning 
community life, especially in decision-making, where any wrong move could spell doom for 
the entire community. While the conception of an ancestor may translate to varying roles and 
attributes among a plethora of groups across the sub-Saharan region, Olaoba opines that the 
principles underlying ancestral belief in Africa, may be viewed as homogenous, but may differ 
in the terminology employed by each society.365 To the Lugbara of Uganda for example, their 
ancestors serve the purpose of conflict managers.366 They are perceived as: 
  
“good people who set examples that men should follow and who maintained the ideal 
of social order and social behaviour… they were men of integrity and worth” …367  
 
The Tallensi of Ghana view the relationship between them and their ancestors as a continuation 
of the bond that existed between them and their departed parents. They go as far as making 
symbols, which they appease from time to time.368 The Tiriki of western Kenya, relate to their 
ancestors via an enduring relationship between the living elders and their recently deceased 
                                                     
364 Ibid, 141 
365 Olaoba, O B. "Ancestral Focus and the Process of Conflict Resolution in Traditional African Societies.", 141 
366 Ray, B C. African Religions-Symbol Ritual, and Community. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc, 1976. 147 cited 
in Olaoba, “ Ancestral Focus”,140 
367 Middelton, John. Lugbara Religion: Ritual and Authority among an East African People. Münster: LIT 
Verlag, 1999.  29 
368 Fortes, Meyer. "African Systems of thoughts-Fortes and Dieterlen Pg. 122-142." www.lucy.ukc.ac.uk 
(accessed July 29, 2015). 
 184 
progenitors. The recently deceased are understood to play the intermediary between the living 
elders and the ancestral spirits.369 
 
The essence of highlighting the close link between African societies and their ancestors is 
purposely targeted to enlighten the reader on the efficacy of the oath system as already hinted 
in the beginning. This mechanism works in unison with the people’s ancestral belief system. It 
is the dread of incurring the wrath of the gods that lends credence the oath system. In some 
ways, such deep ancestral reverence preserves and invigorates indigenous practices like the oat 
system and endorses it as a viable instrument of conflict resolution among African societies. It 
is believed that compliance to the terms of an oath signifies respect for one’s ancestors, in whose 
power it lies to punish deviants. The oath system has shown to be of continued relevance to a 
number of societies across the sub-Saharan region. The Kamba of eastern Kenya for example, 
rely on the oath to detect guilt.370 Among the Yoruba of southwest Nigeria, the oath system had 
the capacity to influence adversaries into confessing wrongdoing 371 The Azande located in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Central African Republic and in parts of South Sudan, 
tap into the oath mechanism to determine cases of adultery and witchcraft among its members.  
 
5. 8. 2 Conflict between the Aguleri and Umuleri of Southeast Nigeria372 
The following section provides an illustration of the oath system as an apparatus for re-instating 
peace and harmony to a society beset with conflict dating back to pre-colonial times. There is 
a dearth of information on the prolonged conflict between the Aguleri and Umuleri conflict, but 
also a paucity of information on how the reliance on the oath system became instrumental to 
the complete termination of an age-old dispute in Nigeria. I rely therefore, on Nwolise 
Osisioma’s373 narrative to portray the trajectory towards the restoration of peace and 
reconciliation for the affected communities at war.  
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The Aguleri and Umuleri had enjoyed peaceful coexistence until the outset of the conflict that 
saw each party lay exclusive claims of ownership to the land called: Otuocha. That conflict 
commenced as far back as 1933 and stretched all the way into the 21th century. In 1995, tensions 
had escalated into riots, and horrifically took the turn for the worse. A war though of low 
intensity, erupted between both communities between 1999 and 2000. The conflict had indeed 
passed through transitions of colonial, democratic and military governance, so that at every 
point in the nation’s administrations, efforts on the platform of litigation had proved abortive. 
In the 50s, the colonial court granted the people of Umuleri the sole right of occupancy to the 
land in contention.  The verdict was appealed and further transferred to the West African Court 
of Appeal and subsequently to the Queens Privy Council in London. The efforts of the 50s had 
proved counterproductive. 374 By 1960, Nigeria had gained independence, there was hope that 
at least from an indigenous standpoint the problem would be peacefully resolved. Instead 
democracy became the platform for some planned manipulations in favour of the people of 
Aguleri. This was stalled and the baton for viable solutions passed unto Nigeria’s first military 
administration. By 1981 Nigeria’s Federal Court of Appeal reached a verdict against the 
Aguleri people. In 1982 the Aguleri community again contested the judgment of exclusive right 
to the Umuleri community.375 The conflict remained unsettled with no compromise in sight. 
Neither of the two communities could produce concrete evidence of possessing sole right to the 
land. Instead historical accounts alluded to one fact, - that both communities had lived and 
cultivated the land in peace and harmony until the selfish desire for sole ownership crept in on 
them.  
In the entire nearly seven decades (1933-2000) of the conflict, traditional mechanisms available 
to both communities for the resolution of conflict became somewhat inconsequential as neither 
parties saw the need to tap into a heritage of peace-making practices. In Nwolise’s opinion, it 
was the gruesome effect of the conflict, which erupted between 1999 and 2000 that triggered 
the search for other means of resolving the protracted conflict. Both communities reawakened 
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to the revival of that one tool which had the capacity to determine truth even in controversial 
circumstances.  
 
It was the oath system that became the solution to this long-standing conflict. The warring 
parties were made to swear to a binding oath. This was a ‘No more war’ declaration made in 
the presence of the deities of both communities. Both communities understood the implications 
of breaking an oath sworn in the presence of the deities and ancestors of the land.  Both 
communities were made to swear to two oaths in the same year of 2000. The first oath in 
January of 2000 was instrumental to dousing tensions from the erupted war. The second was 
intended to consolidate on the negative peace achieved.  Oath number two specifically targeted 
the reconciliation of both communities and to ensure the durability of the elicited peace. Parties 
to the second oath were leaders of the rival communities. The aim was to remind them of their 
position as custodians of the structures of societal harmony and their role as harbingers of peace. 
It was their duty to preserve the long-awaited but reinstated peace. 
 
Some of the important aspects of the declaration included the resolve not to replace dialogue 
with violent aggression. Both parties acceded to an immediate laying down of weapons. The 
oath could not be revoked without the consent of all the parties involved. Intending violators 
were advised against incurring the wrath of the gods especially since the proceedings were 
believed to have transpired in the presence the ancestors of each community. The day’s events 
culminated with a cleansing ceremony. It was a symbolic ritual to expunge the land of all the 
blood shed from the war. Once the ritual had been performed both communities dined and 
wined together. This signified the wars’ end. From that day forward both communities would 
forget the past and remain reconciled to each other in peace and harmony. 
 
5.9 Concluding reflections 
The narrative clearly demonstrates how the indigenous oath system became effective in 
terminating a conflict of many decades.  In similar manner, that account exposed the failure of 
the formal judicial system to produce positive outcomes. It rendered redundant within that 
context, the legal approach to peace where the perception of peace is based on the zero-sum 
winner takes it all principle. The conflict between the two communities hardly engendered a 
humanitarian crisis, in which case international diplomacy became unnecessary. However, the 
enduring severed ties between both communities elicited much concern when it took a drastic 
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turn in 1999. There is no gainsaying the fact that both communities undermined the potentials 
of their age long mechanism for conflict resolution. It is also clear that an earlier reactivation 
of the relevant indigenous conflict mechanism may have forestalled both the protracted nature 
of the conflict as well as averted its eventual escalation in1999. Nonetheless, the potency of the 
people’s oath system remains laudable. It deserves to be acknowledged for its significant role 
in the demise of a nearly six-decade old conflict.  
 
5. 10 Somali indigenous institutions actors and processes, searching for peace in the 
immediate aftermath of war. 
Introduction  
The next peace-making institution under investigation has been conceived as a quasi-success 
and in some instances a near colossal failure. In this section, I examine Somalia’s peace-making 
actors and processes, and its relevance in the conflict that erupted in 1988 and which  by 1991 
had culminated in a total collapse of the state. The Somali people have suffered the same fate 
or even worse when compared with a myriad of societies in the sub-Saharan region. The Somali 
state has for decades since 1991 been characterized by endemic war, famine, state collapse and 
a complex humanitarian crisis. Although the ceded region of Somaliland in the north and the 
autonomous state of Puntland have recorded relative peace since 1991 and 1998 respectively, 
the south-central region of Somalia continues to aspire towards sustainable peace, especially 
since the emergence of a new dimension to the conflict: the ‘Al Shabaab’ militant group.  
 
Why is it important to examine, at least in summary, the Somali people’s indigenous institutions 
and attendant actors? The answer is hardly far-fetched. Indigenous peace processes had 
immensely contributed to reinstating and sustaining the peace in Somaliland as well as in the 
state of Puntland. Even though this was not the case for the people of Somalia’s southern region, 
at the early stages of peace-making in the 1990s, such mechanisms have produced some result 
as an effective alternative means of governance, security, conflict resolution and peace-making 
among the people of the south especially on the local level. This has been the survival 
mechanism of a people grappling with the effects of state failure, the lukewarmness of the 
international community and consistent efforts at securing a viable and sustainable political 
structure: a reliance on indigenous peace-making processes.  In the first section I touch briefly 
on the historical antecedents of the Somali state, then proceed to provide a brief examination 
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of indigenous institutions, practices and actors, extant in the culturally homogenous regions of 
Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia.  
 
5.10.1 Historical background 
The triumph over Siyad Barre’s dictatorship regime and the announcement of cessation in 1991 
by the Somali National Movement had produced the republic of Somaliland. The underlying 
causes of the Somali conflict are rooted in a legacy of colonialism, competition for resources 
and power, and the repression by which the military administration became characterized. 376  
A combination of these factors precipitated the emergence of rebel movements. The creation 
of insurgent groups along clan lines became the Somali people’s mechanism of response to the 
myriad of problems that plagued the country particularly in the early post-independence years.  
 
Initially the Siyad Barre regime projected its regime as that government with the interest of the 
people at heart. Unfortunately, the next two decades of Barre’s leadership proved to be a 
nightmare. Bouts of killings, and horrendous attacks on innocent lives, social and political 
marginalization summed up the hallmarks of that dictatorship government. Intra-clan rivalry 
had always been part of a predominantly nomadic society. Competition over the resources that 
sustained the people’s livelihood prevailed and worse so, even the onset of modernization had 
begun impacting negatively to reveal a shift in the people’s priorities. This precipitated the 
proliferation of the clan-based fights that characterised Somalia’s initial war between 1988 and 
1991. 377 In the 80s, one of such clan groups was identified as featuring prominently in the 
revolt against Barre’s regime. They were an offshoot initiative from members of the Isaaq clan 
in diaspora and were called the Somali National Movement. The fighting, which escalated into 
full-blown war in 1988, was partly attributed to the movements’ insurgent attacks on some 
strategic locations. By 1991, the hitherto independent nation of Somalia now comprised of two: 
Somalia in the south and Somaliland in the north.  
 
As one nation, the northern and southern regions had been subjected to dissimilar colonial 
experiences. British, French, and Italian colonizers partitioned the country into five regions, 
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each taking parts to themselves. The western part of Somalia also came under the authority of 
Ethiopia. Observers claim that the post-colonial state had constantly struggled to surmount this 
legacy of colonialism. The post-independent regime strived towards reuniting its lost regions 
under the caption of a ‘Greater Somalia’.  Many commentators in part, attribute the country’s 
woes to the legacy of the colonial era. The north and the south gained independence in 1960 
and reunified into a single Somali state. 378 
  
Both states are delineated along ethnically homogenous lines, emerging from a similar pre-
colonial decentralized and stateless system of governance in which indigenous practices; actors 
and institutions facilitated the smooth transition from periods of conflicts between clans to 
peace. Years of dictatorship saw indigenous institutions and actors grossly marginalized.379 
With the creation of Somaliland, peace-making mechanisms became revitalized and 
institutionalized, contributing effectively to the country’s gradual transition to peace and 
reconciliation. The reverse was regrettably the case in the nation of Somalia, as related practices 
became insignificant, redundant and largely undermined. The neglect of indigenous practices 
and the adoption by the international community of a different approach to peace in Somalia 
engendered a less hopeful outcome for the people in the south.  
 
Before recounting the significant role of indigenous institutions and actors towards the process 
of reinstating peace in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 civil war, it is relevant to provide 
some insight into a number of Somalia’s peace-making and conflict resolution practices, actors 
and social institutions. As mentioned elsewhere, the people of Somalia regardless of the 
present-day political terrain, share a similar culture, language and religion. Mechanisms of 
peace as such, have largely remained homogenous albeit to varying degrees of efficiency as 
evident in the ceded Somaliland, the autonomous state of Puntland and in the southern region 
constituting the state of Somalia. Regardless of Somalia’s’ state of statelessness in pre-colonial 
times and after the 1991 collapse of Barr’s dictatorship government, Somalis at every given 
phase of their history, knew to rely on indigenous structures and actors as viable mechanisms 
for the maintenance of law and order.  In the absence of political forms of governance 
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indigenous systems and actors, found relevance in a predominantly nomadic society both as a 
means of settling clan disputes and reconciling rival parties.   
 
5.10. 2  Somali indigenous practices 
Some practices linked to Somali culture, features prominently in the literatures.  For instance, 
Somali’s are known to have a flair for literary arts, especially for poems. Poetry is relied upon 
as a medium of cultural expression. It has been specifically utilized in the course of its decades 
of war to elicit peaceful relations among Somalis. It is a channel for exposing the ills of its 
society, for protest and also for handing down history to generations.380 Aside from poetry, 
proverbs have also been viewed to be of discernible significance to peace-making sessions. 
They are a significant trademark particularly of Somali elders.   
 
Intermarriage is another noteworthy practice of the Somali people. It is central to the 
maintenance of cordial inter clan relations. In specific cases intermarriage has become a tool 
for inter-clan reconciliation, in which case Somalis refer to the bonus derived from such a union 
as ‘ godob-reebta gabadhaha, translated as ‘ the leaving behind of a grudge through women’ 381 
Intermarriage reflect strong ties between both families and places the woman in the strategic 
position of a reliable go between.382 Aside from the elucidated cultural practices, other 
practices, institutions and actors have been identified.  As is the practice amongst the Acholi’s 
of northern Uganda, Somalis equally embrace the culture of paying compensation, which is 
restitution for wrongdoing. It is utilized in resolving cases of crimes ranging from theft to 
murder.  The payment of the diya is seen as imperative to avert revenge killings, albeit with the 
ultimate aim to create the appropriate circumstance for mending broken relations. Somalis refer 
to the Arabic translation of ‘diya’ as ‘mag’383. The diya was also associated with a ‘diya-paying 
                                                     
380 Afrax, Maxamed Daahir. "Towards a culture for peace: poetry, drama and music in Somali society." Whose 
peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peace-making. no. 21. Edited by Mark Bradbury and 
Sally Healy. London: Concilliation Resources in collaboration with interpeace, 2010. 72-74. 
381  Rashid Sheekh `Abdillaahi Gadhweyne (ed). 2009, War and Peace: An anthology of Somali literature 
Sugaanta Nabadda iyo Colaadda, Progressio & Ponte invisible, London & Pisa cited Walls, Micheal. State 
Formation in Somaliland: Bringing Deliberation to Institutionalism. February 2011. 
382 Menkhaus, Ken. "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia." In Traditional Cures for 
Modern Conflicts. African Conflict 'Medicine', edited by I William Zartman, 184. Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000. 
383Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peace-
making (London: Conciliation Resources, 2010), 114.  
 191 
group’. According to Menkhaus, the diya-paying group is the ‘most stable lineage unit’ 
consisting of myriads of close relatives, whose obligation it is to make payment on behalf of 
transgressing members or to receive payments on behalf of them. 384 The diya was calculated 
in camels, payments however could be made in monetary terms. In similar vein, it was not 
uncommon among diya paying groups, to insist on strict adherence to a customary code of 
conduct (Xeer) since violations also bore heavily on the resources of the group whose members 
were highly recalcitrant.385   
 
It is important at this juncture to accentuate the presence, among Somalis, of strong clan 
affiliations. The clan system represents the Somali people’s most significant social 
organization. Somalis function under an agnatic descent system. Each family traces its 
genealogy to one of six clan groupings. Indeed, the pernicious conflicts in the last decades of 
fighting have been defined along clan lines. 386Clan rivalries have ranged from fights over 
access to pastureland and water, to very catastrophic conflicts over territorial control and power. 
Yet Somali clans purportedly submit to the tenets of the Xeer to guide social relations. 
 
The Xeer 
The Xeer (pronounced hair), which has been referred to elsewhere, is notably an indigenous 
institution that regulates social relations among the various Somali clans. It is an unwritten 
customary law, containing Somali norms and values interpretable under instances of conflict 
over access to pasture land and water for example. It also contains predefined codes regarding 
the rights of women and conduct during war.387The knowledge to mediate family as well as 
inter-clan disputes is equally derived from it. Diya paying groups are specifically bound by this 
contract whose principles are interpreted by clan elders. It is the sole obligation of a convening 
council of elders called the Shir, to mitigate conflicts based on the authoritative capacity of the 
Xeer. While the Shir refers to an in-clan assemblage of elders, the Guurti represents a gathering 
of elders from different clans, convening to mediate and negotiate peace within the larger 
community. The Shir and Guurti procedures of conflict resolution have been described as 
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lengthy democratic processes. They incorporate the consensus building and consultative 
approach as vital elements of any indigenously motivated efforts at peace and reconciliation.388 
 
Somali elders 
The most significant peace actors known to Somalis are the clan elders.  The distinctive task 
assigned to the position of an elder, is that of maintaining peace in the community. Aside from 
the prevention and resolution of conflicts between and within the clans, their responsibilities 
have included the payment and collection of diya on behalf of the clan. When fights erupt 
between clans, it is the duty of clan elders not related to either of the opposing sides to negotiate 
peace and pursue reconciliation. Clan elders retain the authority to impose sanctions on 
violating groups. They serve their community as honest and impartial peacemakers, they are 
well versed in customary law and they command the respect of the constituency that they 
represent and are accountable to in local peace sessions.  
 
5.10. 3  Indigenous peace-making applied to Somaliland’s conflict 
The basic difference between the approach to peace-making adopted in the early years, in the 
regions of Somalia and Somaliland have been those of a top-down versus a bottom-up 
inclusionary strategy towards settlement. The outcome in both regions had been at variance 
owing to existing factors in the south, which militated against an equally favourable result. How 
could this be? Given the linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity that prevails across the 
regions as well as similar indigenous laws governing conflict and its resolution, albeit with 
distinct colonial experiences.  Somaliland’s stable peace was attributed to at least 38 
indigenously driven peace and reconciliation conferences between 1990 and 1997 and the 
institutionalization of indigenous institutions reconstructed to constitute a synergy between 
modern and indigenous wisdom. Ibrahim and Terlinden have referred to this grafting of 
mechanism as an incorporation of traditional substance into western political forms. The system 
is driven by a power sharing clan-motivated formula for governance and evidenced in the 
institutionalization of the indigenous Guurti system- ‘assemblage of elders’ in the government’s 
Upper House.389 When the conflict erupted in the northern region around the tail end of 1991, 
Somali indigenous institutions and actors were described as central to the restoration of peace 
                                                     
388 Menkhaus, “Traditional Conflict Management”, 186 
389  Ibrahim and Terlinden, Somaliland: ‘home grown’ peace-making and political reconstruction (76-79) in 
Accord an international review of peace initiatives. Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and 
International Peace-making ed. Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy 
 193 
in the region. Two peace conferences: the Erigavo and Boroma peace conferences have been 
identified as key milestones, to the actualization of sustainable peace for many Somalis 
especially those of Somaliland. These conferences have gone a long way to proof the 
effectiveness of the Somali people’s peace-making institutions and actors, if allowed to thrive.  
 
The Boroma and Sanaag peace conferences 
The Boroma national conference held from between January to May 1993, summoned together 
the ‘Guurti’ of the northern region. Over 150 members were in attendance. 390It was a large 
assemblage, which attracted participants from far and wide. Most significant, was its ability to 
produce viable results. Admits a line of achievements recorded by this conference, three have 
most remarkably formed the bedrock of the peace as summarized by Dr. Mohammed A. Omar: 
 
“First, it helped to establish a framework for managing security, second, it aided the 
definition of Somaliland’s political structures, which laid the foundations of an 
independent state and third, it marked the transfer of power from the Somali National 
Movement to a civilian government”391 
 
The ‘Guurti’ of Somaliland, also elected a new president in the person of Mohammed Egal and 
presided over an assembly that produced a ‘National Peace Charter’. According to Omar, the 
charter was conceived as a symbolic reaffirmation of Somaliland’s sovereignty, which had been 
declared in the Burco Grand Conference convened by the northern clans two years before 
Boroma.  Menkhaus observes that this signified a renewed ‘Xeer’ (social contract) for the 
people of Somaliland. 392  
 
The second conference took place in Erigavo, in Somaliland’s eastern region of Sanaag, 
between August 1992 and June 1993. It was a regional conference described as the culmination 
of previously conducted peace processes within the Sanaag region. As the largest region in 
Somaliland, Sanaag plays host to a good number of clans. Dating back to colonial times, the 
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region had become impoverished and marginalized by successive Somali regimes. 
Underdevelopment precipitated competition over scarce resources and at intervals escalations 
into violent aggression between the various clans, which inhibited the region. 393 
The Sanaag peace process is worth mentioning at this point because it produced the resolution 
of disputes between four warring clans in the Sanaag region, facilitated the reconciliation of the 
war’s fierce opposing clans: the Isaaq and Harti clans and by extension contributed to the 
country’s relatively sustained peace.394  On its part, the Erigavo conference became esteemed 
for its capacity to address the region’s numerous problems, some of which were a derivation of 
prolonged fighting and those that triggered them in the first place. In fact, it became the grand 
peace-making event that saw elders negotiating an end to hostilities contingent on Somali 
peace-making mechanisms, which included the Xeer (customary law). Indeed, with the 
subsequent adaption of indigenous apparatus as integral to the proper functioning of formal 
state structures, Somaliland redefined the future of its people and laid the foundations for the 
relative peace by which Somaliland is defined till date. A number of factors account for the 
inability of Somali institutions and attendant custodians, to replicate the same outcome in the 
southern region of Somalia.  
 
5. 11 Indigenous peace-making mechanisms in Somalia: what prospects? 
The following section attempts to capture in summary the opposing dynamics to unsuccessful 
attempts at peace in Somalia 
When the Barre regime was deposed in 1991 January, what followed was a relapse into war 
and lawlessness. The clans had resorted to an intense power struggle in Somalia’s capital 
Mogadishu. Although the international community’s response initially signalled disinterest in 
the affairs of Somalia, what followed subsequently was the intervention of both the UN and the 
US under appellations: UNOSOM I UNITAF and UNOSOM II.  In hindsight, commentators 
remain acquiesced in the singular notion that the method employed in bringing peace to the 
people of Somalia, contradicted fundamental peace-making processes by which Somali 
indigenous institutions were defined.395  
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When UNOSOM II finally arrived as the major peacemaker for the southern Somalis, a 
contrasting approach to peace became evident in the region. Although the south possessed 
similar indigenous institutions, mechanisms and actors, these resources became clearly ignored 
in the entire framework designed towards peace. Contrary to the reconciliation approach 
adopted by the north, Somalia saw the employment of an exact opposite model for peace. As 
has been highlighted in the preceding sections, the Somali peace-making institution relies 
heavily on the Xeer customary law which hinges on the indispensable involvement of elders in 
Shir gatherings or at higher levels the Guurti assemblies.396 In stark contrast, UNOSOM 
undertook to provide peace via the track I trajectory. The model ostensibly defied the natural 
process of peace-making according to Somali culture. In Menkhaus’s words instead of local 
peace conferences,  
“Formal peace conferences and negotiating procedures which conformed to 
international diplomacy were conducted in posh hotels in distant regional capitals of 
Ethiopia, Nairobi, Djibouti and Egypt”.397  
 
As if that was not enough, meetings arranged to negotiate peace among the warring parties 
included faction leaders and warlords, but excluded the reconciliatory mediation and 
negotiation skills of clan elders. In similar vein, the adoption of a ‘quick fix’ approach, which 
contradicted the Somali culture of investing much time into peace meetings, hardly produced 
the desired result for stable peace. To cap it all, the natural atmosphere under which clan elders 
became proponents of peace, was non-existent on the southern terrain. The dynamics of the 
conflict had produced debilitating effects that undermined the effectiveness of indigenous 
institutions and its actors. The proliferation of weapons in the hands of youths engendered the 
diminished legitimacy of the elders. A disassociation also, from so called indigenous wisdom 
and a complete disregard for its purported efficacy became evident. Faction leaders began to 
conceive of indigenous knowledge and actors as anachronisms incompatible with contemporary 
times. 398 At some point however having ran through conventional means of resoultion, 
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UNOSOM began to display subtle interest in Somali indigenous peace gatherings. For example, 
support to indigenous mechanisms was employed in procuring the Jubaland Peace Accord. 
Such moves nonetheless, were perceived as strategic and tailored towards UNOSOM’s own 
interest. Indeed, vigorous clan tussles over Kismayo had resurged; nullifying what was left of 
the signed agreement. UNOSOM withdrew from Somalia in 1995.399 That outing lasted four 
years. The mission’s inability to actualize her designated mandate, delineated the international 
community’s intervention and strategy, in that conflict, a colossal failure. Over the last 24 years 
Somalia continues to search for all means available to secure the peace, which has remained 
elusive.  
 
5. 12 Indigenous mechanisms: strengths and limitations 
From investigating into three cases of indigenous mechanisms across sub-Saharan Africa, it is 
possible to decipher some inherent strengths and weaknesses associated with the practice of 
peace and reconciliation among Africans. Indigenous mechanisms exhibit positive features but 
also limitations. This last section examines both. The examined indigenous systems and 
practices exhibit some similarities in approach, principles and in some cases actors and their 
roles. These features are also emblematic of traditions and customs extant among other sub-
Saharan African societies not mentioned here.   
 
5.12.1 Reconciliation 
One significant principle of conflict resolution and peace-making in African societies, 
emphasizes societal repair.  The restoration of social harmony is achieved on the vehicle of 
reconciliation. The norm of peace-making goes beyond resolving the conflict; it goes further to 
mend the relationships severed as a result of the conflict. African societies believe that “an 
assault on one is an assault on all”. A conflict does not just involve the direct parties to the 
conflict, but his or her immediate family, clan, or even larger community. To ignore the 
reconciliation of parties to a conflict is tantamount to defying indigenous wisdom. 
Downplaying the wisdom behind reconciling parties to a dispute can precipitate violent 
aggressions between the rivalling communities. This can engender complete disorder in the 
larger society.  In order to avoid violence, reprisal attacks, or even a resurgence of the same 
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conflict, African indigenous peacemakers ensure that reconciliation becomes the end target of 
all efforts to resolve and manage conflicts.  
 
Reconciliation is also an occasion for inner healing. It is the platform for the confession of 
wrongdoing and for offering forgiveness for the offender. Rituals cleansing ceremonies for 
example, which are rooted in the people’s belief system become part of the reconciliation 
process, geared towards restoring the social fabric of the society.  The sharing of food from the 
same bowl, the embrace of former adversaries, the shaking of hands and giving out the hand of 
a woman in marriage all symbolize a return to communal status quo. When African indigenous 
mechanisms focus on reconciliation, they indicate an inherent alignment with justice that is 
achieved contingent on non-punitive measures. The main objective of indigenous peace-
making institutions therefore, is to promote the essentiality of restorative justice, which does 
not in any way condone the atrocities of perpetrators of injustice but accomplishes the quest for 
justice based on the customs and traditions of the people directly affected by a conflict.  
 
5.12.2  Lengthy discussions and consensus reaching.400 
Another major defining feature of African indigenous peace-making is the adoption of a 
democratic approach to peace. It involves not only the participation of parties to the conflict 
mediated by indigenous peacemakers, but the presence of immediate family members, clan 
members and interested parties. It is conducted in an open location, mostly under a popular 
village tree, freely permitting the contribution and opinion of passers-by. The significance 
attached to communal consensus tends to allow for peace meetings to drag for long. African 
indigenous peace-making sessions have been referred to as unnecessarily time consuming. 
Lengthy dialogues nonetheless, allows for all interested persons to air their grievances. It gives 
room for deep investigation into the cause of the conflict, effectuates the thorough cross-
examinations of the parties and becomes an enablement for perpetrators to show remorse and 
seek forgiveness. The entire process, although overseen by the mediating peacemakers, such as 
elders, as is the case in a myriad of African settings, is tailored towards attaining favourable 
and satisfactory decisions based on consensus. The weight lent to consensus agreements 
translates to the community’s collective responsibility to ensure the implementation of 
agreements reached. Although consensus came at a cost or was never even achieved, the entire 
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process was usually steered to the direction of a positive sum outcome, which resulted in a no 
victor and no vanquished resolution.   As is the case in the reconciliation mechanism of the 
people of northern Uganda, a consensus is reached on letting go of the past to embrace a new 
future via the Mato Oput. Based on the people’s consensus decision to adhere to the oath of ‘no 
more war’ the Aguleri and Umuleri communities were able again to embrace lasting peace. 
Both the Sanaag and Borama peace conferences tapped into the principle of consensus, which 
has paid off in the stability that greeted Somaliland in the aftermath of the conflicts of the 1990s.  
 
5.12. 3  An African model? 
Even though African societies exhibit similarities in underlying principles like reconciliation, 
consensus, dialogue and the payment of compensation. There is no such thing as an African 
model for conflict management and resolution. Each African society has its own unique practice 
and strategy for reviving peace and order in the society. These methods are embedded in the 
people’s customs and traditions. Therefore, just as the oath system cannot be referred to as a 
universal practice among Africans, the Mato Oput can only be associated with the people of 
northern Uganda, albeit other African societies practice ritual cleansing for specific needs, 
which may differ from what Mato Oput set out to accomplish.  In similar vein, the Xeer is an 
emblem of the Somali people. The Gacaca courts exclusive to Rwandans and the ‘Palaver huts’ 
to Liberians.  While elders and peace meetings remain important components of peace-making 
in Africa, they assume different appellations for different societies yet performing the same 
task of mediating, negotiating and adjudicating to secure that crucial transition from conflict to 
peace.  
 
5.12. 4  Elders 
Unfortunately, the status of an elder has become compromised in many African societies. In 
most cases, elders find themselves torn between allegiance to the system they must uphold and 
loyalty to community they represent. This was the experience of elders in southern Somalia 
during the early years of the conflict in the 1990s.401 The credibility of elders has been put to 
the test with attractive packages intended to coax them into relinquishing themselves to the 
manipulative steer of government officials, against the people they are meant to serve. In some 
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cases, elders have been handpicked by the government and exported outside of their natural 
environment in the periphery, to embrace urban life, which negates the very essence of that 
status. The corrupt imagery of elders in a number of societies, contradicts the African 
perception of an elder. An elder within the African framework of understanding, is one who 
commands the respect of his people, represents the interest of his community, employs his 
wisdom in the areas of conflict resolution and management, exhibits vast knowledge of the 
peoples’ customs and traditions and speaks eloquently, conveying strong messages via 
proverbs.  Alas the corruption of that respectable position has diminished their capacity to 
effectively control conflicts at various levels of community, even at its latent stage.   
Communities can no longer rely on their elders as the voice that speaks the truth regardless of 
whatever circumstance they are confronted by. Young men no longer hold them in high esteem, 
thus their admonishment to young men to shun violent aggressions constantly falls on deaf ears. 
This has been the experience of a myriad of African societies and the fate of attendant peace-
making institutions.  
 
5.12. 5  Women in African indigenous peace-making 
The vast majority of African societies assume a patriarchal nature, therefore the continued 
discrimination of women in indigenous peace-making. The woman is constantly identified with 
the role of procreation and home making. She is consistently reputed to be too feeble and 
incapable of the role of an arbitrator, negotiator or mediator of the disputes prevalent in African 
societies.  This biased opinion is perceived as a major weakness in a contemporary world where 
the role of women in international peace-making cannot go unnoticed. Women hardly assume 
the role of principal peacemakers in a good number of African societies. The respectable role 
of a mediating elder for example, continues to be dominated by the male folk. Although in some 
societies, women feature significantly in the restoration of societal cohesion, such instances of 
women involvement in peace-making may be considered as the exception rather than the rule. 
In the south-eastern part of Nigeria for example, which is predominantly an Igbo speaking 
region, the ‘Umuada’ (First born females in the family lineage) as elaborately expatiated by 
Obasi and Nnamani, assume the role of conciliators especially in stubborn cases of disputes, 
both in the family and the larger community. 402  
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In light of the above, Isike and Uzodike strongly maintain that the discrimination against 
women is not to be understood as a characteristic feature of African indigenous peace-making 
because pre-colonial peace-making procedures allegedly recognized the woman as naturally 
inclined to peace-making, tapping into virtues of womanhood. The subsequent marginalization 
of women they argue is a mere neo-colonial occurrence traceable to the colonial interlude 
experienced in the African region. The adoption of state-centric mechanisms of peace in Africa 
and the interpretation given to African conflicts may have robbed off on indigenous strategies 
of peace. Women as a result, became invisible actors in African indigenous peace-making often 
times completely detached from an entire process aimed at durable peace. 403  
 
5.12.6  Caveats in African indigenous peace-making. 
The unwritten nature of African indigenous mechanisms may play to the disadvantage of a good 
number of African societies. The gradual transition to modernization and the adoption of state 
judicial methods tends to precipitate disaffection for indigenous methods. The only means by 
which such mechanisms are passed down to generations is via experience, songs and proverbs. 
If modernization prompts the younger generation to shun such practices in preference for 
alternative strategies and if hardship causes them to seek greener pastures in faraway lands, 
then the possibility of such methods becoming anathema may not be farfetched. If the 
population in the diaspora shy away from imbibing into their children these undocumented 
cultural ethics of peace-making, treating them as anachronisms of a forgotten era and should 
such practices remain inaccessible in print mediums then chances of their longevity become 
compromised.  
 
5. 13 Conclusion 
This chapter examined three selected strategies of peace-making associated with societies in 
the sub-Saharan African region. A number of the principles underlying these indigenous 
mechanisms have been likened to the same elements of peace-making, which inform the school 
of conflict transformation’s thesis on conflict and intervention. The emphasis for example on 
relational change features strongly within the African indigenous worldview of conflict 
                                                     
403 Isike, Christopher, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike.  African Journal on Conflict Resolution. " Towards an 
indigenous model of conflict resolution: Reinventing women's roles as traditional peace-builders in neo-colonial 
Africa" ." African Journals Online. 2011. http://www.ajol.info (accessed 09 01, 2015). 
 
 201 
resolution and peace-making as evidenced in the examples from Uganda, Nigeria, and the 
regions of Somalia. In similar vein, the long duration peace meetings whether local or national, 
that characterize indigenous peace-making, which are axiomatic of the essence of deep 
investigation, truth telling, forgiveness and reconciliation as played out in consensus-based 
processes, aligns with the prescription to invest more time in building peace. Therefore, when 
the conflict transformation school underscores the essence of long-term intervention in the 
predominantly intra-state conflicts of the 21st century, it simply calls on the international 
community to adopt context specific strategies as vital aspects of a complementary approach 
towards sustainable peace. Indigenous tools should be allowed to thrive where necessary. As 
in the case on Somalia, the continuous engagement of indigenous mechanism has remained the 
only option in the face of unstable governance for more than two decades since the total collapse 
of state structures in 1991.  
 
The selected three cases have substantiated some of the propositions underlying Lederach’s 
comprehensive framework for intervention in protracted conflicts.  
a. All of the selected cases have successfully corroborated the significance of contextual 
peace-making processes in the search for durable peace.  
b. As evident in the context of Uganda, repercussions may accrue from imposing on the 
direct recipients of a conflict, a peace process that lies in contrast with the peoples 
believe system. In this manner therefore, lending credence to Lederach’s 
recommendation for a culturally sensitive approach to peace. 
c.  The Nigerian case supports the claim for a bottom up approach to peace and reveals the 
merits of complementarity. That example encourages African societies to adopt an 
“introspective” approach to peace. It is an affirmation of Lederach’s call to empower 
indigenous actors and resuscitate indigenous practices, primarily where they seem the 
most relevant.    
d. The experience from Somaliland confirms the claims for interdependency. It 
exemplifies “space creation” “incorporation” and is a demonstration of the benefits of 
a synergy between formal and informal peace-making processes. Where significance is 
accorded to the most pragmatic approach to peace 
Finally, it is evident that the three delineated cases: northern Uganda, south east Nigeria 
Somalia, are fraught with lessons for both ends of the peace-making spectrum: the African 
indigenous peace-making and the mainstream. Indigenous techniques cannot be branded “a 
 202 
one- size-fits-all approach” to all contemporary conflicts on the African continent. They 
also do not possess the capacity to stand in isolation of mainstream approaches in today’s 
conflicts. On both sides, the issue of complementarity may be encouraged. There is no 
gainsaying the fact that indigenous mechanisms have retained their efficacy as reliable tools 
in a good number of conflict terrains on the continent. Unfortunately, as evidenced in this 
chapter, others have recorded adverse benefits and told a different story. These instances 
may not be seen as leverage to dismiss the efficacy of indigenous wisdom. Cases of negative 
returns should not elicit a general bias or insensitive approach towards the prospects for 
peace contingent on indigenous processes. Inefficiency cannot be generalized judging from 
a single case. Most favourable therefore would be to adopt the attitude of learning and 
exploration. This tends to reveal the uniqueness of each technique, as applied within the 
context and simultaneously addresses the tendency to unduly subject indigenous 
mechanisms to generalized conclusions.  
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Chapter Six 
6.1 Research Methodology  
This study seeks to address its research questions dependent on a single case, theory driven, 
and qualitative research methodology. Focusing on Darfur’s conflict since 2003, three major 
questions have been developed to guide investigation into: the international community’s 
intervention strategies, the potentials of indigenous knowledge and its actors and the prospects 
of incorporating into a single operational framework, modern approaches and indigenous 
peace-making mechanisms. Yin posits that the case study approach can be utilized when: 
“How” and “why” questions form the platform on which the study will progress. Case studies 
also become a significant strategy in research if “the investigator has minimal control over 
events within the context404 The questions guiding this thesis are suited for a case study kind 
of research because they are specifically conceived to focus attention on describing “how” 
those conflict-mitigating processes, which are linked to the fields of conflict management and 
conflict resolution and eventually transformation have contributed to the peace process in 
Darfur.  
 
State-centric approaches such as peacekeeping and formal mediation, as well as the more 
people-oriented strategies such as informal mediation and problem-solving workshops provides 
the link to investigating the extent to which such approaches have found relevance in the search 
for durable peace to the Darfur conflict. It illuminates further “how” indigenous processes from 
pre-colonial times, have become applicable to making peace and stabilizing the region. .405  
Before I proceed, it is imperative to understand from a scholarly standpoint what the case study 
research sets out to achieve and why this strategy may be applicable to qualitative research.   
In Hartley’s words: 
“Case study research consists of a detailed investigation, often with data collection over 
a period of time, of phenomena, within their context. The aim according to the author 
“is to provide an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate the theoretical 
issues being studied”406   
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According to Yin,  
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-time context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.” 407  
Within the context of this study, that “contemporary phenomenon” within its real-time context 
points to the conflict, on all levels, as obtained in Sudan’s western region: Darfur.  Central to 
this study however, is not to engage in a detailed investigation into the reasons for Darfur’s 
implosion. Scholars and Analysts have since succeeded in understanding and identifying the 
root causes underlying pockets of conflict terrains in the Sudan. One case in point is the conflict 
in the Blue Nile. The more prominent Darfur conflict has not eluded academic conception 
either. Analyst have dissected conflict causalities and probed into the underlying reasons for its 
protraction. The purpose of fighting therefore constitutes no form of novelty to the exponents 
of the theory of conflict. What seems new, though, is the international community’s 
interventionist mechanism. When closely viewed, this ad hoc, hybridized approach by the 
international community to Darfur’s conflict, exposes a new terrain for academic probing.  
 
As earlier noted, it has become a topic for debate especially among African scholars,408 to 
revive pre-colonial peace-making mechanisms on the continent, so as to make them applicable 
to the conflicts of the modern era.  The reason has been the endemic nature of conflicts in 
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.  Scholars have proposed the creation of synergies between 
the contextual resources within a conflict terrain and the more conventional strategies.409 In 
practical terms however, such considerations have been adopted in isolation of each other, I.e. 
applied to societies in the post-conflict settlement phase or have been employed as state 
initiatives to bolster extant western strategies for peace.  The examples from the experiences of 
Somalia, South Africa and Rwanda come to mind.  
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The case of Darfur however, presents a rare scenario to be explored, especially because of the 
unique intervention framework associated with that conflict from the outset. It is the first of its 
kind adopted in response to a conflict on the sub-Sahara. While it still falls within the rubric of 
a state-centric military approach, it is conceived to be of a different kind. The uniqueness is 
evinced in the hybridized nature of the intervention but also in the mandate to operate within a 
multidimensional framework that allows for grassroot intervention. In the empirical chapters 
on international intervention, this study will interrogate the international community’s approach 
to peace, in the direction that investigates a synergy between the external peace actor and 
specific actors on the level 3 of Darfur’s affected population. The UN’s innovative strategy, 
which authorizes partnership from top to bottom as well as from bottom to top, is yet to be 
considered a success or a failure. However, it leaves room for further investigations, one that 
this study cannot fully achieve without an empirical analysis of the “real time context” that 
accords special attention to intervention on the grassroot level. 
 
6. 2 Research design 
Yin differentiates between four types of case studies: the single case holistic, the single case 
embedded, the multiple cases holistic and the multiple cases embedded. The major differences 
are between the single versus the multiple types and the holistic versus the embedded.  By 
embedded, the author describes the multiple or the single case study approach, which involves 
the analysis of embedded units within the chosen case. While the single case among other 
reasons “can be used to determine whether a theory’s propositions are correct or whether some 
alternative set of explanations might be more relevant.” The single case “embedded” becomes 
relevant when “within a single case, attention is also given to a subunit or subunits”.410  
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Single-case embedded with multiple units of analysis adopted from Yin411 
 
This study will employ the single case embedded approach.  One the one hand I examine 
intervention approaches utilized in the conflict by the international community. I focus on 
UNAMID (peacekeeping mission), the first embedded unit of analysis and the officially 
recognized peacemaker, operating within the framework of its mandate. On the other hand, I 
investigate into my second embedded unit of analysis which is Darfur’s peace-making 
institution. I probe into this second unit of analysis as an independent unit. This in alignment 
with the proposition underlying my framework for analysis has the capacity on the basis of 
unique and positive methods to contribute to the transformation of the Darfur conflict. More 
successfully so, when they are integrated into the operational framework of the officially 
recognized peacemaker.   
 
It is important to note that for the purpose of background information, this study will equally 
consider the activities of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the United Nation 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as separate missions preceding UNAMID. At the initial stages of 
the conflict’s outbreak, both the AU and the UN intervened as two separate and independent 
bodies. The AU heeded the initial call as regional peacemaker while the UN followed suit as 
international peacemaker. That being the case regardless, this study as mentioned earlier, 
concentrates on UNAMID as a single mission comprising both organizations-the UN and the 
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AU.  Having elucidated on the research design, I proceed to state the purpose for selecting the 
case.  
 
6. 3 Case Selection 
Initially, the years of civil strife between the north and the south marked Sudan as one of the 
nations in the sub-Saharan region with a prolonged history of fighting. That conflict terminated 
in 2005 and as mentioned earlier, precipitated the secession of the south from the north in 2011. 
Separate regions within the Sudan have also documented a history of violent eruptions. The 
conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile are cases in point.  Darfur, located in the west 
of Sudan, has equally remained an active zone of conflict since 2003. Pockets of conflict 
domains have therefore plagued the Sudan. I have nonetheless, chosen the Darfur conflict as 
the selected case for investigation in this study. The conflict takes ascendancy over others 
within the Sudan, owing to the myriad of instruments applied by the international community 
to the mitigation of the conflict. Also, the Darfur case exhibits features that this thesis utilizes 
to illuminate the theoretical perspectives412 underpinning the conflict transformation field of 
inquiry. As outlined elsewhere in this study, conflict transformation prescribes its underlying 
ideas as germane to the amelioration of protracted conflicts. The Darfur case for one, has 
prolonged for a decade and counting. The transformation perspective also seems to align with 
emerging African scholarly debates about the efficacy of indigenous peace-making systems413 
in contemporary conflicts. The Darfur case therefore provides a real-time conflict scenario for 
probing into African perspectives, as well as unexplored academic research areas, which this 
thesis intends to examine. 
  
Furthermore, when the Darfur conflict initially broke out, it attracted international attention on 
the basis of controversies over genocidal tendencies meted out on the black population by 
government-backed militias also known as the “Janjaweed”. Neither the conflicts of the Blue 
Nile nor those of Southern Kordofan have generated that magnitude of concern from the outside 
world. The Darfur case is the only conflict in Sudan and the one singular conflict in the world 
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that has played host to an unprecedented hybrid peace mission. The mission is a conflict 
intervention synergy between the AU and the UN.  On the basis of such unparalleled 
cooperation, the Darfur case provides a very good platform for investigating into the prospects 
of integrating indigenous peace-making mechanisms into the UNAMID’s working framework 
for peace. I find this to be a very interesting starting point to revive African methods of making 
peace, especially in semi modern societies like Darfur. A reawakening to some of Africa’s 
positive intervention strategies may ensure harmony and prevent the eruption of conflicts with 
the propensity to attract international concern.  
 
UNAMID represents collaboration between the parent body and a regional organization. That 
been the case regardless, the direction of this thesis argument must be clearly stated. I conceive 
of the principles guiding the African Union intervention in conflict terrains like Darfur as 
parallel to the framework within which the UN operates. UNAMID functions under a 
multidimensional mandate, however both organizations as separate entities, represent an 
embodiment of militarized operations as well as bolster state-centric approaches to peace. I 
have not selected the Darfur case with the aim to determine the workability of a synergy 
between both organizations. This will by far negate the purpose of this research.  It is also not 
within the scope of this thesis to determine the general success or failure of UNAMID in the 
Darfur conflict. The Darfur case nonetheless, becomes relevant to this study for probing into 
the operationalization of a multidimensional framework that sanctions grassroot intervention 
and aims towards cooperation with host state’s contextual peace-making resources. Developing 
chapters illuminate on UNAMID’s multidimensional mandate in Darfur. In utilizing the Darfur 
case, the study is able to gauge the extent to which UNAMID’s work in tandem with Darfur’s 
peace-making actors and methods contributes to the conflict’s gradual transformation.  That 
been said, I shall proceed to elaborate on my choice of research tools and how they aided the 
collection of evidence. 
 
6. 4 Study Location 
Concise information about the exact study location would suffice at this point. The Darfur 
region comprises of five federal states: Central Darfur with its capital in Zalingei, East Darfur 
with the capital located in El-Daein, El-Fasher, the capital city of Northern Darfur, while Nyala 
and El Geneina are capital cites of both South and West Darfur respectively. Each of these 
states experience spates of violence. The entire Darfur province is characterized by precarious 
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security precipitated by active fighting. The study’s research location was El Fasher, the capital 
of northern Darfur. El-Fasher plays host to UNAMID headquarters. Other states in Darfur were 
not visited because the study’s units of analysis (UNAMID’s CAS and Darfur’s Indigenous 
Peace-making Institution) function under the same operational framework in all of the other 
four regions. Also, Darfur’s peace-making institutions tend to be largely homogenous across 
all the states. 
 
6. 5 Sources of Data 
Secondary sources 
 
This study relies on both primary and secondary data. Specifically, three libraries have been 
beneficial to gathering secondary data that provided detailed insight into what have constituted 
the theoretical chapters of this thesis. The online materials of the Berghof Research Centre have 
been very insightful in unearthing and understanding assumptions from the school of conflict 
transformation guiding this study. The resources from both the Nigerian Defence College Abuja 
and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs provided rich data pertaining to the AU’s 
intervention in the Darfur conflict. The knowledge gathered from secondary data afforded 
acquaintance with the “case” as well as with a number of notable indigenous Sudanese authors. 
While on ground in Khartoum, the researcher enjoyed the rare privilege of engaging a number 
of these local scholars in insightful interview sessions. Finally, a good number of authors 
engaged in writing about Sudan, rely on archival materials from Durham University in the 
United Kingdom. This research draws on a number of E- theses with rich empirical information 
about the Darfur conflict.   
 
Primary sources 
 
In order to gain deeper understanding of the study location, the researcher (I) connected with 
scholars, experts and other researchers working on Sudan and South Sudan. This connection 
was effected on the platform of a conference organized by the SOS Darfur student group of the 
University of Erfurt. The solicited link to local contacts and relevant information collected from 
that forum, specifically about conducting research in the Sudan, served to bridge the gap against 
initial challenges that may have stemmed from the researcher’s unfamiliarity with the domain 
of study. Once on ground in Khartoum other logistics began to fall in place, those that 
eventually paved the eventual access into Darfur.  
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Mazurana et al state that: 
“Conflict environments are often rapidly evolving, requiring that researchers be 
flexible and able to adapt their methodologies”414. 
Also hear Druckman: 
“Loosely bound case studies are performed in an inductive emic tradition that allows 
for inventiveness at all stages of research. Tightly bound case studies, conducted in an 
etic tradition, proceed from a research design that specifies in advance the collection 
and analysis procedures… 415  
The emphasis here is both on the researcher’s flexibility and on the “inventiveness” at all stages 
of the research, which the case study approach condones. Accordingly, the thesis adopted an 
open-ended approach to sourcing its primary data. This was intended to allow for 
“inventiveness” on the field, as the need arose. The notion of “inventiveness” became 
paramount to generating the thesis’s primary data owing to the strict regulations guiding 
accessibility into the study terrain as well as the volatility of the region.  
Interviews: 
According to Yin, interviews constitute one of the major sources of evidence when doing a case 
study research. They are differentiated from surveys because of the conversational manner 
interviews adopt. This study relied on unstructured methods of interviewing especially because 
it allowed the researcher (I) to delve into matters that did not necessarily relate to the proposed 
questions, but which added some value to the entire process.  In like manner, seeking 
information from more than a single source, became a calculated effort to enable the 
“development of converging lines of inquiry” i.e. to allow for the triangulation of the evidences 
gathered “416   
 
The study relies largely on in-depth interviews with key informants. Access to a good number 
of informants became available due to a snowballing technique. Focused group discussions 
were conducted with participants that were specifically sampled for the purpose of the targeted 
information. Significant documents were obtained from UNAMID. Unpublished materials 
were also made available to the researcher by a number of Interviewed key informants.  
 
                                                     
414 See, Dyan Mazurana, Karen Jacobsen, and Lacey Gale, eds. Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A View 
from Below (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)  
415 Daniel Druckman, Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2005), 163 
416 Yin, “Case Study Research”, 98 
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6.6 Multiple Sources 
The strength of any case study research is the use of “multiple sources of evidence”417As earlier 
pointed out, initial data was sourced from within the state capital Khartoum and from the 
neighbouring commercial city of Omdurman. This plan was easily conceivable as part of the 
inventiveness which accompanies an open-ended research design. The researcher utilized this 
approach as a plan B to the proposed plan A. This became necessary at the point where the 
actualization of plan A seemed unattainable.  
In Khartoum, in-depth interviews were conducted. The first interview with a key informant 
facilitated the connection to all other informants interviewed in Khartoum. The interviews 
lasted between 60 to 90 minutes. In the course of the interviews I noticed, once I asked for the 
respondents’ names, that these were the very authors I had become familiar with while reading 
secondary materials about the Darfur conflict. Within the premises of the University of 
Khartoum, interviews were carried out in English language. 
 
Outside the University premises an interpreter became indispensable. That was the case with 
the group discussion conducted in Omdurman where the informal services of an interpreter 
were engaged. A diplomat, (Names withheld for security purpose) with one of the embassies 
located in the state capital, facilitated the link to 10 Darfuri male youths between the ages of 30 
and 35. Two of the ten group participants were childhood acquaintances to the interpreter. (I 
refer to them as informant A and B). Informant A and B fetched other 8 of their friends. All of 
the 10 had lived a greater part of their lives in Darfur and had fled the violence in its initial 
stages.  They had become traders at the Omdurman market, eking out a living from meagre 
profit generated from their trade.   Informant B specifically displayed vast knowledge and 
claimed strong affiliations with the known Native Administration hierarchies. One could sense 
that he spoke from a wealth of experience.  My interpreter had explained my mission to them.  
I noticed the readiness on their part to pour out their hearts to me, once I reassured them of the 
confidentiality of our meeting. We conducted silent group discussions on two separate dates in 
one restaurant. Our conversations usually lasted for not more than 30 minutes at the most. 
Although participant A and B had started off responding to my line of questions in English, 
they arrived at the point where it became difficult to express themselves in clear terms and had 
to make the switch to Arabic.   
 
                                                     
417 Yin, “Case Study Research”, 97 
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The restaurant was the choice of the participants of the group discussion. This was a calculated 
step to ensure confidentiality as well as the safety of the participants. Worthy of note is the fact 
that issues around the conflict in Darfur have almost become a political anathema.  
 One strategy adopted by the researcher since coming to terms with “Darfur” being anathema, 
was to become involved in informal personal conversations. Social functions in Khartoum drew 
together the high and mighty of the society, attending them provided the unique opportunity for 
relaxed discussions. Questions were usually posed in a manner that concealed the actual 
intention behind them.  
 
6. 7 On ground Darfur… 
The permit into Darfur was approved, albeit with stringent conditions. A short duration of stay 
was granted, and this facilitated the commencement of the second phase of data collection. For 
reasons of personal security, the collection of primary data in Darfur was carried out strictly 
within the confines of the UN headquarters in El-Fasher, northern Darfur.  
Reflecting on the data gathered while in the state capital Khartoum, I realized my respondents 
seemed divided on the issues I presented before them. With this background knowledge in 
mind, I understood to make adjustments that incorporated other aspects, and which would 
enable a deeper insight into the problem I sought answers to. I began to spread my tentacles so 
as to capture varying perspectives. For example, while in Khartoum, I discovered that my 
informants were either Darfuri or non-Darfuri. Perspectives were either connotative of 
subjective opinion or extremely critical and reflective of issues from an academic stand point.  
  
In Darfur, my data-gathering horizon became much wider in contrast to what obtained in 
Khartoum. In- depth interviews were carried out with UN personnel. Informants responded in 
the capacity of their represented department; the political and the humanitarian. So as to fully 
explore the terrain, the researcher was introduced to the head of the Civil Affairs Section. He 
in turn assigned the researcher to the team leader of the Civil Affairs Section (sector north), as 
it is being referred to on ground.  
 
A group discussion was organised to enable officers who are part of the team leaders’ group, 
to enlighten the researcher on the department’s mandate as well as introduce the four cells 
operating under the Civil Affairs Section: The Capacity Building, Information Management, 
Quick Impact Projects and Conflict Resolution Cells jointly operate to ameliorate conflict at 
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the grassroots. At the end of that introductory session was able to identify the appropriate cell, 
which based on my research questions could aptly furnish me with the needed data. In the days 
that followed, I focused on extracting vital information from the Conflict Resolution Cell.  My 
questions revolved around issues of the conflict, international response and prospects of 
indigenous peace-making mechanisms. Our discussions would last between 25 -30 minutes and 
were usually morning sessions which stretched into the afternoons. 
 
Triangulation 
The idea of data triangulation is to encourage the researcher to collect information from 
multiple sources, they are aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon. 418 For this 
reason, interview sessions were taken a step further. A representative of Darfur’s civil society 
groups was engaged in a lengthy discussion.  The researcher in that manner became acquainted 
with on ground facts relating to the efforts at mitigating conflict at the middle level of society. 
In similar vein, the researcher was opportune to be in the presence of four representatives of 
the “Ajaweed”. The Ajaweed are mediators and custodians of the “Judiyya;” Darfur’s 
mechanism for justice and reconciliation. The underlying motivation was to understand the role 
of the region’s indigenous peace-making heritage: “Judiyya” in the current conflict. The 
researcher sought insight into the process itself and tabled some of the allegations levelled 
against Darfur’s indigenous mechanisms. One of these claims capture discussions about the 
ineffectiveness of the NA institutions and the diminished legitimacy of local peace-making 
custodians in asserting a mitigating authority on local tensions. This inadequacy on the part of 
local methods purportedly culminated in the eruption of fresh violence in 2003.  
6.8 Analytical Approach and Interpretation 
According to Robson, the case study does not call for a particular approach to the analysis of 
the data it produces.419 This study nonetheless relies on selected propositions and techniques to 
analyse the data collected from Khartoum and Darfur alike. 
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419 Colin Robson, Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005)  
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6.8.1 Research propositions 
The essence of propositions within the case study approach is the opportunity afforded the 
researcher to contemplate theoretical issues.  They also aid a refined search for evidence on the 
field.420    
In similar vein: 
… “The researcher needs to develop theoretical frameworks during the course of the 
research, which inform and make sense of the data and which can be systematically 
examined during the case study for plausibility”421 
The propositions underlying the conflict transformation field form the lenses through which 
this study engages in a descriptive analysis of the data that will be collected.  Around the early 
1990s, scholars from the school of conflict transformation engaged in a thorough examination 
of guiding ideas and propositions. Their assumptions against those underlying the fields of 
conflict management and conflict resolution as mentioned in the theoretical chapters, advance 
the transformation discourse as pragmatic, beneficial and significant towards the realization of 
durable peace especially to cases of prolonged conflicts. There is however a paucity of detailed 
empirical backing in this regard. A further examination into the applicability, in a real conflict 
scenario like Darfur, of conflict management and conflict resolution approaches, validates or 
repudiates the creation of a vacuum as suggested by conflict transformation scholars.  
 
Two main analytical models as expounded by Edward Azar422 and John Paul Lederach423 will 
be employed in the empirical chapters of this study. Edward Azar’s lenses for understanding 
Protracted Social Conflicts, forms the basis on which the thesis sets out to examine the 
conditions which may have precipitated the eruption of conflict in 2003. To what extent can the 
author’s propositions find cogency within the Darfur context? Contingent on Lederach’s 
comprehensive framework, the study will investigate into the prospects for the creation of 
“space” for the region’s indigenous resources within the working mandate of UNAMID in 
Darfur.  
                                                     
420 Yin, “Case Study Research: Design and Methods”, 28 
421 Hartley, Case Study Research, 324 
422 Edward Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1990). 
423 John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive 
Framework," in Conflict Transformation, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 
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6.8.2 Pattern Matching 
Pattern matching is the core procedure of theory testing with cases. Testing consists of matching 
an “observed pattern” (a pattern of measured values) an “expected pattern” (a hypothesis), and 
deciding whether these patterns match (resulting in a confirmation of the hypothesis) or do not 
match (resulting in a disconfirmation).424 According to Yin, It compares findings from the case 
study with predictions made before the collected data.425 Therefore findings most specifically 
from Darfur will be compared with Lederach’s postulations to “confirm” or “disconfirm” the 
assumptions. The technique will be used to evaluate the extent to which Lederach’s 
propositions can be viewed as a pragmatic approach to sustainable peace achieved on the 
platform of reconciliation administered in conjunction with resources from within.  
Longer time frames invested on the terrain of conflict, and a bottom up integrative approach to 
peace, constitute some of the underlying conjectures, which should facilitate the transformation 
of prolonged conflicts.  Its implication for the case of Darfur is yet to be fully explored. Also, 
its effectiveness within the capacity of an official strategy of the international community 
remains to be proven.  
  
Historians may recommend a historical approach to investigating the case of Darfur. It is not 
out of line, considering Darfur’s antecedents of conflict as well as an age long peace-making 
institution. This study touches on historically related issues but does so with brevity to avoid 
any form of digression. In this light, it must be reiterated that it is not the focus of this study to 
concentrate on the causes of conflicts per se, but to examine basically the effectiveness of 
conventional approaches to the conflict. Therefore, as put forth by Yin, the choice to do a case 
study above a historical method arose for me because the study contemplates the analysis of 
contemporary events, “where relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated” and where the 
concentration is not on the ‘dead past’. 426The edge the case study approach exercises above 
the historical method is the ability to hear directly from relevant sources involved with these 
events. Also, the case study caters for the direct observation of the object of study which is 
Darfur. However, as already mentioned, a historical perspective cannot be entirely overruled.427   
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 216 
6.8.3 Generalizations 
While the case study approach is refuted for its proneness to subjectivity, others view the ability 
to make analysis contingent upon a collection of instruments as expedient against issues of 
researcher bias. One area where the case study approach tends to come under intense scrutiny 
is the issue of ‘generalizations’. Its critics tend to fault the ability to generalize from a single 
study. Its exponents tend to view such assertions a different light.  Yin repudiates this claim 
stating that  
 
“case studies are generalizable, but in a different manner as compared to other 
approaches to research. Case studies according to him, are generalized to theoretical 
propositions, and not to populations or universes” 428 
 
Since the case is not to be likened to a sample under assessment, generalizations through the 
case study lenses must be viewed as an analytical rather than a statistical task, where the 
objective is “to expand and generalize theories”.429 Johansson further illuminates the analytical 
stance by stating that analytical generalizations are based on reasoning. He mentions three 
principles of reasoning: deductive, inductive and abductive, stating that “Generalizations can 
be made from a case using one or a combination of these principles”. Going by his 
understanding, this study will adopt the deductive; without seeking to “falsify theory” as he 
puts it, but to contribute to the conflict transformation body of knowledge. 430   
 
What implication does this have for the case in question? Will the findings from the Darfur case 
be transferrable to other cases of protracted conflicts on the sub-Saharan region? Note must be 
taken to understand that no two conflicts on the sub-Saharan region have displayed the exact 
same dynamics or complexities as have been recorded in Darfur or in the wider context of the 
Sudan as a whole. Similarly, until now, Darfur remains the first and the only conflict where a 
hybrid mission has been deployed to aid the containment of a deadly escalated violence. The 
task as it is, therefore is one of contributing to what Yin referred to earlier as the expansion and 
generalization of theories. To that effect the underlying propositions of the adopted framework 
for intervention as projected by the field of conflict transformation may become applicable to 
                                                     
428 Ibid, 15 
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other cases of protracted conflicts on the continent.  Yet the results are bound to differ, as is 
evident in its partial form, exhibited for example in the case of Somalia. In like manner, the 
findings from here should expose the weaknesses and strengths of the propositions, while 
checking for their plausibility and practicability in real time conflicts or future conflicts of the 
region. Finally, since this study focuses on the northern region of Darfur-El Fasher, findings 
may readily become applicable to all other states of Darfur, where homogeneous conditions 
apply.    
 
 6. 8 Caveats to the study  
Conducting research in a volatile region like Darfur can be a daunting task for any researcher 
interested in “systematic documentation, testing, and learning that helps to identify which 
practices are effective, which components work and how, which approaches are cost effective 
and sustainable…”431 Darfur has for some time remained out of the international media’s 
spotlights. The enthusiasm therefore to venture into on ground research initially becomes 
dampened as researchers realise they are in the dark about the status of the war. Yet the 
motivation to fill the gap in knowledge and tell the story from the perspective of those within, 
tends to propel the researcher regardless. Sometimes it is by sheer luck that researchers become 
aware of beneficial sources of information like the Radio Dabanga432 and the online resource: 
The Sudan Tribune433 or about bloggers like Eric Reeves434 who by some means stumble on up 
to date information about the region. In the course of data collection in Darfur I was confronted 
with a number of challenges, surmountable and insurmountable alike. These encounters have 
called for the flexibility and inventiveness alluded to in the section capturing the thesis research 
design. The efforts made towards contextualising the methodology of this thesis within Darfur’s 
active conflict is what I present as the caveats of this study.  
 
6.8.1 Accessing the field 
Accessing the Darfur province starts with an entry visa into Sudan, however, it does not end 
there. A researcher must make an application to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in 
order to procure the permit that grants entry to the region. The delay in processing is one aspect 
                                                     
431 Michael Wessells, “Reflections on Ethical and Practical Challenges of Conducting Research with Children in 
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432 See, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en 
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of conducting research in the province that should be put into consideration especially when 
the entry visa into Sudan is a short one. The commission may also decide the length of stay. In 
my case, a three-week duration was approved. A short stay has the tendency to distort the data 
collection plan mapped out for the research trip. I resorted to adopting an intensive approach to 
data collection as a strategy to maximise time. Nonetheless, the lack of sufficient time tended 
to inhibit the opportunity to access a wide array of respondents, which indeed may have boosted 
the level of the thesis reliability and minimised any biases.435 For example, a visit to the 
government of North Darfur was impossible. Scheduled interviews with respondents at the 
university of El-Fasher could not be executed. Similarly, interview sessions revealed that 
Darfuris on the camp maintain a form of the Native Administration hierarchies and therefore 
depend on indigenous peace-making mechanisms to preserve peace and harmony on the camps. 
Based on the rational that my personal security would not be guaranteed, a visit to the IDP 
camps in the company of Civil Affairs officers who frequently carried out routine checks was 
disallowed. It may have been possible with a longer duration of stay to penetrate these areas 
when tensions have doused.     
 
6.8.2 Protecting Data from the field 
“The challenge of protecting sources (from zones of conflict) can be quite difficult and may 
force one to limit the research conducted and what is done with information collected.” 436  
 
While in Darfur the researcher (I) resorted to full note taking as compared to the freedom to 
record interviews in Khartoum. Although conducting interviews within the UN quarters did not 
constitute any problem, the major complication was in being able to circumvent the confiscation 
of recorded data while departing the Darfur region. Therefore, the idea of interviews at all 
became a problem. Taking notes while conducting the interviews was more of a drawback for 
the researcher. In Khartoum, it was possible to take repeated listens to recorded interviews once 
the researcher retired to her closet. It is therefore possible to have omitted some vital 
information during interview sessions. Although the researcher largely avoided recording, 
during the interview/ discussion session conducted with the indigenous mediators, it became 
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pertinent to weigh the risk benefit ratio of recording or not.  Since the Ajaweed communicated 
in Arabic, the imperativeness to second vet and cater for accuracy became the motivating drive 
to shun the envisaged risk. The researcher, (I) engaged the services of a UNAMID staff to act 
as interpreter. On my arrival in Germany, I equally explored the language prowess of Arabic 
speaking colleagues from Palestine and South Sudan. The effect of language barrier on the 
authenticity of a research nonetheless must be acknowledged especially as this hinders access 
to the depth of the information solicited for. In Khartoum for example language constraint 
tended to hamper the flow of the discussion during some attended state functions.  
   
6.8.3 Data Sourcing 
By virtue of Sudan’s patriarchal configuration, the sourcing of data tended to tilt predominantly 
towards the male folk. They, in contrast to the females readily responded to casual 
conversations or entreaties to conduct interviews. On stating my mission via email or telephone, 
a number of women for some reason promptly declined any form of interview or discussion. 
This constraint can undermine the potential of the research to produce a gender-balanced 
opinion. The reverse however was the case when sampling the opinion of Civil Affairs and 
UNAMID top personnel.  
 
A researcher practically meets the challenges of conducting research in a conflict setting by 
adopting what Mazurana et al have referred to as “one of the most productive approaches”. It 
is the proposition “for externally based researchers to partner with an organisation based in 
the conflict zone and staffed with locals”.437 The research study is not the result of an official 
partnership with UNAMID. However, the researcher was granted access to UNAMID premises 
for research purposes. On the basis of unhindered access to UNAMID, both the analysis delved 
into in chapter 9, and the core empirical findings stated in chapter 10, rely to a large extent on 
primary data acquired from UNAMID’s coffers of classified information. It is for this reason 
that the research’s susceptibility to biased interpretations cannot be absolutely nullified. 
Nonetheless when such information is contrasted with what seems like rumours deriving from 
the state capital. The conclusion tends to retain its validity. According to the editors of 
“Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A view from below”,  
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“Research in conflict settings requires careful triangulation of information to sort out 
rumour from knowledge. However, rumours are revealing in and of themselves as to 
what they disclose about the communities’ view of those in power and of the power 
dynamics affecting daily lives…”438  
This assertion aptly captures the context of substantiating vital primary data collected from 
UNAMID with other data, but also with the “rumours” emanating from Khartoum.     
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Chapter Seven 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to achieve a dual purpose. The first is to provide historical insight into the 
conflict that eventually engulfed the Darfur region in 2003. This initial task does not make the 
attempt to rummage into the region’s long historical antecedence. It is instead, an inquiry into 
the factors that have contributed to the protracted nature of Darfur’s conflict. I delve into this 
analysis against the backdrop of Edward Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflict.  I conceive 
of his framework as significant to investigating into the occurrence of “protracted social 
conflicts” in developing worlds.  The keyword here is “protractible”. My analysis based on that, 
seeks to establish the connection between the underlying factors of protractedness as expounded 
by Azar and those responsible for Darfur’s prolonged war.  Azar expatiates on four clusters of 
variables. The “Genesis” component is embedded with explanatory patterns matching the 
Darfur case. While this account may represent a mere synopsis of the causes of the Darfur 
conflict, the reader is furnished with background information of those historical events that 
culminated with the fresh eruptions of violence in 2003. 
 
The second objective progresses from a probing into the causes of Darfur’s prolonged violence, 
towards an investigation into the international community’s approach to peace in Darfur. In 
chapter three, I examined the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution as well as 
the principles and assumptions for intervention underlying them. These approaches 
predominantly informed the strategies applied to intervention in conflicts of the protracted kind. 
In this chapter, it is my preoccupation to probe into how specific strategies such as formal 
mediation or peacekeeping have contributed to the search for peace and stability in Darfur. The 
concluding section introduces UNAMID’s mandate for grassroot intervention. It also examines 
the mission’s approach to peace on the grassroot, by utilizing Lederach’s comprehensive 
framework as the analytical tool.  
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7.2 Examining the protractedness in Darfur’s conflict: An analysis based on Edward 
Azar. 
Understanding the causes of prolonged violence in Darfur  
According to Edward Azar: 
‘Many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are 
characterized by blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and 
actors, they are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, 
actors and targets…and are conflicts which do not show clear starting and terminating 
points. 439 
To a great extent, this opening statement from Azar mirrors the narratives captured as salient 
to the comprehension of Darfur’s prolonged conflict. As I will examine in detail subsequently, 
an investigation into the conflict and its dynamics ostensibly reveals, as proposed in Azar: 
“blurred demarcations between internal and external sources”; the emergence of “multiple 
causal factors and dynamics” as well as the absence primarily of a “clear terminating point”. 
Also, it is inadequate and academically incorrect to attempt an analysis of Darfur’s conflict 
without mentioning the impact of across boarder affiliations on the frontiers to the east of 
Darfur.  Ostensibly, ethnic loyalties have fed into the conflict drivers of both Chad and Darfur 
to precipitate escalated tensions on each side of the divide.  
 
It is against the backdrop of Azar’s conflict prototype that Darfur’s conflict can be explicated 
along the trajectory that “characterizes it as a conflict exhibiting blurred demarcations between 
internal and external sources and actors.” In similar vein, the region’s historical antecedents 
and climatic conditions account for and constitute “the multiple causal factors”, that provoked 
the outbreak of the war in the first place. The chronology of events leading up to 2003 would 
be incomplete for example, if an analysis capturing the salient role of Libya’s erstwhile and 
demised dictator: Gadhafi, is omitted.  His pendulum of intervention, motives and unwavering 
interest had swung towards catastrophe for the entire region. Gaddafi represented one major 
external actor in the early making of the war which erupted subsequently.  
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Finally, since 2003 the region continues to be a zone of active conflict. Tribal fights resulting 
from pending unresolved matters persistently trigger fresh eruptions of conflicts notably from 
early 2013.  There is hardly any end in sight as the political undertone of the war of insurgency 
and counter –insurgency unabatedly gains ascendancy on disputes between tribes on the 
grassroot.  This assertion holds true at least up until April 2014 when the researcher visited the 
region of Darfur for field research.  
As mentioned elsewhere, Azar presents three variables in his thesis of protracted conflicts.  
They contribute to or may be responsible for the emergence and longevity of social conflicts. 
They are Genesis, Dynamics and Outcomes. Significant for this analysis are the components 
which underlie the Genesis variable: a. Communal Content, b. Human Needs, c. Government 
and the State’s Role and d. International Linkages. As already alluded to in the introductory 
note, the Darfur case to a large extent matches the patterns: b, c and d as linked to the Genesis 
variable.  According to Azar these “components” constitute the ‘preconditions’ for protracted 
conflicts to occur.  
 
7.2.1 Communal Content 
The multi ethnic composition of colonized societies plays a vital role in the emergence of 
protracted social conflicts. In Azar’s words: 
“If a society is characterized by multi communal composition protracted social 
conflicts are likely to occur”.  
In most colonized societies, the communal content derives from the era of colonialism. 
However, it is the politically active nature of its multiple groups traceable to a ‘colonial legacy’ 
of divide and rule that tends to exacerbate conflict. To what extent can this component find 
validity in the Darfur case? In order to establish the parallel between Azar’s contention and the 
Darfur case, it is imperative to establish whether or not Darfur’s communal content was a 
configuration from the colonial era. Also, did colonialism bequeath the legacy of “divide and 
rule”, which according to the author is responsible for the politically active nature of multiple 
groups?  For explicit comprehension, it is important to start by an exploratory analysis of 
Darfur’s communal content.  
 
The outsider perspective of Darfur’s communal content categorizes Darfur’s ethnic 
constellation into a classification of Arab and African races. Such conception of Darfur’s ethnic 
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configuration is only partially valid when conceived from an ideological point of view.440 This 
misguided perception had in fact gained prominency in 2004 when Collin Powel the former 
United States Secretary of states alluded to genocidal tendencies meted out on the ‘black 
population’ by government backed militias known as the Janjaweed.441 Indeed the initial 
perceptions of the terms  ‘Arab’ and  ‘Black’ tend to suggest that the population in Darfur 
comprises light and dark skinned people. This may be the case especially when the majority 
tends to associate the word Arab with a light skinned race. Unfortunately, this imagery as 
confirmed during my research visit negates the reality on ground. Such skin colour contrasts as 
may be the case in the capital city of Khartoum are unavailable at least in Darfur. Furthermore, 
intermarriage makes it even more difficult to distinguish between the appearances of extant 
groups traceable to different origins.   
 
Author Gerard Prunier described the regions communal content as a ‘complex ethnic 
mosaic’.442 On that note, it is easier to detect racial divergence based on the people’s means of 
sustenance. It is possible therefore to identify some contrast in lifestyle especially between 
pastoralist and farmers, but not based on physical appearance per se.  Even so, with respect to 
occupational distinctions, Mamdani observed that “occupational transitions”443 do exist, 
leading to somewhat blurred lines between pure nomadism and sedentary life. “These nuances 
regardless do not deny the fact that certain groups remain to be identified with specific 
orientations.”444 
 
Migrant groups began to settle into what is today known as Darfur from as early as the 
fourteenth century and stretching into the nineteenth century. These groups have since co-
existed with the Fur who prior to this period occupied the Jebel Marra Mountains. Indeed, the 
name Darfur does drive from a combination of the Arabic Dar (abode) and predominant Fur 
ethnic group.445 History has it that the early migrants were either of Nilo-Saharan origin who 
stemmed from the Nile Valley or consisted of Arab groups. Today their descendants exist in 
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Darfur as the Nilotic Saharan: Berti, Zaghawa and Bidayat, the Nile Valley: Meidob and the 
Ziyadiyya, Ta’aisha, Beni Halba, Habbaniya and the Rizzeyqat Arabs, who have been referred 
to as Darfur’s native Arabs.446 Present day Darfur also constitutes descendants from settlers 
who supposedly joined the flow of migrants in the seventeenth century. Their origin was 
traceable to today’s northern Nigeria. This brief description of Darfur’s ethnic configuration 
suggests that the region comprises of aborigines and migrant groups from around the fourteenth 
century. Such communal arrangement therefore defies comparison with nation states referred 
to as: ‘colonial constructs.’ Where the comprehension of ‘colonial construct’ depicts the 
colonial exercise that merged diverse ethnic groups into a single territorial space called the 
“Nation state”. Darfur’s communal content is therefore not the prodigy of colonial intrusion but 
of series of migratory influxes to the region. In like manner, there is no evidence of a politically 
active group in Darfur that derives political authority from the era of British administration in 
Darfur. To this extent therefore, the policy of divide and rule, as a factor to induce ethnic 
domination, cannot be validated within the Darfur context in the same manner as epitomized 
within other British colonies. A conspicuous level of dominance became evident only when 
Darfur lost its independence and became amalgamated with Sudan. With that singular act, 
Darfur became subservient to the elites of the riverine who also dominated the entire political 
terrain of the Sudan.  
 
Not a legacy of divide and rule, but a legacy of poverty. 
 
It is important to note however, that while the legacy of “divide and rule” cannot apply to the 
Darfur case, the policy of “indirect rule” remoulded to suit Darfur’s political configuration, 
continues to be applauded as the colonial era’s laudable contribution towards the preservation 
of peace and stability in the region. I shall elaborate on this in chapter 8 of the study.  In similar 
manner, nonetheless, other legacies from the era of British colonialism abound that indicate a 
nexus between that phase in Darfur’s history and the overt expression in 2003. Those that 
mirrored the discontentment defined by years of political marginalization, underdevelopment 
and economic inequality.     
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Analysts have christened it ‘institutionalized neglect’447, ‘marginalization’448 ‘benign 
neglect’449 and more. These terms serve to summarize the British ‘conservative’ policy towards 
governing and administering its newest protectorate as from 1916: Darfur. Sudan’s western 
region had remained an independent Sultanate until1899 when the British occupied the ancient 
Funj kingdom.  History has it that present day Sudan existed as two independent regions: the 
Funj kingdom and Dar Fur Sultanate.450 The death of Ali Dinar- the last sultan and the 
occupation of Darfur in 1916, historically marked the end of the Fur Sultanate and the beginning 
of new historical tides for the region.   
 
The colonial master’s blueprint for administration in Darfur: The ‘conservative policy,’ sought 
to maintain existing political structures along indigenous lines of governance, albeit reflecting 
economic and social policies, which steered development away from Darfur. What seemed 
peculiar about the system was the marriage between the “indirect rule” style of administration 
(where Native leaders were elevated to the level of absolute authority over the community) and 
the institution of a “conservative policy” with respect to the development of the region. The 
conservative policy fundamentally designated life essentialities to the privileged class. 
Education for example became reserved for a selected few- ‘for people who mattered.’451 Daly 
explains how the British may have concocted several own-interest tailored arguments to favour 
the adoption of such policy on the terrains of Sudan’s Darfur. This arrangement diverged 
completely from the framework guiding the administration of Khartoum. The British colonials 
nonetheless justified its actions.  Restrained expenditure for the British administrators, 
accounted for a conservative policy, while peace and stability and the insulation against ‘foreign 
trend’ such as ‘nationalism’, were counted among the reasons for empowering tribal leadership 
and instituting a ‘Native Authority’ in Darfur.452  
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Although the colonial administration stood to benefit from its much-approved approach, its 
gradual internalization eventually translated to a state of economic condemnation. This has 
ostensibly trailed the western region of Sudan till date. The conspicuous economic disparity 
between contemporary Darfur and the capital city Khartoum stems from the continued 
economic neglect of the province as orchestrated from the centre. However, there is no 
gainsaying the indelible impact of a conservative policy, administered for 40 years and 
bequeathed to post independent Sudanese leaderships. Indeed, successive Sudanese 
administrations have remained in stark denial of governing strategies and the attendant realities 
that confront the governed as a result.  In any case, this sort of conservative attitude towards 
Darfur’s economic health, slowly but steadily transformed Darfur from an independent 
Sultanate into an economically deprived region, while a more progressive policy towards the 
north showed glaring signs of economic prosperity. The disparity in mode of governance 
became evident around the ‘triangular area’. Specific locations between Khartoum and the 
valley of the Nile in the north, the Blue and the White Nile and extending southwards to the 
frontiers of central Kordofan and the southern parts of Kassala province, began experiencing 
the economic boom453 For an autonomous state that hitherto made sufficient economic 
prosperity for itself, this new development would only serve to its detriment. Darfur’s overall 
sectors ranging from transport to health and education had remained completely stagnant.  
 
The education sector as alluded to elsewhere, served the precise purpose of providing education 
specifically to highly placed citizens of the community. This trend was heavily backed by the 
colonial administration’s retrogressive ideas towards education in Darfur.  The best form of 
education was to be derived majorly from Islamic schools called the khalawa. The khalawa 
focused on the intensive study of the Qur’an. Conventional education was almost entirely 
written off to the extent that Darfur could hardly flaunt more than 12 primary schools from the 
early to the late 1920s. In fact, Darfur at this time never owned a secondary school. As at 1929, 
none out of 510 students who attended Sudan’s only channel to acquiring secondary education 
came from the Darfur region. 454 The situation continued to record a downward progression. 
By 1935 Darfur could only boast of four government primary schools455. From the 
administration point of view everything worked according to the colonial administration’s 
conservative plan for the region.  
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The health sector was not excluded. In fact, when the initial drought and famine invaded the 
region, the need for health care intensified. Not even such deteriorating ecological conditions 
attracted the attention of Darfur’s administrators for some development either.456 Suffice it to 
say that Khartoum continued to enjoy preferential treatment over Darfur, most notably in areas 
were basic living requirements remained consciously unavailable. To buttress this point, for 
example, it was most obvious that provision for at least one maternity clinic could not be made 
for in Darfur. This was at a time when Sudan owned eighteen maternity clinics, with eight 
located in Khartoum.457 According to Flint and De Waal, not even records contained in the file 
‘Economic Development, Darfur Province’, from the Sudan archives, could contradict the 
height of neglect and underdevelopment that befell the region during the period 1917-1950. It 
was only in 1945 that colonial administrators began to lift the tiniest finger for some 
development.458 Cattle, camel and its by products remained Darfur’s only export product. These 
merchandises could hardly compete in the larger markets and therefore fetched only very 
limited returns.459 From none, Darfur by 1952 now owned its own secondary school.460 These 
developments may have been the early signs of what was to come in the future. The years 
leading up to Sudan’s independence similarly provided no meaningful succour in all of the 
areas already examined. However, it seemed that some ray of hope was to shine on Darfur at 
the time when Sudan would finally achieve its independence. Two secondary schools: one 
located in El Fasher and another in Nyala now serviced a population of 1,329,000, while the 
number of elementary schools had also increased to twenty.461 By the time Darfur’s colonial 
masters were signing off, total investment had recorded the highest in Khartoum. 56% had 
accrued to Khartoum leaving Darfur with an ignominious 5-6% rating.462 Although after 
independence, rail lines had been constructed reaching Nyala to the south of Darfur, this was 
of relatively zero consequence to the region. Mamdani noted that by 1956, when Sudan finally 
gained its freedom, the situation had only improved ‘marginally’.   Analyst observed that 
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between 1967-68, in comparison with its northern counterparts, Darfur’s poverty rate was 
documented as being the highest. 463  
 
The leadership of Sudanese nationalists has recorded no tangible development for the province. 
Indeed, Darfur continues to be deprived of the smallest modicum of change. As a matter of fact, 
since the arrival of the seating government in 1989, economic and political inequality has 
persisted as defining features of the region. Suffice it to say, that colonialism had bequeathed 
to these leaders a heritage of poverty that tarried into the 21st century. 
 
On the issue of the ‘Communal Content’ as precondition for protracted violence underlying the 
‘Genesis’ component, Azar concludes using with the following sentence: 
‘Imposed integration or incorporation of distinctive and often conflictual communities 
into one political entity retards the nation-building process, strains the social fabric 
and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict’.464 
  
Azar in that context had referred to societies like Nigeria, Uganda and the likes, where colonial 
governance served to promote the ‘divide and rule’ policy.  In contemporary times, such 
countries have experienced internal cleavages between the northern and southern divides. His 
analogy nonetheless is somewhat synonymous with the case of the Fur Sultanate’s compelled 
amalgamation with Sudan. This forced marriage, which only retarded the growth and 
development of the region, bred somewhat racial ‘fragmentation’ as orchestrated by the centre, 
between Arab and non-Arab communities (in their competition over depleting resources) and 
culminated with the outbreak of a conflict which has remained ‘protracted’ in every sense of 
the word.  
 
7.2.2  The Human Needs factor 
An investigation into Azar’s stance on the human needs factor with respect to ‘Protracted Social 
Conflicts’ has been examined elsewhere in this work. To what extent can his analysis be 
validated in the Darfur case? Having examined the extreme economic marginalization that 
characterized the Darfur region since the era of colonization, one may be quick to conclude that 
there can be no other reason for the region’s entanglement in prolonged violence other than the 
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abject poverty by which it is defined. This argument is valid, but only in part. While inequality 
and marginalization largely reverberate on the level that investigates national and communal 
concerns, other salient issues have dominated the discourse at the grassroots.  
 
Land needs in Darfur 
I commence by asking the following questions in line with Azar’s thesis. Can it be said of 
Darfur that ‘…communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of material needs’? Are 
there groups within the province that above others, have enjoyed in abundance, the satisfaction 
of basic needs? 465 Have successive Sudanese administrations failed to redress, if any, 
grievances resulting from need deprivation? Lastly, Can the escalated violence in Darfur be 
linked to the government’s attitude towards the satisfaction of “basic needs” as seen through 
the lenses of Azar? 466 To provide answers to these questions, I have identified one underlying 
root cause to the conflict- ‘land’. My position is based on the complexities that have surrounded 
the Darfur’s land tenure system. Controversies around this topic have persisted without tangible 
solutions in sight. Problems resulting from depleting resources amidst a growing population, as 
well as famine and drought have become exacerbating factors in a scholarship capturing 
continued intertribal rivalry over land and the right to ownership. Needless to say, that land has 
remained the bone of serious contention among land and landless tribes in Darfur. There is no 
gainsaying that ‘land’ constitutes that ‘human need’ tied to the survival of both sedentary and 
nomadic communities in Darfur. This point of view nonetheless must be expatiated on. 
 
To investigate into the case of Darfur in this context, the researcher relies on extant scholarly 
categorizations, which tend to split Darfur’s multi-ethnic composition into: a) land owning and 
b) landless groups.467 Category (a) comprises those tribes in Darfur associated with a sedentary 
way of live. These tribes mainly indigenous to the Darfur region depend largely on farming as 
their source of livelihood. Other groups recognized within this classification as opposed to a 
sedentary lifestyle, practice a nomadic way of life in which cattle herding has largely prevailed 
as the core source of livelihood. These are Arab groups such as the Rizeigat (Baggara), 
Habbaniya, Ta’aisha and the Beni Halba whose homeland is located in the southern part of 
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Darfur. The (b) category consists of landless tribes, which include Arab camel herding nomads 
of northern Darfur. They are referred to as the northern Rizeigat or Rizeigat Abbala.468   
 
Categorizations such as these reveal a correlation with the ‘Human Need’ factor underlying 
Azar’s stated precondition for the occurrence of protracted social conflicts. Azar identifies two 
groups: A discontented and a contented group.  Darfur’s internal composition comprises both, 
especially when argued from the standpoint of these classifications.   The landless groups are 
the “discontented” in the region because ‘material needs’ with respect to land have remained 
unmet. A separate group nevertheless enjoys the satisfaction and contentment of material needs. 
As far as land is concerned, a basic need (for the land-owning group) is recognizably ‘justly 
met’. An inequitable pattern of wealth distribution according to Azar creates the enabling 
environment for protracted social conflicts to occur.469 In Darfur, this feeling of 
disenfranchisement continued to lurk around for a while until in tandem with other exacerbating 
factors the region finally imploded in 2003.  
 
The question is: How did the region arrive at an arrangement that granted land rights to some 
and rendered others landless? This is traceable to Darfur’s land tenure system. Before probing 
into the system of land rights, it is important to point out two debilitating factors that have 
undeniably contributed to Darfur’s predicaments:  drought and environmental degradation. In 
addition to a growing population these factors in connection with proximate causes, fanned to 
flame the war of insurgency, which commenced in 2003. Darfur’s ecological configuration 
distinguishes between the wastelands to the north and the savannah marshlands to the south. 
Declining climatic conditions from as early as the 1930s impacted negatively on Darfur’s 
communities especially those located to the north of the region.  A number of communities not 
exclusive to Arab groups have been confronted with, as well as endured harsh climatic 
conditions that took a heavy toll on the very source of their livelihood and survival. 470 In many 
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instances, intense cases of drought have precipitated survival related mass movements into Fur 
homelands, as was evident during the period from 1979 to 1985. 471   
In hindsight, such movements resulted in overcrowded terrains and the struggle over depleting 
resources. However, the host community ensured to coordinate and accommodate mass arrivals 
using a regulatory system also known as the land tenure system. The Hakura as will become 
explicit shortly, is Darfur’s preserved age long land acquisition heritage. It differs from a good 
number of African societies where the kin-based system of land allocation and rights continue 
to prevail. From the era of the Sultans, Darfur’s land tenure system preserved societal order as 
it resolved all land related issues. The next heading reveals the linkage between human needs 
factor as delineated by Azar and one of the major causes underlying the prolonged conflict in 
Darfur. 
 
Darfur’s land tenure system 
A brief historical journey into Darfur’s traditional land tenure system dating back to the era of 
the sultans is imperative at this juncture. It is intended to uncover background knowledge 
leading to the questions on how Darfur arrived at categorizations such as mentioned above, 
which have fed into Darfur’s prolonged conflict narrative.  
Darfur’s indigenous tribes have been traced to three successive dynasties:472 The Daju, Tunjur 
and the Keira dynasty. The last of the three dynasties produced several prominent Sultans whose 
leadership had left indelible marks on the growth and development of the DarFur Sultanate. 
Advancements included territorial expansions but were not exclusive to it. The Fur sultans also 
sought to enlarge the sultanate ethnically and socially. The homeland of the Furs thereby 
(DarFur) included other ethnic groups and even now constituted a nomadic people who 
perfectly blended into a predominantly agrarian society.473   
For the purpose of our analysis, it should suffice to focus on Sultan Musa ibn Suleiman the 
second king of the Keira dynasty, he ruled from1680 to 1700. History has it that he was 
instrumental to the changes the Sultanate experienced in the area of land rights.474 Prior to this 
development the Fur sultanate had operated under a communal system of land ownership. 
According to Abdalla Mohammed, when a tribe acquired a land, it belonged to its entire 
                                                     
471 Jerome Tubiana, "Darfur: A Conflict for Land?" In War in Darfur and the Search for Peace,  ed. Alex De 
Waal, (Global Equity Initiative. Harvard University, 2007), 77 
472 Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 134 
473 Ibid 134 
474 ibid., 137 
 233 
members. The traditional leader oversaw both property and people.  Each family owned a share 
in the land for the purpose of cultivation. Excess or unallocated land was reserved for other 
purposes, which included offering land to arriving guests (nomads) as a mark of hospitality475.  
In line with the minor adjustments made by Sultan Musa Ibn Suleiman, the Hakura as it was 
called in Arabic, (plural: Hawakir) was now to serve an administrative purpose. It became the 
platform on which the Sultans attracted the loyalty of its chiefs. In the real sense of it, the sultans 
did not effectuate any fundamental change to the land acquisition mechanism that the people 
had been used to. The Hakura system merely became an official confirmation of ownership. 
The major restructuring that may have occurred was the opportunity for individual ownership 
that came with it. The estates (Hawakir) for which the sultans granted rights of acquisition were 
of two types: The Administrative Hakura and the Exclusive Hakura of privilege.  
 
The Administrative Hakura was granted to native leaders who apart from their role as tribal 
heads now became the legal custodians of the estates over which the collection of limited 
taxation was also permitted. The Administrative Hakura today referred to, as ‘dars’ e.g. (tribal 
homelands) therefore became an official right of occupancy by the Sultans to the tribal chiefs 
in favour of the tribes under their tutelage. To confirm its authenticity, the Sultans also awarded 
some sort of certificate of occupancy written in Arabic. It stipulated the boundaries to these 
estates. The more personal Hakura of privilege on the contrary, was awarded to eminent 
persons in recognition of their service to the state. Among the recipients were religious men, 
merchants, army leaders and state officials whose right to land also extended towards tax 
collection as a source of income. 476 Land rights were granted to indigenous farming groups as 
well as herding groups such as the Rizeigat, Habbaniya, Beni Halba, and the Ta’aisha whose 
homelands (Dars) are located to the south of Darfur.  To the north of Darfur, Arab groups such 
as the northern Rizeigat were to be excluded from this new system of land allocation. The 
reason is that these nomads were non-sedentary and constantly in search of pasture for their 
animals. At the time, it was of no specific importance granting land rights to camel herding 
groups. This new arrangement ostensibly bred no animosity or dissatisfaction, not the least 
among landless nomads.  
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When the British finally annexed Darfur with Sudan in 1916, having deposed Ali Dinar the last 
sultan of the Keira dynasty and Fur sultanate, all existing tenure rights were left in place albeit 
with adjustments such as the enactment of the ‘Land Settlement and Registration Act of 1925 
and the Land Acquisition Act of 1930. These amendments demanded for all land in the Sudan 
to be registered. Its implementation according to Tubiana, became most effective in the towns 
than in the hinterlands like Darfur. To this end Darfur continued to operate under the customary 
system of land acquisition.477Indeed, the authority of tribal leaders became all the more 
confirmed with the establishment of the Native Administration, which became the colonizers 
strategy for providing and ensuring stability and governance. 
 
 During the colonial era, the tribes held true to the tenets underlying the administrative Hakura. 
One of such principles was to grant herders the access to the animal migration routes known as 
the ‘Marahil’478.  It was also within customary practice for tribal leaders to welcome 
newcomers to the tribe. As mentioned elsewhere, the Hakura made provision for the temporary 
accommodation of visitors (nomads) whose life style included seeking greener pastures 
especially when their homelands became dryer. Abdul Jalil479 explains how initially arriving 
guests would adhere to the rules guiding the new place of habitation, including subservience to 
the native heads of the host community. These arriving guests also knew that lands allotted to 
them for whatever purpose was not meant to serve as a permanent place of abode. Tensions 
between farmers and herders (arriving nomads) were not entirely ruled out, however ensuing 
conflicts either over grazing land or water, as was predominantly the case, were promptly 
resolved with the intervention of Native Administration leaders. In fact, in the words of the 
author, relations between farmers and herders were more of ‘complementary’ than adversarial  
When the Sudan gained its independence in 1956, Darfur’s traditional land rights remained 
untampered with, but for a short period until 1970. Until then, native leaders continued to 
successfully wade into whatever kind of conflicts that emerged between sedentary farmers and 
nomadic pastoralists.  By the 1970s and stretching forth into the 1980s, the region began 
experiencing the onset of some of its worse environmental downsides. Droughts and 
degradation began encroaching in on camel herders of northern Darfur and also on the 
homelands of the Zaghawa, precipitating mass migratory movements towards more habitable 
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lands. Unruh explains how despite emerging tides the Hakura systems adjusted to changing 
times. Successfully and peacefully migrants were accommodated on unused vast lands of 
indigenous tribes, pending when living conditions would have improved on their own 
homelands. 480 
 
As already mentioned, newcomers were under the obligation to remain subservient to the 
Native Administration of the host community without any right to affirm their presence. (For 
example, by way of claiming ownership to acquired land) However, it behoved traditional 
leaders in the midst of escalating ecological conditions to relax the stringent rules binding the 
land tenure system. Arriving groups were now allowed to choose leaders from amongst their 
own members to manage some of its internal affairs. That notwithstanding, the newcomers 
would remain accountable to the authority of the host community’s tribal leadership. The 
jurisdiction of leaders referred to as the Sheikh Anfar were moderate when compared to the 
powers of the Sheikh Al-Ard (Sheikh of land). These native leaders wielded such powers over 
land as well. The Sheikh Anfar (Sheikh of people) was in contrast, constrained to jurisdiction 
over people. 481 As a matter of fact, the Sheikh of the people continued to act in support of the 
land Sheikhs to effectuate a regulated system that now accommodated and made provision for 
both farmers and herders. To this extent, Native leaders continued to operate in their fullest 
capacity: mitigating conflicts and maintaining the law and order required for peaceful 
coexistence on the level of tribes and communities. Then came the breaking point. The 
assumption of office in 1970 of Sudan’s military administration headed by Jaafar Nimeiri can 
be viewed as a contributing factor to the deeply adversarial relations which now prevailed 
among existing tribes. In reality, such grassroot cleavages could not fall short of the description 
of interethnic confrontation, as that was exactly the manner in which events unfolded in the 
years that followed.  
 
The underlying tenets of the ‘Unregistered Land Act’ promulgated by the Nimeiri regime, 
apparently stood to oppose those of traditional land acquisition rights guiding the west of Sudan. 
This uncalculated step in effect, as well as measures adopted by the 1989 regime, precipitated 
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or legalized the overt expression of a hitherto seemingly deep-seated and unnoticed grievance 
nursed by the landless tribes of Darfur. This was to become one of those significant changes 
that ended up transforming Darfur negatively. Such debilitating factors undoubtedly fed into 
existing tensions aggravated by declining ecological conditions. The law was to be interpreted 
like this: ‘Henceforth, all land in Sudan belongs to the government, we render all forms of land 
acquisition and ownership null and void’. Newcomers who prior to this time remained within 
the confinements granted them, now began to capitalize on the new law to make legal claims 
to lands belonging to indigenous tribes. This was the resultant effect exactly. Land rights in 
Darfur regardless of the existing status quo essentially became subject to new laws, albeit 
without taking serious effect in places such as Darfur. 
 
The Unregistered land act was also accompanied by the abolishment of Darfur’s Native 
Authority. Unfortunately, it now became a thing of the past for the once reliable channel for 
conflict resolution to manage climax periods (specifically relating to land) at the grassroots. 
Native leaders were stripped of their usual powers. Their office of authority became 
undermined, and with it came chaos, anarchy, instability and insecurity to say the least. A state 
of complete lawlessness emerged, and of course, the onset of the ‘land grabbing 
discourse.’482By now, landless groups had begun to exhibit a preference for the statutory 
interpretation guiding land acquisition in Sudan, shunning thereby, all pre-existing traditional 
ownership arrangements.  
By the time the 1986 regime reinstated and legitimized the powers of the Native Administration, 
so much water had gone under the bridge. Subsequent efforts by the government to make 
appropriate amends, only proved to be inadequate. In fact, landless Arabs commenced the 
forceful occupation of the same lands granted them out of hospitality. For fear of losing more 
land to drought induced migrants and the likes, farmers initiated the closing of all animal 
passage routes hitherto accessible to herders. As tensions arose, discontentment on both sides 
of the farmer/ herder divide, even louder.  Indeed, the magnitude of the impending catastrophe 
was inconceivable. For some, the signs were comprehendible, -violent escalations were 
imminent.  The only obscurity lay in the inability to forecast actual timing. When the war 
erupted in 2003, some analysts insinuated a connection, at least in part, with issues of land and 
the scramble for depleting resources. While natives took up arms to safe guard their inheritance, 
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others became propelled by the government’s bait of land rights, to partake in a counter 
insurgency war that unleashed mayhem in the entire western region.  
 
The government backed militias also known as the Janjaweed unabatedly cleansed out entire 
villages. They perpetrated heinous atrocities in the hope that someday their landless status in 
the region would be overturned to assuage their growing need for land. This was a deviation 
from the status quo as precipitated by declining ecological conditions. Such increasingly 
unbearable climatic conditions by now, had begun compelling affected tribes such as the 
Zaghawa to push further south as well as embrace alternative sources of livelihoods for the sake 
of survival. It seemed also that previous administrations never took into serious cognizance the 
need for camel herding groups to become officially accommodated into a fairly regulated land-
owning system. Indeed, as time passed, and desertification began to take its toll, successive 
governments only overlooked the exigency to secure a permanent settlement for hitherto 
landless tribes.   Flint and De Waal describe how landless tribes survived decades on the basis 
of patchwork tribal arrangements dating back to colonial times. Poorly laid out tenets regarding 
leadership and land rights only amounted to periods of violent escalations.483  
 
By 2004 and stretching into 2005, what seemed like mere local tensions soon to be resolved, 
now elicited serious international concerns. The figures representing dead civilians increased 
with each passing day, while countless displaced persons began flooding the camps. These 
citizens of Darfur were expelled from their villages and forced to flee the venom of the 
Janjaweed militias. The Darfur Peace Agreement signed in May 2006 recognizes that land 
issues and depleting natural resources should be addressed in order to achieve sustainable peace 
for the region. Article 20 makes meaningful provision in the required direction. While 
paragraph 158 underscores the significance of traditional land ownership rights, paragraph 159 
draws attention to rectifying the discontentment not only of ‘displaced persons but also of ‘other 
persons arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived of rights to land’484. Apparently, this can be 
interpreted as referring to landless tribes as well, who by virtue of customary laws may not lay 
permanent claims to any land in Darfur.  
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The current situation sees a good number of “landholding tribes” occupying displacement 
camps, whose villages have been usurped by militant groups. Landless groups now craving 
land see no reason to relinquish the vast areas they have come to occupy since the onset of the 
war. Indeed, the expectations of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), almost a decade on, 
remains to be fulfilled. 485While the region continues to anticipate peace, the imperativeness of 
appeasing both discontented parties must be carefully considered, otherwise peace may 
continue to elude the region. Reflecting deeply, it seemed less strenuous for both rebel and 
Janjaweed leaders alike, to capitalize on underlying sentiments for the mobilization of 
membership in support of a course that putatively promised a better life for all enlisted 
sympathizers in the final analysis. This consideration stems from the fact that somewhat 
harmonious relations existed between Arabs and non-Arabs prior to the eruption of conflicts in 
2003, This fact indeed corroborates Azar’s stance on the manner in which identity groups tend 
to air their grievances collectively as a single voice against their perpetrators.  In many ways 
the Darfur experience stands to validate Azar’s insightful thesis on underlying factors that 
enable protracted conflicts to thrive. It is indeed correct to assert that:  
‘Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure 
to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for protracted social 
conflicts.486  
 
Accordingly, unaddressed grievances have the capacity to engender the ‘them’ and us 
dichotomy, especially within deeply divided societies where ethnic consciousness tends to 
resonate the loudest as in the context of Darfur.  
 
Suffice it to say also, that the war with the South overly engrossed the regimes in Khartoum. 
Under the circumstance, other internal issues were accorded diluted attention. The 
complications generated from across the Sudanese boarders in no time started to engulf its 
western region. I shall elaborate on this in developing chapters. As time passed, such problems 
only transmuted to levels that subsequently became too intransigent to tackle. In the light of 
what can be interpreted as a clear case of regional marginalization and negligence, it may not 
be wrong to stress that the reverse (with reference to the escalated conflicts of 2003) may have 
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played out, if successive regimes had considered the amicable settlement of land rights an issue 
of priority.  The enactment of progressive policies for example, geared towards the development 
of the region may have attracted diverse and alternative means of survival in the province of 
Darfur. Sudan’s western region may have surmounted the challenges of the trial years, 
regardless of the ravaging rage of the droughts.  This was not the case. In fact, all parties 
involved seem to be confronted with immense loss. Neither the armed movements who 
subsequently splintered into factions as the conflict progressed, nor the Janjaweed whose hopes 
were gradually dashed, recorded major headways in the directions initially anticipated. Darfur 
has remained on the level on which the entire drama unfolded. The dynamics of the conflicts 
continue to defy on-going efforts at peace. They blur all expectations for an end to what has 
become a conflict too intransigent to budge.  
 
In the next section, I shall examine the issue of political marginalization as precipitated by 
ethnic domination. It delineates within the Darfur context, those preconditions according to 
Azar, that may precipitate Protracted Social Conflicts especially in developing worlds.    
 
7.2.3 Governance and the State’s Role 
Azar’s thesis, enumerates those ‘human needs’, which are essential to the survival of a group. 
487 Security needs, acceptance and access needs are prioritized. The ‘access need’ is accorded 
specific attention with a targeted reference to either the satisfaction or deprivation of the rights 
of identity groups to participate or not in the political landscape of the state. This has been 
extensively discussed elsewhere.  Essentially, the satisfaction or the deprivation as the case may 
be, is the prerogative of state authorities. In this section, the focus is not on the “basic need,” 
but to investigate into the role of the Sudanese state with respect to its responsibility of equitable 
governance to all its citizens.  In this study, the ‘political authority’ under scrutiny, referred to 
as the state, is the leadership of the Sudanese state from the time of independence in 1956.  
 
The ideal Sudanese state going by Azar, should be characterized by a fair and just mode of 
governance. It should be able to satisfy human needs regardless of communal or identity 
cleavages. At the same time, it should exhibit the capacity to promote communal harmony and 
social stability. If this is not the case, the state as opined by Azar is prone to experience 
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protracted social conflict. Accordingly, the occurrence of prolonged conflict under such 
circumstance should be attributed to the governing mode of incompetent, parochial, fragile, and 
authoritarian (Sudanese) governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs’. 488 
 
The ‘incompetence’ and ‘fragility’ of the civilian administration in Sudan, occasioned the 
emergence in November 1958 of an authoritarian military regime. By 1965 the Sudanese state 
again reverted to civilian rule, only to be submerged into another round of military repression 
from the ‘parochial’ government that saw Jaafar al-Nimeiri at the helm of affairs. The regimes, 
both civilian and military alike, turned a blind eye to the development of its peripheries (with 
specific reference to the region under our radar of scrutiny: Darfur). Also, the governments of 
the day exhibited laxity and bias towards ‘promoting communal harmony and social stability’. 
The pursuit of strategic foreign policies perceived as being connected to polarizing ideologies 
originating from Libya, coupled with a demonstrated prejudiced perception of grassroot 
cleavages by the government in Khartoum, (notably as from the 1989) served to fuel an already 
precarious situation, one that eventually engulfed the region. Not only did the 1969 
administration of Nimeiri for example, abolish the ‘Native Administration’ which stood to 
preserve the region’s grassroot sanity to a reasonable level, it equally, not excluding other 
regimes, cultivated a politics of derailed international relations which as already mentioned got 
Darfur entangled in Chad’s political conflict.   
 
By providing a safe haven in Nyala for Chadian rebels under the leadership of Ibrahim Abatcha 
to found in 1966 the ‘Chad National Liberation Front’ (FROLINAT-Front de Liberation 
Nationale du Tchad) and by succumbing gradually to Gadhafi’s antics, who pursued a 
supremacist doctrine on the platform of ‘ The Arab Gathering’, Darfur regrettably plunged 
deeper and deeper into a complicated web of afflictions.489 At various times the political 
terrain of the Sudanese state was dominated by the governing elites of the riverine. (Bold 
for the sake of emphasis) What seemed to have exceeded ordinary comprehension nonetheless, 
was the region’s inability to secure tangible change in all its devastated sectors despite its 
unrelenting support to its own Umma party. The Umma party was formed in February 1945. It 
drew inspiration from the era of the Mahdist, a revolutionary movement that had emerged to 
oppose the repression that defined the days of the Turkiyya in Darfur.  In both 1958 and 1965, 
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Darfur’s Umma party was said to have gained considerable access to the state’s governing 
platform. While nineteen out of its twenty-two constituencies had been claimed by the party in 
1958, the 1965 elections also recorded a win with an emerging victory of 76 seats out of a total 
number of 173.490 Sadly, neither these victories nor its third victory in 1985 became 
consequential to the state of deterioration that had for long burdened the region. In fact, the 
1985 government of Al-Sadiq al-Mahidi further aggravated the rising instability in the west by 
keying into across boarder rifts inherited from its predecessor.   If Darfur was to suffer neglect 
even with representatives in government, then all hope was already lost by the time the next 
military coup of 1989 brought Omar al-Bashir into power.   
 
On assumption into power, it seemed the regime would adopt a policy different from its 
predecessors. What was to come only summarizes and validates Azar’s assertion on Protracted 
conflict prone societies. 
He states: 
‘Most protracted social conflict-laden countries are hardly neutral. In democratic societies, 
the state is an aggregate of individuals entrusted to govern effectively and to act as an impartial 
arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts. Empirically, however the world behaves 
differently. Political authority tends to be monopolized by a dominant identity group or a 
coalition of hegemonic groups’.   
 
Inter-tribal rivalry had always been part of a society whose configuration constituted both 
nomadic and sedentary life styles. Yet a vibrant tribal authority amid Darfur’s enormous 
challenges, sought in all respects to provide the region with order and stability.  When Bashir’s 
regime announced its arrival in 1989, a greater part of Darfur had been engulfed in lawlessness 
and turmoil owing to the mode of governance and the strategic interest of preceding 
administrations too weak and overly distracted to reinstall orderliness and stability.  
By now an Arab –Fur war had been underway. An undermined tribal authority only struggled 
to find voice in establishing peace among its respective constituencies and this amid a new era 
defined by gun violence. In the face of a dwindling tribal authority, a new regime headed by 
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Omar Bashir, waded into a heated Arab-Fur dispute, bringing to an astonishing halt an 
ideologically motivated ethnic cleavage. 491 
 
This outstanding achievement by the government projected new hope for a region already 
plunging deeper into precarious security. However, when the new government revealed its true 
nature by carrying over its predecessor’s policy of political and economic marginalization, 
(which Daly refers to as ‘internal colonization’) it fed into the narrative that captured underlying 
causes of the Darfur conflict as from 2003. It turned out that the major allegation levelled 
against the 1989 regime had been, as culled from Azar’s assertion, its inability to act as the 
‘impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts’ in Darfur. In alliance with an 
ideology for Arab dominance the new regime demonstrated the incapacity to shun ideologically 
motivated racial sentiments. In like manner, it became evident that the responsibility to employ 
appropriate state apparatuses in the most urgent and sensible direction, was abandoned by the 
administration only to intensify the state of instability in Darfur.  
 
Darfur’s black African ethnic groups such as the Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa condemned 
the government’s interventionist role in inter-tribal rivalry since 1989 as ostensibly lacking in 
neutrality. An endless outcry against the regimes unflinching support for Arab groups (both 
militarily and otherwise) continued to fall on deaf ears, while slowly brewing deep indignations 
against the centre. At the slightest eruption of inter-tribal disputes ensuing predominantly over 
land and ownership rights, as well as other scarce resource, rival groups allegedly seized the 
advantage of government backing to annihilate, overpower and mesmerize non-Arab groups. 
Arab attacks on both the Masalit and Zaghawa in June and September of 1996 respectively, 
have been documented in this regard. This conflict culminated with a peace conference in 1997.  
Positive peace nonetheless had remained elusive to say the least. 492 
 
Flint and De Waal in their scholarship, recount how non-Arab groups in the event of such 
incessant government-backed attacks, began the mobilization of its members in self-defence 
and resistance against erstwhile neigbours who had now turned ‘foes’. Such circumstances had 
warranted the birthing of ‘rebel movements’. Darfur’s case began to gradually get out of hand. 
Local rivalry met with a renewed proliferation of weapons, a reignition of ideological 
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sentiments from the 1970s and a resuscitation of the issues from the Nimeiri regime surrounding 
the then enactment of ‘the unregistered land act’. Although by now the legitimacy of the native 
authority had been revived to a certain degree, its exclusive and customary authority thanks to 
the government, began to infiltrate into hands that hitherto possessed no traditional claims to 
power within the native administration hierarchical order. Observers without mincing words 
interpreted such tendencies as unabated efforts tailored towards the actualization of the 
regime’s vested interest in establishing an Islamic state 493  
  
This destabilizing agenda according to Prunier had begun translating into what he tagged the 
‘ethnic consciousness split’. It was a tactics deployed by so-called Arab elites in Khartoum to 
exploit the region for its own political aggrandizements: To float an ideologically motivated 
‘Arab Alliance’ backed by Libya. Once the need to tap into Darfur in fulfilment of this agenda 
arose, Darfur became a polarized region consisting of its own ‘Brothers’ and others termed 
‘Foes’- Arabs and Non-Arabs respectively.494  However when the moment came for the same 
leaders to assuage the ‘basic needs’ of the region, the story changed, - from a ploy to pit one 
race against the other for political gains, to that of an unwavering political agenda that 
demonstrated the continued perpetuation of political marginalization and injustices as 
perpetrated by the National Islamic Front (NIF).  Azar assertions in the light of underlying 
conditions for PSC went further to underscore what seem to be most conspicuous in the centre 
periphery narrative of the Darfur conflict. He states that: 
‘Political authority tends to be monopolized by a dominant identity group or a coalition 
of hegemonic groups.’495 
Small wonder that in the year 2000, when a group of anonymous intellectuals emerged with the 
‘Al-kitab al-aswad’ fondly known as the ‘Black Book’ it was to be perceived as the last straw 
that would break the camel’s back.  The conflict of 2003 as interpreted by many, became the 
overt expression of both prolonged economic deprivation and an accumulation of grievances 
captured in black and white in the pages of the ‘Black Book’. 
It was titled: The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan and was written in 
Arabic. For the purpose of this analysis, I rely on an article in English, published in the journal 
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of African National Affairs in 2003 by Abdullahi El-Tom, a renowned Sudanese scholar based 
in Ireland.496 
 
The Black Book 
The Black Book basically summarizes the political marginalization meted out on Sudan’s 
peripheries by its centre based in Khartoum. Special emphasis is placed on the experience of 
Sudan’s western region: Darfur. The book excludes the economic deprivation occasioned by 
the conservative policy of the colonial era. The main focus is the critical examination of the 
discourse on Darfur’s ‘internal colonization’ or most emphatically the perpetuation of political 
marginalization’ by a ‘dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups’ as 
presaged in Azar’s thesis.   
 
The controversial literature commences with stressing the inherent nature of the continued 
dominance of state authority by the regional North, since 1964. It names successive 
governments from civilian to military rule, those that have been presided over by a Northern 
leadership: Multi-party democracy (1964-69), Nimeiri regime) 1969-1985, Military 
Provisional Council (MPC) (1985-1986), second multi-party democracy (1986-1989), NIF/ 
National Salvation 1(NS1) (1989-1999) and National Salvation 2 (NS2) 1999-date. 497 While 
the Book does not deny the presence of marginalized ethnic groups within the north as well, it 
spares no words in identifying the major culprits in the act of political injustice. The Shaygia, 
the Jaalieen and the Danagla,498 are the three major ethnic groups in the north known to have 
steered the affairs of the Sudanese state from inception. This trend has remained static both at 
top most leadership and national ministerial levels, ostensibly creating a parallel between 
Azar’s reference to a coalition of hegemonic groups’ and the case of Sudan’s governing 
authority as it were.  According to Azar: 
‘Hegemonic groups tend to use the state as an instrument for maximizing their interests 
at the expense of others. In the protracted social conflict context, these groups have 
manifested in communal terms. …The means to satisfy basic needs are unevenly shared 
and the potential for protracted social conflict increases’     
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In fact, there is no gainsaying the fact that the state as dominated by the aforementioned trio, 
has persistently maximized its interests at the expense of others. A fact corroborated by data 
supplied in the Black Book. These hegemonic groups from the north have denied other regions 
of the Sudan access to that representative platform on which to satisfy its human needs. Indeed, 
this is indicative of a government as suggested by Azar without the capacity for ‘fair and 
successful governance’. While our focus here rests on the Darfur region, it must be noted that 
other regions have suffered the same fate albeit in lesser magnitude when compared to Darfur. 
The Book in similar vein highlights the proliferation of such exclusionary tendencies as exerted 
by the north, on the state’s legal system.  As translated by El-Tom, its authors aver that: 
“The leadership of the legal system at the level of the Minister for Justice and the 
Attorney General has been controlled by the executive powers, which are characterized 
by nepotism and discrimination among members of the nation.”499  
 It goes ahead to confirm this allegation by presenting in tabular form a regional representation 
at the top of Sudan’s post -independence legal system.500 
 
Region No. % 
North 8 67 
Eastern 0 0 
Central 3 33 
Southern 0 0 
Western 0 0 
  
From the table above, it is explicit that the northern region with a percentage of 67 and followed 
by the central with a percentage of 33, have dominated the legal system in the post-independent 
era of the Sudanese state. Other regions have recorded zero representation within the same 
period under examination.   
 
In a multi-ethnic society as the Sudan, its media as suggested by the Book, equally shares in 
the tainting of unjust practices and serves as a medium in the propagation of ideological 
sentiments originating from the racial coffers of the North. The Book specifically underscores 
the injustice of showcasing and promoting the culture of the northern region in a manner that 
depicts the Sudanese state as a homogenous entity. This notion is perceived to be in apparent 
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denial of an existing cultural diversity. An allegation its authors perceive as a stratagem in 
furtherance of its supremacist ideologies.  It accuses the centre of inequitable wealth 
distribution, traceable to the colonial era and re-emerging as a bad habit embraced by a 
government supposedly of the Sudanese people, by the Sudanese people and for all the 
Sudanese people. 
 
The 1989 regime has remained in power till date, consolidating on its ‘monopoly of power’, 
which as confirmed by Azar may be actualized by denying other groups access to political 
power. It is an accumulation of the centre’s atrocities officially since 1956 and exacerbated by 
the myriad of attendant factors already discussed that provoked in the Sudan, what Azar refers 
to as a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ that eventually culminated with the war of insurgency. In a 
concluding related assertion Azar attests: 
 
‘Such crisis exacerbates already existing competitive or conflictive situations, diminish 
the state’s ability to meet basic needs and lead to further developing crisis…   In most 
protracted social conflict-laden countries, policy capacity is limited by rigid or fragile 
authority structure, which prevents the state from responding to and meeting, the needs 
of various constituents. This happens because the state is often unable to insulate the 
decision-making machinery from political pressures of the dominant identity groups.’ 
 
 His statement apparently illuminates on the case of Sudan, but most ostensible alludes to the 
prevalence of a neo-patrimonial style of governance across sub-Saharan Africa since the end of 
the cold war and its attendant backlash on the continent as a result.   
 
7.2.4 International linkages  
‘International linkages’ is the last assumption underlying the ‘Genesis’ component identified 
by Azar as holding the capacity to engender protracted social conflict within the state. This last 
precondition from the author’s thesis, shall be examined as a concluding note in this section 
dedicated to investigating the most salient issues responsible for the implosion of Darfur in 
2003. 
A cursory assessment of Sudan’s foreign relations confirms that successive post-colonial 
regimes from around the late 1960s, exhibited strong inclinations towards regional geopolitics. 
In the crisis of legitimacy that haunted Chad barely six years into independence for example, 
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the Sudan was known to have played opposing dual roles: either as conspirator providing safe 
havens for Chadian rebel groups as mentioned elsewhere or as conflict mediator.  In like 
manner, the state became inundated with ambitious ideological motivations emanating from the 
Libyan state and its leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, shortly after he seized power in 1969. 
His obsession with creating an alliance with so called regional like minds and the strategies he 
employed for its actualization, projected him as a significant external actor in Darfur’s conflict. 
Analyst and experts on Darfur’s insurgency understand the erroneousness of divorcing these 
external conflict drivers from the narrative surrounding the conflict. 501  
 
Historical accounts reveal an apparent interference of stronger governments in the affairs of 
other governments: For example, Libya’s overzealous ambitions to unify and Arabize the 
region, translated into aggravated local tensions and an attack on Darfur’s economic 
vulnerability. In similar vein, Sudan’s conspiratory involvement with Chadian rebels unduly 
heightened insecurity amid existing challenges. A quick look at Azar’s conception of an extant 
connection between ‘international linkages’ and PSC, suggests that underlying determinants of 
protracted conflicts, do not emanate exclusively from internal drivers alone.  The dynamics of 
any protracted conflict may equally emerge from without, as suggested in the introductory 
summary of the Sudanese experience provided above. Azar’s postulations indicate two 
pathways towards a state’s susceptibility to PSC under the international linkages exacerbating 
factor: ‘economic dependency’ and the second, being a ‘political and military client 
relationships with stronger states’. Such parasitic relations with more economically vibrant 
states, ‘not only limits the authority of the state, but also distorts the pattern of economic 
development, and at the same time, impedes the satisfaction of security needs’ 502  
 
The second factor attests to a patron-client relationship between two states.  In this case, the 
client forfeits its autonomy and independence, in return for benefits.  This it does at the expense 
of the needs of its own citizens. The big question is, has ‘international linkage’ played any role 
in exacerbating tensions in Darfur in anyway at all? The answer is in the affirmative. Darfur 
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became a rear base for Chadian dissidents armed by Libya against repressive regimes as well 
as a recipient of the victims of the Sahelian drought. Previous regimes before Nimeiri 
purportedly forged good relations with Libya. When Nimeiri arrived in 1969 and coinciding 
with the accession of Gaddafi to power, cordial ties became severed. Nimeiri’s islamization 
policy could have provided the smooth path leading to Gaddafi’s ultimate agenda for the region. 
Nonetheless, Nimeiri was Pro-US. He relied on US aid and therefore withheld support. Ties 
with Libya during that regime could have been termed ‘cold’ more or less. However, 
subsequent regimes embraced Libya and all of the ideological baggage that accompanied it. 
   
Gaddafi’s global aspirations turned him into an enemy of the West.  He ostensibly became 
consumed with the desire to create a common ground on which his supremacist ideologies could 
blossom. His envisaged Arab unity coincided with the music of pan-Africanism also gradually 
gaining grounds around the late 1960s under Chad’s Tombalbaye.503 In 1972 the Libyan head 
founded the ‘Islamic legion’. It was the platform on which he intended both to actualize his 
ambition for a unified region as well as fight his self-acclaimed adversary: the Chadian dictator, 
who was both African and Christian. Gaddafi demonstrated his aggression against Chad by 
occupying the Aouzou strip. These harassments reverberated with racial undertones and were 
in line with his own ideological sentiments. Recruits into the ‘Islamic Legion’ included 
Bedouins from Mauritania to Sudan,504 as well as migrant workers.505  In furtherance of his 
mission, Gaddafi went on to establish the ‘Arab Gathering’ in Darfur.  According to Prunier ‘it 
was a militantly racist and pan- Arabist organization which stressed the Arab character of the 
province’.506  
 
In the meantime, war had begun to rage in neighbouring Chad. The rebellion had emanated 
from Chad’s predominantly Muslim north against a southern repressive government headed by 
Francois Tombalbaye. Both Libya and Sudan were in support of the resistance. Small wonder 
that Nyala, located in the southern part of Darfur, became the locus for the formation of 
FROLINAT (Front de Liberation de Nationale du Tchad) on the 22 of June 1966 and Libya, 
the preparation ground for insurgency against the regime. In fact, as earlier mentioned, Ibrahim 
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Abatcha, the hardliner against Tombalbaye’s government, allegedly received material support 
from Khartoum and was given political access to Chadian refugees in Darfur507  
 
When Nimeiri took over power in 1969, he continued in the same line of support for Chadian 
dissidents, this time in support of Hissen Habre’s Northern Army (Forces Armees Nationales 
Tchadiennes) also known as FANT (English: Chadian National Armed Forces) against the 
government of Goukouni Oueddei.  After Nimeiri was ousted from power, the Transitional 
Military Council and eventually the coalition civilian government which replaced him, not only 
revived ties with Libya, but also, Chadian insurgents continued to receive unabated assistance 
in the fight against a supposed illegitimate regime.  
  
Having garnered some historical insight, it is important not to get drowned in history but to sift 
out the analytical significance. Whether this was a matter of negligence or a mere display of 
the government’s inadequacy or probably a calculated move, Darfur became embroiled in 
activities and foreign policies of both Tripoli and Khartoum. The consequences these 
debilitating developments have engendered continue to hunt the region. There is no 
contravening the fact that Darfur’s case was gradually being amplified.  Darfur continued to be 
the pawn not only in Gaddafi’s games but also in those of successive regimes in Khartoum.   
Apparently, Libya was beginning to take advantage of Darfur’s economic vulnerability and the 
onslaught of the1985 famine in Darfur, to offer a soothing effect. Sadly, relief took the form of 
both the desired and the destructive. With the inflow of rebels and refugees: those fleeing the 
war in Chad and seeking to regroup against repression, came the proliferations of guns and light 
weapons.  Libya had seized every opportunity to arm aggrieved groups in furtherance of the 
war against Chad.  Guns became a new development in Darfur, one that gave fresh impetus to 
the conflict of 2003. The porous border and the resultant influx from across, accentuated the 
Arab factor already gaining momentum among Arab groups in Darfur. Thanks to Libya. 
Therefore, when Libya’s handshake with Khartoum began to go beyond the elbow, Darfur 
began reaping the consequences.  Khartoum deeply engrossed with the war in the south, 
financed by Tripoli, neither found any moral justification to forestall Libya’s destructive role 
in Darfur, nor was it capable of addressing the growing instability resulting from it.  In any case 
the security vacuum it engendered by nurturing such relations with Libya only validates Azar’s 
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assertion of a state’s inability under such circumstance, to provide any form of ‘security needs 
to its citizenry’. Sudan’s reliance on Libya’s military and economic assistance, serves to 
validate the claim that international linkages inadequately conducted contributes to the 
susceptibility of the state to Protracted Social Conflicts. In the same vein the dependency of a 
weaker state on the military strength of a stronger state, strips the weaker of its autonomy. In 
that way, obligation to its citizenry becomes compromised by a forced loyalty to the stronger 
state.      
  
 
Conclusion: 
It has been the task of this initial section, to examine to what extent Azar’s thesis on Protracted 
Social Conflicts serves as a framework for understanding the preconditions that underlie the 
Darfur conflict.  All of the stated preconditions undergirding the ‘Genesis’ component as 
expounded by the author cannot be validated within the Darfur context. However, the human 
needs factor with respect to the conflict over land, triggered by discontent from landless tribes, 
as well as the political dominance of specific groups by elites to north of Sudan, as evidenced 
by the Black Book strongly align with the Darfur case. Similarly, in demonstrating the 
consanguinity between Libya and the Sudan at one point and the ostensible role played by 
Libya’s Gaddafi in exacerbating precarious conditions on ground Darfur, (which served as a 
trade-off for her military support to the Sudan), Azar’s reflections on international linkage have 
undoubtedly found validation. Indeed, the Darfur case exposes the impact of an external actor 
like Libya. Darfur’s communal content nonetheless, may not be delineated as the product of 
colonial construction. The case of a divide and rule bequeathed to the independent state of 
Sudan, as a legacy, becomes irrelevant to understanding Darfur predicaments. The 
commendable accomplishment of empowering local leaders served to preserve the stability of 
the region. Nonetheless, poverty, inequality and marginalisation abide as grievances of the 
periphery, which informed and fuelled the outburst of conflict in 2003.         
 
7. 3 International Intervention: An analysis of methods, tools and actors 
Introduction. 
In chapter three precisely, this study examined theoretical underpinnings, actors and tools 
associated with both the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution. The chapter 
delineated the essence of track I and track II diplomacy in conflicts of the 21 century and shed 
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light on the significance of attendant actors in internal conflicts of the sub-Saharan region. 
Formal mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement were identified as consistent 
approaches within the rubric of the field of conflict management or state centric strategies. 
Informal mediation, controlled communication and problem-solving workshops recognisably 
found relevance as strategies of the field of conflict resolution. It became evident in that chapter, 
that in contrast to the techniques of conflict management, the conflict resolution field pursues 
a more people to people dialogue defined approach to peace. Yet as suggested by the salient 
underlying notions and principles of the school of conflict transformation examined in chapter 
four, inadequacies do abound. It is against this backdrop that this section seeks to delve into an 
analysis of approaches, methods and instruments, those that have found utility in the 
longstanding search for peace to Darfur’s conflict. 
 
7. 3. 1 The crux of this section: 
This sub-section of the seventh chapter, as captured in the sub-title above, examines the third-
party response, both track I and track II, to Darfur’s on-going conflict from 2003 till 2014. The 
basic focus of this section is to provide the reader with concise insight into the international 
community’s approach, tools as well as the strategies to sustainable peace in Sudan’s western 
region. State centric intervention kick started by Chad’s Idriss Derby and concluded in Doha 
with the DDPD, is examined to understand how effectively or not, informal mediation has 
contributed to stable peace in Darfur. I intend to establish whether the deployment of troops to 
the conflict terrain provided an opening to sustainable peace in Darfur? Have both strategies 
made headway in the desired direction of sustainable and durable peace? Has PSW contributed 
to the long search for peace in Darfur? If in the affirmative, to what extent?  How have the 
principles guiding these approaches to peace impacted (negatively or positively) on the entire 
process of peace in Darfur? In the concluding part of chapter three, the study argued that there 
seems to be a large vacuum created by both fields. Does this hold true for the case of Darfur? 
The knowledge of the entire process towards sustainable peace has become and continues to be 
the preoccupation of scholars in the quest for greater knowledge. It is on the scholarship of 
seasoned authors and experts on Darfur’s conflict resolution trajectory, that this thesis seeks an 
analysis of methods applied to Darfur. Those in consonance with the conflict management and 
resolution framework for intervention in international conflicts. 
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7. 3. 2 Darfur implodes with a war of insurgency: A brief Historical background 
It is not the aim of this thesis to concentrate on the conflict in Darfur. The purpose as mentioned 
elsewhere is to delve into an analysis of the intervention strategies of the international 
community in their search for durable peace in Darfur. Other sections in this chapter have 
threated relevant aspects of the conflict in line with the primary objective of the thesis. (Please 
see chapter 7.2 for details) A brief history nonetheless suffices at this juncture. 
 
Two major armed groups were observed to be at the forefront in what was ostensibly a rebellion 
against the Government of Sudan (GoS).  Both the Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army 
formerly going by the name: Darfur Liberation Front and the alleged mastermind behind the 
Black Book,508 the Justice and Equity Movement, took up arms to fight a course that both 
aggrieved parties assumed was capable of engendering a turning point from prolonged years of 
political marginalization and economic deprivation. 
 
What has now prevailed for the fourteenth year and counting, commenced with attacks on 
government establishments by one of the two major mutinying groups. In February 2003, the 
SLM/A reportedly launched attacks on military posts in Gulu the capital of Jebel Marra 
province, killing 200 soldiers.509 A subsequent attack targeted the El- Fasher airport located in 
the capital of northern Darfur. Similar rebel outrage was recorded around both Kutum and Tiany 
leaving scores of soldiers dead.510 The GoS initially dismissing these eruptions of violence as 
mere local rivalry responded with counter attacks. In alliance with the Janjaweed (the Arab 
militia group, hitherto armed and supported by the government to ward off any form of threat 
from local non-Arab tribes) the GoS resorted to what it considered the best quick action. With 
aerial and landed counter attacks, the GoS sought to rapidly nip the violent outburst in its bud.511  
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While the two elephants fought, the grass suffered. A huge humanitarian crisis promptly 
emerged. Thousands were displaced and many more lost their lives. And while the international 
community at this time, seemed too engrossed in matters concerning the southern part of the 
country (by now the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) responsible for halting the war 
between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the GoS was in the making in 
Naivasha Kenya.) Time was of the essence. An urgent intervention to intercept the emerging 
carnage sweeping rapidly through the western part of Sudan became imperative.   
 
7. 3. 3 Mediating the Darfur conflict: The Chadian response  
Intervention to douse escalating tensions initially emerged from Chad under president Idriss 
Derby. Talks centred on achieving a ceasefire, and on the provision of humanitarian assistance 
for the victims of the war.  Derby’s efforts eventually produced the signing by both belligerents 
of the Abeche Agreement on September 3. 2003.  The GoS and the SLM/A consented to a forty-
five-day truce. This was notably the most significant outcome of that Agreement. However, as 
observed by Iyob and Khadiagala, hostilities resumed almost immediately, rendering the 
agreement null and void. 512 Toga also observed that the agreement proved inadequate in 
hindering the Janjaweed’s relentless outrage on civilians identified by the militias as 
sympathizers with the SLM/ A or JEM 513. Nonetheless to some extent fighting tended to 
decrease between the parties. Whether the Chadian president acted out of the necessity to halt 
the spill over effect from the war into neighbouring countries such as his, or whether his efforts 
stemmed from a mere humanitarian concern or not, his initial actions however minute, was a 
welcomed move which attracted subsequent and even higher levels of intervention.   
 
The Ndjamena Ceasefire Agreement 
By March 23. 2004, renewed mediatory efforts had been underway.  Idriss Derby of Chad was 
still the mastermind, hosting what eventually birthed the ‘Ndjamena Ceasefire Agreement.’ By 
now mediatory meetings had become more advanced and were holding in conjunction with the 
African Union. Pitswane noted an added leverage to the peace process with the official 
involvement of the AU.  The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had reviewed the body’s 
guiding tenets of ‘non-interference’ to adopt a principle of ‘non- indifference’. Now 
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metamorphosed and rechristened, the AU seemed poised and ready to embrace the challenge 
from new organisational perspectives, which included the notion of seeking ‘African Solutions 
to African Problems’.  It was Mali’s erstwhile president Alpha Konare, who would take on the 
mantle of the new AU leadership, as its first Chairperson. According to Flint and De Waal, 
Konare’s antecedence seemed to make him capable for what lay ahead.514  Hamid Elgabid, a 
former prime minister of Niger was appointed to lead the AU mediation team to the talks in 
Ndjamena.  A Nigerian Ambassador-Sam Ibok replaced him few months later, owing to an 
unsuccessful outing.515  Despite AU internal reshufflings and a noticeable reluctance on the 
part of the GoS to negotiate terms with the rebel groups, a ‘Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
on Darfur’ emerged on the April 8, 2004, albeit with some pressure from AU’s Alpha Konare 
on Sudan’s Omar Bashir. Bashir who had strongly opposed the presence of the larger 
international community at the meetings, previously assured, that the Darfur issue was in good 
hands.  Darfur, he insisted was merely facing internal challenges not necessitating international 
intervention beyond already existing consultations with Chad’s Derby, as well as the watchful 
eyes of the AU.516   
 
The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement made certain provisions, which included: the cessation 
of hostilities, the creation of an unhampered path for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the 
release of prisoners of war. 517 Most significantly it produced the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS)/ Ceasefire Commission. Flint and De Waal re-echoing Konare, noted the 
significance of the body’s physical presence. Konare equally enlightened on the limitation of 
partaking in the mediatory talks alone. It was also pertinent to set initial precedence in Darfur 
(in line with its renewed humanitarian vision on intervention in Africa) by deploying forces to 
the troubled Sudanese region. On that account and in line with the outcome of an AU Peace 
and Security meeting held on May 25, 2004, boots were deployed on the grounds of Darfur, for 
the first time since the commencement of the war.518 The Ceasefire Commission as it was 
tagged, initially consisted of 120 military observers and 350 troops. In classical peacekeeping 
fashion these deployments were to be restricted to the monitoring of the ‘Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement’. Their duty was to give protection to the members of the Ceasefire 
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Commission and not to the dying victims of war. 519 The Ndjamena Agreement seemed to have 
yielded some fruit. After all the AU was now present on ground. Toga observed nonetheless 
that the entire process was unfortunately compromised. The Agreement was purportedly 
tampered with and allegedly so, with knowledge of the Chadian prime minister.520 The GoS 
was to benefit from this major alteration: An extra sentence had been included to the 6th 
paragraph of the document. It read as follows:  
‘The Sudanese government shall commit itself to neutralise the armed militia, the forces 
of the armed opposition should be assembled in clearly defined sites.521  
This singular display of knavery might have allowed the rebels the audacity to discredit the 
entire process.  Flint and De Waal termed the document ’fatally flawed’. Noting impediments 
cited by deployed military personnel, those with the capacity to militate against accomplishing 
the Commission’s mandated task. 522 
 
In similar vein, Pitswanne affirms the failure of the Ndjamena Agreement as well as the 
emergent Ceasefire Commission. He maintains that this was traceable to the myriad of 
challenges encountered during the process, after the signing and in the operationalization phase.  
Among them: the document’s insufficiency in providing a balanced measure for addressing the 
violence emanating from both parties. It must be noted that both adversaries had been involved 
in attacks and reprisal attacks which left citizens at the receiving end of the entire aggression. 
Similarly, when the document accentuated on the disarmament and cantonment of the rebel 
groups and turned a blind eye to ensuring the same became applicable to the government backed 
Janjaweed, it raised questions on the credibility of that statement.  Furthermore, the supposed 
neutrality of the Chadian president was at some point called to question.  There had been initial 
contentions on the rebel side, over Derby’s capacity to assume the role of an impartial mediator 
going by the political friendship that existed between him and Sudan’s Omar Bashir. Khartoum 
had years back, backed the Chadian leaders’ political ambition from on ground Darfur.  At the 
same time Derby remains ethnically affiliated with the Zaghawa group in Darfur. The Zaghawa 
have been the main targets of the Janjaweed violence. The group is ably represented in both 
SLM/ A as well as in the JEM leadership. Derby was therefore viewed as a loyalist of both 
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Khartoum and the JEM movement. It is on account of this that Slim argues that ‘the Chadian 
process lacked the political leverage necessary to give talks credibility and weight’523 
 
In a nutshell, the process was perceived to have assumed an asymmetrical posture. On the one 
hand, the rebels pushed for maximum international presence in order to expose the atrocities 
perpetrated by the government and its agents. On the other hand, the GoS concentrated on 
propaganda directed at thwarting all efforts to beef up security.524 De Waal noted that the GoS 
succumbed to pressure coming from the UN Security Council to acquiesce in an increase to the 
inadequate number of troops on ground in Darfur. The government already declined the 
proposal for extra 3,500 troops, to augment the already scanty deployment of 300.525 The 
deployed observer mission as was the case, became confronted with challenges that militated 
against the task of achieving its mandate. The scant resources and Darfur’s huge landmass too 
insurmountable, superseded the capacity of the meagre troops (135 military observers and 310 
AMIS soldiers) deployed to monitor the ceasefire. Although the size of troops later increased, 
this initial predicament posed a huge challenge to the entire exercise. It seemed like the mission 
was close to ending in a futile venture. 526 Neither party adhered to the signed accord. Tensions 
escalated, leaving innocent citizens at the worse end of the spectrum. Even when the boots on 
the ground more than doubled its initial size, it translated to minimal progress on the safety of 
civilian lives. According to Iyob and Khadiagala, ‘At Khartoum’s insistence, AMIS increased 
its numbers without changing its mandate’.527 
  
Mediatory Talks: A restart in Addis Ababa 
While the fighting showed no signs of abating, AU leaders also relentlessly pushed for renewed 
avenues for political solutions.  The first of the seven rounds of political dialogues (The Inter-
Sudanese Peace Talks) had commenced, this time in Addis Ababa. Both adversaries amidst 
vehement recriminations, nonetheless made some effort to remain focused on stating the 
conditions under which further talks would be considered plausible.  The GoS emphasised 
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majorly on neutralising rebel groups and in addition, ensure their cantonment. However, the 
GoS equally signalled a vested interest in increased humanitarian assistance, as well as the 
repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The rebels on their part 
assertively demanded that the GoS, ensures among other things: the disarmament of its 
Janjaweed agents, discontinue aggression on civilian lives as well as consent to the unhindered 
passage of humanitarian relief. 528 According to Daly, the GoS insistence on a humanitarian 
action going by its antecedence since the eruption of the war, was a mere charade, to be taken 
with a pinch of salt529. In reality the GoS, did all it could to close all avenues through which 
humanitarian aid could reach the victims of that war. 
 
7.3.4 …from the talks to the signing: Examining the Abuja mediation, 2004-2006 
It is pertinent at this juncture, to note that most analysts have viewed the Abuja process as the 
main mediation process associated with the Darfur conflict. It is the case because mediators 
engaged both parties in talks that led to the signing of Darfur’s first Peace Agreement. Although 
the emergence of a Peace Agreement failed to translate to the much envisaged “peace” in 
Darfur-neither negative nor positive. The process nonetheless, is noteworthy since it 
corroborates and sheds light on the employment of ‘official mediation’ as a strategy underlying 
the field of conflict management. The chapter makes evident: Who was involved? How it was 
conducted? As well as examines whether or not the adoption of official mediation satisfactorily 
doused violent tensions in Darfur?    
 
By the 23, August 2004 the talks had moved from the Addis Ababa to Nigeria’s capital city 
Abuja. They were presided over by the then Nigerian incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo, 
who by now chaired the AU. Until December 21, 2004, when the fourth round of Inter-
Sudanese Peace Talks were ending for the year, not much had been achieved either on paper or 
on ground in Darfur. Deliberations had continued to focus at the insistence of the parties on 
humanitarian and security issues. 530At other times the pendulum of discussions swayed to 
political matters. De Waal observed that once discussions tended to focus more closely on 
security and humanitarian issues, it seemed to play to the advantage of the GoS, who would 
rather circumvent any path towards a political resolution. This ultimately disadvantaged the 
rebels. Although issues of security were also paramount for the rebels, the author noted the 
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significance attached to channelling discussions in the direction of unearthing the conflicts root 
causes.531 Security situation on ground was yet to improve and attacks on civilian lives 
continued unabated. It therefore became exceedingly crucial for the mediation team to persuade 
both parties to agree on adhering to a cessation of hostilities. To this end discussions 
commenced towards achieving a draft protocol on security matters in Darfur. While the GoS 
pushed for the rebels to comply by the rules and guidelines necessary for its self-disarmament 
under the supervision of AMIS, the rebel groups insisted on the imperativeness of a ‘no fly 
zone’ and the disarmament of the Janjaweed via a more reliable platform other than the GoS. 
532By now, the UN Security Council had passed the resolution 1556 on 30 July 2004. This 
pressed on the GoS, to halt all military attacks on unarmed civilians as well as to adhere to the 
demand for discontinued obstruction of humanitarian relief. Furthermore, the GoS was advised 
to disarm its agents (the Janjaweed) and bring to book all perpetrators of human rights 
atrocities.533  
 
The Declaration of Principles 
While consultations were underway, it became significant on the team’s agenda to map out a 
trajectory towards realizing a ‘comprehensive political settlement’.  Both parties were thus 
persuaded to commit to what the team referred to as a ‘Declaration of Principles’ (DOP). This 
document was to contain an outline of statements (by the GoS and the two rebel groups). The 
statements were to be developed and deliberated upon in order to lay the groundwork for further 
negotiation. The contents of the DOP would then serve as guideline in resolving matters 
pertaining majorly to power and wealth sharing. 534 The GoS made its position clear: it was in 
support both of a decentralized system and an equitable distribution of the country’s wealth. 
The rebel groups wanted inter alia an end to the prolonged marginalization of the region, the 
reconstruction of Darfur and compensation for accrued damages. The mediation team also 
became constantly confronted with obstacles. One major challenge was getting parties to reach 
a compromise on the contents of the ‘DOP’. For example, the issue of whether or not it was 
paramount to include a ‘no fly zone’ kept arising. For the rebels, this was of high priority 
especially considering the safety of the civilians on ground. With a signed consent on 9 
November 2004, the GoS eventually accepted inter alia to honour the ‘no fly zone’ proposal by 
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the rebels. Nonetheless it failed to match this written statement with appropriate action on the 
ground.  During the same period, it launched attacks on civilians at the El Geer refugee camp 
in southern Darfur, precisely in Nyala and on rebel strongholds. This action promptly nullified 
the potency of the November agreement. 535 
 
The Libyan initiative 
In between the Abuja peace talks, Colonel Gaddafi also made some attempts at mediating the 
Darfur crisis. This peace initiative however assumed a different posture from the proceedings 
in Abuja. The Gaddafi initiative drew to its dialogue sessions a delegation not consisting of 
leaders of both rebel groups already participating in the Abuja talks.  Although a subsequent 
intervention effort from Libya notably summoned the presence of both SLM/ A and JEM, the 
initial attempt in October 2004 consisted of tribal leaders. Darfur’s indigenous rulers notably 
focused on resolving inter-ethnic rivalries at the grassroot level. The dialogue session was 
tagged the ‘Darfur Tribes Initiative’. It centred mainly on peripheral matters. The meeting 
among other things saw tribal leaders remain resolute on preserving the old system of 
landownership rights known as the Hakura system. .536  
 
For this analysis, it is important to sift out unnecessary information and proceed to the fifth 
round of talks as was convened from 10 June till July 5, 2005. This round tends to represent the 
most decisive path leading to the eventual signing of the peace agreement.  Dr. Salim Ahmed 
Salim headed the mediation team on further talks aimed at brokering a peaceful settlement 
between both parties.  Despite hard haggling and controversy over the role of both Chad and 
Eritrea in the peace talks, (recriminations ensued between the GoS and the rebels over the 
purported bias of Chad and Eritrea, who supposedly sided the GoS and the rebel groups 
respectively) it became possible in this fifth round of talks, to conclude deliberations over the 
terms of the DOP. On precisely 5, July 2005, both adversaries signed the DOP. Some very 
tough points had been tabled for deliberation. The issue of landownership rights for example, 
known to be among the key elements underlying the Darfur conflict, became a highly 
controversial topic for debate. Discussions in this phase reached a troubling crescendo. At one 
point, mediators found it extremely challenging to persuade both rebel groups to accession.  
They insisted that their demands to solidify security in Darfur be attended to with utmost 
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urgency. The intervention from the international community and some prominent African 
leaders had been timely; else the entire proceeding may have ended without achieving any 
significant milestone.  One very positive outcome nonetheless was the provision to create the 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. A forum intended to draw a pool of stakeholders 
together, whose major purpose will be to dialogue and sketch out a way forward for the entire 
Darfur region. 537     
 
Abuja talks: The seventh round 
Why is it necessary to proceed from the fifth round of talks onto the seventh round of the Abuja 
discussions? The seventh round as it were, constituted the final stages of the mediation process 
but also vividly portrays the international community’s adopted tactics towards accomplishing 
the DPA on behalf of peace in Darfur. It is important, before delving into extracting the main 
argument from the Abuja mediation process, to comment on the internal friction that emerged 
between the rebel groups. These divisions tended play to the detriment of the movements in the 
final analysis. As commentators observe, the polarity may have militated against the 
achievement of the desired mediation outcome. 
 
Internal cleavages within the ranks of the SLM/A leaders, hitherto latent in nature and posing 
yet no threat to the mediation process, had begun to escalate. So as to avert the negative impact 
these divisions may exert on the process, the AU and the international community promptly 
commenced mitigating the ensued power tussle between SLM/A Abdel Wahid and his 
counterpart Minni Minawi.  While this task became time consuming, it was pertinent to attempt 
an amicable resolution in order to secure the smooth running of the re-launched talks. By the 
time the seventh round of talks were fully underway, Minawi had assumed leadership of the 
SLM/A.  This development as Toga538 noted, became an incontestable bitter pill for Abdel 
Wahid-the erstwhile chairman of the SLM/A, to digest. Mediators were left with no option than 
to manage two factions of the SLM/A. It is significant to note, how in the last round debilitating 
factors such as these weighed heavily on the mediators and the process alike. This predicament 
compelled mediators to seek the most viable party to forge ahead with.  
 
At that point in time realities on the battlefield had reinforced the notion that SLM/MM wielded 
greater military strength on ground in Darfur. His group members were equally less inclined to 
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internal rifts. That been the case regardless, it was also a known fact that Abdel Wahid’s Fur 
population constituted the majority in the IDP camps and outweighed SLM-MM’s faction in 
terms of numerical strength. AU mediators nonetheless perceived the prospects of creating 
alignments with that group which possessed greater influence on the deteriorating level of 
security on ground. 539  
 
The lack of internal cohesion on the part of the SLM and the gradual resonance of Abdel Wahid 
(Fur) and Minawi’s (Zaghawa) ethnic affiliations ostensibly fed negatively into the group’s 
capacity to declare its position as a united front. Brook affirms that the split ‘altered the 
negotiating dynamics of the mediatory talks.’540 Nathan also noted how difficult it became for 
the talks to progress hitch free. Not only did the climate around both factions become 
characterized by mistrust, the fragmentation elicited a discernible fear among the 
fractionalized groups who perceived that the split could be capitalized on and used as a 
manipulating tool by both the mediators and the GoS representatives against them and their 
power to negotiate in unison.541 But while the AU mediators envisaged higher benefits in 
dealing with Minawi, the GoS representatives, as analyst opine, anticipated a deal with 
SLM/AW for his membership base. In the eyes of Khartoum SLM/AW held strong prospects 
for the elections that were to hold three years later in 2009.542  
 
The seventh round also became exceedingly challenging for the mediators, because of the 
intricacies of arriving at a compromise on the subject of power and wealth sharing as presented 
for deliberations by the respective commissions. Neither the GoS nor the rebel groups conceded 
to shifting its stance on issues perceived to be hard-core. In the area of power sharing for 
example, the GoS found it quite an onerous task conceding to the rebel’s demands for 
meaningful representation in government. On the part of the movements, the call to equity and 
fairness in the allocation of power was based on the argument that Darfurians constituted two-
fifths of the entire nation’s population, and therefore deserved justice in that regard. Under the 
rubric of wealth sharing, the GoS would resist the rebels longing for recompense to the victims 
of the conflict. Further recommendations to alleviate the security tensions on ground, pointed 
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to adopting an Enhanced Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.543 Both parties (the rebels and 
the GoS) continued to contravene agreements tailored towards halting the aggression. Rebel 
cleavages had become exceedingly prominent, while the mediation process on its part, scarcely 
made any headway. By now, the prolongation of the talks had begun to beget frustration on the 
part of the AU leadership. Worse still, international donors also threatened to withdraw 
financial support.544 These unsettling scenarios may have compelled the organization’s next 
line of the action.  
 
At this juncture, it is important to pay attention to the significance of this ‘next line of action’ 
by the AU and its international allies.  It specifically accentuates the impact engendered (by 
this new tactics) on the mediators, the parties at the mediating table and the final outcome of 
the mediation process. Analysts view this final development as most decisive in the seventh 
round of the Abuja talks. 545 
 
Adopting a new mediation strategy (The last days) 
 
The AU’s Peace and Security Council in conjunction with the UN Security Council would on 
account of the previously mentioned reasons, settle for the ‘deadline tactics. To its initiators 
this change in operational tactics felt like the most feasible approach towards a positive 
settlement. The deadline strategy aimed at fast tracking the entire process. The idea was to 
pressurize parties into a final compromise and dissuade a foot- dragging attitude. Flint and De 
Waal noted that after series of unachieved deadlines a deadline for April 30, 2006 was 
announced. This action was thought to be germane to the envisaged entrance of UN troops into 
the conflict zone, especially since the impact of AU boots on the ground had begun to prove 
inadequate to the security demands in Darfur. As the chapter progresses a critical examination 
of the modified strategy reveals whether or not a viable and enduring solution was eventually 
achieved.   
  
The Abuja mediators had failed to meet up with previously set deadlines. However, when the 
final April 30 deadline was announced, it came with a compelling urgency on the mediators to 
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work towards finalising consultations. The mediation team ostensibly succumbing to growing 
pressures, commenced a compilation of all deliberated matters and then handed the parties a 
five-day ultimatum to digest its contents.546 Contingent on the final consent of all the parties 
involved in the consultations, the compilations should translate to the long-awaited Darfur 
Peace Agreement (DPA). Towards the end nonetheless, both sides expressed dissatisfaction at 
the level of compromise on a number of issues deliberated upon. Since the mediation team was 
intent on smoothening out these rough edges, an appeal for an extension of the deadline was 
requested.  The deadline was postponed for 48hours. Now in the final days of the deadline 
phase the pressure on the mediators to deliver on the much-awaited settlement intensified.  
Senior officials from the US and the UK: in the persons of Ambassador Robert Zoelick and 
Hilary Benn, the US Deputy Secretary of State and the British Secretary of State for 
Development respectively, had started arriving in Abuja. It seemed appropriate, since the 
presence of influential persons could prospectively inject positive energy into the process. The 
‘deadline diplomacy’ nonetheless, remained in use. It was considered a feasible trajectory in 
achieving the end goal: A Peace Agreement.547. Assessing this new development, Nathan 
opined that the distinct strategy proved counterproductive to the entire mediation process. 
Brooks also noted a deviation from a more viable and positive outcome oriented ‘resolving 
formula’ to an ‘agreeing formula.’ The process as it were, now progressed as founded on the 
bedrock of an international strategy. It prevailed on the parties to accept a final settlement deal 
by way of imposing it.548 Duursma further confirming these sharp adjustment of approach 
states: ‘The US mediation team attempted a breakthrough in negotiations by employing a 
strategy based on threats and rewards’…549   
In addition to adopting this stratagem, the international team would allegedly assure the rebels 
of the US’s unflinching support in the implementation of the DPA. Ostensibly, this was 
interpreted as bait targeting the rebels’ acquiescence and signatures.  Incentives would also go 
hand in hand threats against SLM/A’s Minni Minawi, who was also confronted with pressure 
to sign or face UN sanctions or ICC indictments in the event of a refusal to partake as a signatory 
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to the DPA. 550  Abdel Wahid would not yield to the mounting demands. Instead he bided for 
firmer assurances on issues of security and pressed for concrete guarantees with respect to the 
implementation of the DPA once signed. 551 Baltrop552 also observed that the exertion of 
‘diplomatic pressure’ on both adversaries yielded the desired fruit after all. Interestingly, five 
days into the month of May 2006, the Abuja talks birthed the Darfur Peace Agreement. 
 
In the end, the GoS representative Majzoub al Khalifa and the Minawi led faction of the SLM/A 
became the only signatories to the Agreement. The Abdel Wahid faction of the SLM/A and the 
leader of JEM expressed unresolved discontentment with provisions of the DPA and therefore 
declined to partake in the signing. Regardless of intensified persuasion in the aftermath of the 
signing on May 5, 2006 as well as additional days of grace from the May 15 to 31 to review 
their position and sign, both non-signatories remained insistent on the fulfilment of their 
respective conditions before cementing a final deal.553 The best offer from both non-signatories 
JEM and SLM/ AW was a declaration to support the DPA. Their signatures never appeared on 
the DPA itself. Meanwhile on ground in Darfur, the DPA met with zero acceptance, not the 
least among the IDPs by whose interpretation the DPA spelled bias and a purported prejudice 
toward the Zaghawa minority group.554 By now Minawi had gone ahead to embrace the GoS 
offer for a position in government. An action which was perceived as side tracking other 
factions and movements also represented in the Abuja talks.   
 
7.3.5 Continuing the Peace: From Abuja to Doha 
In the ensuing months after the signing of the DPA, continued efforts to resolve the conflict, 
saw the parties return to the negotiating table. From 2007 until 2008 peace talks were held 
between the GoS and the movements in Libya. A more robust intervention into the conflict in 
the form resembling the Abuja peace talks commenced in July 2009 under the joint efforts of 
AU, the UN and the government of Qatar in the Doha. It was referred to as the AU/ UN Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST).  Djibril Yipene Bassole, a diplomat from Burkina Faso 
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functioned as the joint Chief mediator. More than two weeks into Bassole’s appointment, AU 
leaders sought to broaden its intervention strategy by establishing a platform designed for 
detailed investigation into the region’s conflict. –The AU High panel on Darfur was created 
almost parallel to the renewed talks in Doha. It was charged with the responsibility of 
unravelling the most appropriate trajectory towards justice, peace and reconciliation in Darfur.  
Findings and recommendations were to be submitted to its mandating authority- the AU. The 
team adopted a distinctive intervention approach, which involved trips to Darfur to engage in 
dialogue like consultations with diverse groups at the grassroot level of society. By 2009 when 
the commission published its recommendations to the AU, it had embarked on more than three 
missions to the Sudan.555 It is such visits that afforded the team a glimpse into the suffering of 
the war’s direct recipients. The commission’s capacity to permeate the different categories of 
Darfur’s grassroot society was what differentiated its approach to peace from other forms of 
intervention hitherto employed.  Despite an envisaged complementarity between the Doha 
mediation and the AUPD’s (African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur), observers have been 
quick to identify some measure of competition between both mechanisms of intervention. 
556Nonetheless, the panel’s strategy without doubt, continues to be regarded as one of those 
forums, which presented Darfuri stakeholders with the rare privilege of being heard. The AU 
panel ostensibly embraced a bottom-up approach, when compared with the peace talks 
organised by the government of Qatar.  
 
Doha for example tended to replicate Abuja in some ways albeit with slight divergences.  The 
nature of proceedings never deviated from the usual top-level track I diplomacy involving the 
mediators, the GoS and its antagonists. The talks in Doha nonetheless, gleaned a lesson or two 
from the Abuja mediation. For example, Darfur’s civil society was hosted to three conferences 
in Doha. The mediation team allegedly claimed that a ‘unanimous endorsement’ of the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) had emerged from one of such assemblies in May 
2011.557 Analysts nonetheless, perceived foul play, criticising the efforts to showcase civil 
society as less substantial to the peace talks. Others have further denied the existence of any 
connection between Darfur’s traditional civil society, and that group of civil society represented 
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in Doha. Such allegations have been based on insinuations that the said group was a mere 
concoction of the government in Khartoum.558  
 
Furthermore, the configuration of rebel participation in the Doha talks mirrored one of the major 
concerns resulting from the signing of the DPA-the emergence of an array of splinter rebel 
movements. While one of Darfur’s main armed movements- JEM remained almost intact as a 
group, the name SLM had by now almost fizzled out of Darfur’s peace talks in Doha.  The 
significant roles nonetheless, played by Libya and the US in Addis Ababa to unify fractionalised 
Fur groups precipitated both the coordination among hitherto fragmented parties aligned with 
the SLM and the subsequent formation of an alliance movement called the (LJM) Liberation 
and Justice Movement. 559 It became one of the major negotiating parties in Qatar. Tijani Sese, 
a Fur indigene became the movement’s nominated leader.  Analysts suggest that his nomination 
was premeditated, bearing the concealed objective to secure huge membership from the Fur 
community. Nonetheless, the group comprising majorly Zaghawas and Arabs, appeared less 
attractive to the Furs 560.  
 
The Doha process was confronted with similar pressure from the international community- to 
produce results within a stipulated timeframe.  When compared with the talks in Abuja the 
exertion nonetheless was to a lesser degree.   Mediators made efforts to obviate the risk of 
compromising the entire process a second time over. Also, the question of imposing on the 
parties an outcome, which they seemed unprepared to consent to, constituted a non-option in 
Doha. In the light of this, mediators tended to improvise as much as the situation presented 
itself. For example, consultations developed gradually and contingent on the platform of a 
strategy referred to as ‘proximity mediation’. The technique, which allowed for documents to 
move back and forth from mediator to the negotiating parties, aimed at securing an agreement 
in the final analysis.561The mediators applied this method to circumvent the challenge of 
dragging the parties to the negotiating table.   
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Of major significance during Doha, was the signing of two agreement frameworks. The first 
agreement signed in February 2010, between JEM and the GoS, aimed at securing a cessation 
of hostilities between the signatories. The second agreement targeted the resolution of the 
conflict and was signed by both the GoS and LJM.  Despite all attempt by the JMST to avoid 
the same mistake made in Abuja, Doha in the final analysis proved to be no different from the 
Abuja negotiations. The JMST failed to secure the signatures of all the parties present at the 
Doha talks. Observers suggest that coupled with the sense of urgency injected into the process 
towards the end, the mediator’s incapacity to deliver as anticipated, may have resulted from the 
reappointment of the AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator Bassole as his country’s foreign minister. 
More so, South Sudan’s independence, which was only four days old, supposedly also served 
to divert the international community’s focus on Darfur. 562Whatever the case, the DDPD was 
eventually signed on 14. July 2011 between the Gos and LJM, albeit without JEM.  Going by 
the team’s chairperson-Bassole, the Doha process was to be referred to as a ‘document’.  As 
opposed to the appellation - ‘Agreement’ with which the DPA was identified, the ‘document’, 
instead of being treated as sealed and final as with the DPA, would allow non-signatories the 
chance to review their stance. The final agreement with LJM was described as partial and 
lacking in the capacity to translate to any form of stability on ground in Darfur. Six years have 
passed since the initial signing of the DDPD. Non-signatories to the document remain adamant 
towards joining the peace process. The DDPD which abounds as the framework for Darfur’s 
most anticipated peace, can only be described subtly as ‘work in progress’. In the eyes of 
Darfur’s displaced and refugees the DDPD is far from being a ‘work in progress’. Resentment 
towards the lack of implementation of the DDPD’s provision continues to mount four years on.  
As reported by Radio Dabanga563 in January 2015, the Doha Peace Accord has brought Darfur’s 
displaced and refugees even more suffering. In an interview, Adam Suleiman, the head of the 
Oure Cassoni refugee camp criticised the DDPD for its failure to fill the vacuum created by a 
long-lost peace and instability in the region. He lashed out at the leadership of LJM for 
“betraying and selling the Dafuris by signing this partial Doha agreement” and accused the 
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group of “participating with the Khartoum regime in the widespread crimes against the people 
of Darfur”.564 
 
7.3.6 Concluding reflections 
International mediation endures as one of the salient tools of conflict management. It has been 
applied to both interstate and intrastate conflicts of the 21st century. The utilisation of the 
approach in Darfur’s conflict was perceived therefore, to be in line with the international 
community’s state-centric blueprint for conflict resolution in war torn societies. The initial and 
subsequent response therefore, by Idriss Derby of Chad, the AU and the international 
community, to mediate Darfur’s conflict, underscores the persistent reliance on mediation as a 
top-down third party non-coercive approach to peace in conflict torn societies like Darfur. 
International mediation cannot be relegated to the past because it bears roots as a mechanism 
of conflict management associated with the era of interstate rivalry. The usage has therefore 
gained significance over time and specifically to societies beset by internal strife.  Having found 
applicability in civil wars, it may be important to fashion out ways in which this apparatus of 
conflict management can be made adaptive enough to engender sustainable peace in conflicts 
prevalent on the African soil. With respect to Darfur, the international community has failed to 
project the mediation strategy as a viable and effective tool for accomplishing the task of 
positive peace for the people of Darfur.   
 
Bercovitch echoing Ott in a most recent publication, states that ‘the success or failure of 
mediation is inter alia determined by the nature of the dispute’. ‘Parties in conflict weigh up 
certain issues and attach more relevance to some than others’ furthermore, ‘some issues will 
be seen by one or both parties as vital’565.  For the Darfur rebels, there was no compromising 
the issue of civilian protection and power sharing. The GoS on its part was resolute on 
neutralising the movements. However, since both parties especially the GoS would persistently 
violate ceasefire agreements, the issue of security became a tough compromise to make.  The 
process would as a result experience several deadlocks and intangible results. The several 
rounds of talks, the impasses and the boycotts from deliberations, are evidence enough to show 
that the Abuja talks were nothing short of hitch free. When pressure set in, based on the AU 
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and international community’s deadline diplomacy the process became jeopardised, forcing 
mediators to alter the natural course or the strategy hitherto applied to the mediation process.  
 
In chapter three of this work, I cited according to Touval and Zartmann,566 the procedures 
mediators are likely to adopt during a mediation process: communication, facilitation, 
formulation and manipulation. When applied to conflict mediation, they have the capacity to 
positively or negatively influence both the process and the conflict itself and in essence produce 
a failed or successful outcome. As such, a mediator may perceive within a unique context, 
higher prospects of achieving a positive outcome and therefore chooses to apply one strategy 
over another. On that note, a mediator may assume the role of either one or a combination of 
the following: communicator, facilitator, formulator or manipulator. According to Bercovitch, 
when mediators act as ‘go between’ merely making contacts with the parties, gaining the trust 
and confidence of the parties, arranging for interaction between the parties, identifying issues 
and interests, clarifying the situation and amongst others encouraging meaningful 
communication and developing a framework for understanding, they assume the role of 
communicators- Facilitators. When mediators inter alia structure agendas, deal with simple 
issues first, reduce tensions and establish protocols their role is conceived as ‘procedural - 
formulative’.567 The Abuja mediators initially adopted both strategies to varying degrees. They  
sought to maintain the tempo by way of persuasion at least up until the sixth round. It is no 
wonder therefore that the mediators recorded some positive outcome with the signing of the 
DOP, by all parties, in the fifth rounds of talks.  
 
The change in strategy in the final round of talks became the last straw to break the camel’s 
back. The fragile equilibrium maintained by the mediators had begun to corrode. In the seventh-
round mediators lost control of the process and began dancing to the piper’s tune. With very 
minimal input from the mediating team at this juncture, the baton moved to the hands of the 
AU authorities and their international partners.  Brooks noted that ‘while the AU mediators 
continued to attend meetings and served as experts on issues, the command of the negotiation 
had been passed to the international diplomats’568 who were now physically present in Abuja. 
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Once the baton changed hands, the new owners commenced with manipulating the process in 
the assumed ‘right’ direction, relying on threats, sanctions and inducements.  
 
Bercovitch and Mi Lee contend that the directive strategies (the authors term for manipulative 
strategies) constitute the highest and most powerful form of mediation. It gives the mediators 
the power to “affect the content and substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives 
for parties or issuing ultimatums’ aimed at changing the motivation and behaviour of the parties 
in dispute. However, when applied to a conflict situation, directive strategies “allow mediators 
to control the process and the substance of the conflict, albeit at the expense of the disputant’s 
freedom to control their own affairs”569.  The authors identify the use of Ultimatums as part of 
the strategy towards the achievement of the desired goal. They allude to this strategy as ‘most 
powerful’. The question is, what kind of results are yielded in the final analysis when applied 
to a case of protractedness like Darfur. The authors do not refer to the use of threats and 
sanctions as part of the instruments at play, when directive strategies are adopted.  Yet it is 
firmly assumed that in comparison with other mediator strategies, when directive strategies are 
utilized in international mediation they yield successful outcomes. 570Unfortunately, this 
strategy proved inappropriate to the Darfur case.  Deadlines, incentives and sanctions translated 
to nothing but the failed DPA and attendant consequences as a result.  
 
The officials from the United States and Britain sought to assuage the growing impatience of 
donor countries in the short term by applying the manipulation strategy in order to achieve a 
final settlement. Most ominously, this engendered the imposition of a final agreement and 
precipitated the withdrawal of the parties right to fully own the resolution process. The long-
term consequences of such undoing have lingered as a sour taste in the tongue of all affected 
by the conflict. In resolving the conflicts of our 21st century, essential ingredients of consensus, 
free volition and inclusion continue to be emphasised in peace process seeking sustainability. 
The Abuja mediation sacrificed these essentialities, compromised the chances for a 
comprehensive agreement and rendered that mediation process ineffective.  As aptly summed 
up by Nathan the conflicts prevalent in our 21st century world:  
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‘are not conducive to a viable quick accord. They have multiple historical, structural, 
political and economic causes that are complex, deep-rooted, and intractable. The 
difficulty of resolution is compounded greatly by the protagonists’ mutual hatred and 
suspicion. However, grave the situation, mediators have no option but to be patient.’571  
Although there have been subsequent attempts at mediating the Darfur crisis since 2006, the 
Abuja process is conceived as that singular mediation effort to have attracted ample attention 
and analysis from the international community, analysts and scholars alike.  
 
7.4 Applying the Problem-Solving Workshop (PSW) approach to Darfur’s conflict 
Scholars from the field of conflict resolution as examined in preceding chapters, may have 
identified the link between its Basic Human Need theory and the prolonged violence in Darfur. 
Ostensibly, the continued denial of the region’s most pressing needs: security, land ownership, 
recognition, political participation to the very basic means of survival: food, water clothing and 
shelter, is accountable for the conflict’s intractability and longevity. In a bid to diversify the 
options leading towards positive peace and also to identify the conflicts root causes, unearth 
such and seek the complete termination of Darfur’s conflict, scholars from the field of conflict 
resolution, contingent on one of its unique apparatuses for peace, delved into the peace process, 
to activate the scholar practitioner third party unofficial initiative for peace, as applied under 
circumstances of intractability. 
 
In the third chapter of this thesis I examined Problems Solving Workshops as a conflict 
resolution apparatus for intervention in protracted conflicts. (See section on controlled 
communication and interactive problem solving) The application of Problem-Solving 
Workshops to conflict, engender “changes in attitudes, perceptions, and ideas for resolving the 
conflict among the individual participants in a workshop” which are then transferred to the 
more official negotiation process572 In this section, I probe into the significance of PSW in the 
search for peace to the Darfur conflict. Since there is a paucity of documentation on the process 
and impact of Darfur’s Problem-Solving Workshop- dubbed the “Sudan Task Group” (STG), 
on the conflict, I will rely on the account from R. J Fisher titled “Acknowledging the Basic 
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Human Needs and adjusting the focus of the problem-solving workshop” 573published 2011, in 
a collection of essays. 
 
In both July 2009 and February 2011, a group of social scientists under the auspices of the 
School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR), at the George Mason University at the 
Arlington, Virginia campus, came together to facilitate a PSW in honour of the Darfur conflict. 
Both workshops were held at the University of Siena Italy, with major financial support drawn 
from the Italian Foreign Ministry. Attending the first workshop held in 2009 were 17 
participants.  These constituted representatives from the (Wahid, Shafi and Unity), the United 
Resistance Revolutionary Force Front, and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance.  Since after 
the signing of the DPA in 2006, several splinter groups emerged in pursuit of identifiable 
political views and a solidification of ethnic alliances.  The effect of such rebel fragmentation 
became manifest in the lack of cohesion among rebel parties at the negotiating table. This was 
evident in the Abuja process for example, when the initial divisions ensued within the 
hierarchies of the SLM/ A- Minawi and Wahid.  For Wahid, the security of the main targets of 
the war-the Fur, was paramount. Minawi was basically concerned with issues of power sharing. 
(See section on Abuja mediation). A divided front could not satisfactorily coordinate internally 
to produce harmonised views, against its opponent-the GoS. Disunity reduced the chances 
towards progressive deliberations between the negotiating parties and left divided groups 
susceptible to the pranks of the divide and rule antics that played out in the Abuja talks.  It was 
against this backdrop that the Sudan Task Group targeted Darfur’s splinter groups with the aim 
of: 
“Jointly analysing the nature of their grievances and the overall conflict, fostering coordination 
and cooperation among the movements… to seek unity of purpose in their negotiations with the 
GoS. In addition, the workshop sought to improve intergroup relationships among movements 
and renew channels of communication that had broken down during thee fractionation 
process” 574 
 
The workshop proceeded with an official plenary session facilitated by the organisers and 
unofficial smaller groups that were presided over by local leaders from Darfur, who possessed 
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good knowledge about the conflict and the various alliances of the rebel groups. The issues 
discussed in the smaller unofficial circles were subsequently presented before the more official 
sessions. The session produced a consensus accord stating proposals for the way forward in 
terms of coordination and cooperation between the splintered groups.  
 
Problem Solving Workshops develop and proceed as a non-binding arrangement organised by 
facilitators who do not wield any power to propose or impose on the proceeding.575 Sessions 
are therefore allowed to take its natural course in anticipation of positive outcomes and changes 
to the participants’ attitudes and perceptions.  In similar vein, on the basis of improved 
communications participants become capable of discerning mutually acceptable outcomes and 
other ways of achieving their objectives without having to bear the high cost of continued 
aggression.576 In the final analysis, such workshops become supplementary pre-negotiation 
sessions, which serve as transfers to more official processes for peace. 
 
Notably, transfers were made to the official mediation process in Doha.  Some of the 
workshop’s factions formed alliances that later transformed into the umbrella movement known 
as the Liberation and Justice Movement. The Liberation and Justice Movement became the 
only party in the Doha mediation to sign the Document for peace. (DDPD). The positive impact 
of the proceedings may have been discernible among the factions represented at the workshops. 
The outcome in the final analysis nonetheless missed the mark. The major rebel factions – 
Minawi, Wahid and JEM declined involvement with the signing of the document. The final 
outcome may have been expected, since there was no representation for the SLA and JEM 
factions in Siena.  
 
The second PSW workshop was organized in 2011. In contrast to the first, conveners arranged 
for participants to include representatives from Darfur’s civil society sector. Among the 
participants were members from non-governmental organisations and the academia. One of the 
reasons why the DPA was considered a failure was because it did not resonate with Darfur’s 
civil society. Darfuri’s conceived the DPA as an agreement that served the interests of the rebel 
movements, while neglecting theirs.577  Having identified the distrust and altered relation 
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existing between the rebel movements and Darfur’s civil society, it behoved the STG to 
facilitate direct discussions between “mid-level leaders from a combination of rebel 
movements” and “influential” representations from Darfur’s civil society. The objective was 
directed towards altering un-progressive perceptions of the conflict as well as attitudes formed 
in the process of peace.   
 
While the PSW on the Darfur conflict may not have recorded any direct impact on the conflict 
per se, such avenues have nonetheless presented the opportunity for scholars to critically 
analyse the conflict for which they have also garnered deeper insights. Scenarios as these have 
equally afforded the organisers fresh ideas to better contextualize workshops to adequately 
achieve the desired purpose. For example, Fisher noted that the first two workshops illuminated 
one of the major root causes underlying the Darfur conflict-land. It is such consciousness that 
has allowed for the STG to plan towards convening a third workshop, which will draw together 
a wide range of stakeholders for a forum to discuss several other issues underlying the conflict 
in Darfur.578    
 
7.5 Applying the peacekeeping approach to peace in Darfur 
Introduction 
In the previous section, I investigated into the use of mediation as a non-coercive means of 
delivering peace to the people of Darfur. This section examines another tool of conflict 
management applied to the Darfur conflict shortly after its eruption in 2003. My major 
preoccupation here is to probe into the effectiveness of realizing the quest for peace and stability 
in Darfur, based on a coercive (militarised) means of intervention as managed by the AU.  
 
Peacekeeping as I explored in the third chapter of this study, records a history of relevance as 
a mechanism for curbing aggression among the states of the international system. Since the 
prevalence of intra-state rivalry, military intervention has become equally relevant to managing 
the debilitating effects of violence in civil wars. As has been the case with a number of conflicts 
across sub-Saharan Africa, the Darfur conflict is one of those violent eruptions where the UN 
and its regional affiliates intervened with the sole aim of effectively dousing tensions and 
ensuring the safety of civilians at the risk of displacement and death, using military action.  
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In 2004 the world saw the AU promptly respond to the onslaught of violence in the Darfur 
region. Having evolved from the defunct OAU, the AU seemed revitalised and ready to take on 
the challenge of militarily tackling issues of violent eruption under its jurisdiction.  With 
recommendation from its newly instituted Peace Security Council, an observer mission to 
Sudan’s western region was authorised in 2004. It was called the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS). According to the constitution of the OAU, the body had no business interfering 
in the affairs of Sudan. The transformed body of the AU however made room for major 
adjustments to the OAU’s stance on matters of conflict among its members. Although the AU 
maintained adherence to the issue of ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of member states, acts of 
genocide and cases of crimes against humanity now became exceptions to that rule.579   
 
The ultimate decision to deploy boots on ground emerged from the signing on the April 8, 2004 
of a Humanitarian Ceasefire between the GoS and Darfur’s major rebel groups: SLM/A and 
JEM. The conflict had seen the prompt mediation effort of the Chadian president Idriss Deby.  
The onerous task became the AU’s second attempt at peacekeeping on a terrain of conflict. 
Observers may have too soon heaved a sigh of relief at the presence of the AU in Darfur. No 
sooner had AMIS I arrived than it became apparent that the AU peacekeeping experience in 
Burundi a year earlier was insufficient to replicate the achievements of ECOWAS in the 
conflicts of both Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
7.5.1 The tenets of peacekeeping and its impact on Darfur 
Some of the principles underlying the theory of traditional peacekeeping have been outlined in 
the third chapter of this thesis. These principles determine the conduct of peacekeepers in UN 
and regional deployments across the globe.  Some of such basic principles continue to include:  
(a) Taking cognisance of the consent of the host nation where the troops are to be deployed.   
(b) The maintenance of a neutral stance.  
(c) The use of force authorised only in instance of self-defence.   
 
The analysis in that chapter, disclosed some of the weak points associated with operationalizing 
these principles in real time conflict scenarios.  It drew the conclusion that traditional 
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peacekeeping viz a viz what we today refer to as Peace Support Operation (Peacekeeping with 
extended functions) continues to be a work in progress. The ethics of peacekeeping in most 
cases persistently obstructs the need to urgently and adequately attend to cases of complex 
humanitarian emergencies like have been evident in Darfur.   
 
Diehl’s definition of peacekeeping for example describes the activity in its traditional form, but 
also provides insight into what constituted the first major military response to Darfur’s conflict 
shortly after the signing in 2004 of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA). He states:  
“Peacekeeping is the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a 
cessation of armed hostilities and with the permission of the state on whose territory these 
forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an 
environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved”  
Indeed, the HCA though violated many times over, was intended to cease the hostilities between 
the GoS ’s proxy forces in Darfur also known as the Janjaweed, and the two major rebel groups.  
The peacemakers contemplated that once peace was achieved it would pave way for the warring 
parties to deliberate on the root causes of the conflict at the negotiating table in Addis Ababa. 
In pursuant of the signed truce, AMIS I came on board. Shortly after the authorisation from the 
AU’s Peace and Security Council, Darfur witnessed, in 2004, the deployment of 120 military 
observers to monitor the truce and 350 troops to protect the lives of the observers. 580 
That initial deployment was a far cry from commensurate with the military capacity required 
to reasonably terminate the incessant killings perpetrated by both the Janjaweed and the rebel 
forces. By this time observers had begun to count the dead. In late 2003 the USAID 
administrator Andrew Natsios allegedly put the number of dead civilians at 7,000. By March 
2004, the UN estimated a death toll of 10,000 and in early August 2004, the UN reportedly 
gave an estimate of 30,000 to 50,00 dead.581  By now AMIS I, had months earlier made its 
appearance on the terrain of conflict, albeit without a mandate to protect the growing number 
of casualties on ground. Instead AMIS I was to cooperate with the strict orders to exclusively 
monitor the truce.  
 
In like manner, if the mandate solely authorised the protection of military observers, then this 
kind of peacekeepers could not be associated with the use of heavy weapons of any sort. Besides 
this glaring operational constraint, and the lack of numerical strength, AMIS I encountered 
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several other problems, which hampered its effectiveness on the ground. It was logistically 
constrained and severely under resourced.  
Be that as it may, this fledgling organisation mustered the courage to embark on an assignment 
it was hardly attuned to or capable of. The magnitude of that escalation definitely required the 
intervention of well-equipped and experienced hands. The AU on this initial outing became 
unable to defend its new commitment to hinder, among its members states, the degeneration of 
conflict to the level of genocide and human violations. As the war ravaged on, there was the 
exigency to protect civilian lives, to disarm and neutralise the Janjaweed and to ensure the 
unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid. It was clearly beyond the observer mission to meet all 
these expectations.582 To this end, the AU commenced arrangements to strengthen its capacity 
on ground and equip such with a stronger mandate.   
 
In the face of Darfur’s escalating tensions, the GoS would neither approve of the AU’s plan to 
increase the number of boots on the ground nor would it consent to proposals for a stronger 
mandate to accommodate the right to protect civilian lives. At one point it dawned on the AU 
authorities that it may have been overstretching its bounds. It soft-pedalled on pushing for a 
stronger mandate and opted for an alternative, which suited the government in Khartoum, but 
would maintain the status quo for the victims of the war. 583 
According to Kagwanja and Mutahi: 
“The PSC (Peace and Security Council) backed away from its campaign for a strong mandate. 
It instead settled for a smaller force with no civilian protection capacity. A triumphant regime 
in Khartoum welcomed a feebler AMIS II”584 
 
These lines culled from the authors above underscores the crippling conflict between the theory 
and practice of peacekeeping. Khartoum no doubt reserved the right to exercise its sovereignty 
and uphold its territorial integrity. That fact regardless, the AU equally possessed the 
constitutional right to:  
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‘Intervene including through multilateral military force, in respect of grave circumstances, 
genocide and crimes against humanity… to restore peace and security in a member state 
(Constitutive Act, Articles 4 (h) and (j))’. 585 
If the AU had such strong constitutional backing, why did it fall short of the mark? Why did 
the AU allow itself to become inhibited in its duties to Darfur’s unarmed civilians? Was it a 
case of continued adherence to the principle of ‘non-interference’? Did the lack of a political 
will to protect civilian lives, under clear instances of genocide, continue to stand in the way of 
the AU as it did debar the OAU from intervening in Rwanda? Or Was the AU too weak to 
confront Khartoum with its atrocities and complicity in the conflict?    
While it remains a known fact that the AU lacked financial and material capability, onlookers 
were baffled by the AU’s failure to deter the perpetrators easy manoeuvring, regardless of its 
physical presence on ground.  Not even an expanded AU mission now tagged AMIS II proved 
consequential to the fate of Darfur’s vulnerable civilians. 
Yet Bellamy and Williams contend that:  
“The post-Westphalian understanding of international security recognises the sovereignty of a 
state only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens” the most significant of these 
obligations being the “protection of civilians against arbitrary killing”.586  
 
In addition to Bellamy and William’s assertion, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the September 2005 
‘Summit Outcome Document’, contains the reaffirmation by world leaders to assume the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity… should the state fail in such duties to its citizens.587 
 
If these assertions fit into the vision of the international community, why did it take so long to 
respond to the Darfur crisis? Why the hesitance until the outcry from the save Darfur movement 
to motivated into an eventual response towards accelerating a state of emergency. 588 
Ostensibly, the government of Sudan not only failed in its duties to protect the lives of its 
citizens, but also aggravated the conflict by engaging in acts of killing, which it perpetrated 
with the aid of its violent militias: the popular defence forces also known as the Janjaweed.  
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Bellamy and Williams however rightly concluded that: 
‘The post-Westphalian conception remains controversial and is opposed by defenders of the 
Westphalian order, most of whom are found in the ‘global south’.  
Meaning that the global south (which includes the Sudan), - as opposed to an attempt by the 
international community or organisations like the AU to secure the lives of individuals at the 
risk of death or displacement, interprets any military intervention on its soil as an incursion on 
its territorial sovereignty. This probably explains why the government in Khartoum initially 
rejected the offer for an expanded peacekeeping mission on its terrain. After all, in the first 
instance, the UN’s 1970 principle of international law states that: 
‘No states or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly for any reason 
whatever, in internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention 
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against its political, economic, and 
cultural elements are in violation of international law’.589    
 
On the flip side however, Khartoum may have also contemplated the consequences of an 
effective mandate on its militia proxy forces. Nevertheless, such controversies tend to expose 
the dark sides of peacekeeping and undermine the viability of applying or relying solely on this 
apparatus of conflict management to violent internal conflicts, especially those of the global 
south where the integrity of the state remains pivotal.  If any peacekeeping operation however, 
fails to significantly ameliorate the suffering of victims directly affected by war, what then, is 
the essence of military intervention in civil wars in the first place? 
 
7.5.2 A more robust peacekeeping mission for Darfur 
In October 2004, AMIS I was officially authorised to give way to AMIS II. It took the mission 
almost six months to get its act together and make its first appearance on Sudanese soil. Finally, 
in April 2005, AMIS II arrived with a larger contingent comprising 2,341 military personnel, 
450 military observers, 815 civilian police, and 26 civilian staff.590 By October 2005, the 
number of both military personnel and civilian police had increased to 5,583 and 1,198 
respectively591. 
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The upgraded AMIS II on the basis of its staff component bore on the one hand, the similitude 
of a peace support operation. On the other hand, it remained too weak to enforce compliance 
with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N’djamena. Both belligerents had 
continued to violate the truce despite continued deliberations reaching its fifth round in the 
Abuja talks, to end the violence. 592 AMIS II by contrast, deployed a larger contingent, yet 
analyst suggested a more robust deployment to the numerical strength of 20,000 troops, 
insisting that the deployment at that time could hardly create an impact by any standard, on the 
rapidly escalating humanitarian conditions on the ground. 593AMIS II also elevated from the 
status of an observer mission to an operational mandate that empowered it to accommodate the 
security imperatives of Darfuris, albeit with patent ambiguity.  The mandate stipulated the 
following:   
‘To monitor compliance with the N’djamena agreement, ensure the unimpeded flow of 
humanitarian relief and create the needed safety for the return of IDPs and refugees’  
 
and in what may be perceived as an attempt to verbally water down the reality on ground-of the 
persistent volatility of the region and the plight of civilians, the mandate specified for 
peacekeepers ‘to protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the 
immediate vicinity, within resources and capability’594. These last lines seemed like mere 
formality, based on the fact that AMIS in all of its appearances (I, II) lacked the sufficient 
resources and capability to confront its challenges from the onset.  
 
As earlier indicated, AMIS II arrived Darfur in April 2005. This was several months after the 
mission’s authorisation at the end of 2004. Prior to AMIS II arrival in March 2005, the AU 
delegated a Joint Assessment Mission to Darfur (JAM) in conjunction with its international 
partners from the EU, UN and US. The team returned with a report, which underlined the 
exigency of prioritising efforts towards a more secure environment. The report in addition, drew 
attention to AMIS’s ineffectiveness amid violence.595 Despite this confirming report of 
insecurity on ground in Darfur, AMIS II arrived with conditions attached to the task of 
providing security.   
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In similar vein, as at September 2005 Jan Egeland, who was then the head of the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, emphatically warned about the carnage 
and drew attention to addressing with utmost urgency the growing insecurity in Darfur. There 
was a persistent exigency to sustain a lifesaving operation covering 2.5 million people.596 With 
this startling reality, the best security arrangement ended with the clause to accord protection 
only to civilians under imminent threat, and within the vicinity of AMIS deployment.  At the 
same time, AMIS could decline to offer protection to civilian lives if the resources and 
capacity was inadequate. (Added emphasis)  
By all implication AMIS was ill prepared. Simply operating on an ad-hoc basis to limit the 
effects of the violence and secure lives.  It was obvious nonetheless, that the experience in 
Burundi had not sufficed. How did the international community anticipate for AMIS, despite 
declined proposals to elevate the capacity of the contingent to over 12,000 troops by the end of 
2006,597 to manage with the array of challenges to its name. Analyst have catalogued a litany 
of AMIS weaknesses and constraints ranging from logistical shortcomings, a lack of standard 
operating procedures, to poor finances and data management and to the very least of necessities 
required under such conditions: maps, to navigate Darfur’s huge landmass matching the size of 
France. 598. This were the lapses a more robust mission like UNAMID was meant to cover. 
 
Prior to effecting the transition to UNAMID on December 31st, 2007, AMIS remained the only 
international response to the crisis in Darfur. Despite a poor outing, the AU’s prompt 
intervention and bravery to venture into tough areas of responsibility, based on scant expertise 
and experience is laudable. AMIS continued to weather the storm without manpower 
commensurate with the degree of carnage occurring each day in territory as vast as Darfur. 
Coupled with a weak mandate, or a clear authorisation to secure the lives of vulnerable Dafuris, 
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hardly anything tangible in terms of security could be expected from the peacekeepers who 
themselves became the target of the insurgents. That being the case, Khartoum tactically dodged 
the responsibility to protect its citizens at risk of genocide, refused to disarm the Janjaweed and 
persistently obstructed all efforts from without to assume such obligations.  As the war raged 
on, so the number of displaced civilians in dire need of humanitarian relief increased.  
 
Since peacekeepers barely guaranteed maximum security within the region, even the job of aid 
workers providing relief became jeopardised. With increased pressure on the international 
community to intervene appropriately in the Darfur crisis and ameliorate the suffering of 
millions, and on Khartoum as well, to open its doors to the UN, UNAMID was born in 
accordance with the UN’s resolution 1769 and chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorising the 
enforcement of peace in the Darfur region.599  Now in its ninth year this hybrid mission between 
the African Union and the United Nations, operates within a mandate that authorised the 
deployment of:  -31, 042 personnel, 19,555 soldiers, 6,432 police officers and 5,105 civilians600. 
The mission is regarded as a robust Peace Support Operation. It was mandated to operate 
beyond the tasks of an observer mission. The mission targets the stability of a region now in its 
fourteenth year of continued violence.     
 
7.6 A Transformatory approach to building peace in Darfur 
Introduction 
This section is basically about the practicability of the conflict transformation’s approach to 
building sustainable peace in Darfur’s protracted conflict. As established in chapter four, the 
school of conflict transformation suggests a rethink in the international community’s approach 
to durable peace in protracted internal conflicts. It is my task in this section, to identify the 
extent to which Lederach’s proposition to adopt a “comprehensive framework”601 in protracted 
internal conflicts, can apply to UNAMID mandate to espouse grassroot intervention in Darfur.  
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The researcher is able to delve into this validation exercise on account of the field research 
conducted in April 2014 at the UNAMID headquarters in El-Fasher Darfur. According to 
Lederach, the adoption of a comprehensive framework behoves the external peace actor to 
recognize the imperative for reconciliation based on resources from within.  
 
The reader also becomes acquainted with support component, which UNAMID relies on for 
grassroot intervention. I shall elucidate its role in the conflict and identify the “affected 
population” within the conflict as expounded in Lederach’s Pyramid. However, I do not 
examine the prospects for reconciliation, which may derive from collaborative efforts between 
track III actors under scrutiny and the external peace actor. That aspect will be treated in the 
last chapter of 9 of the research.  
 
7.7.1 The role of UNAMID’s “Civil Affairs” component (CAS): An analysis based on 
Lederach’s Comprehensive Framework for Protracted Internal Conflicts  
 
Within the conflict transformation line of thinking, Lederach avers that underlying a 
Transformatory peace-building framework for intervention in a protracted conflict scenario, are 
“central and guiding conceptual elements”602. The following analysis examines three of such 
elements with a view to evaluating the prospects of a transformative approach to peace in 
Darfur. While chapter four already delved into the core message of the conflict transformation 
field, a brief reminder may suffice so as to understand the link between that chapter and the 
main objective of this section. 
 
A transformative approach to building peace the author says, adopts “a more holistic view of 
conflict”603 when compared with other lenses for analysis within in the field of conflict studies. 
The transformation model possesses the capacity to be descriptive of conflict dynamics and 
prescriptive of an all-encompassing approach to sustainable peace. In practise, the external 
peacemaker is enjoined to intervene in a conflict from the viewpoint of conflict transformation. 
To that extent it envisions and absorbs multiple actors and strategies and channels such 
interdependency towards the realization of durable peace. More specifically, it incorporates 
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tracks I, II and III into the peace process and acknowledges as integral to it, the component of 
“reconciliation”604.  
 
This external peace actor’s strategy for transforming conflict, should obtain from what 
Lederach refers to as the “comprehensive framework”. It sets out to achieve the gradual 
transformation of protracted conflicts. It also seeks innovative means of sustaining the 
transformation. The fourth chapter dealing with reflections from the conflict transformation 
school of thought, already illuminated on the propositions underlying Lederach’s 
comprehensive framework. For the sake of emphasis, I have highlighted some important points 
from the author’s statement, which tend to strike a chord. Please refer to chapter four for details 
on the propositions. 
 
7.7.1a Proposition one makes the case for “establishing an Infrastructure for Peace” 
With reference to the external actor in conflict scenarios, the author suggests that the 
intervention mechanism “legitimizes and integrates multiple levels of the affected population” 
and “devices mechanisms explicitly and intentionally” for the purpose of coordination. 
Furthermore, he specifies the exigency of creating “space”. From the author’s postulations, it 
is possible to draw a few inferences, which can be related to the case of Darfur.  
 
The adoption of a comprehensive framework ultimately translates to a refusal to marginalise 
any level of the affected population. It recognises that all levels of the affected population 
(levels 1,2,3) are integral parts of the peace process. Furthermore, it acknowledges the 
expediency of tapping into the complementarity of the inputs that may be extracted from all 
three levels. The author equally advocates for the creation of “space” but does not mention 
specifically for whom space should be created.  
 
A deep reflection on the history of external intervention in Sub-Saharan internal conflicts 
(especially of the kind analysed in this study) reveals to a large extent, that “high” and “middle” 
605 range actors have constituted the major players in peace processes. In fact, these actors often 
operate without requiring “space and legitimacy” from the external peace actor.  They tend to 
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flow naturally into the peace process as legitimate actors.  It may be correct to conclude 
therefore that the group that does require “space and legitimacy” exists at the bottom. Lederach 
refers to them as the “level 3 or the grassroots”. Diagram 1 (Please refer to the appendix), 
reveals according to the author the three levels of society that may constitute the affected 
population within a protracted conflict scenario and also the peace-making focus of each level. 
Based on analysis from preceding chapters, it is possible to link the players in the Abuja 
mediation or Doha peace talks and the Problem-Solving Workshops to what Lederach refers to 
as Level 1 and 2 of the affected population.  
 
In his book titled: Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Lederach 
in his opinion, contends that level 2 or middle range actors are: “the key to a sustainable peace 
building framework in contemporary conflicts”606… he affirms this is so because “middle range 
actors” tend to be positioned in a way that they are connected to and often have the trust of both 
top-level and grassroot actors”607. The author at the same time strongly subscribes to the 
“restoration and rebuilding of relationships”. In the light of mending broken relationships, he 
posits further that a transformative framework “must address and engage the relational aspects 
of reconciliation as the central component of peace building”.608  
I contend that in line with the significant feature of the transformative approach, which is to 
rebuild and restore relationships on the platform of reconciliation, the institution of the Native 
Administration, specifically the Ajaweed mediators and the Judiyya mechanism for 
reconciliation fit best into level 3 actors of Lederach’s affected population.  
 
The institution of the Native Administration is an encapsulation of indigenous conflict 
management, resolution and above all reconciliation.  While I do contend that the Native 
Administration and its corollaries have a significant role to play on that level, I do not hold that 
these indigenous actors by themselves are key to the transformation of the conflict. I also do 
not argue that they constitute the sole actors available on the grassroot level. However, the 
institution and the players in it, represent a culture and a way of life, a tradition despite 
colonialism, which the people can relate to. These indigenous actors have constituted 
dependable resources for conflict resolution and reconciliation prior to 2003. They predate the 
conflict to as far back as the sultanate.   
                                                     
606 Lederach, "Building Peace,” 41-42 
607 Lederach, "Building Peace,” 41-42 
608 ibid, 24 
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Essentially the NA as elaborately discussed elsewhere, is the only indigenous institution that 
from inception recognises and acknowledges the imperative to reconcile conflicting parties and 
restore broken relationships based on the parameters of Darfur’s peace-making heritage.  
Reconciliation is in fact central to the Judiyya process, and the Ajaweed are the custodians of 
that mechanism.   
 
My position is that this track III actors represent the missing link. That is, the connection 
between the international peace actor’s obligation to reconcile conflicting parties and their lack 
of a context specific cultural mechanism with which to reconcile parties. Consequently, within 
a comprehensive framework, indigenous strategies would become adaptive tools of the 
international peace actor. They should however be operated by indigenous actors, in tandem 
with the external peace actor’s efforts geared towards sustainable peace.  
 
What is the main point? 
The major business in all of this preliminary discussion is to examine how this proposition from 
Lederach finds applicability in the Darfur case. Has the international peace actor adopted a 
“comprehensive framework” or not? If yes, does it incorporate multiple levels of the affected 
population in Darfur? In order to find answers to this question, it is imperative to establish a 
number of facts. These facts enable a logical flow. They serve as premises, to validate or negate 
the proposition.  
So, to answer the question whether or not the international peace actor integrates multiple levels 
of the affected population it is important to establish the following:  
 
First, I start by stating that UNAMID (United Nations African Mission in Darfur) stands as the 
authorised international peace actor in Darfur. For this reason, I intend to focus my analysis on 
UNAMID. Second, UNAMID was deployed in conformity with the United Nation’s tenets 
guiding “multidimensional” peacekeeping.  Such guidelines specifically point out the 
complexities of contemporary conflicts as the rationale behind “multidimensional” 
peacekeeping. It states that:  
“The transformation of the international environment has given rise to a new generation of 
“multi-dimensional” United Nations peacekeeping operations. The operations are typically 
deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of 
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military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive 
peace agreement”609. 
 
 As I will elucidate subsequently UNAMID is a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities. 
It was also mandated to follow up on the implementation of the DPA (Darfur Peace 
Agreement). In the light of this it is safe to surmise that UNAMID, in compliance with the core 
functions of “multidimensional” peacekeeping listed below, recognises the essence of an all-
embracing perspective of the conflict as well as conceives of a broad intervention strategy 
towards Darfur’s protracted conflict. Accordingly, the core functions of multidimensional 
peacekeeping are:  
• To create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to 
provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights, 
• To facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and 
supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; 
•  To provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and international actors 
pursue activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner. 610 
Having established that UNAMID was deployed with a multi-dimensional directive, I should 
indicate that this analysis would defy comprehension without introducing the components 
attached to the peace support mission deployed to Darfur.   
 
While the components exhibit additional evidence of UNAMID’s multidimensional nature, it 
is equally expedient that I proceed on this path because I introduce thereby, the most important 
component for this analysis: The Civil Affairs Section. Since this is an analysis that examines 
UNAMID’s activities on the grassroot level. It is imperative to introduce the Civil Affairs 
component because of its unique role on level three of any conflict society where they are 
deployed. I will expatiate on this subsequently. 
 
To this point, I have evidenced in part that UNAMID operates from a comprehensive 
framework. This I did by illuminating on the mission’s multidimensional attribute, which 
consists of a mixture of military, police and civilians. However, it is not yet clear whether or 
not this is truly comprehensive going by Lederach proposition. Why? This is so because it is 
                                                     
609 United Nations, 22 
610 United Nations, 23  
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yet to be determined, whether UNAMID incorporates multiple levels of Darfur’s affected 
population. In proceeding I shall be discussing towards validating or refuting that proposition. 
However, it is important to advance toward an examination of the components attached to 
UNAMID. Why is this so?  
 
First, when I speak of a multidimensional peacekeeping, it is possible without much 
investigation to construct in one’s mind, an imagery of what the military and the police might 
be involved with on a terrain of active violence. Nevertheless, it becomes somewhat of a 
challenge, without first-hand experience or research to conceive of civilian involvement on a 
terrain defined by active violence and aggression. This, in any case, constitutes the trend going 
by the current UN configuration as stipulated within the parameters of peace building and as 
prompted by the nature of contemporary conflicts. Civilians are deployed to contribute their 
quota in fulfilment of an authorised mandate. It is also civilians who form the bulk of the 
personnel assigned to the various components attached to a peacekeeping mission.   
 
Second in the course of introducing the components, I shall be discussing the component 2 in 
detail. It is from examining the role of component 2 in Darfur, that I can determine whether or 
not UNAMID incorporates multiple levels of Darfur’s affected population.  
 
7.7.1b Introducing UNAMID’s supporting components  
When UN resolution 1769611 authorised for the hybrid operation to replace AMIS in Darfur it 
attached certain components to bolster the mission. These components612 are as follows: 
1. Support for peace process and good offices 
2. Civil Affairs 
3. Security- military 
4. Security- police 
5. Security- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
6. Protection and promotion of human rights 
7. Rule of law 
                                                     
611 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1769," United Nations, last modified July 31, 2007, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769(2007). 
612 United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 5 June 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council," UNAMID/ United Nations, last modified June 5, 2007, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/307/rev.1. 
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8.  Humanitarian liaison 
9. Child protection 
10. Gender 
11. HIV/AIDS support 
12. Mine action 
13. Public information 
14. Safety and security 
15. Conduct 
16. Mission support. 
Each of the components operates under specific directives as authorised by the mandate. In 
2014 when I embarked on my research trip to Darfur, I visited the offices of components 1 and 
8. The offices of both components are located at the UNAMID headquarters in El-Fasher. 
Nonetheless, this is an investigation that focuses purely on the activities of component 2. The 
interviews with personnel attached to components 1 and 8, were conducted for the purpose of 
triangulation. For that reason, therefore, besides the focus (component 2) I shall also give 
cursory information about components 1 and 8. The reader is enjoined to refer to resolution 
1769 for information on all other components.613  
 
Component 1: Support for the peace process and good offices 
I was introduced to this component in Darfur as the political affairs section. The component as 
stipulated by the resolution, was created to assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement and any other agreement. It will carry out this obligation by collaborating with all 
stakeholders involved in the Darfur peace process. It will also monitor relevant developments 
of the peace process and perform early warning and conflict analysis functions. The component 
will provide political guidance to all other components and will be responsible for ensuring that 
reconciliation initiatives are coordinated with security, recovery and development efforts in 
Darfur. 614 These are but mere stipulations as culled from the mandate.  When I conducted 
interviews with representatives of this section, I gathered concrete information and insight into 
how UNAMID operates on the political level. I received illumination on the scope of its 
activities but also their opinion on the main subject of my inquiry.  
                                                     
613 United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 5 June 2007”, components 
614 United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 5 June 2007”, components 
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Component 8: Protection and promotion of human rights 
The human rights component will also assist in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement but 
only in aspects that are connected to issues of human rights. It will work according to the 
guidelines of the international humanitarian law and other relevant international standards. Its 
activities will include monitoring, investigation, reporting, advocacy, protection, advisory and 
capacity and institution building. It will also provide support for the establishment of a national 
human rights commission in accordance with the Paris Principles.615When I visited this section, 
I gained insight into their modus operandi and most importantly, gleaned information on how 
the lenses through which they view peace-building efforts tends to be incompatible with some 
of the customs and traditions of the people of Darfur. 
 
Component 2: Civil Affairs 
As mandated by resolution 1769: 
“The civil affairs component will assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
and any subsequent agreements through support to reconciliation processes, including at the 
grassroots level, the conduct of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation and the 
functioning of the institutions established under the Darfur Peace Agreement, including the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, the Land Commission and the Civil Service 
Commission. The component will also assist in the capacity building of national institutions 
and civil society organisations in Darfur. The component’s activities will include the holding 
of workshops on various governance and peace building aspects, with the aim of promoting a 
culture of peace and establishing contacts with key stake holders to support dialogue and 
reconciliation among conflicting parties. Furthermore: 
Given the complex conflict dynamics and the necessity for grassroot engagement in the 
peace process, civil affairs officers will be deployed throughout Darfur…”616 
 
These are the precise words with which resolution 1769 sets out the specific functions of CAS. 
To this extent, this directive is true on paper. It allows the reader some knowledge into what is 
expected of UNAMID on the grassroot level in Darfur. It also confirms the authorisation of a 
                                                     
615 ibid 
616 ibid, Components/ Civil Affairs 
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grassroot activity and by extension a call to collaborate with actors in the area of reconciliation. 
Besides documented evidence, one must delve into further research in order to ascertain the 
implementation of these directives in Darfur.  The main challenge therefore is to eventually 
deduce how pragmatic these injunctions are in Darfur’s conflict. 
   
Although the practicability of these injunctions might remain ambiguous to the reader, the 
following inferences may be made from closely examining resolution 1769 demands on CAS. 
1. That CAS operates mainly on the grassroot level of Darfur 
2. That the authorizers of UNAMID going by Lederach’s propositions should: explicitly 
and intentionally devise mechanisms for integrating and coordinating high, middle and 
grassroot level strategies. This is evidenced by incorporating into the peace operation 
the components mentioned above, (the 16 of them) as ways of supporting the peace 
process. 
3. It indicates furthermore that grassroot actors should officially constitute a part of the 
peace process. This can be actualized through CAS, when it ultimately provides the 
“space” and “legitimacy” for cooperation with level 3 actors 
4. That UNAMID is designed to recognize the imperativeness for relational change in 
Darfur. More specifically it realizes that such change can be achieved on the platform 
of reconciliation. It also understands that dialogue is integral to the peace process.  
5. That UNAMID’S peace effort engages the civil society. However, it refrains from 
making any elaborations when referring to civil society in Darfur.  As it is common 
knowledge, civil society does cover a wide spectrum of actors on the grassroot level. In 
addition, some commentators prefer to distinguish between “civil society” and 
“traditional civil society”. In which case, they refer to traditional leaders and mediators 
as members of the traditional civil society. It is assumed that civil society in this context 
refers also to indigenous peace-making actors like the Ajaweed. 
In the first part of chapter eight, this study identified the institution, actors and mechanisms 
employed in peace and reconciliation in Darfur. In similar vein, it is now established that going 
by resolution 1769, it is imperative for CAS to engage in the reconciliation of conflicting 
parties. The question however is:  Does UNAMID collaborate with specific actors on the 
grassroot or within civil society in order to achieve the goal of reconciliation? 
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In order to provide a valid answer to that question, I must examine the second proposition 
underlying Lederach’s comprehensive framework. However, in further pursuit of my initial 
question, (Does UNAMID incorporate all levels of Darfur’s affected population) it is significant 
at this juncture to provide a working definition of CAS according to UNAMID as well as 
furnish the reader with some insight into the core roles of CAS on ground Darfur. After 
accomplishing this task, it should be clear to a reasonable extent, with whom CAS partners in 
achieving the task of peace and reconciliation.  
 
7.7.1c Defining CAS and examining its role in Darfur. 
“The Civil Affairs Section is a civilian component in UNAMID that works at the social, 
administrative and sub-national political levels to facilitate the implementation of the 
UNAMID mandate and to support the population and government in creating and 
strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace in Darfur.”617 
A second definition states that: 
“Civil Affairs is the most important interface between the UN mission and the 
community, not just in terms of the local/regional authorities but also civil society in its 
broadest sense”.618  
While both definitions provide concise information on CAS, one very vital feature of CAS 
becomes evident: CAS acts as the intermediary between the UN missions and actors on 
Lederach affected population level 2 and 3.    
Furthermore, CAS in Darfur performs three major roles in accordance with the directive to 
achieve the main objectives for which UNAMID was deployed.  
1. “Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation of the peace process at 
the local level: 
Civil Affairs is the channel for communicating the priorities and perceptions of different 
sectors of the population to the mission, concerning both UNAMID and the Darfur 
peace process.” 
2. “Confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation and the 
resolution of conflicts: 
                                                     
617 United Nations, "Civil Affairs," UNAMID, last modified July 2012, http://unamid.unmissions.org/civil-
affairs. Accessed August 20, 2016  
618 United Nations, Civil Affairs Handbook (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
and Department of Field Support, 2012),130 , 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Civil_Affairs_Handbook.pdf. Accessed 
September 15, 2016  
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For a conducive and sustainable peace, Civil Affairs convenes and facilitates dialogue 
between interest groups and stakeholders; undertakes direct outreach to the population 
(working with other mission actors to design and deliver appropriate and consistent 
message); supports efforts of government, Native administration and civil society 
groups seeking peace and reconciliation; identify, implement and monitor Quick 
Impact Projects (QIPs); and promote or protect of the interests of excluded, threatened, 
marginalized or minority groups.” 
3. “Support to the restoration, strengthening and extension of state authority and 
governance institutions: 
Civil Affairs contributes to the establishment and strengthening of legitimate and 
representative governance, as well as providing operational support to the activities of 
National, state and governance institutions through capacity building activities and 
assistance in the structuring of state and transitional governance institutions as well as 
supporting dialogue between different sectors of the population (including civil society 
actors) and the government.” 
“In each of the roles identified, the work of Civil Affairs intersects with, supports and draws 
upon the work of other UNAMID components and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), 
as well as providing information to facilitate community level responses.”619 
 
The number two role of CAS in Darfur revolves majorly around the themes of conflict 
management, resolution and reconciliation. Three actors are mentioned as collaborators with 
CAS in her efforts towards the realization of conflict resolution and reconciliation. Reference 
is made to the government, the Native Administration and civil society groups. Ostensibly, the 
Native Administration exists as an entity of its own and has not been lumped under the “civil 
society groups” tag name. This study already examined peace-making on the platform of 
“government sponsored peace conferences”. It is therefore not out of place to assume that such 
“government sponsored peace conference” constitute part of the peace initiatives associated 
with the government, which as stated in role No. 2, also gains the support from CAS.   
 
Civil societies in Darfur also play a significant role in peace-making activities. Based on that 
CAS is equally mandated to provide Civil Society Groups with reinforcement. The Ajaweed 
                                                     
619 United Nations, "Civil Affairs," (roles) 
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for Peace and Reconciliation is one good example among the over 20 civil society groups620 
presently in partnership with CAS to secure stable peace for the all Darfuris.  Lastly, going by 
CAS role number 2, it is possible to assume that CAS supports the kind of peace-making that 
exits within the framework of the institution of the Native Administration. Of particular interest 
to this thesis is the cooperation between CAS and the indigenous mediators who are an integral 
part of the NA. 
 
To this extent, I have been able to identify some relevant actors involved with peace-making 
on the grassroots, with whom CAS tends to merge efforts. However, it is not yet clear who 
constitutes level 3 of Darfur’s affected population and most importantly whether they have a 
say in UNAMID’s peace process.  
 
Validating the propositions 
I mentioned elsewhere, that my visit to UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher afforded me a rare 
insight into CAS sector north. It is on the basis of that research visit that I can categorically 
make an affirmative statement or refute UNAMID’s presence on the grassroot level of Darfur’s 
conflict. On that basis, I also can validate or repudiate the incorporation, as projected by 
Lederach, of levels 1, 2 and 3 of Darfur’s affected population into the peace process.  However, 
both of my assertions can only be validated if I go beyond this stage to demonstrate their 
validity. That implies that I must be able to substantiate the premise that leads me to making 
such conclusions. 
 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, I assessed some of the current third-party external 
strategies that have been applied towards peace in Darfur. In that analysis, I provided insight 
into the participation and input of levels 1 and 2 of the affected population in the peace process. 
In the course of my field trip it was possible to ascertain besides CAS, the engagement of other 
components (as already mentioned) with the affected population. 
 
The political affairs component for example engages more of the affected population on level 
1 and guided by the dictates of its mandate, operates within the framework of a statist kind of 
diplomacy. My visit places me at an advantaged position to develop on scholarship 
documenting the participation of tracks I and II in the peace process.  
                                                     
620 United Nations, CSOs, Intellectual reps, (UNAMID Headquarters El-Fasher: CAS Sector North, n.d) 
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Lederach argued that:  
“Reconciliation should be seen as a process of encounter and as a social space… Reconciliation 
can therefore be comprehended as both a “focus and a locus”. He states, “as a perspective it is 
built on and oriented towards the relational aspect of a conflict. As a social phenomenon, 
reconciliation represents a space, a place and a location of encounter where parties to a conflict 
meet”621.  
Why is it important to bring in this argument at this juncture? It is intended to usher in 
illumination on the essence of the CAS cells.  I establish that it is the cells that facilitate this 
“location of encounter” which Lederach expounds. It is one specific cell, as I will display, that 
takes on the responsibility to ensure that reconciliation becomes “a process of encounter” and 
eventually a “social space”. In essence, the cells can be conceived of as the meeting point 
between level 3 of the affected population and CAS, and by the same token, the connection to 
the parent body, which is UNAMID.  
 
Introducing CAS and its underlying cells 
The cells are the various departments operating under CAS. All of the cells are assigned specific 
functions that are tailored towards actualising the three core roles of CAS. On my arrival at 
UNAMID headquarters, I was introduced to the team leader of CAS Sector North. He obliged 
me the audience of all the staff working under him. In that meeting, I became acquainted with 
CAS sector north and its cells.  
These cells are as follows: 
• Crisis management / Conflict resolution 
• Capacity building 
• Information management 
• Quick impact projects.622 
After the introductory session, it became apparent that I needed to narrow down my research 
activity to just one cell. This was the conflict resolution cell. 
 
The conflict resolution cell according to the discussion I eventually held with staff under it: 
• Monitors the impact of the security situation on the civilians 
                                                     
621 Lederach, “Building Peace “, 30 
622 Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014. 
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• Monitors conflict at the local level between two tribes 
• Facilitates meetings for the conflict parties to come together  
• Facilitates and supports intra community dialogue 
• Organises workshops for the strengthening of the role of the Native Administration.623 
On account of these findings, and based on the discussions I shall further advance, it is correct 
to confirm that CAS and its cells engage in grassroot activity geared towards peace and 
reconciliation. However, it is not yet evident who constitutes the level three of Darfur’s affected 
population as propounded by Lederach.  Two facts are important to note here. First, it is by 
identifying these stakeholders that this study can emphatically aver whether or not UNAMID 
has integrated the 3rd level and indeed considered them to be legitimate actors in the peace 
process. Second, in order to probe further into the validity and practicability of proposition 1 in 
Darfur, it is pertinent to proceed further with examination into the second component. Lederach 
considers this second proposition to be vital to a comprehensive and transformative approach 
to sustainable peace in protracted conflicts.  
 
This second proposition investigates into whether the creation of CAS and its cells and the 
incorporation of the third level of the affected population, if proven to be so, should be 
perceived merely as a ploy to observe formality or not. It checks to determine whether the 
incorporation of level 3 actors can be interpreted as CAS actively involved with charting the 
course of reconciliation and relationship building?  Should UNAMID’S involvement on the 
grassroot be perceived as a strategy to commence with a resuscitation of a peace culture in 
Darfur?  Does this engagement by any means provide Dafuris with the “suitable space”624 but 
also the platform to experience a relearning of social peace and harmony? Are these efforts 
been channelled towards the restoration (if needed) of those human and cultural resources that 
should engender sustainability long after UNAMID is gone? The answers may be found in this 
proposition 2. Nonetheless besides these conjecturing, this next sub title should lead to 
identifying the stakeholders on level 3 of the affected population in Darfur.  
 
                                                     
623 Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014 
624 Darfuris have witnessed the manipulation of their that space which invariably denied them the privilege of 
encountering their peace-making heritage in the true colour that lead to reconciliation 
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7.7.1d Proposition two: Building a Peace Constituency  
It is important to mention here that the entire notion behind building a peace constituency is for 
the peace actor to aim towards sustainability that builds on the resources from within the 
context. How does this translate to the Darfur case? 
To the assertions (a) and (b) (See chapter four for details) the author adds that there are three 
salient principles guiding the efforts towards building a peace constituency.  
• The principle of indigenous empowerment 
• The principle of cultural relevance 
• Long-term commitment.625 
Before expatiating on these three principles, it is essential to draw attention to the key 
intervention concerns, as projected by Lederach. According to the author they constitute 
considerations that are vital to the external peacemaker’s commitment towards adopting a 
transformative approach to peace. The initial concern is to ascertain: 
1. Why it is important for an international actor to be concerned about who participates in 
peace-making 
I understand the author to be suggesting a shift away from the partisanship that tends to 
inform the choice of parties (among the affected population) to participate in a peace-
making process. The external peace actor is expected to adopt an open and flexible strategy 
that allows for the accommodation of all kinds of initiatives available within the conflict 
setting. In order to actualise this, it is assumed that the external peace actor neither attaches 
ample significance to strategies external to the conflict setting nor exhibits preference for 
any actor or initiative within the conflict setting.  
 
This initial concern may be paralleled to the mediatory sessions in Abuja, which culminated 
with the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. When the AU dragged the 
movements to the negotiating table, they acted on the assumption that these representatives 
constituted the key to resolving the situation on ground. Indeed, the predilection to pressure 
Minawi over Wahid, into signing the peace agreement, turned out to be misguided. Even 
though Miniawi wielded greater military strength in Darfur, the majority of the internally 
displaced were members of the Wahid divide. The agreement eventually attracted the 
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signature of one party-SLA Minawi. It failed to ameliorate the suffering of the IDPs at the 
same time, aggravated the security situation in Darfur all the more.  
 
Indeed, as may be inferred from Adam Azzain, the choice of who participated in Darfur’s 
mediation process, lay in the external peacemaker’s presumed deeper understanding about the 
conflict. Had the team in Abuja been guided by in-depth knowledge of the conflict and its 
dynamics. If the mediators deeply reflected on the fact that the movements merely triggered the 
conflict but were not the underlying root cause, maybe the strategy to intervene would have 
differed. It may have included other actors on other levels of the affected population 
This is what Adam Azzain had to say in his paper titled “Evaluating the Darfur Peace 
Agreement: A call for an Alternative Approach to Crisis Management. 
He states:  
By overlooking the vast body of indigenous knowledge and conflict resolution practices, and 
by focusing on the civil war dimension of the conflict by placing emphasis on the wealth and 
power sharing, the DPA… became out of touch with the hearts of the real conflict parties 
in conflict- the landless and the landowning groups…626 . Notice the highlighted expression: 
became out of touch with the hearts of the real conflict parties in conflict. The team of mediators 
had analysed the conflict wrongly. In fact, it is such inaccurate analysis that has informed 
according to Hottinger’s the application of the same templates for the mediation processes that 
culminated with the CPA and the DPA. Unfortunately yielding an undesirable result for Darfur.  
 
Therefore, as far as the DPA was concerned the real parties in conflict (the landless and the 
land-owning groups) were not part of the negotiating process in Abuja. Neither the parties nor 
their leaders, by which I mean the tribal leaders, were invited to the negotiating table. Civil 
society groups were not represented. The focus was on the movements. In fact, it was the Doha 
document that eventually recognized the need to take cognizance of indigenous peace-making 
actors as well as attendant peace-making mechanism. 627 Ostensibly, conflict raged on even in 
the immediate aftermath of the signing. It denotes further that too much attention was placed 
on the political. That is on level 1. Leaving out other levels and other initiatives for peace that 
might have contributed to a gradual transformation.  
                                                     
626 Adam A. Mohammed, "Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement," Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research. UPPSALA Universitet, last modified 2009, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18583_CAMP6-
Adam_Muhamed.pdf. 11 
627 See, Doha Document for Peace in Darfur Chapter V- Justice and Reconciliation, Article 55: 279 and Article 
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Since the arrival of UNAMID, a multidimensional mandate tends to stipulate the mission’s 
operation in line with the major focus of actualizing sustainable peace for the people of Darfur. 
UNAMID, going by its operational framework is therefore obligated through CAS:  
To “make an exhaustive survey of civil society beyond the most vocal or empowered 
and look to provide a voice for the voiceless”628.  
 
This by implication suggests that the current approach rectified the deficiency in prior 
intervention models. Beyond levels 1, commendable significance has been attached to pooling 
stakeholders on the grassroots, in order to address the peace and reconciliation demands of the 
affected population on level 3.  
2. Why should any intervention strategy take into cognizance how various actors are 
understood and coordinated? The important point to note here is that there usually are 
several peace actors within the conflict setting. They should be coordinated as legitimate 
partakers of the peace process because each peace actor possesses the capacity to 
contribute in a distinctive manner towards the actualization of an initiated peace process.   
In that case, the international peace actor is urged to refrain from conceiving of any actor within 
the conflict setting as less significant to the peace process. Again, with reference to the Abuja 
mediation, external mediators had estimated levels 2 and 3 of Darfur’s affected population as 
irrelevant to the peace process, while focusing all attention on level 1 actors. Adam Azzain 
contends that in the Darfur case, in order to understand and coordinate the various actors, the 
first step would have been to understand the conflict as a triadic one.   
He contends: 
“Three distinct conflicts are to be separated, (The intergroup conflict at the grassroots 
level, power struggles between communal elites, region centre conflict over 
marginalization charges) instead of lumping them together under one label and 
resorting to the so-called inclusive negotiations and dialogues to deal with them.”629  
 
Were this the case, the AU and its partners could have identified the various actors in the 
conflict and attendant strategies for making peace within the setting. Within the on-going 
framework towards peace in Darfur, UNAMID as the major external actor currently seeks to 
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address that flaw by connecting to stakeholders in each of these conflict categorizations using 
as a platform the components attached to the mission.  
 
CAS and its cells for example are charged with coordinating all peace actors on the level of the 
intergroup conflicts that from time to time play out on the grassroot. In similar vein, the political 
affairs for example supports initiatives geared at mitigating the “region centre conflict over 
marginalization charges”.   
3. Why is it important for the external actor to identify what unique resources each actor 
brings and when they are incorporated into the peace process? 
In the first place, the above question implies that every peace-making resource is unique in its 
right. Furthermore, no single peace-making actor or initiative should be viewed as the panacea 
to ending conflict. All actors should be treated as legitimate, while taking into cognizance the 
notion of interdependency. Equally significant is the timing. It is imperative for the peace actor 
to be able to ascertain when the time is ripe for the incorporation of each actor. This is simply 
suggesting that the peace actor is expected to discern when to administer military strategies, 
utilize external mediators and recognize the point where the conflict warrants that contextual 
resources also be incorporated into the peace process.   
 
In the case of Darfur, what human or material resources has the peace actor identified as 
relevant to the peace process? The answer may be derived in the developing discussion below. 
UNAMID’S CAS is configured to cooperate with “interlocutors ranging from local 
government officials, elders and traditional leaders to a wide spectrum of non –institutional 
actors, including civil society organizations, media, the business sector, IDPs and members of 
the general population” 630 More precisely UNAMID has identified the institution of the NA 
and its integral parts. In addition to the above-mentioned, CAS SN as at 2014, officially 
identified and established links with 28 Civil Society Organizations.631  
 
Among the 28 is the organization already mentioned elsewhere, called “Ajaweed for Peace and 
Reconciliation”. This organization is not directly involved with the kind of mediation 
conducted by traditional mediators. The Ajaweed organization nonetheless prepares the 
platform and the suitable conditions and environment for traditional mediators to carry out their 
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functions. The traditional Ajaweed are also not members of the organization. The job of the 
traditional Ajaweed and members of the organization can be viewed as complementary632  In 
fact my visit afforded me the opportunity of a meeting with the head of civil societies in Darfur. 
 
Having expatiated on these major concerns, I probe further into the three elements underlying 
the proposition, which expects the peace actor to work towards building a peace constituency 
within the conflict settling  
 
The principle of indigenous empowerment: (See chapter four for details) 
How does this translate to the Darfur case? Going by this principle, the conflict transformation 
approach advocates for the external peace actor, in this case UNAMID to envision, include, 
respect and promote the human and cultural resources from within the setting,633 in this case: 
Darfur. This implies that Darfur and Darfuris must no longer be viewed as the problem, and the 
external peacemaker as the solution. Darfuris must now become part and parcel of the solution 
to their problems. Not just as belligerents seeking the intervention of a third party, but as 
prospective peacemakers themselves. UNAMID in essence bolstered by supportive 
components like CAS, is expected to create the enabling environment for Darfuris to own their 
peace process, considering that the notion of ownership shores up the prospects for 
sustainability.  
 
How then can Darfuris become part of the process that envisages peace in the long run? In the 
first place, and as already stated CAS operates within the legal framework that has authorised 
access to the population directly affected by the conflict on various levels but especially on the 
grassroot. It is therefore the platform on which UNAMID “promotes the human and cultural 
resources” that may be available within the Darfur region. Moreover, in the light of guiding 
tenets it is incumbent on CAS and its cells to take the initial step of “considering the skills and 
expertise that local actors possess”634. CAS must “avoid undermining local capacity by “doing 
or replacing” rather than enabling. It must “identify and build on existing processes and 
structures that are both formal and informal. In like manner CAS must “value and make use of 
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local or “insider” knowledge and expertise, including that of National Professional Officers and 
local counterparts”635.  
 
These are but general guiding principles for CAS deployed in conjunction with peace missions 
all over the world. Does the Civil Affairs component of UNAMID, implement them on Darfur’s 
conflict terrain? In developing sections I shall delve into the operational aspect of this 
proposition so as to check for its validity.  
 
The principle of cultural relevance suggests: 
“That all cultures and groups develop ways and approaches for handling conflict…these 
cultural modalities and resources for handling conflict in a given setting are not only important 
to identify but should be seen as foundational for building a comprehensive transformative 
framework”…it understands outside models, even widely accepted practices of international 
diplomacy with its strong Western influences, as having intrinsic cultural biases and 
adaptations, and does not blindly accept them as applicable in a given setting”636 
 
In the case of Darfur, it is important going by this 2nd principle for UNAMID to transcend 
strategies that are external to Darfur in order to unearth the potentials for peace that may be 
embedded in mechanisms and actors that stem from within that conflict setting. “Such 
mechanisms and practices must be viewed as “foundational for building a comprehensive 
framework” Darfur is still at the point of transitioning from a traditional to semi-traditional 
society.637 Therefore peace-making continues largely to be informed by the cultural practices 
of the people of Darfur. On that note and based on Lederach it may be correct to surmise that 
UNAMID explores the options of peace-making that are in line with the institution of the Native 
Administration and the practice of mediation as delivered by the Ajaweed. Such culturally 
defined peace-making mechanisms according to Lederach, are “naturally a part of the setting 
and must be rediscovered and put to creative use within the setting and must be viewed as 
foundational for building a comprehensive framework”638 In this regard, UNAMID is designed 
to adopt a culturally sensitive approach to peace in Darfur. This requires, going by its 
underlying principles, for UNAMID via CAS to 
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 “Understand and consider prevailing beliefs, norms, traditions, attitudes and practices when 
planning and implementing activities and interacting with communities”. However, UNAMID 
does not conform to this principle when “local customs or practices run contrary to other 
principles, such as equality, inclusiveness or human rights”639  
 
7.7.1e Proposition three: long-term and short-term perspectives 
The assumptions underlying this proposition tend to overlap with the principle of “long term 
commitment underlying the proposition two. The significance is interpreted as the peace actor 
capacity to accord equal relevance to perspectives that inform both short-term and long-term 
intervention in protracted conflicts. This proposition assumes that the international peace actor 
“recognizes that peaceful transformation takes time and continues well beyond the crises 
moments of interest when the media is paying attention…”640 
 
Validating, creating space and building from both human and cultural resources within the 
setting also requires time. Rebuilding a society to the level where the peace actor can reliably 
disengage requires intervention on a longer duration basis. It implies that the authorizers of the 
UNAMID mission are expected to reckon with the fact that realizing a ceasefire agreement 
based on short term perspectives represent a significant step towards peace, nonetheless 
“broader transformation, reconciliation and social reconstruction”641 of Darfur’s conflict may 
require for the mission to invest time beyond the envisaged period.  
 
A long-term engagement should allow for the establishment of a peace constituency that can 
sustain the achieved peace past when UNAMID has exited from the conflict terrain. This kind 
of intervention is defined by the realization that the underlying structural concerns that have 
motivated Darfur’s conflict have brewed over a long period. The eruption in 2003 only became 
the overt expression of a conflict in the making. Darfur’s conflict has eaten deep into the 
society’s fabric. Accordingly, it is correct to assume that the root causes of Darfur’s conflict 
cannot be uprooted in the short term. While it is important for UNAMID via CAS to devote 
time to re- empowering indigenous actors as a means to an end, such notion must not be 
misconceived as an effort to romanticize whatever human and cultural resources may be 
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available in Darfur. Darfur does possess other formal and informal mechanisms, which have no 
cultural undertone.   
 
A culturally apt approach to peace nonetheless captures the essence of building a peace culture 
that aims at sustainability. One that is hinged on resources and extant practices within the 
setting. In similar vein the idea of short-term intervention cannot be dismissed. Such may form 
part of the phases a conflict undergoes in order to earn a longer-term intervention in the final 
analysis. The major idea behind this proposition is for the international community to take into 
consideration that intervention in conflicts like Darfur, cannot terminate at the level of AMIS. 
The international community has therefore taken the right step to deploy the UNAMID mission 
in consonance with a vision to rebuild Darfur.     
 
The big question however remains: How much longer must UNAMID remain in Darfur for its 
efforts to be considered commensurate with that kind of peace that is perceived to sustainable? 
That answer lies with the members of the Security Council, but also with the level of progress 
made in Darfur by the current peace actor UNAMID. It is imperative for Darfur’s security 
situation to mutate to the level where the citizens are able to embrace lasting peace and stability. 
That the conflict also seizes to constitute any threat to international peace and security. A 
number of conflicts in the sub-Saharan region have prolonged for many years. To predict an 
imminent end is beyond the peace actors themselves. How then must the international 
community and donors to the peace in Darfur respond to the prolonged path towards peace, 
should the situation remain the same for many more decades? The answer might lie in Lederach 
postulation: “decade thinking” This implies that UNAMID and its authorizers: 
 
“Must think in longer blocks, in decades, in reference to peace building processes 
required to move toward the desired change in relationships” … cognizant “conflicts 
(such as the Darfur one) have been expressed through violent cycles of interaction that 
dates across decades or even generations.”642   
 
In any case it is worth mentioning that UNAMID made its first appearance on Darfuri soil in 
January 2008 following the authorization of its mandate by resolution 1769 in July 2007. In 
like manner, the Security Council on June 29, 2016, adopted resolution 2296 in favour of 
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renewing UNAMID’S mandate once again.643 In 2017 UNAMID would be close to clocking a 
decade in Darfur.     
 
7.8 Examining Lederach’s propositions based on the role of CAS SN in Northern 
Darfur’s conflict.644 
In this section, I endeavour to probe into the operationalization of these propositions in a real-
time conflict like Darfur. How does CAS, deployed as a component of the UNAMID mission 
function on a terrain marred by years of active violence? Put differently, how does CAS 
implement the mission’s mandate on the grassroot level of the conflict?  Elsewhere in this study, 
I established according to Adam Azzain that there are three kinds of conflicts in Darfur. This 
study concentrates on “intergroup conflicts at the grassroot level”. Why is this so?  I chose to 
explore this path because it is at that level of the conflict that an adequate examination of the 
“prospects of indigenous mechanisms in modern conflicts” becomes feasible.  Also, cultural 
resources like those linked to the institution of the NA are utilized in the mitigation of conflicts, 
which stem from the grassroots only. Lastly the inter-group conflict “is the most intricate and 
most challenging to peaceful coexistence in Darfur” and is supposed to have informed the other 
two: The region- centre and the communal elites’ conflict.645  
Similarly, I introduced the cells and mentioned that significant to this study are the activities of 
CAS via the cell which oversees the activities of conflict management, resolution and 
reconciliation. The core of role of CAS, number 2, as outlined elsewhere, basically defines the 
functions of this cell.  
 
Essentially, the general functions of the cells and the second core function of Civil Affairs have 
been examined. In order to build on that and provide concrete evidence of the activities of CAS 
via this cell as obtainable in Darfur, (conflict management and resolution cell) it is imperative 
that I examine the activities of CAS Sector North located at the Headquarters of UNAMID In 
El-Fasher. It is at this point of the analysis that it becomes evident what stakeholders have 
become incorporated as actors in Darfur’s peace process 
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Evaluating CAS SN: 
Broadly speaking, CAS “is entrusted to contribute to the peace building (in Darfur) through 
conflict resolution and reconciliation, as well as capacity building of local authority and civil 
societies, conflict mapping activities and implementing of Quick Impact Projects”646  
It is from these specific categorizations of its duties that CAS SN derives clear-cut guidance 
into the scope of its activities in Northern Darfur.  
 
In one of the documents647 I had the rare privilege to gain access to during my visit to North 
Darfur in 2014, CAS SN had recently reviewed its efforts on the grassroot in the two years 
preceding my arrival. The obligations of CAS SN as culled from that report was outlined under 
the specific rubrics I have listed below: Why do I engage in providing such insight? The 
objective is to briefly provide illumination on specific activities that CAS SN facilitates within 
the geographical confines of north Darfur. As I proceed further in this regard, I will draw 
attention to salient points which that report uncovers.  
 
Firstly, the scope of SN’s activities are as follows:    
1. Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation 
2. Conflict Mapping 
3. Capacity building 
4. Capacity building 
5. Quick Impact Projects 
Conflict Resolution 
That report reveals that prior to my arrival in 2014, CAS SN was and continues to be actively 
engaged with incorporating stakeholders from among level 3 of Darfur’s affected population, 
into the peace process. Over a thousand representatives had been pooled together from among 
the Native Administration, Locality Administrations, IDPs, women, farmers, nomads, 
academics, government officials, youth groups and pastoralists to partake in initiatives geared 
towards peace for the province. This “space” was created by CAS SN to communicate to 
Darfuris the international community’s position on indigenous mechanisms. Darfuris should be 
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aware that the international community attaches importance to the region’s “Traditional 
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms” and views them as relevant to the peace process.  
 
In essence CAS SN facilitates the meeting point for the NA (as an institution) and other 
stakeholders who beyond their representative units also constitute members of tribes under the 
jurisdiction of the NA. This may be interpreted as CAS SN targeting the restoration of the 
Native Administration’s diminished legitimacy648 as well as a reinvigoration of the institution’s 
concomitant role in conflict resolution and reconciliation on the grassroot. To this end, 
initiatives originating from CAS SN also tend to aim towards empowering the Ajaweed who 
are integral to the NA. In similar vein that report discloses that CAS SN does accentuate the 
significance of the Judiyya as a vital tool in the reconciliation of parties to the conflict.  
 
Furthermore, CAS SN putatively recognised the essential role of religious leaders. This in turn 
propelled their integration into the peace process. Religious leaders as I gathered during 
interview sessions, were initially excluded as stakeholders in the Doha document. A subsequent 
review of that document recommended the integration of religious leaders into the peace 
process. Members of the conflict management cell, during our discussions, corroborated this 
decision with a concrete evidence of how CAS effectuated a formal assimilation of religious 
leaders in Darfur. CAS SN had organised (prior to my arrival in 2014 April) four peace process 
meetings that incorporated 130 Imams in Darfur.  One member of conflict management cell 
stressed that: 
“These meetings were organised to explain the Doha document. The Imams were enjoined to 
admonish their followers into accepting peace and to further disseminate the information in the 
Doha document to their followers during Friday prayers.” 649  
The envisaged input of these Imams as leaders who wield considerable influence over a people 
inclined to religious beliefs was assumed to be the motivation for absorbing them as legitimate 
players within UNAMID’s framework for peace in Darfur.   
 
Beyond that, CAS SN supposedly facilitated a number of sensitisation workshops in favour of 
famers and pastoralist in Darfur. The rationale behind these workshops was to hinder the 
emergence of disputes along migratory routes and to engender communal harmony through 
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dialogue among members of the community. As part of CAS efforts towards the reconciliation 
of conflicting parties, SN became involved with the conflict between the Beni Hussein and the 
Northern Rezeigat. In fact, the conflict management cell followed the process up to point where 
both tribes signed a local ceasefire agreement on the 17th of January 2013. I shall elaborate on 
this process in the ninth chapter. At this point it suffices to learn that CAS SN further invested 
time into elevating the capacities of both tribes. This was to enable the negotiation of a peaceful 
settlement at the reconciliation conference that was scheduled to convene at a later date.   
 
To this point, it is clear with reference to validating Lederach’s first proposition, that CAS SN 
legitimates and integrates multiple levels of the affected population. This ostensibly includes 
level three of the affected population as proposed by the author. Furthermore, it is well founded 
to conclude that the stakeholders mentioned below constitute level three of Darfur’s affected 
population. However, when guided by examples from Lederach’s pyramid captured elsewhere, 
the stakeholders below represent a mixture as the case may be of levels 2 and 3 of the affected 
population in Darfur: (See Apendix for Lederach’s Pyramid) 
 
Stakeholder on level three of Darfur’s affected population 
 
• . Members of the Native Administration and by extension the Ajaweed 
• Members of the Locality Administrations 
• IDPs 
• Women 
• Farmers 
• Nomads 
• Academics 
• Government officials 
• Youth groups 
• Pastoralists 
• Religious leaders650 
Indeed, CAS recognises the meaningful contributions of these stakeholders towards the peace 
process. Besides acting in accordance with the stipulations of the mission’s mandate: to adopt 
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an inclusive approach that incorporates actors on the grassroot, CAS SN maintains an 
advantaged position on the basis of its proximity to the people. On that account, officers are 
able to unearth stakeholders deep-seated concerns, fears, and interests.  One officer of the 
conflict management cell during our discussion buttressed the rationale behind CAS SN’s 
efforts to subsume inputs from levels 3 of the affected population as captured above, with other 
initiatives geared towards stable peace. He re-echoed the stakeholders’ sentiments in this 
manner: 
“They want to participate in the peace agreement and not leave the deliberations to the rebels 
and the government alone”.  
 
Essentially this connotes a yearning interest to transcend a marginalised position and to assume 
a status that allows a hitherto voiceless majority “space” in the process that should engender 
peace and stability for all Darfurians. 
 
Conflict mapping:  
This is another aspect where CAS SN’s performance is perceived as relevant to the process of 
achieving peace and stability in the northern Darfur area. As stated in that report, CAS SN is 
involved with “indicating potential flashpoints in North Darfur” 651. In order to understand the 
role CAS in conflict mapping, it suffices to furnish a conception of what conflict mapping 
entails.  Conflict mapping is defined as the systematic process in which a conflict is critically 
analysed to help both the interveners and actors of the conflict in comprehending its root causes 
and nurturing its possible reduction, management or resolution.652 Based on this definition it is 
possible to assume that CAS is involved with analysis on terrains of conflicts where a 
peacekeeping mission is deployed. The document under analysis provides insight into CAS in 
this regard. 
 
CAS via its Crisis Management cell was instrumental in a critical analysis of the conflict in 
Kutum/ Awala locality. Based on that analysis the mission became aware of the root causes of 
that conflict and similarly commenced with formulating strategies to address underlying issues. 
In chapter nine, I will delve in details into the manner in which that conflict was approached. 
Important however is the fact that CAS’s analysis informed the initiatives applied towards 
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charting the pathway to peace for that locality. This demonstrates to a certain extent the 
mission’s dependence on CAS SN as a reliable source for extracting information on conflict 
occurrences within the Northern Darfur area.  However, CAS does not solely assume the role 
of conflict analysis in Darfur, and especially not on the national level, the authors of the Civil 
Affairs Handbook argue that “the analysis from the local level nonetheless feeds into a complex 
stream of analysis conducted by different internal and external actors…”653 in the light of this 
argument analysis by CAS must be meticulously executed. However, there is no way of 
ascertaining the quality and accuracy of reports which have emerged from CAS SN’s conflict 
mapping efforts, which I will subsequently analyse with respect to arriving at the main theme 
of this thesis.  
 
In the course of my discussions with representatives of the Political and Humanitarian Affairs 
nonetheless, I gathered that their units equally engage in analysis of the conflicts on ground as 
related to the duties assigned to them by the mandate. I also realised that these officers exhibited 
equal knowledge when compared to CAS, of the dynamics associated with tribal conflicts that 
erupted between from 2012 and 2014. Similarly, a trend analysis report from the Joint Mission 
Analysis Centre validates a number of the issues highlighted in conflict analysis reports 
emerging from the office of CAS.  In any case, it is worth mentioning that the authors of the 
civil affairs handbook underscore the need for CAS officers to conduct conflict mapping with 
precision:    
“If the basic facts and the interpretation of the local conflict dynamics are inaccurate, the 
overarching strategy of the mission to fulfil its mandate is likely to be misdirected”.  654 
A subsequent mapping of the conflict in the Jabel Amir area precipitated the creation of the 
“Joint Protection Group” as the intervention mechanism utilized in addressing that crisis. 
That initiative became the platform on which the crisis management cell participated actively 
in supporting efforts towards peace in that locality  
 
Capacity Building: 
In similar vein, that report disclosed the activities of CAS SN in the sphere of building the 
capacity of local leaders as well as those of civil society organisations.  
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One major accomplishment of CAS in this regard, was the organisation of 57 DDPD 
dissemination workshops in various localities in Northern Darfur. Participants were drawn from 
the male and female gender bringing the number of all participants to a total of 7,540 
Darfuris.655 A separate report stated that DDPD dissemination workshops were conducted 
between 18 January and 02 July 2012. That report discloses stakeholders ranging from: locality 
Native Administration and youths to religious leaders, lawyers and political leaders.  
 
One striking observation from that data was: that from a total number of 7,286 participants, 
4,478 were men while 2,808 were women.656 This variance in male and female participation 
may be interpreted two ways. On the one hand, it tends to evidence (on the part of women in 
Darfur) a minimal interest in the peace process. On the other hand, it may be understood as the 
clear manifestation of a patriarchal society. One group tended to favour the argument of a male 
dominated indigenous conflict resolution system. Others demonstrate an ingrained inclination 
towards gender inequality.  For example, out of the 141 representatives from the Zam Zam 
Native Administration, all were male. In similar vein of the 113 IDP youths from the Zam Zam 
IDP Camp in El-Fasher who participated, all 113 representatives were men. Also, among 
religious leaders all 94 participants were men. 657This is the point where the humanitarian 
component steps in: To advocate inclusiveness, underscore human rights, promote gender 
equality and communicate to all Darfurians the right for all people (male and female) to 
participate in the peace process. 658 Within the scope of building the capacity of locals, CAS 
undertakes activities that foster cooperation with civil society groups. The regulations guiding 
the activities of CAS with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) recommends for CAS to: 
“Act as an “enabler” for civil society to emerge and function, but not to take a strong lead in 
doing so. Civil Affairs can and should encourage civil society actors to understand their 
potential role in conflict resolution and democratic governance…”659  
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During my group discussion with CAS SN, I gathered that prior to 2003 CSOs had been 
dormant.  CSOs were not allowed to operate in full swing in Darfur. 660In fact, the re-emergence 
of CSOs in Darfur can be traced to the year 2004 when (according to a former Minister of 
Darfur) the many initiatives to solve Darfur’s problems were collated under a single framework 
tagged: “The Darfur Forum for Peace and Reconciliation”. During the 2nd Tripoli declaration 
in 2005, the group split and formed the pro and anti-civil society groups extant in Darfur 
today.661 According to one respondent during the meeting: 
“Grave challenges are facing CSOs in Darfur. The environment in not conducive for CSOs to 
play their role in the peace process and most times the government blocks the activities of a 
good number of vibrant CSOs and banned others from any further participation in the Doha 
talks”. 662 
 Regardless of the numerous setbacks, CAS continues to support whatever efforts CSOs bring 
to the table. CAS organises seminars and conferences to empower and assist them in developing 
their capacities further.  One of such seminars was tagged:  
“The role of CSOs in the Darfur Peace Process”. 
 
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): 
“Are small scale, low cost projects that are planned and implemented within a short timeframe. 
With respect to a UN mission, QIPs represent projects funded and/ or implemented by UN 
peacekeeping operations. QIPs are executed to the advantage of communities and should not 
be perceived as humanitarian or long-term development support. The implementation of QIPs 
tends to bolster confidence in the mission. 663 According to one officer during my discussion 
with CAS SN cells: 
 
 “Officers go to communities to ask them what they want then return to map out strategies 
toward implementing.”664 
 
In 2011, a number of QIPs included the funding of two youth training centres in El-Fasher, 
North Darfur and the construction of classrooms, offices, and other facilities. In addition, the 
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Shangil Tobaya locality in North Darfur benefitted from funding in the area of education, health 
and water.  Prior to my arrival in 2014 the implementation of 11 QIPs had been underway in 
addition to four backlog projects.  
 
By probing into the activities of CAS SN in the Northern Darfur region, I demonstrated the 
manner in which CAS incorporates stakeholders into the peace process using workshops and 
seminars. This section has also brought clarity to the issue of who constitute the stakeholders 
on level 3 of Lederach’s affected population. In like manner, the section informed about CAS 
SN engagement in conflict analysis tailored towards both the understanding of conflict 
dynamics and the utilization of appropriate strategies in its mitigation. Finally, the reader has 
garnered insight into CAS SN role in the area of conflict management, resolution and 
reconciliation confirming the significance of Darfur’s peace-making mechanisms in the 
conflicts mentioned.  
 
Conclusion reflections 
The factors, which have militated against Darfur’s path to sustainable peace, are legion. In spite 
of that, the nagging question as to how positively or otherwise hitherto applied mechanisms 
have contributed to peace and stability in the first place, continues to arise.  Examining the 
international response to Darfur’s conflict from another analytical perspective, one is led to 
reflect on whether the continued instability in the Darfur region, was a case of failure on the 
part of the AU- during the period of its existence, to bring sustainable peace or might it have 
been that the military approach to peace was inadequate to address the nature of the Darfur 
conflict? While AMIS activated military action- (albeit at its barest minimum), against the 
insurgents and other warring parties, the Abuja talks became the interventionist tool targeting 
a political solution to the conflict. Yet all of these mechanisms have engendered very minimal 
successes with respect to durable peace.  
 
In seeking to restore the Darfur region to a state of normalcy, the international community has 
both successfully and unsuccessfully in many areas applied two of the three major tracks of 
third-party intervention to conflicts of the 21st century. UNAMID beyond military action 
operates within a framework that encapsulates peacekeeping, peace-making and peace building.  
As was elucidated in the chapter, such intervention approach relies on the support of 
components like the Civil Affairs Section; tasked with the onus of actualising the mandate that 
authorises intervention on Darfur’s grassroot level  
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The track III level of intervention as demonstrated in the third section of this chapter, evidences 
a work in progress status with respect to a multidimensional intervention that creates space for 
grassroot participation. It is yet premature to make an overall statement, especially since the 
mission remains an active one. Nonetheless chapter nine will illuminate on individual cases of 
conflict, where an analysis may expose levels of success or failure.   This chapter also examined 
the direct causes of the Darfur conflict, based on Edward Azar’s framework for understanding 
the management of Protracted Social Conflict.  
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Chapter Eight 
8.1 The crux… 
This chapter seeks to provide an understanding of Darfur’s indigenous conflict resolution and 
peace-making institutions. It develops on the preceding chapter in a way that illuminates on one 
of the listed stakeholders relevant to the goal of achieving durable peace for Darfur. As there is 
a lot of history connected to the region’s institutions for handling conflict and reinstating 
stability within society, this chapter will attempt to maintain brevity by providing the basic and 
most salient information which should lead to the main points to be addressed in this thesis. 
The chapter commences by providing insight into Darfur’s “Native Administration”. It is an 
indigenous institution basically associated with the task of local governance, conflict resolution 
as well as the restoration of societal coherence. That term “Native Administration” (Idara Ahlia 
in Arabic) is adopted- as dubbed by the Anglo-Egyptian influence- in reference to such local 
governing structures extant within the sultanate prior to its capitulation to imperial invasion in 
1916. While the focus here is not mainly to draw attention to the local governing institution, 
attendant actors, and the evolution thereof, from the era of the sultans to contemporary times, 
such background information nonetheless, must be delved into, so as to provide scholarship 
about the ways in which society functioned, maintained order and stability and how it has 
operated in contemporary times in the face of near consistent reformation.  
 
What is of major essence in this chapter is to understand the current standing of Darfur’s peace 
and reconciliation mechanism- Judiyya and its custodians- Ajaweed, and their functions in the 
search for sustainable peace within the region. The first step is to establish whether or not the 
people of Darfur, despite colonial interference, attach any significance to indigenous peace-
making institutions and actors. In chapter 5, an overview knowledge on peace-making 
mechanisms and actors across sub-Saharan Africa has been provided, specifically those actors 
who advocate for justice and peace of the restorative kind. When linked to Lederach’s 
underlying assumptions for transforming protracted conflicts, international peace actors are 
essentially enjoined to adopt a culturally sensitive approach. One that empowers these 
indigenous institutions and reinstates the legitimacy of undermined attendant custodians.  
 
In the light of Lederach’s propositions three important points are worth mentioning. First, this 
chapter identifies the broader institution of Darfur’s Native Administration, concomitant 
custodians and mechanisms, as the “sociocultural resources” within the context. According to 
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the author, these “local people and their culture” can indeed become significant to the external 
peace actor’s framework for achieving durable peace.665  I must specifically point out here that 
in establishing Darfur’s peace-making institution as an age long one, I do not suggest that 
attendant procedures exist in its pristine form. Phases of external intrusion as well as successive 
post -colonial governments, impacted on its peace-making institution (NA) and remoulded 
them to the current state in which it exists today.        
 
Second, in the light of the author’s (Lederach) assertion of the concept of reconciliation as an 
integral aspect of building peace in protracted conflicts, this chapter will concentrate on and 
provide detailed scholarship on Darfur’s Ajaweed elders as the “insider partial” and Judiyya as 
both the “cultural and contextual” resource for achieving reconciliation.666  
 
Third, Lederach contends that middle range leaderships are the most suitable actors within the 
context of a protracted conflict because they possess the capacity to sustain conflict 
transformation.667. He supports his assertion with the argument stating, “middle range actors 
are positioned such that they are connected to, and often have the trust of both top level and 
grassroot actors.”668 His definition however of middle range leaders as “natural helpers”, 
“insider partial” and “mediators” delineates clearly Darfur’s Native Administrators as well as 
Ajaweed elders. These leaders are located at the grassroot level of the Darfur’s peace-making 
society.  Though they possess the capacity to act as intermediaries between the top-level leaders 
and their constituencies at the bottom, (NA) they are not recognized as leaders of the middle 
range or second level. With those points at the back of the readers mind, this chapter proposes 
to examine the relevance of such indigenous actors and mechanisms for peace, from pre-
colonial Darfur until the current regime. In developing chapters I shall examine the prospects 
of such peace-making mechanisms when applied to the current cases of conflict at Darfur’s 
grassroot level. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to mention why the chapter accentuates the Judiyya system and not 
the parent institution of Darfur’s “Native Administration” per se? The first reason on the one 
hand is connected to the fact that the Judiyya remains Darfur’s only mechanism for 
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reconciliation. The NA on the other hand was instituted to perform other functions besides its 
major obligations of conflict resolution and the maintenance of law and order within the society. 
In the postcolonial era however, the authority and legitimacy to extend its influence into the 
postcolonial state, diminished immensely. This indigenous conflict mitigating institution 
became unable due especially, to its abolition in 1970, to exert the same legitimate control over 
domains formerly under its jurisdiction. This was the case in the whole of Sudan, but most 
prominently within Darfur’s predominantly rural disposition. The end result for example being 
evidenced by the NA’s inability to tackle pockets of conflict which eventually escalated into 
full blown in 2003, at its very latent stage.  
 
The task therefore is not only to examine the prospects of a re-empowered, yet politicized NA 
in the emanating discourse relating to the current tides, but as already mentioned, to examine 
the prospects of administering relational change as suggested by Lederach contingent on the 
wisdom and resources of specific track III actors charged with the realization of that vital aspect 
of conflict transformation-reconciliation. It therefore rests within the purview of this study, to 
probe into the efficacy of the “Ajaweed-elders within a peace process that gives room for the 
application of the Judiyya- reconciliation mechanism as supplementary efforts to bolster a 
comprehensive framework geared towards the realization of sustainable peace. 
 
8.2 The term indigenous  
This chapter on Darfur’s indigenous peace-making mechanism also retains conception of the 
term “indigenous” as already alluded to in the sixth chapter of this thesis. The usage of the term 
in conjunction with expressions like institutions, mechanisms and actors, which are linked to 
peace-making, will refer to systems, methods and players emanating from within the context in 
question. This basically establishes the fact that such resources will not fall under the rubric of 
mechanisms or actors that are exogenous to Darfur. Also, when examining the context in 
question, peace-making resources will not include initiatives such as grassroot NGOs, religious 
groups or the likes, operating at the micro level within the region. The term “indigenous” 
therefore does not encompass or depict all inputs towards peace as may be emanating from civil 
society groups in Darfur.  Contextual resources will only be captioned “indigenous” as long as 
they draw heavily on and continue to establish a connection to Darfur’s peace-making heritage, 
to which the people can relate, and in many ways can be linked to the era of the Fur sultanate. 
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This will equally hold true regardless of external influence from the era of colonialism or a 
process of reformation effectuated by regimes of the post-colonial dispensation.  
 
The seventh chapter of this thesis established the connection between land acquisition in Darfur 
and the attendant role of the Native Administration in its allocation, as was the case more 
prominently during Anglo-Egyptian condominium. In this chapter I shall examine another 
domain of the Native Administration’s influence in Darfur- conflict resolution as well as peace 
and reconciliation. Native Administrators undertook such obligations especially during the 
colonial era and in the aftermath. Chapter seven conceived of the NA as an indigenous 
governing institution whose actors became recipients of colonial favouritism. It equally 
constituted the platform on which the condominium launched a cost-effective form of 
governance that was adopted in consonance with its proposed conservative policy and which 
ultimately was defined by gross underdevelopment to say the least. Yet the onus of providing 
peace and stability, rested on the institution, the actors in it and the mechanisms employed in 
sustaining orderliness and reinstating harmony in the aftermath of conflict.  
 
8.3 Native Administration and its evolution: A historical analysis 
Darfur in the days of the Sultanate, maintained a multi-ethnic society. The Sultans sought to 
establish a centralized system of governance to supersede extant indigenous and hierarchical 
political structures that revolved around the Fur chiefs. The entire endeavour to reorganize a 
predominantly agrarian society targeted the creation of institutions that would both contribute 
to the proper functioning of the state and at the same time redirect the authority wielded by the 
Fur chiefs to the Sultans at the centre. Such attempts at state creation, culminated with the 
creation of three major centralized institutions of administration and governance. The first was 
an upgrade from kin based communal arrangements for landownership and allocation, to the 
Hakura system already mentioned in the seventh chapter of this thesis. The second was the 
embrace of a belief system as state religion, which was also applied to administrative as well 
as judicial sectors of the state. The last was the establishment of a control system where power 
and authority previously invested in a hierarchical framework presided over by territorial heads, 
(wielding influence over a heterogeneous ethnic configuration with powers for land allocation), 
shifted but not entirely, to the institution of the magdume- a commissioner, who ruled over a 
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magdumate-province and was furnished with ultimate authority. Magdumes now administered 
provinces with a multi-ethnic composition.669  
 
This was the status quo and the modus operandi of a centralized system of governance before 
the invasion in 1874 of Egyptian powers (also known as the Turkiyya) and the Mahdisht 
movement between 1885. During both phases of Sudanese history, the system of governance 
and power rested at the centre, almost replicating the era of the Sultans.670  In fact it seemed the 
efforts to create a centralized system of governance intensified during the era of the Mahdist. 
Mamdani buttresses this point with a brief insight into the nature of governance at the time. He 
states that: 
 “The Khalifa’s rule was extremely centralized and autocratic, and he saw any power 
wielded by tribal sheikhs as a threat to his supreme authority. For thirteen years (the 
period of Mahdist control in Darfur), the main axiom of the Khalifa’s policy was to 
break the power of any tribal sheikh who might possibly oppose his authority… he 
concluded “The Mahdiya was extremely hostile to tribal organization along political 
and administrative lines.671  
 
The era of the Mahdist ended in 1898. For a period, the sultanate of the Fur was reactivated but 
not in its entirety. Ali Dinar who was allegedly a ‘prominent Fur loyalist of the Keria royal 
family’ was said to have returned and ordained himself sultan. It was he who supposedly made 
efforts to revamp old administrative systems. His stay nonetheless would not prolong enough 
to make an impact, especially as echoes of imperialist invasion already within the Sudan, soon 
caught up with its western region.672   
 
8.4 The end of the Sultanate and the arrival of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
With the arrival of the British in 1916, Darfur lost its independence forever and became 
amalgamated with the rest of Sudan.  The colonial powers deposed Ali Dinar who was the last 
of the Fur sultans and then adopted a devolutionary approach towards administering the region. 
At this point it may be important to mention quickly that although this colonial regime was 
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referred to as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Egyptian influence was almost largely 
invisible.  
 
The devolutionary approach as already alluded to, was a deviation from what had obtained in 
the previous era of the Mahddiya. In fact, the British initially thought to replicate the Indirect 
Rule system of administration as defined by Lord Lugard, which had found strong relevance in 
the northern part of Nigeria. Indirect rule in its defined original form would nonetheless become 
inapplicable to the setting in Darfur. 673The British therefore resorted to designing a system 
compatible with Darfur’s existing internal structures for administration. It was in the light of 
this, that internal structures as well as mechanisms were revived, and Darfur’s indigenous 
institutions and actors empowered. With time an evolutionary process was set in motion. This 
one gradually restructured and developed the system and for example introduced new 
leadership titles to conform to the imperialist underlying vision for the region. In fact, the 
British conceived of the notion to politically side line Egyptian administrators with both the 
adoption of a locally inspired institution for governance and the corollary empowerment of its 
custodians. Above all the arrangement was regarded as most economical and efficient;674 and 
on the grounds of its origin, would be referred to as “Native Administration”.  
 
8.5 Native Administration: Definitions. 
 At this point a very brief definition of the Native Administration as culled from James Morton 
should suffice. According to the author, the Idarat al ahlia (the Arabic version of the term 
Native) is: 
 ‘a system of local government in which the state uses traditional leaders-chiefs or sheikhs- to 
administer the people of their tribe, where tribe means any group which is organised around 
kinship’. 675 
His definition provides some basic knowledge into how the Condominium (Anglo-Egyptian 
powers) managed to hold together Darfur’s predominantly tribal arrangement.  However, a 
more elaborate definition according to Lord Hailey, quoted by Bakheit states that the: 
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“Native Administration is a procedure by which a colonial government whose European 
establishment is necessarily restricted in numbers, has provided itself with administrative 
machinery required for certain definite purposes of which the most important was the 
supervision of tribal communities, the maintenance of law and order, the assessment of taxes, 
the provision of local government services and the establishment of judicial tribunals”. 676 
 
8.6 The leadership structure of the Native Administration 
The institution of the Native Administration naturally operates within a hierarchical framework. 
In contemporary times both leadership titles and structures of the Native Administration have 
largely evolved. British colonial administrators gradually commenced with the changes, which 
have continued in the post-independent state. The Native Administrative consists of three 
leadership levels: The top, intermediate and lower level leadership positions. Each level 
possesses the power to preserve law and order as well as collect tax. The paramount chief 
occupies the top-level leadership position. He presides over an entire tribe. He exercises judicial 
powers inside the courts and possesses the authority to deliver jail sentences.677  Today 
appellations used to identify a paramount chief, differs among tribal groupings and would 
include titles like:  Malik, Shartai, Sultan, and Nazir. The title ‘Nazir’ was a creation of the 
British for the paramount chiefs of a number of Arab groups678. The ‘Omda’ occupies the 
intermediate level of leadership. He directly submits to the paramount chief and heads tribal 
sub-groupings. Put differently, he exercises power over as many as 100 lower level leaders.679 
Both levels of leadership in addition can exercise mitigatory powers over their followers. At 
the lower leadership levels are the ‘Sheikhs’. These are village or camp heads. 680  They have 
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powers to resolve conflicts, which stem from between 10 to 40 households under them. They 
nonetheless cannot exercise judicial powers from within the confines of a real court.681  
 
8.7 Relevance during the Sultanate 
It must be noted that despite strong efforts to centralize the Dar Fur sultanate, such 
readjustments never aimed at eroding the legitimacy of Native leaders in significant domains 
such as the judicial sector of the state, where their impact had been most effectively felt.  The 
Fur Sultanate as early as around the 15th and 16th century engaged the services of the tribal 
leaders to perform the function of administering justice based on customary law. In this way 
the Sultans maintained societal adherence to the law, which curbed lawlessness to its barest 
minimum. Even with the advent of Islam and the Sharia law, Native leaders retained their power 
over judicial matters with guidance from an Islamic clergy. 682Defaulters within the state did 
not go scot-free. Crimes such as fornication, adultery, homicide etc., were levied with the 
payment of fines in form of cattle or length of cloth called takiyya. Other duties of a tribal leader 
during that period included the collection of taxes, and the power to administer land, which the 
Sultans eventually redefined in line with the newly established Hakura (estate) system683 
 
8.8 In the Colonial era: relevance and reformation of tribal administration 
As mentioned elsewhere, the powers of the Native Administrators became all the more 
legitimatized during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The colonial administrators absorbed 
the entire framework of Darfur’s indigenous peace-making and governing institution-Native 
Administration and subsequently commenced with effecting significant changes. In areas for 
example where the structures of the Native Administration seemed to defy basic 
comprehension, modifications were concluded and applied contextually. 684 In actual fact, the 
purpose for adopting Darfur’s extant indigenous governing structures, was to achieve the 
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gradual transition from native governing institutions to more modern apparatuses for 
governance.685  
 
The British colonisers elevated the powers of the tribal leaders to perform administrative 
functions in addition to the duties hitherto assigned to them during the sultanate. Tribal leaders 
thereupon, became visible within the education and health sectors of the colonial regime, 
maintaining both administrative powers as well as judicial. Executing judicial rights- on the 
platform of native courts- over their communities.  Similarly, very conspicuous changes became 
discernible in the Native Administration’s configuration of authority. The1922 ‘Powers of 
Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance’ for example, successfully legalised the judicial authority of 
nomadic sheiks686. These village headsmen now operated with the full approval from the 
colonial government, even though before now limited powers had been assigned to them. In 
like manner, the creation of new titles for Arab groups engendered the impetus for 
insubordination and further exposed the system to unnecessary power tussle.687  From 1922 
onwards, a number of other ordinances were passed: in 1925(Village Courts Ordinance). The 
1927 ordinance was a review of the 1922 ordinance exclusive to nomadic tribes, which now 
covered sedentary groups. The 1928 ordinance basically vested tribal leaders with extended 
judicial powers to include the hearing of cases. Such tasks hitherto were beyond their scope of 
operation.  
 
By 1932 the Native Courts Ordinance called into existence more formalised courts that were 
presided over by the native sheikhs.688  Shortly before independence in 1951, colonial powers 
passed yet another ordinance in line with its evolutionary agenda for Darfur’s NA system. It 
was called the Local Government Ordinance. Its provision stipulated the detachment of certain 
administrative duties from the functional capacity of Native Administrators; more precisely, 
this new legislation precipitated the transfer of financial powers from tribal leaders to the local 
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government councils. 689.  Reformations, which occurred during the colonial era almost always 
enhanced the capacity of the Native Administration to carry out those duties, which they knew 
to perform best: conflict resolution and peace-making. Apparently, the Native Administration 
functioned most effectively in conjunction with the institution of the Native Courts, which 
ultimately became the trajectory through which tribal leaders exercised judicial powers over 
the community and by extension, also maintained law and order among its people. 
  
The British perceived this approach to governing the province of Darfur as most undemanding 
financially. Yet in hindsight, it might not be misguided to view Darfur’s version of indirect 
rule, -on the flip side- as somewhat of a blessing in disguise, especially within the context of 
having the colonial government provide unflinching support to a system with tested capacity to 
guarantee maximum security as well as maintain law and order.  British administrators never 
painted a picture of perfect harmony within the society. In fact, it recorded severally, occasions 
of intergroup or intragroup conflicts: between Arabs and Non-Arabs as well as intra-group 
conflicts.  
 
In his write up, Morton citing the 1945 Governor General’s report noted that: 
“Despite the relative success the British had in keeping the peace, there hardly was a 
single year of the Condominium in which the Governor did not report a number of tribal 
fights”690 however these were amicably resolved.  And contingent on the authority 
wielded over the community by tribal leaders, the province satisfactorily maintained 
stability and order. 691  
 
The Native Administration effectively put a check on its members to circumvent the escalation 
of conflicts. One thing was certain, while the influence of the Native Administration had been 
milder in other parts of the Sudan, for a predominantly rural profile like Darfur, it became an 
option without a best-case alternative. That being the case however, the period of colonial 
influence in Darfur was considered the most retrogressive phase of Darfur’s history. Having 
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bequeathed posterity with an indelible legacy of inequity and impoverishment. Darfur in 
currents times, continues to languish under the consequences of a trajectory further explored 
by successive national governments. Conversely, there is no gainsaying the overriding 
consensus among scholars conversant with the Darfur’s indigenous conflict resolution and 
peace-making institutions, that some wisdom may have emerged from that phase in Darfur’s 
history: The empowerment of Darfur’s Native Administration as a vehicle towards social 
coherence and re-engineering. Unfortunately, such discernments about the potency of the 
Native Administration have eluded successive post-independence national governments in the 
Sudan. These have either chosen to bury its efficacy with a colonial past or to manipulate such 
in the direction of special interests.  The next section will probe into how the Native 
Administration fared in the hands of Sudan’s postcolonial civilian and military governments 
alike.  
 
8.9 Native Administration after 1956. 
Not long after attaining its freedom in 1956, that colonial agenda geared at accomplishing the 
gradual transformation of the Native Administration into an institution to be incorporated into 
more contemporary structures for governance was shelved. According to Abdul Jalil however: 
“Native administration with its twin institution of native courts continued to function as 
the backbone of local government in rural Sudan even after the country became 
independent in 1956 under the first civilian government which administered the country 
for two years…” 
It was shortly afterwards that the institution called Native Administration and its custodians 
began to experience the intense heat that has trailed as well as undermined it effectiveness in 
Darfur’s till date. Today the institution called Native Administration has since ceased to exist 
in its purest form, as obtained during the condominium at least. Tribal leaders have undergone 
ostensible transformation. One that aligns with the purpose of the 1989 regime led by the 
National Islamic Front.  
 
As early as the 1960s, a growing antipathy towards the Native Administration commenced 
gathering momentum among liberally minded educated Sudanese. Their perception of the 
Native Administration in a nutshell, labelled the institution as a neo-colonial apparatus capable 
of compromising the efforts of Sudan’s independent state towards establishing world compliant 
democratic governing structures. By 1964 the call to neutralise the NA system had become all 
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the more vociferous. Sudanese elites motivated either by ideology or religion, pushed for a 
complete abolition of the Native Administration. Interestingly, Islamic fundamentalism and 
leftist inclinations in Sudan have existed as political antagonist, however both ideological 
motivations had, most specifically around the early 1960s and 1970s, prevailed as the Native 
Administrations worse adversary. Both groups posed as agents of reformation on a postcolonial 
political stage dominated by nationalist parties, which maintained a very strong alliance with 
members of the Native Administration.  The more leftist opinions envisioned the reformation 
of Sudan’s governance structures devoid of Native Administrators. The religious minded aimed 
at ideologically penetrating, especially Sudan’s rural west to overthrow existing religious sects 
that had significantly shaped the political orientation of the people.692  
 
While the atmosphere remained tense around the subject of establishing social change, Sudan’s 
military regime between 1958 and 1964 seemed less agitated over the clamour against the 
Native Administration. It was the new interim government aligned towards the left that devised 
concrete plans to dissolve the NA. Its strategic agenda included mapping out a replacement 
strategy for when the plan to neutralise the NA would eventually be completed. It commenced 
by putting forth recommendations for members of an elected local government council to 
supplant Native Administrators in all of their functional capacity; the plan as stipulated would 
follow through with: 
• The suspension of the Native Administration in northern Sudan and the distribution of 
its functions among various specialized agencies. 
• The repeal of the Chief’s courts and the Native Courts ordinances 
• The withdrawal of judicial powers of the nazirs, omdas and sheikhs and vested in the 
Judiciary. 
• The consolidation and increase of local government police to fill the vacuum created by 
the dismissal of nazirs, omdas and sheikhs. 
• The increase of local government staff to discharge the responsibilities previously 
performed by the Native Administration. 
• The formation of purge committees to punish corrupt administration personnel 
• The immediate liquidation of Native Administrations in the Blue Nile, Northern 
Kassala, Khartoum, Kordofan and Darfur provinces and the formation of a commission 
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to investigate the necessary plans for liquidating Native Administration in the southern 
provinces. 693 
For the short-lived appearance made by the interim government on the political stage, these 
measures would not be implemented, as that administrative leadership soon made way for a 
new regime. 
 
The quest for social transformation clearly inspired a strong hostility towards the Native 
Administration, but equally prevailing was a political undercurrent to the entire discourse 
around dissolving the system of Native Administration. While a greater part of Sudan’s post-
independence political history has been shaped by the influence of communism and Islamism, 
two indigenous political parties had emerged as nationalist parties and frontrunners on Sudan’s 
immediate post-colonial political landscape: The Umma party with ties to the Mahdist 
movement and a solid political base in Darfur and the National Unionist Party popular among 
Sudanese in the north. To overturn the political status quo in their favour, major opposition 
groups (Communist and Islamist) needed to break into extant alliances between these political 
parties and members of the Native Administration. Native Administrators became mobilising 
agents within their communities for the political aggrandizement of these indigenous parties 
who dominated Sudan’s political scene during the first and second post independent 
parliamentary dispensation. The homogeneity of purpose-to actualise the abolition of the Native 
Administration- constituted the common ground on which these estranged groups (communist 
and Islamists) could meet.  
 
Very pronounced in December 1964 was equally the outcry by Sudanese professionals within 
the judicial sector, over the need to terminate the judicial powers hitherto exercised by members 
of the Native Administration. 694 The dissolution of Sudan’s Native Administration system 
seemed imminent.  However, when exactly this could become reality continued to remain 
obscure. Apparently, this also was a case of each government’s unpreparedness to take the bull 
by its horns. There was no denying the ostensible undertone of disinclination to terminate a 
system whose roots obviously run so deep. 
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In the meantime, the question of dissolution seemed to remain at the discussion level. Members 
of the Native Administration however, would not sit and watch an age-long institution and its 
custodians gradually plunge into oblivion. On that account, substantial efforts emerged. They 
were aimed at reliving the institution’s positive contribution to the preservation of peace and 
stability-at least, as was the case in the peripheries.695 In fact Takana citing Abushouk noted the 
creation at this time of the Kordofan Native Administration Leadership Association intended 
to maintain the internal unity of its members and equally calling on them to hold strong in the 
face of gross animosity towards the institution.696. With the emergence of the Umma party as 
victorious in the parliamentary elections of 1965, the intense pressure to dissolve the Native 
Administration subsided. 697 Probably owing to the added value to be derived from preserving 
the system.  In the next phase of Sudan’s history, Darfur’s NA struggled hard to maintain its 
balance against the currents of tough oppositions which confronted it.  
 
8.10 Native Administration under the Nimeiri regime 
In 1969 the political atmosphere transitioned from civilian to military. Jafar Nimeri had 
assumed power on the platform of a military coup and promptly proceeded in 1971 to assuage 
the yearnings of all agitators seeking to undermine the authority of Sudan’s Native 
Administration. Once his act was perfected, the substitution of the now abolished Native 
Administration for a new legislation: The People’s Local Government Act, followed suit. This 
development denoted the withdrawal of all powers previously vested in the Native 
Administration. Government ordained personnel would fill the vacuum and continue to 
administer these areas in the same manner as members of the Native Administration. With time, 
it became evident that the government lacked a clearly defined blueprint to effectuate 
successfully, the transition from the status quo to the new order. The consequences could hardly 
be shoved aside. Security became an issue as the government battled contingent on meagre 
resources, inexperienced officials and few law enforcement personnel, to maintain any form of 
cohesion at all. This was specifically true to areas like Darfur where the Native Administration 
constituted the backbone of society in terms, as already mentioned, of governance, law and 
order, conflict resolution and peace-making. 
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It must be stated nonetheless, that the dissolution of the Native Administration affected only 
tribal leaders at the uppermost leadership positions. The leadership authority of the omda at the 
intermediate, and the sheikhs at the lower levels were left intact. But how could the body operate 
without the head? Besides it had never been a part of their functioning nature-at both levels 
below the paramount chief-to relate directly with the government or operate in judicial capacity, 
even when they possessed the powers to settle disputes on their own level of jurisdiction.  At 
some point, it became inevitable for government officials assigned to fill the vacuum for local 
governance, to revert to the wisdom and expertise of Native Administrators on resolving issues 
that gradually proofed too overwhelming. Some very delicate issues relating to land nonetheless 
continued to receive the direct attention of experienced leaders who at each point remained 
willing to render such services. 698 In fact, Leonardi and Abdul- Jalil noted that: 
‘The importance of the judicial role of the traditional leaders was made particularly apparent 
by the abolition of the Native Administration’.   
Ostensibly, the more modern judicial set up, established to replace those of the Native 
Administration failed to measure up to the precedent set by the abolished institution.699 The 
situation therefore warranted for Native Administrators to assume significant roles along the 
line of more modern judicial practices. Indeed, the waters were becoming troubled. Only the 
experienced and knowledgeable could attempt to wade in them. 
 
There was no gainsaying the void created by dismantling the justice and control mechanism of 
Sudan’s rural societies. Armed robbery became rampant in Darfur700, and no sooner than the 
abolition became a reality than the south of Darfur began experiencing initial boundary disputes 
numbered to as many as 16.701 
 
8.11 Seeking the restoration of the Idara Ahliya 
In the 1980s the Native Administration was restored in individual regions of the Sudan: in the 
east and in the west. In Darfur precisely, Ahmed Direiji, was said to have restored the uppermost 
level of the Native Administration. He was himself a leader in the institution’s hierarchy and a 
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sitting governor of Darfur.702 However as rightly observed by Morton,703 it seemed like the 
Native Administration never really succeeded in gathering its initial momentum especially as 
the odds continued to move against it. Not even under the guise of a revival agenda floated by 
Sudan’s Islamic fundamentalist. In 1989 a new regime seized power and what followed 
afterwards was a complete overhaul of the Native Administration in a manner that conformed 
to the ideological persuasion of the National Islamic Front headed by Sudan’s incumbent- Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir. 
 
8.12 The Idara Ahliya and the 1989 regime 
If previous regimes in the Sudan either developed cold feet towards dissolving the Native 
Administration or simply threw caution to the wind by out rightly abolishing the Idara Ahliya, 
the 1989 regime arrived neither seeking the Native Administration’s redundancy in Sudan’s 
rural areas, where they had been most active, nor a complete abolition of the system. In fact, 
the NIF had no problem from the outset, figuring out exactly to what use it wanted to put the 
Native Administration. This consideration holds true for a regime whose blueprint for the Sudan 
included an agenda for islamization, with emphasis on its peripheries. The current regime 
referred to as the Ingaz (Salvation) in Sudan, is responsible for some of the major 
reconfigurations that have occurred in the entire Native Administration system since 1989. In 
Darfur, it has successfully weakened the cultural foundation of the Native Administration and 
indeed redefined the purpose as well as the role of the Native Administration in the Sudan at 
large. It has become evident during this regime how tribal affiliations have resonated most 
prominently on Sudan’s rural terrains. In the past, it was largely uncommon for a Tribal leader 
to wield authority over a purely homogenous ethnic composition. In fact, a Fur chief could 
exercise authority over Arabs and non-Arabs alike. Under the current Ingaz, this arrangement 
has become an anomaly. The tendency to have perceived the empowerment of the Native 
Administration during the Condominium as a process to re-tribalize Darfur becomes even more 
ostensible during the NIF regime. 704 The 1989 regime has indeed taken the discourse on 
Darfur’s tribilization via the Native Administration to a different level. In contrast to an 
empowerment agenda geared towards societal harmony, the Ingaz has maintained an institution 
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to which it plays the tunes its custodians must dance to.  In the light of a reconstruction agenda, 
the current regime has created leadership positions in the line of the Native Administrations 
positions of authority; where positions of authority hitherto remained none existent. Traditional 
posts and titles had been renamed and lower ranking leaders or persons without specific 
designations or obligation elevated to the level where such reformations became capable of 
fomenting disputes between tribal groups. In current times the system has been confronted with 
excessive control from the centre. This has called to question the legitimacy of a system where 
the loyalty of the tribal chief must first and foremost align with those of his constituency.  
 
Whatever posture the Native Administrative has assumed in contemporary Sudan, stems from 
the orchestrations of the NIF as well as attendant eroding factors.  As much as the Native 
Administration could not be considered a system without its flaws, in its heydays, the system 
continued to flourish in accordance with the vision of its forbearers, whose motive was to 
establish an institution capable of maintaining law and order, of providing justice and of 
ensuring societal cohesion via its apparatus for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Today a 
tribal leader leads his community in prayers, in the similitude of an imam (an Islamic religious 
leader) collects religious taxes, teaches in the mosque and mobilises his members for the 
purpose of a jihad (holy war) with the south. 705. He maintains strong political allegiance to the 
government’s political party also known as the National Congress and earns a monthly income 
to compensate for his dual role of service to the community and loyalty to the government. 
Such radical reversal in the functions of a Native Administrator is perceived as a complete shift 
from the original (during the sultanate and the condominium) conception of tribal leadership in 
Darfur and the Sudan as a whole, to compliance with the stipulations of a regime overcome by 
deep religious sentiment.  Accordingly, it has become commonplace for indigenous leaders to 
be referred to by Islamic appellations like Amir (Arabic for prince), which have substituted 
traditional titles like: sultan, shartai and nazir employed during the Sultanate or 
Condominium.706 
 
The current war has further impacted negatively on a system whose efficacy is persistently 
eroding. Concurrently, the authority and legitimacy of its custodians as a result continues to 
dwindle. The prolonged stay of the 1989 regime has in fact coalesced with the on-going conflict 
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to exacerbate the problems confronting the Native Administration.  The war has either separated 
a people from its tribal leadership or a tribal leader from his people. In similar manner, the 
strategies adopted by the NIF to diminish the powers of the Native Administration since its 
arrival in 1989 (tribilization and politicization) have since stayed and become more pronounced 
in wartime Darfur. Even now the government seems to be embroiled in contestations with the 
rebel movements over what may be considered the priced allegiance of tribal leaders. Some 
members of the Native Administration have supported the mission of the movements, who in 
2003 took up arms purportedly to end the suffering of Darfuris by demanding justice and equity 
from the GoS. The GoS reaction to any form of political disloyalty as a matter of fact has been 
grave. It has wasted no time in responding to dissidents among members of the Native 
Administration, in a manner as to mete out despicable actions on them, as reward for any 
perceived insubordination.707  
 
On the IDP camps, displaced Darfuris have continued to draw on the wisdom embedded in the 
indigenous peace-making mechanisms of the Native Administration. This has become a viable 
tool for wading into disputes, capable of disrupting camp harmony. A good number of local 
leaders continue as a result, to maintain even stronger legitimacy on the camps. Where a people 
have become disconnected from the system, makeshift leaders have emerged to assume the 
responsibility of conflict resolution and peace-making. In like manner, the search for better life 
has precipitated the outflow of large numbers, as has the war, forced the migration of many 
including traditional leaders from Darfur to the bigger cities, where security in comparison to 
the war-torn province is most assured. These days, it is common for a local leader to exert 
authority and perform his ordained duties from his abode in the city, using a representative who 
remains in close proximity to the people. 708 Indeed, when the people themselves seek greener 
pastures in the cities, the pressures and comfort from urban life precipitates a diluted allegiance 
to the institution of the Native Administration and in most cases, engenders a certain 
disaffection for rural life and all of its baggage.  This forced separation either in search of 
greener pasture or as a result of the war, most often impacts negatively on any existing cultural 
consanguinity between a migrating people and their ancestral base. It leaves room for urban 
generated and so to speak-modernised reasoning. These re-orientations tend to counter strong 
affiliations to a system or way of life once revered.  While the many factors mentioned here 
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constitute the huge challenges that have confronted and continue to confront the institution of 
Native Administration, the system amidst the raging storm is yet to be completely wished away. 
And as in the words of Leonardi and Abdul Jalil: 
“Native Administration has not survived because it represents some kind of ideal, much 
loved or age-old authority, but because it is entrenched in local power structures that 
have been more enduring than national ones”.  
The next section is vital to the study because it introduces the Native Administration’s 
mechanism for peace and reconciliation and examines its prospects as a tool for rebuilding 
social harmony in war torn Darfur. It seeks to understand it prospects in conjunction with third 
party interventionist efforts of the major peace player in targeting durable peace. 
 
8.12 The Judiyya: A mechanism for indigenous mediation and reconciliation 
Introduction  
In April 2014, while taking final notes, of over one-hour discussions I had with four Ajaweed 
members from El Fasher northern Darfur, one of the four respondents wrapped up the session 
with a quick quiz. “What is Judiyya”? He asked via my interpreter. I was quite taken aback, for 
the simple reason that the basis for our long discussions concentrated solely on providing me 
with illumination on the Judiyya mechanism and attendant custodians. “Judiyya brings 
conflicting parties together and resolves the issues between them using the Ajaweed.  My 
intellectually packaged response nonetheless fell short of the message the Ajaweed elder 
intended for us and especially me, to part with. Judiyya means ‘generosity’ he replied. It is 
synonymous with the Arabic word – “Karam” which denotes hospitality. What was the Judiyya 
being generous or hospitable with?   
 
Back in my cubicle that day, I reflected upon that meeting hoping to figure out how Judiyya in 
one word connotes ‘generosity’ or even hospitality? Indeed, further reflection, matched with 
available scholarship from the literatures confirmed what should have been the obvious. To be 
generous is to give without restraint.  To be hospitable is to be equally accommodating. 
Dictionary.com gives another variation of the word generosity, as “the freedom from meanness 
or smallness of mind or character”. Contingent on the mediatory skills of the Ajaweed, the 
Judiyya as I came to conclude, which is a cultural heritage of Darfur sets the stage for 
protagonists to transcend their conflict. At the same time, it seeks to usher the parties in conflict 
to that level where they may now relish the generosity (forgiveness) and hospitality 
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(acceptance) the community has to offer in the aftermath of reconciliation. In other words, the 
Judiyya encapsulates the ingredients that parties to a conflict require to enable them to chart 
their path towards reconciliation.  The concluding part of this 8th chapter provides insight to 
the reader, into the journey most Darfuris are inclined to embark on once there is the tiniest tear 
in the society’s fabric of social cohesion. This commences at the level of the family and extends 
all the way to the level of the tribes.  I also provide scholarly elucidation on the Judiyya as a 
peace and reconciliation mechanism and examine the functions and qualities of the ‘Ajaweed’ 
(council of elders). It concludes with an investigation into their modus operandi when 
confronted with a scenario of conflict?  
 
8.13 Understanding the Judiyya mechanism 
In an article for ACCORD titled “From war to peace and reconciliation in Darfur, Sudan: 
Prospects for the Judiyya, El Tom, an indigene of the Berti tribe in Darfur, defines Judiyya as: 
“A grassroot system of arbitration that focuses on reconciliation and the resurrection of social 
relationship in the community”.  
From his very succinct definition, one is able to deduce the following: 
a. That reconciliation is at the foremost when applying the Judiyya mechanism to a 
conflict scenario. 
b. Social relations broken down as a result of a dispute or a conflict, may be mended 
contingent on the vehicle of reconciliation. 
The Judiyya therefore, is Darfur’s quintessence of that cultural resource for reconciliation, 
which according to Lederach may deliver prospects for peace and reconciliation in the final 
analysis. It is that indigenous peace-making mechanism, which international peace actors are 
expected to activate in tandem with other exiting outsider initiatives like peacekeeping and 
informal mediation, designed to achieve durable peace. On that account, the Judiyya may be 
delineated as the platform on which a society plagued by protracted conflict, commences as 
expounded by the school of conflict transformation, that journey toward the transformation of 
a conflict, which has eaten into the fabrics of society.  In this manner, the Judiyya is considered 
the link to the concept of reconciliation already examined elsewhere in this study.  
 
Having identified Darfur’s mechanism for peace and reconciliation, it is expected that the 
Judiyya, possesses at the least, the capacity to offer the victim and the perpetrator the 
opportunity to forge ahead into the future and within the same community, having transcended 
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“subjective realities” precipitated by war and conflict. As propounded by Lederach, 
reconciliation (Judiyya) should be “that place where truth, mercy and justice meet. It is that 
social space, a locus where people (conflicting parties, their spokesperson, the Ajaweed with 
their wisdom and skill) come together”. Where concerns for exposing what has happened and 
for letting go in favour of renewed relationship are validated and embraced. 709  
 
In similar vein, Ibrahim conceives of the Judiyya as: 
“Darfur’s heritage used to solve little problems before they escalate into conflicts” 710 
Going by the above denotation of the Judiyya, it may be inferred that the custodians of this 
mechanism realize the essence of nipping a conflict in the bud, whose imperative goal is to 
circumvent the eruption of a full-blown conflict. Put differently, it seeks to tackle conflict at its 
latent stage, to avert its degeneration. The Judiyya therefore operates to fulfil a restorative kind 
of justice. It aims to re-establish societal cohesion by initiating the first step in the direction of 
rebuilding broken relationships while using reconciliation as a platform towards its 
accomplishment. In the light of this, the Judiyya mechanism is viewed differently from the 
institution of the customary courts, (makhama aliya) where punitive measures may be meted 
out on the offender. Having established this fact about the Judiyya and in similar manner 
identified this mechanism as the apparatus, which can enable peacemakers, begin to chart the 
course towards transformation, I advance towards examining the role of its custodians, known 
in the Sudan as ‘the Ajaweed’ or council of elders.  
 
A number of times people have tended to confuse the term ‘Ajaweed’ with the more widely 
known - ‘Janjaweed’. The latter is the appellation peculiar to the government-backed militia at 
the centre of the carnage perpetrated on innocent civilians in Darfur, especially since 2003. The 
former is a title ascribed to indigenous mediators in the Sudan as a whole. 
 
8.14 The Judiyya and its custodians-The Ajaweed 
The Judiyya-in the similitude of other apparatuses for peace-making and reconciliation- must 
be applied to a conflict situation.  In the exact words of (Ajaweed elder Tanko), conflicts, just 
like the one in which Darfur is embroiled in,  
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“leaves very bad effects on social relations, it is at this point that traditional mediators like the 
Ajaweed step in”711.  
The Ajaweed are therefore the conveyors of Darfur’s peace and reconciliation mechanism.   
“The word Ajaweed comes from perfectness”. 712 
It is the plural form of the word Ajwad, denoting elder. The Ajaweed are a council of elders. 
They are an integral part of the institution of the Native Administration, serving as custodians 
to the Judiyya system for peace-making and reconciliation.  The Ajaweed are known to be 
“wise people, the best among the elderly, they are bestowed with the wisdom to straighten out 
what has been made crooked”713 It is their duty to mitigate conflicts within the community from 
the level of the nuclear family up to the level of intra and inter-tribal conflicts. Putting forward 
a conflict for the Ajaweed to mediate in constitutes one of the ways in which specifically 
members of Sudan’s rural societies seek redress in the event of dispute.  In predominantly rural 
Darfur for example, it is common for members of the community to utilize other options 
available to them- like the customary courts for example or the more modern and formal judicial 
system, in obtaining justice for cases of crime or of airing grievances between adversaries.   
 
The Ajaweed have received greater acceptance as the preferred channel for righting the wrongs 
within the community. This may not be unconnected to the precedent already set by the 
Ajaweed in matters of conflict resolution and peace-making. To a large extent these indigenous 
mediators are known to enjoy the respect of the people. The supposed non-biased posture of 
the Ajaweed elicits a perception of assuredness, such that members of the community feel 
uninhibited and comfortable to approach them with their dispute714 The Ajaweed display their 
mediatory prowess in conflicts at varying levels. They may wade into disputes over water and 
grazing for example and can be called upon to partake in higher-level government sponsored 
tribal conferences. At government sponsored peace conferences, their wisdom may be 
applicable to negotiate a compromise between two tribes. More often than not, parties comply 
with the outcome of a Judiyya proceeding as recommended by the Ajaweed.  Compliance with 
an Ajaweed ruling does, in most cases, indicate satisfaction with the outcome and the readiness 
on the part of parties in conflict to accede to a compromise. Ultimately, it communicates the 
readiness to make amends (reconciliation) and move past the current dispute. This is not to 
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connote the infallibility of the Judiyya mechanism per se. If most of the time parties tend to 
wholeheartedly embrace an outcome, at other times dissatisfaction with a Judiyya ruling can 
allow for a petitioning of the formal justice system, but as noted by Tubiana et al, the courts 
prefer to refrain from going counter to the ruling of the Ajaweed.715  
   
The Ajaweed do not initiate a mediatory session on their own, parties to a conflict must 
themselves invite the Ajaweed if they require their intervention. Once the powers of the 
Ajaweed have been activated, it is obligatory for the parties to accept the decisions arrived at 
in the final analysis.716 Unlike members of the Native Administration, whose positions until 
lately, - since the drastic evolution by the Ingaz regime - had been hereditary, the position of 
an Ajwad on the contrary may not be inherited. In the light of this, membership to the council 
of elders (Ajaweed) is never a permanent one.  Similarly,  
“in order to enhance reliability transparency and creditability” says Ajaweed elder Musa, 
“members to the Ajaweed council of elders are drawn from different tribes”. “For example, I 
come from the Fallata Futi tribe. If conflict ensues between my tribe and another, I cannot be 
a part of the elders who will be called upon to settle the conflict” 717 
 
An Ajwad prides over a repository of the people’s customs and traditions. He relies upon them 
to solve the problems brought before him. The Ajaweed are not members of the Native 
Administration. They do however, perform mediatory functions in the company of the lowest 
and intermediate levels of leadership of the NA (sheikh and omda). Once there is the dispute in 
the community, the Ajaweed is notified via the Sheikh, the Omda or the paramount chief. It is 
not uncommon for a conflict to move within the Native Administrations’ leadership hierarchy, 
that is: from the lowest level to the topmost level.  As it is expected of them, members of the 
Native Administration will initially exhaust all efforts within their capacity to mitigate a conflict 
before passing it on to the wisdom of the Ajaweed. By virtue of their proximity to the people, 
these native leaders (sheikh, omda, paramount chief) as the case may be, often enjoy the 
privilege of being conversant with the different occurrences under their jurisdiction. The 
Ajaweed are therefore more likely, based on that fact, to depend on such knowledge for a 
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historical perspective of a conflict. Ostensibly, this serves as background information to enable 
the council to produce a positive outcome. 718 
 
8.15 Community based vs Government sponsored Judiyya sessions. 
A Judiyya proceeding is either organised on the level of community or as a government-
sponsored peace and reconciliation conference.  The latter is traceable to the era of colonial 
administration in Darfur. The former originates from the region’s cultural reservoir and stands 
as a pre-colonial mechanism for managing and resolving different kinds of conflicts at the 
grassroot level of society. Government sponsored reconciliation conferences are applicable to 
conflicts that have escalated to violence between bigger identity groups. For the most part, the 
outbreak of violence can be interpreted as the inability or unwillingness of respective native 
administrators to mitigate the conflict.719 During the condominium one of such conferences was 
convened. Subsequently between 1957 and 1997, over two dozen of such conferences were 
organised to mitigate conflicts between groups.720 Going by this fact, it might not be out of 
place to conclude that the Judiyya- during British administration- may have functioned 
effectively in curbing grassroot aggression at the very latent stage, before attracting the 
attention of the colonial masters.  
 
If the colonial administration organised a reconciliation conference, it ensured to assume a more 
detached posture. This gave room for the proceeding to progress naturally as directed by the 
Ajaweed. As it were, the condominium almost completely steered clear of manipulating the 
process in its favour.  Initially also, early postcolonial governments played the role either of 
“observer or a secretariat”. They maintained a non-partial and non-authoritative stance.  The 
entire process was dependent on the good will of the parties. When the parties had reached a 
deal, the government became the guarantor. It did not impose its views on the proceeding and 
people were happy with the process. In any case the government was present but neutral. After 
2003, the process, with reference to government-sponsored conferences, has almost become 
irrelevant to peace. The interference of the ‘third hand’ has largely compromised the 
process”.721  
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“Personally, I prefer that the government does not interfere but should respect the mechanism 
of the Judiyya. They can concentrate on helping us with administration and expertise says 
Ajaweed elder Musa.” 722  
When the impact of the ‘third hand is heavily present in disputes between parties who share a 
common peace-making culture, it creates an advantaged position for one party, thereby setting 
one above the other. That way the process becomes undermined723.  Unfavourable outcomes 
are generated thereby, or as noted by Tubiana a resurgence of violence is precipitated.724 In any 
case, such practices have contributed to diminishing the efficacy of government organised 
Judiyya reconciliation meetings. The continued manipulation of these government sponsored 
peace meetings, does largely negate the experiences of many Darfuris. Mohammed one of the 
participants in my focused group discussion noted that the peace-making tradition of the 
Judiyya can help to create social harmony, only if the people are left to solve their problems 
themselves.725  Notwithstanding these strong interferences from the government, people do feel 
the need to make peace and therefore indulge in secret peace-making.726 Groups therefore, 
continue to activate the potentials of the Judiyya so as to enjoy peaceful relations as well as 
create their own conditions for survival.  
 
Secret peace deals have taken place in some areas of Darfur because the people do not want the 
government to hear about it, says one of my key informants. These secret peace deals did not 
resolve the overall conflict, but certain aspects were settled. For example, some groups wanted 
to regulate access to a given water point. The Ajaweed established a deal between them. 
Although other issues still needed to be resolved –like making peace between families who lost 
members during the conflict-, a deal that allowed for both groups to take turns at using a 
controversial water point was reached as well. One group was to make use of the water point 
in the morning and the other in the afternoon. This was how that problem was resolved amicably 
without the knowledge of the government.727  
 
This example supports the notion that the more traditional version of the Judiyya, which serves 
the community in times of conflict, continues to retain its credibility to a large extent.728 This 
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may be so because both parties tend to enjoy the benefit of sharing positive sum outcomes. In 
addition to achieving a good compromise, broken relationships are restored, and parties are able 
to go on living their normal lives.  
 
8.16 Paying the Diya… 
Even though reconciliation remains the focus of a Judiyya proceeding, the peace-making 
process does not end with it. The Ajaweed, beyond negotiating a good compromise for both 
parties also ensure that justice is served to the victim. The perpetrator does not get punished in 
line with the precepts of retributive justice, but he is definitely held accountable for his deeds. 
In this way, a complete termination of the conflict rests equally on the fulfilment of the 
customary requirement attached to the process. This is the payment of the diya. Diya is our own 
form of resolution. We do not punish… says Ajaweed elder Yousif 729 The Diya therefore is to 
the Judiyya process, what the prisons are to the court. The Diya serves as a communally 
accepted mechanism used to appease the offended family, clan, or tribe after a conflict has 
reached the settlement stage. It is the Judiyya mechanism’s way of holding the perpetrator 
responsible for crimes committed. The Diya is mainly applied to cases of homicide.  It is normal 
for the Ajaweed to get involved in peace-making, if this were an unintentional act of killing.  
According to Ajaweed elder Tanko,730 if the crime of homicide is committed intentionally, the 
victim’s family may seek justice for their member, in three ways. They may ask for the offender 
to receive punishment based on the Sharia law. They also may let the offender off the hook by 
extending their hand forgiveness. Similarly, the Diya can be applied if that becomes an option 
for the family of the victim. When the Diya becomes an option for compensating a victim’s 
family, a sum of 40, 000 Sudanese pounds must be paid in the case of intentional homicide. If 
this was an unintentional act, the sum of 30,000 Sudanese pounds is paid to the victim’s family 
so as to terminate the conflict completely. The perpetrators identity at this time still remains 
undisclosed. As such it behoves the tribe of the perpetrator to make this Diya payment on his 
behalf and more specifically on that of his family, tribe and administrative unit.  This remains 
true under a system where collective responsibility continues to hold sway within the society.  
 
When a tribal group assumes collective responsibility, it means that a whole tribe is held 
accountable for the offences of one of its members. In fact, it is possible that no one gets to find 
out in the final analysis, who the real offender was. According to Ajaweed elder Yousif: “After 
                                                     
729 Ajaweed Elder Mohammed, April 23, 2014 
730 Ajaweed Elder Adam, April 23, 2014 
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paying the Diya forgiveness is granted to the perpetrator” The family of the victim collects the 
Diya for the victim’s children (if he has any). The Ajaweed then makes a written statement 
confirming the payment and recommends that this payment is to be reserved for the children’s 
welfare. A written statement such as this is called “Rakoba”. For future purposes, this 
mechanism allows for the family to refer back to the manner in which such disputes were 
resolved. 731  
 
8.17 The process… 
A Judiyya mediatory session may be presided over by 3 to 9 Ajaweed elders. The intervening 
elders must be acceptable to both parties. They should be regarded as neutral and credible732. 
Neutrality assumes a different connotation when applied to a Judiyya peace and reconciliation 
process. An Ajwad is allowed to take sides during a Judiyya proceeding. He tends to slant 
towards the party that subscribes to a peaceful compromise. As for the party refusing to yield 
to peaceful negotiations, the Ajaweed, so as to ensure they accede, exerts pressure on them.733 
The process commences with prayers and citations from the Koran. Everyone is allowed to take 
part in a Judiyya meeting.  Representatives and family members of the victim and the 
perpetrator converge at the location designated for the hearing. According to one informant in 
Gado’s thesis, a meeting to resolve family related disputes will normally hold at night, while a 
Judiyya session organised to intervene in a conflict between groups or tribes, commences 
during the day.734 The elders investigate into the matter at hand by listening to the testimonies 
of both parties via their representatives. At this juncture, the “fadfada” commences.  This is the 
moment when, going by the translation of the Arabic word, parties start to pour out their hearts. 
In this period of ‘letting go’, tempers do rise to the extent that intense exchange of words may 
ensue between the parties.735. It is not unusual for the parties to also begin pointing accusing 
fingers at each other. In fact, it is allowed for the atmosphere to become heated up especially 
since this is not misconstrued but perceived as part of the proceeding. However, when it 
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becomes too tensed, the Ajaweed promptly wades in to calm the tensions and prevails upon the 
parties to submit to a reasonable compromise.  
 
The witnesses also get the chance to be heard.736  It is an erroneous assumption to conceive of 
the Judiyya process as a smooth sailing venture. Sometimes issues at hand become extremely 
complex that Ajaweed elders are compelled to engage the adversaries in very long hours of 
mediation. Under such instances, a proceeding is likely to commence at 8.00am and terminate 
at about 5.00pm.  Once this is the case, the Ajaweed allows for some time out. A recess usually 
happens immediately when the parties have gotten the opportunity to “pour out their hearts”. 
Since it is mostly impossible for this part of the process to proceed without tempers rising, a 
pause in the proceeding is initiated, to give room for prayers and food. 737 This is probably to 
calm down the atmosphere. A Judiyya process in essence, has the tendency to reach a successful 
conclusion only after more than one sitting.  After the hearing, the Ajaweed retire for a closed 
session where they deliberate further on what must be the best possible solution to the 
conflict.738Once the verdict is announced, both parties must adhere strictly to the 
recommendations.  Rejecting an Ajaweed ruling is tantamount to rejection by the society.  
 
Adam Azzain Mohammed provides a metaphorical insight into the process of a Judiyya session.  
“The Ajaweed elders divide themselves into doves and hawks. The doves work relentlessly to 
persuade parties in conflict to forgive and forget. They remind them of how their ancestors lived 
in peace and what types of friendship they maintained. Considerable citation from the Koran, 
Sudanese proverbs and sayings are made, praising the virtue of forgiveness and showing how 
feuds are mischievous in life and hereafter. The wrongdoers will be asked to make friendly 
gestures-such as kissing the head of the victimised. On the other hand, the hawkish group would 
threaten the recalcitrant about the mischief that they would get into should they refuse to accept 
the Ajaweed judgment”739 Going by Adam Azzain’s metaphorical description of the Judiyya 
process, the reader is able to fit together some significant characterizing features underlying the 
Ajaweed peace-making process: forgiveness, the search for peace and the maintenance of 
healthy friendship.  The Ajaweed hawks “threaten” the offender into submitting to a peaceful 
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and positive compromise. The Ajaweed doves nonetheless, unlock the offenders mind towards 
discerning the essence of societal harmony. The offender is guided to the understanding that 
the society stands to fare better when conflicts are resolved amicably, and peaceful relationships 
restored. The focus therefore is for both the Ajaweed (hawks and doves) to reinstate, based on 
their unique technique, a harmonious co-existence between the parties in conflict.  That, in 
essence is the imperativeness of applying persuasive words and admonitions to the mediatory 
process. The essence therefore of underscoring forgiveness in such a peace-making procedure 
is to accentuate also the significance of reconciliation and social harmony. These components 
remain identifiable as the hallmark of an Ajaweed mediation process. They constitute the 
central focus of any Judiyya proceeding. It must be established here, however as noted by 
Tubiana et al,740 that forgiveness is tantamount to truth telling. While truth telling may be 
considered an integral part of the entire process, it is never to be conceived of as the 
responsibility per se of the perpetrator, to perform an open confession. This assertion is 
reminiscent of social configurations already mentioned elsewhere, where collective 
responsibility is identified as part of the society’s norm.  Essentially, the lack of an open 
confession serves to ensure that the identity of the offender remains undisclosed till tensions 
have become calm, or till the peace-making process has reached a successful end.  What is 
important to note however, is that telling the truth or the acceptance of wrongdoing in very 
remorseful terms, does translate positively during a Judiyya proceeding.  The victim’s family 
may begin to soft pedal on their stance and in many cases, this has led to a reduction in the 
amount of compensation (diya) collected by the victim’s family.   
 
8.18 Oath taking as part of a Judiyya process 
Elsewhere in this thesis, we saw how oath taking was applied within the context of a conflict 
in order to extract the truth from the parties to the conflict. Specifically, I recounted the 
historical conflict between two antagonistic groups in the south-eastern part of Nigeria. Both 
adversaries as was delineated in chapter five, swore to the oath that held them bound to the 
compromises reached during the resolution process. In similar vein, there are certain times 
during a peace-making process, when the Ajaweed deems it appropriate to integrate the oath 
taking (halifa/Qasam) mechanism.  According to one informant741 captured in Gado’s thesis, 
                                                     
740 Mark Bradbury et al., Local Peace Processes in Sudan. A Baseline Study (Rift Valley Institute, 2006), 66 
741 Tribal leader from the Falata group (Names withheld by author) interview by Gado in “Conflict Resolution 
and Reconciliation in Sudan”, June 10, 2010 
 344 
when a violent confrontation occurs for example between pastoralists, the Ajaweed intervenes 
with the immediate action of an “al suf”.  ‘Al suf’ in Arabic means, “line”.  This is when the 
Ajaweed, based on the activation of the ‘al suf’, carry out necessary action to deter parties from 
any form of direct contact -whether at the market place, grazing area or the water point- until 
the conflict has been resolved amicably. This action is central to the prevention of any further 
violent outrages between both adversaries. The Ajaweed also refuses both conflicting parties 
any access to land if for example a competitive resource like “land” becomes the bone of 
contention. A restriction as this remains valid until a Judiyya proceeding has been initiated and 
concluded.  
 
Oath taking is deliberately incorporated into the process at the point where the Ajaweed deem 
it necessary to enforce adherence to the created restrictions.  The elders will then subject both 
parties to swearing an oath. The oath should elicit compliance to all of the preventive measures 
already initiated by the mediating elders. The community leader of the parties in conflict swears 
the oath on behalf of its members who are in involved in the conflict. Most often a Quran is 
used, and the following words are proclaimed loudly742: 
“Neither I nor any person from my part, will involve in any act or behaviour that might 
provoke the other party. The restricted measures made by the mediators to contain the 
situation, will by no means be violated. Unless a Judiyya is carried out to decide 
otherwise, I will respect these commitments and will make my group respect it too”. 
 
At other times, the oath taking mechanism may be incorporated into a Judiyya mediatory 
session in other to ascertain guilt. The mechanism tends to accelerate the resolution of the 
dispute at hand regardless of a shortage in evidence against the accused.  For instance, a group 
mounts allegation on another without the capacity to present enough evidence. The supposed 
offenders deny the allegation.  The initial response from the Ajaweed would be to propose a 
dismissal of the case for lack of adequate evidence. However, as a matter of last resort the oath 
system may be activated. On the insistence of the plaintiff, the alleged offenders are subjected 
to swearing an oath. The accused often accepts to swear to the oath in other to defend their 
supposed inculpability. Unlike the oath taking procedure described in chapter five, the potency 
of this kind of oath taking is not necessarily tied to a certain deity or ancestor per se. In that 
unique case described in chapter five, the fear of being punished by the ancestors tends to impel 
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parties towards confessing the truth.  As part of a Judiyya process however, oath taking is 
conceived of as an evidential act, in favour of the plaintiff.  It is basically carried out to fulfil 
the bidding of the group presenting the claims. Once the oath is sworn, it is an indication that 
the alleged offender may not have been guilty as accused.  The parties then proceed to shake 
hands. This is a sign that peaceful relations have resumed, and the conflict forthwith terminated. 
The one condition attached to this kind of Judiyya oath swearing, is that the alleged offenders 
must have to swear the oath in accordance with the preferences of the party tabling the 
allegation. For example, the accused may be requested to either place their hands on the holy 
Quran, a spear or a piece of wood. Alternatively, they can be asked to mention the name of a 
spiritually gifted Muslim cleric. Although the reason for invoking the sanctity of a spiritually 
gifted person is unknown, its execution is crucial to the process as a way of repelling the 
capacity for an offender to tell lies under oath.743 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has concentrated on furnishing the reader with insight into Darfur’s conflict 
resolution and peace-making heritage.  It examined a peace-making culture, relied upon to 
preserve societal coherence in a setting defined by its unique multi- ethnic configuration. From 
the era of the sultans up until the immediate post independent phase of Sudanese history such 
indigenous peace-making mechanisms have remained relevant especially to Sudan’s rural 
societies. Years of evolution have impacted positively and sometimes negatively, on the 
development of a peace-making institution struggling to withstand the test of time largely since 
its initial abolition in 1970.It is important to reiterate nonetheless that modern and more formal 
peace-making institutions and apparatuses do exist in the modern-day Sudanese state. This by 
extension also applies to Darfur.  However formal peace-making structures have not measured 
up to the capacity required to preserve sanity within the society. Indeed, this has engendered, 
within a predominantly rural setting like that of Sudan’s western province, a persistently 
prevailing preference for the more indigenous forms of peace-making.  Ordinary Darfurians 
still find solution to their problems in spite of the diminishing legitimacy of indigenous actors 
and culturally inspired mechanisms. One notable aspect of the entire system as was established 
in this chapter, is the fact that indigenous peace actors and their attendant institutions never 
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operated in isolation.  Dating back to the sultanate, indigenous mechanisms largely depended 
on the strong endorsement from the government of the day. Darfur’s indigenous peace-making 
institutions and actors may have withstood the tides of day-to-day conflicts on the macro level. 
The question however remains: what are the prospects of such peace and reconciliation 
strategies in conflicts of the kind, which have prevailed on Darfuri soil since 2003?      
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Chapter Nine 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I intend to examine the role indigenous actors and mechanisms play in 
conjunction with CAS in the management and resolution of the conflicts on the grassroot since 
the arrival of UNAMID. I have selected for this task a number of conflicts as analysed in reports 
obtained from CAS SN during my visit to north Darfur in 2014.  By now, the reader has become 
conversant with this study’s continued allusion to Lederach assumptions, which underscores 
the essence of initiating reconciliation for parties enmeshed in a long history defined by conflict. 
He underlines the need to restore broken relationships and perpetuate harmonious co-existence. 
Also, I identified Darfuri actors charged with the task of reconciliation, as well as mechanisms 
used in the compensation of aggrieved parties in order to consolidate the reconciliation. Such 
efforts as elucidated, are geared towards the preservation of societal co-existence.  I have 
equally established that the NA constitutes a part of the stakeholders incorporated into the peace 
process.  
 
My final task is to examine to what degree the NA and its integral parts are perceived as relevant 
actors in the restoration of peace to the ongoing war in Darfur. Within the scope of my analysis 
are those conflicts that have freshly erupted between 2012 and April 2013. This was the period 
when Darfur experienced a renewed spate of intertribal conflicts.  However, I have not excluded 
from my analysis updated reports on the conflicts that erupted after 2003 and especially since 
the arrival of UNAMID in 2008. This is also specifically so because the purview of the entire 
thesis covers the period from 2003-2014. It is also worth reiterating that the data for this analysis 
was gathered from sector north. All of the conflicts mentioned in this analysis have occurred 
inside the geographical space of northern Darfur. They comprise two major conflicts and three 
minor ones.  Finally, in pursuit of the main question guiding this thesis, I ask the question: Does 
CAS via the conflict management cell rely solely on the Native Administration, the Judiyya, 
the Ajaweed and the Diya in its attempt to actualize the mandate for resolution and more 
specifically reconciliation?      
9.2 Inter-tribal conflicts on the grassroot of Darfur: the prospects of applying 
indigenous peace-making mechanisms to modern conflicts. 
In 2010, Julie Flint writing a working paper titled “The Other war: Inter-Arab Conflict in 
Darfur, noted a rising trend in inter-tribal conflicts in the aftermath of the signing of the Darfur 
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Peace Agreement in 2006. The author specifically highlighted the emergence of intra-tribal 
fighting among Arab groups in Darfur who nearly a decade earlier, had served to perpetuate the 
government of Sudan’s (GoS) counter-insurgency war against the rebellion of 2003. The 
conflict between the Missiriya and the Northern Rizeigat as precisely narrated, occurred in the 
southern part of Darfur and became the bloodiest in the wake of de-escalating tensions between 
the government and the armed movements. Amidst the known reasons underlying the Darfur 
conflict itself, the fighting between these two Arab groups according to the author depicted:  
 
“a struggle for the spoils of the counter-insurgency- use of, and access across, the land 
from which the “Janjaweed”, drove farming tribes perceived to be aligned with the 
armed movements.” Darfur’s reconciliation mechanism: the Diya allegedly played a 
decisive role in terminating the conflict and reconciling the parties. 744   
 
In similar vein a trend analysis report from the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) in May 
2013 reported the escalation of Inter-Tribal Clashes in Darfur from July 2012 –April 2013. That 
report outlined major inter- and intra-tribal conflicts among the following groups: Between the 
Northern Rizeigat and the Masalit in Masteri, Rizeigat v. Dinka Malual in Samaha, Northern 
Rizeigat v. Beni Hussein in Jabel Amer, Gimir v. Beni Halba in Ed El Fursan, Salamat v. 
Misseriya in Zalingei, Salamat v. Misseriya/ Taa’isha in Um Dukhun and Rahad El Berdi and 
also between the Rizeigat and Misseriya in confirmation of Julie Flint’s write up from 2010. 
On the one hand the report drew attention to the proliferation of weapons as one of the factors 
fuelling the eruption of conflict in recent years.745 Following that line of thought, analysts 
suggest that the prevalence of sophisticated weaponry in the hands of belligerent groups 
evidences a perceived sign of imbalance in local power politics that diminishes further the 
legitimacy of traditional governing structures. It tends to accentuate a disposition among 
fighting groups, which is perceived as being detrimental to the peace-making capacity of elders 
and the application of indigenous mechanisms in disputes of inter-tribal bearing.746 
On the other hand, and regardless of the arms possession discourse, that report informs that 
local reconciliation mechanism constituted a conflict-mitigating factor, almost successfully 
                                                     
744 Julie Flint, "The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur," Small Arms Survey, last modified October 2010, 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-22-The-Other-War-Inter-
Arab-Conflict-in-Darfur.pdf 
745 UNAMID, Trend Analysis: Escalations of Inter-Tribal Clashes in Darfur: July 2012 - April 2013, (El-Fasher 
North Darfur: Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), 2013). 
746 Director Peace Research Institute University of Khartoum, Personal, Khartoum Sudan April 13, 2014. 
(Names withheld) 
 349 
filling the gap where inept formal institutions created the vacuum that had engendered a 
nagging security dilemma.747  
Using the precise wordings of that report, it stated thus: 
“In the absence of established conventional justice system, traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms serve the purpose of settling disputes and provide a sense of 
justice to the involved parties. If not total successful, reconciliation efforts have led to 
the reduction of inter-tribal tensions in some case”. 748 
 
Some examples of conflicts where indigenous mechanisms became applicable to tribal disputes 
included those between the Rizeigat and Misseriya as well as those of the Rizeigat and the 
Dinka in Malual in Samaha. The map 2 in the apendix shows pockets of conflict eruptions 
around Darfur states between 2012 and 2013.749 When I arrived in 2014, Darfur states were 
still reeling from these inter and intra-tribal conflicts. On that account, it was possible to gain 
access to some data cataloguing the occurrences of northern Darfur’s fair share of conflict 
eruptions in recent times and since the arrival of UNAMID.  It is against that backdrop that I 
commence this analysis by examining 3 of the minor conflicts before probing into northern 
Darfur’s most devastating conflict, which occurred in 2013 between the Northern Rizeigat and 
the Beni Hussein.  
 
Up to this point it is evident that inter-tribal conflicts have overridden the initial conflict that 
emerged in 2003 between the GoS and the insurgent groups. Inter-tribal conflicts have not only 
become prevalent, the magnitude of its devastation does call for serious concern as these 
conflicts continue to constitute a major threat to peace and security in Darfur. To this end some 
observers may prescribe indigenous peace-making mechanisms as a good starting point in the 
quest for peace among tribal groupings. That position remains to be validated in the course of 
this analysis.  In the five conflicts that will be examined, background information to the conflict 
will be provided.  Furthermore, tribal groups involved in the fighting will be identified, as well 
as attendant localities from where these conflicts erupted. The root causes and as much as 
possible the triggers will be unearthed.  Eventually I will endeavour to ascertain the role of 
indigenous mechanisms either as a lone option for making peace, or as a mechanism utilised in 
collaboration with CAS initiatives.  As the case may be, I will equally examine instances where 
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such mechanism became irrelevant in the efforts tailored towards resolving the conflict and 
reconciling its parties.  
 
9. 3 Conflict One:  
Conflict in the Korma locality of northern Darfur. 750 
9.3.1 Background: 
The villages of Kafod, Kuma Garadayat, and the Kobe Athar fall under the administrative unit 
of the Korma locality. These terrains have accommodated a mixture of African and Arabs 
groups known to have enjoyed harmonious relations over a long period of time. The Kafod area 
in particular evidences such tribal blend with communities like the Tunjur, Berti, Gowama, 
Arabs, Zaghawas and other minority groups who prior to the carnage of 2003 had lived side by 
side and in relative unison. With the implosion of Darfur more than a decade ago, African and 
Arab tribes each established political affinities with the armed groups and with the GoS in its 
campaign against insurgent groups respectively. As Arab tribes ostensibly became pitted 
against African groups, it seemed like a united front on each side, until the deep controversy 
that corroded the unity of the movements in 2005 emerged, revealing a new and divergent 
dimension to the conflict.  In the aftermath of the 2006 DPA specifically, it became possible to 
speak of the presence of political alignments with factional groups such as the SLM/ MM, SLM/ 
AW or SLM/ Free Will. The Tunjur for example were core followers of SLA/Free Will. In 
essence, the conflict of insurgency mutated to factional fighting either between supporters of 
Minni Minawi and Abdel Wahid from 2005 to 2006 or in 2007 and 2008 among loyalist of the 
SLA/MM and SLA/ FW also embroiled in fighting in the Kuma Garadyat and Kobi area. These 
belligerents ostensibly constituted African groups engaged in a power tussle with one another, 
over political dominance in these specified communities. 
 
9.3.2 Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation 
For order to be reinstated in these villages, three peace actors became involved in mapping out 
solutions to the conflict: The Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Council, which was created by 
the DPA to oversee conflict situations in Darfur. UNAMID’S CAS and the Ajaweed mediators. 
The initiated mediation process, which hinged on the Judiyya mechanism culminated with the 
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signing of a local ceasefire agreement in El Fasher on the 26th of August 2009. The peace actors 
in essence relied on the Judiyya peace-making process as well as attendant custodians of the 
process: (the Ajaweed) to re-establish peace and security in these communities. As a follow up 
on the negotiated peace settlement, the peace actors proceeded to conduct dissemination 
sessions as a way of lending credence to the signed agreement. It aimed at informing members 
of each community involved about the conditions under which the conflict was terminated. It 
also drew awareness to the imperative to preserves the secured peace. In this case, CAS played 
the role of supporter and enabler. Backing as well as enabling the actualization of initiatives 
geared towards the peaceful transformation of the conflict.   
 
 
9.4 Conflict Two: 
Conflict in the Kutum and Alwaha localities in North Darfur751   
9.4.1 Background: 
The Kutum area had been an economically vibrant locality dealing in agriculture and animal 
livestock. Located approx. 120km northwest of El-Fasher, the town rich in arable land, is 
regarded as the headquarters of the Kutum and Al-waha localities.  Prior to the recently 
escalated conflict of 2012, the town surrounded by nomadic villages, maintained commercial 
momentum from providing the link roads between Darfur and Libya. The demographic 
configuration of the area captures a predominantly Arabs population in the Al-waha locality 
while tribes like the Tunjur, Fur, Zaghawa, Kinneen, Birgid to mention a few constitute the 
majority in Kutum town and in the IDP camps in Kassan and Fatta borno.  
In 2003 Kutum came under the siege of SLA factions. In 2004 a turn in the tide of events saw 
the movements capitulate to the control of the GoS and its proxy forces.  Unfolding events 
ostensibly turned the area into the quintessence of a battleground.  
 
These clashes mirrored the devastating tensions not only between the GoS and the rebel 
movements, but also at some point, depicted the fragmentation that characterised rebel groups 
seeking political alignments from among tribal groupings in the area. Historically conflicts 
between Arabs and non-Arabs derived from the economic marginalization narrative by which 
the entire Darfur region is defined.  Depleting resources exacerbated by the climatic conditions 
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of the 1970s and the 1980s contributed to the escalation of conflicts in the area.  Since 2003 
disputes have become politically motivated, precipitating spates of inter-tribal clashes. In 
August 2012, conflict erupted in the Kutum area following the assassination of an Al-Waha 
commissioner by unidentified armed men. The commissioner who was murdered in the Kutum 
market was putatively a member of the Arab Mahamid. The Mahamid tribe shares kinship with 
the Abbala Arabs otherwise referred to as the Northen Rezeigat. In response to the attack on 
one of its own, the Mahamid retaliated by launching a massive attack on the IDPs located in 
Kassab and Fatta Borno.  It seemed that the revenge attack was based on impulse, as allegations 
tended to be devoid of concrete evidence as was perceived from the report. Indeed, a separate 
report traced the murder of the commissioner in the market place to a reprisal attack conducted 
by a separate Arab group referred to as the Arab Zeyadiya. The Arab Zeyadiya reportedly 
accused members of the Arab Mahmid of their refusal to submit its members suspected to have 
been involved in the elimination of a Zeyadiyah top official in Kutum. 752 Evidently, the attack 
on the camps seemed misdirected. This resulted not only in the looting of property in the IDP 
camps but also the displacement of 25,000 IDPs from the Kassab IDP camp as well as from 
Kutum town. The incidence nonetheless, underscores the prevailing trend of attacks by 
government-backed militias on fellow Arabs. 
 
9.4.2 Restoring peace in the Kutum area 
An initial report from November 2012, made no direct reference to the potential role of Darfur’s 
peace-making mechanisms or custodians in this conflict. Nevertheless, the report alluded to the 
prospects of applying inter-community dialogue to the conflict. On the account that the conflict 
exhibited minimal connection to hitherto prevalent historical rifts over resources, it became 
evident based on that report that “inters community-dialogue, if applied, would become 
counterproductive to the peace envisaged. It further pointed out that the conflict, which 
accurately should be defined along the lines of a political conflict, must be addressed using the 
appropriate tools.   In fact, that report pointed out salient issues: The most significant for this 
analysis basically reflected CAS’s incapability to initiate the path towards peace and 
reconciliation.  Certainly, stringent regulations debarred CAS from a full engagement in the 
process. CAS was required to seek formal approval from the government of North Darfur.  The 
report states that:  
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“The space for local reconciliation is controlled by the government” … in that light the initiation 
of “parallel processes” by CAS could be interpreted as an act of defiance against the laws of 
the state. Even though UNAMID and by extension CAS, operates within a framework which 
authorises it to delve into matters of resolution and reconciliation. It must constantly rely on the 
prior approval of the host nation to take decisive steps towards the fulfilment of its duties.  If 
CAS were resolved to broker peace between the belligerent groups, its final option was to 
consider co-operation with the government. To partner with the government in a conflict with 
political undertones (where the government is assumed to be in support of the Arab group) was 
tantamount to CAS undermining the mission’s guiding principles: To maintain a neutral stance 
at all times. In any case, as at the time that report was drafted in 2012, CAS understood the need 
to uphold the mandate, which authorised conflict resolution and reconciliation on the grassroot 
but remained handicapped in the face of the realities on ground.  
 
A second document from 2013 reported that representatives from the Al-Waha and Kutum 
localities signed a peace agreement in January 2013. Putatively, both communities acquiesced 
in the peaceful co-existence agreement during a forum organised in El-Fasher, to promote 
peaceful co-existence among communities. The agreement allegedly contained a 60-point 
recommendation on the way forward in the area of security as well as economic and socio-
cultural concerns. Even though this second document highlighted the significance of 
“Traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution” it lacked evidence on the involvement of the 
Native Administration, the Ajaweed or even the Judiyya in achieving peace to the localities 
under review.  
 
9.5 Conflict three:  
Conflict in the “Triangle”: In the Malha, Mellit and Kuma localities753 
9.5.1 Background:  
Three tribes dominate the Malha, Mellit and Kuma localities referred to as the triangle. They 
are the African tribes of the Meidob and Berti as well as the Arab Zayadyah respectively. The 
Meidob earn a living through pastoralist activities.  The Berti are predominantly famers while 
the Zayadyah survive on farming and cattle herding. Until 2003, the Mellit town was famously 
regarded as the commercial hub of the triangle and a trade route connecting the town of 
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Omduruman, Libya and Egypt.  The Malha locality was known around the early 1970s as the 
base for the first Custom Office for trade between Libya and the Sudan, while the Zayadyah 
women distinguished themselves on the basis of their handcraft. Regardless of a history of 
peaceful co-existence reinforced with inter-tribal marriage, the three major tribes of the triangle 
have witnessed periods of incessant fighting as provoked by competition over land. In the early 
1990s conflicts erupted between the Berti and the Zayadyah over rights to land. The Zayadyah 
had asserted ownership of four Hakura (traditional land rights) around the Mellit area. The Berti 
putatively debunked such claims and promptly initiated the expulsion of the Zayadyah from the 
said lands.  The Meidob, the third major tribe in the triangle, who were also the neutral party, 
initially made numerous futile attempts to mediate the conflict. Eventually two follow up 
attempts at organising a peace conference tended to yield result. The Sayah and the Mellit 
conferences seemed to have reinstated the peace and mended broken relations, however this 
was short-lived as fighting resumed in August 2012. The land issue, which in the first instance 
precipitated the fighting, was left unaddressed. As the peace remained elusive, the government 
waded in to schedule a peace conference, which ultimately targeted the restoration of peace 
contingent on addressing the major underlying issue: land.   
 
A similar conflict on the Berti- Meidob frontiers emerged around the year 2000. Land 
constituted the major bone of contention between the two belligerent African tribes. An attack 
by the Berti on the Meidob supposedly triggered the conflict. In a bid to frustrate the Meidob 
out of the locality the Berti allegedly engaged in the harassment of the Meidob, the blockage of 
their trading routes and the closure of the customs office, which had served to support trading 
activities.754 To return the locality to normalcy, a peace conference was organised and based on 
the traditional diya (compensation money) both parties consented to a local ceasefire that was 
signed in 2001.By 2003, the conflicts in the triangle had assumed a political dimension. 
Although the area had been prone to conflict, the triangle became emblematic of the war 
between the armed movements and the GoS. In the meantime, resource-based conflicts had 
largely remained unresolved aggravating tensions to unprecedented heights. The political 
undertone deepened the age long historical anger due to land, while the involvement of the 
Zayadyah as puppets in the counter-insurgency campaign of the GoS, spelt further doom.  
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The Zayadyah capitalizing on historical grievances of land deprivation utilized such advantaged 
position as the government’s proxy force to unleash terror on their neighbours within the 
triangle: the Meidob and Berti. In 2005 a peace conference called on all parties to the conflict, 
with the notion to chart the trajectory towards a durable solution to the conflict. The conflict 
however remained unresolved as the Zayadyah and the Meidob failed to arrive at any 
compromise with respect to the root cause to the conflict: land and access to water points. In 
2008 the three tribes (Berti, Meidob and Zayadyah) consented to abide by the established “no 
hostility zone” A separate conference held in 2011 intended to consolidate on the agreements 
from previous conferences. 
 
9.5.2 Searching for Peace: The role of CAS 
In seeking to restore peace to the triangle, Darfur’s peace-making mechanisms were found to 
have played a significant role. The Diya was activated to serve justice to the victims as well as 
to address all the loss accrued from the prolonged conflict between the Berti and the Meidob. 
Participating actors to the peace process from 2000 until 2012 included indigenous actors and 
the government. The effectiveness of these indigenous mechanisms varied especially with the 
change in conflict dynamics in 2003. It seemed that the clout of indigenous actors with respect 
to the politicized nature of the conflict had diminished or become ineffective. CAS played no 
major role in the resolution and peace process. Indeed, the profile report lacked any evidence 
of CAS’s direct involvement in the path to actualise peace within the triangle. The proliferation 
of small arms in the hands of civilians as stated by that report, ostensibly undermined any 
concrete engagement of CAS in the peace process. It calls to question the essence of 
UNAMID’s military wing in effectively providing protection to unarmed personnel at the risk 
attack in their line of duty. To surmount the constraint, the document recommended the 
commencement of a disarmament and demilitarization programme that will facilitate the 
entrance of CAS into the conflict area.  Taking away weapons from the custody of civilians 
grants CAS direct access to the affected population in the “triangle” and to the belligerents 
themselves.  Such access can enhance the delivery of accurate conflict mapping and based on 
such analysis the planning and implementation of appropriate peace initiatives with prospects 
for durable peace. 
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9.6 Conflict Four: 
The conflict between the Zaghawa and the local communities in the Shangil Tobaya and 
the surrounding areas.755 
9.6.1 Historical background and conflict: 
Successive periods of drought between the early and late 20th century induced the migration of 
the Zaghawa from their original homelands. Around the early 1970s similar devastating 
ecological condition occasioned a major migration southward into the Shangil Tobaya area 
dominated by the indigenous Tunjurs. Since then the Zaghawa have become a constituent 
population in the Shangil Tobabya area.  In addition to the Zaghawa, tribes like the Mima, 
Fallata, Birgid, and the Fur inhabit the Shangil Tobaya. It is considered to be the economic 
nerve centre of Northern Darfur, linking the capital El_Fasher with Nyala via trading areas and 
large cultivable lands.756  The Shangil Tobaya area started to record intermittent conflict around 
1976, shortly after the arrival of the Zaghawa. History has it that the Zaghawa became 
enmeshed in disputes with their neighbours who constantly accused them of planned 
domination and the determination to usurp lands belonging to their host community. The 
Zaghawa are putatively vibrant, industrious and assertive in nature. In fact, it is believed that 
the migration of the Zaghawas southwards, which contributed to their advancement in different 
spheres of live, was the orchestration of the Zaghawa elites at home and in diaspora757.    
 
Contingent upon a seemingly dominating character, the Zaghawa tend to invariably earn the 
hatred and distrust of their neighbours. Specifically, Zaghawa to the north of south Darfur and 
those located in the east of North Darfur fall the most prey to hate motivated confrontations. A 
typical example was around the 1990s when the Birgid ignited a wave of violence with the 
slaughter of 8 Zaghawa men. Although it turned out to be a futile venture, the motivation was 
to eject the Zaghawa from the northern part of south Darfur. Since being enlisted as part of the 
government’s counter insurgency war in 2003 nonetheless, the Birgid have successfully 
expelled the Zaghawa from areas like the Jadeed in southern Darfur.  In 1991 competition over 
power precipitated the eruption of a separate conflict between the Zaghawa and the Mima.  
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Today, the Zaghawa predominantly constitute members of the SLA and JEM who in 2003 
commenced the war against the GoS over the economic marginalization of Darfur region. 
 
9.6.2 Conflict since 2003  
The Shangil Tobaya area fell to the hegemonic control of the SLA/ MM in the immediate 
aftermath of the rebellion, which engulfed the entire Darfur in 2003.  Since then other tribes 
like the indigenous Tunjur and the Birgid for example, have expressed discontent over the 
adverse treatment meted out to them by the SLA/MM and its cohorts within the Zaghawa group. 
Such has propelled hostile responses from the suppressed tribes toward members of the 
Zaghawa community and exacerbated precarious conditions in the area.  Following the violent 
hostilities between Minni Minawi (the only signatory to the 2006 agreement) and the GoS over 
violations to the signed DPA, the conflict in the Shangil Tobaya is said to have mutated into 
intensified confrontations between the armed movements and the GoS. So as to gain political 
ascendancy over the movements, the GoS putatively recruited and mobilized hundreds of 
tribesmen from the Tunjur, Mima and Birgid (the suppressed groups) to form an alliance against 
the stronghold of the Zaghawa in the area. 758 The fighting between the rebels and the GoS 
ultimately reached its peak in December 2010. Since the established alliance between the 
government forces and the local militia in the area, the expulsion of Zaghawa by their neigbours 
has continued unabated prompting a refugee situation in camps around Nyala and El-Fasher.759 
The execution of 17 civilians by the government-backed militia in 2011 precipitated renewed 
violence in the area. A reprisal attack by the Zaghawa further aggravated security concerns and 
displaced a huge number of civilians. 
 
9.6.3 Mapping out the path towards peace: 
 Preliminary action centred on supplying relief to the victims. CAS SS in December 2010 
waded in to access the conflict and provide humanitarian aid. In January 2011 CAS without 
specific reference to which particular sector, initiated separate peace meetings with the Native 
Administration leaders of the Zaghawa and the Birgid tribes. The discussion targeted the 
initiation of collaborative efforts with the capacity to restore harmony to both communities. 
Similarly, an initial response (by local government officials and leaders) to investigate the 
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assassination of the 17 civilians and forestall impending retaliation attacks, was reportedly 
thwarted by an ambush mounted by local militias. In April 2011 CAS held a meeting with the 
Shartay of the Shangil Tobaya and the head of the Shangil Tobaya transitional committee on 
how to establish a platform for both parties to express their grievances, resolve the conflict and 
be reconciled to one another. CAS continued to monitor the conflict until 2013 when a 
substantial initiative for peace emerged.  
 
In November 2013 CAS organized a workshop for 30 Native Administrators and community 
leaders of Dare Salam and Kalimando localities in El-Fasher. It was tagged “Strengthening 
Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanism”760 The central team bordered on reviving the 
diminished legitimacy of indigenous leaders as well as on the resuscitation of mechanisms for 
peace and reconciliation. The workshop objectives included: 
1. To facilitate a joint interactive discussion between Dar al salam and Kalimando rival 
parties and to gauge their perception on prospects of peaceful coexistence among 
them. 
2. To enhance the Traditional Conflict Resolution and Management Mechanisms to 
become relevant in resolving the conflict in Kalimando and Daru-salam localities. 
3. To give the participants an opportunity in a participatory approach to share ideas on 
conflict analysis and the best practical ways of resolving conflicts by Traditional 
Conflict Resolution and Management Mechanisms.761   
 The workshop created the “space” for belligerent groups to establish a compromise amidst 
apparent differences that had emerged as a result of prolonged fighting. It provided the 
opportunity for both parties to discuss the path towards revivifying communal harmony 
contingent upon Darfur’s peace-making heritage. Guest speakers reminded the parties of the 
era during the Sultanate when traditional leaders beyond exhibiting political astuteness, utilized 
Darfur’s mechanisms for peace and reconciliation, to preserve societal coherence and maintain 
stability.  The workshop equally created the platform for participants to discuss in groups 
around the following questions: 
a. Is the Judiyya a relevant mechanism to successfully resolve the post 2003 conflicts 
in Darfur? 
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b. How to revive traditional peace mechanisms to successfully resolve conflicts in 
Darfur 
c. Whether the key community religious leaders and Native Administration can play 
an active role in resolving current conflicts in Darfur 
d. What measures are required to ensure peaceful co-existence among rival tribes in 
the two localities?762 
  
The workshop concluded with the formation of a nine-member follow-up committee 
comprising members from both communities charged with the responsibility of implementing 
recommendations from the workshop.  
 
The idea behind CAS’s adoption of the workshop approach in the Shangil Tobaya conflict can 
be linked to Lederach reflections on the “Elicitive Model”. The elicitive approach according to 
the author:  
“Starts from the vantage point that training (workshops) is an opportunity 
aimed primarily at discovery, creation and solidification of models that emerge 
from the resources present in a particular setting and respond to needs in that 
context” … “Participants and their knowledge are seen as primary resource for 
the training, whether or not they initially see themselves as such…763 
Likewise, the author finds that: 
 “The foundation of this approach is that this implicit indigenous knowledge about the 
way of being and doing is a valued resource for creating and sustaining appropriate 
models of conflict resolution in a given setting… Primary emphasis is placed on first 
discovering and identifying what people have in place and already know about the 
strength and weaknesses of their own models of conflict resolution”. 764 
 
These reflections from the author, allows the reader make sense of the workshop approach as a 
technique CAS utilizes to reinvigorate traditional leaders to the level of conscious detachment 
from political sentiments, towards the rediscovery of their erstwhile position as advocates of 
social re-engineering.  
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CAS has therefore refrained from imposing on the conflict in the Shangil Tobaya locality, an 
approach to peace that the people cannot relate to.  Instead it reconnects traditional leaders to 
their cultural peace-making heritage reliant upon the workshop approach.    
 
Similarly, participants acknowledged the “strengths and weaknesses of their own model of 
conflict resolution”.  
 
Reacting to the first question tabled for discussion: 
“Is the Judiyya a relevant mechanism to successfully resolve the post 2003 conflicts in 
Darfur?” 
 Participants acknowledged the current challenges facing indigenous peace-making 
mechanisms in Darfur. Deliberations culminated with the conclusion that the efficacy of the 
Judiyya can be revamped as well as sustained, and ultimately utilised in the resolution of the 
post 2003 conflicts in Darfur, if adopted in its undiluted form.  
 
Underscoring this position further, participants noted the imperativeness attached to “selecting 
neutral mediating members who are aware of the general context, the root causes of the 
respective conflicts and interests of the rival groups”. As a concluding statement, participants 
suggested:  
“the empowerment, training, support and protection of the mediators, so as to enhance their 
positive contribution to activities of reconciliation”.765 
 
In response to the second question on how to revive traditional peace mechanisms to 
successfully resolve conflicts in Darfur, participants uncovered additional factors capable of 
undermining the effectiveness of Darfur’s peace-making resources: the appalling proliferation 
of weapons and a corollary predilection for the use of weapons and violence in addressing 
discontent. This has corroded (among Darfuri youths) the essence of a peaceful and non-violent 
approach to conflict as defined by Darfur’s indigenous mechanisms for peace. In order that 
posterity may be reconnected with Darfur’s peace-making heritage, participants suggested the:   
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“Documentation and dissemination of traditional conflict resolution mechanism and 
norms within the community, in schools and universities to transfer the experience to 
new generations”766 
 
Another debilitating factor confronted the participants while examining the third question, 
which investigated into the role of women and youths in achieving peace and resolving conflicts 
in Darfur. Participants identified that the role of women, specifically in the conflict under 
review, was misplaced. Women with particular reference to the Hakkamat for example, 
(traditional singers) must replace the role of “singing war supporting songs” with the chants of 
peace. Recommendations specified further: 
 “That women and youths should be trained on conflict resolution management 
and reconciliation to positively contribute to conflict resolution and peaceful 
co-existence.”767 
  
 Participant’s general assessment of the workshop rated:  very good. Yet, there is no way of 
ascertaining further, whether indeed changes did occur in the attitude and perception of the 
leaders to both rival groups, and whether these changes were transferable to conflict itself.  
What may be certain nonetheless, is that with the workshop approach, CAS SN evidenced what 
Lederach suggests is the attitude of a trainer operating within the rubrics of an elicitive 
approach: 
“I do not have the answer (CAS SN), but I can work together with others (Traditional leaders) 
on a process (Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms) that may help us find it”  
 
9.7 Conflict five: 
The conflict between the Beni Hussein and Abbala/ Northern Rizeigat in north Darfur. 
9.7.1  Introduction 
The last conflict that I will be examining occurred in the north of Darfur in 2013. It is considered 
to be one of the major violent escalations between two Arab groups: The Beni Hussein and the 
Northern Rezeigat also referred to as the Abbala tribes. Observers of the Darfur conflict seem 
to possess wider knowledge about the on-going confrontations between Arab and Non-Arab 
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groups, vis-a-vis the GoS backed militias and the war against the rebel movements. Only little 
is known about the current trend of conflict eruptions in Darfur.   
 
In recent years, it has become possible to speak about intra- Arab conflict escalations. Arabs 
have also become the victims of what the authors of Darfur’s Gold Rush refers to as: “State-
Sponsored Atrocities”. 768 The conflict between the Beni Hussein and the Abbala over rights to 
the gold mines in Jebel Amer (El –Sereif Locality in north Darfur), broke out precisely on the 
5th of January 2013. As of 2013 it was regarded as the cause of the biggest humanitarian crisis 
Darfur had experienced in recent years.769 It recorded hundreds of casualties and resulted in the 
displacement of over 30,000 civilians. 770  While history has it that both Arabs groups have co-
existed peacefully, the recent occurrences tend to lend credence to the “politicized tribal war” 
narrative spreading across all of Darfur.  Even though the Beni Hussein are an Arab group, the 
GoS was unable to co-opt them into the Para-military forces purposed for the counter-
insurgency war against the armed movements.  
 
The Northern Rezeigat on their part, also Arabs, have earned notoriety as the government back 
militia dubbed the “Janjaweed”. The Janjaweed have perpetrated numerous atrocities against 
innocent civilians since the outset of the war in 2003.   Before proceeding further, it is 
imperative at this juncture, to provide background information to both Arabs groups.  It will 
become explicit why the Beni Hussein as a group, rejected enlistment into the GoS proxy forces. 
 
9.7.2 Background to the tribes: 
The Northern Rezeigat: 
The Northern Rezeigat are camel herders who trace their origin to Chad. They are mainly 
located in the North, West and Central parts of Darfur. It is common in Darfur to differentiate 
between the Northern Rezeigat (Abbala tribes) and the Southern Rezeigat (Baggara). In contrast 
to the Abbala, the Baggara inhabit the Southern part of Darfur and earn their livelihood as cattle 
herders. While the Southern Rezeigat are a landowning Arab group, with traditional rights to 
Hakura in Darfur, the Abbala based on their nomadic lifestyle are a landless group. They own 
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what in Darfur is referred to as Damrats (Settlement villages) around the Kutum town. As 
alluded to earlier, the Northern Rezeigat were enlisted into the government’s auxiliary forces 
and later incorporated into the GoS’s Boarder Guards and Central Reserve Police. With the 
outset of the War in 2003, the Abbala are known to have been financially, militarily and 
politically bolstered by the government in Khartoum.  
 
The Beni Hussein: 
The Beni Hussein have inhabited the El-Sererif locality, northwest of the Kabkabiya in northern 
Darfur since the British Colonial era. They are a pastoralist group also majorly engaged in 
sedentary farming. Unlike the Abbala Arabs of northern Darfur, the Beni Hussein are a land 
owing Arab group as well. It is believed that their refusal to be aligned especially with the 
counter insurgency war stems from their ability to lay claims to their own traditional homeland 
(Dar). Since the eruption of the conflict in 2003, the Beni Hussein Native Administration have 
successfully steered its community clear from embroilments in the cancerous battles between 
the GoS and the rebel movements. 771Regardless of hostilities, between the Beni Hussein and 
the Zaghawa in 1992, the group is considered the most peaceful Arab tribe found to maintain a 
harmonious co-existence with neighbours like the Fur, Massalit and the Gimir.  
 
9.7.3 The Conflict: 
Since the discovery of gold in the Jebel Amer, El-Sereif locality in 2011, the area has attracted 
over 60,000 gold mine workers from within Darfur, other parts of Sudan as well as from 
neighbouring countries like Chad, the Central African Republic and Nigeria. Mining activities 
are said to have proceeded peacefully under the control of the Beni Hussein (the traditional 
owners of the land on which gold was discovered). A local committee created by Native 
Administrators of the Beni Hussein, specifically to oversee all mining activities, mitigated 
conflicts among the mineworkers and preserved security in the area. 772 In fact, the committee 
equally controlled the licensing of mining permits in the area.773 Interested miners acted in 
conformity with the modus operandi specified for extraction by the landowners until a group 
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of Abbala Arabs invaded the locality to commence mining activities without the formal 
notification of committee members.  
 
Controversy ensued, in which the Beni Hussein assertively demanded for the Abbala to 
terminate its activities till all protocols were duly observed. The face-off resulted in the killing 
of one N. Rezeigat, while three committee members sustained injuries.774. As tension continued 
to mount, both parties  began to record an increase in the number of casualties:  8 killed and 15 
injured from the Beni Hussein, 30 dead and 50 injured from among the Abbala. This happened 
on January 4, 2013. The day after, on January 5, the Abbala mobilized its members. A 
devastating assault on the minefield and on 65 Beni Hussein villages precipitated the 
displacement of about 100,000 civilians.775  Intense fighting continued until January 13, 2013 
 
9.7.4 Mitigating the conflict, and searching for peace  
The initial action taken by CAS SN Crisis Management Cell (CMC) between January 13 and 
14 was to embark on a verification mission to the affected locality. An analysis of the conflict 
was conducted to ascertain the local dynamics and deliberate on the most appropriate approach 
to handling the conflict.776 Successfully, attacks were brought to a halt on January 17, when the 
North Darfur Sate Government negotiated the cessation of hostilities based on the agreement 
signed between the warring parties in the Saraf Umra locality. Regardless of the ceasefire 
agreement fighting resumed between February 21 and 23. Renewed hostilities stemmed from a 
breech in the signed agreement 777 by members of the Abbala who reportedly commenced 
mining activities in the El-Sereif locality.  
 
Besides the assumption that violent hostilities resurged due to resumption in mining activities, 
the ceasefire agreement was putatively perceived as non-inclusive. One the one hand it was 
understood to be incapable of addressing the root causes of the conflict.778 On the other hand it 
lacked the support of top leaders from the Abbala tribes, seen as being capable of restraining 
its people from further attacks against the Beni Hussein. 779In signing the ceasefire agreement, 
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the parties consented to participation in a reconciliation conference, which was scheduled to 
hold on April 15, 2013. As the violence continued unabated, a renewed commitment to maintain 
ceasefire became imperative.  
 
On March 2 therefore, leaders from both tribes converged to a meeting convened by the Walis 
of North and West Darfur in Saraf Umra. A second ceasefire agreement ordered the removal of 
all roadblocks to allow for unhindered access to civilians in the conflict area, in need of 
humanitarian relief. While a second ceasefire failed to completely restrain further attacks, other 
initiatives geared towards the restoration of peace in the affected locality began to emerge.  
 
A Joint Reconciliation Mechanism (JRM) was established early March by the northern Darfur 
state government, in a meeting, which had UNAMID, UNDP, civil society organizations, and 
the Native Administration in attendance. The obligations of the JRM as specified in the terms 
of reference included the: “monitoring of potential clashes, resolving reported cases of loot and 
theft, ensuring the removal of roadblocks and enforcing adherence to suspend extraction in the 
goldmine for the time being”. The JRM was to be supported by a sub-mechanism: “daira” 
(circle) created in each of the affected conflict areas in the Jebel Amir to mitigate security 
concerns that may obstruct preliminary initiatives towards the slated reconciliation conference.  
The “dairas” reportedly “co-ordinate on a daily basis to facilitate quick response to security 
incidents involving the two tribes as well as engage in conflict resolution. It is said to have 
mitigated a number of “skirmishes, looting, cattle rustling and harassments involving both 
tribes”780  
 
Regardless of the recognized presence of civil society organization, UNDP and the Native 
Administration, there was no attest to any role specifically linked to them.  Still, on the part of 
UNAMID, beyond the demand for logistical support to the activities of the mechanism, the 
State Government made a further entreaty to secure UNAMID’S participation in the 
reconciliation process.781 The Governor’s request to UNAMID served as a formal approval for 
CAS to operate within the ambit of a reconciliation “space” strictly controlled by the 
government. In fact, one report confirmed that:  
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“For the first time, the government has opened the possibility for UNAMID to 
participate substantively in the reconciliation itself”.782  
This statement goes a long way to revealing that CAS might be confronted with a number of 
constraints as it endeavours to accomplish the stipulations of the mandate that authorizes it to 
carry out reconciliation activities on the grassroot level in Darfur. In the light of a perceived 
leeway to become involved in the reconciliation process as specifically requested by the 
government of North Darfur, UNAMID sees the need to thread softly on grounds assumed to 
bear the political imprints of the GoS.   
 
Inflammatory comments such as: “Land belongs to everybody”783 within the context of the 
conflict, tends to reveal the position of the local government. Similarly, it not only calls to 
question, the government’s competence in accomplishing lasting peace contingent on the JRM, 
but casts doubt on its capacity to remain unbiased as it plays the lead role within its established 
framework for peace and reconciliation (JRM). Indeed, this captures the exact concerns vocally 
expressed by leaders of the Beni Hussein during a pre-reconciliation workshop separately 
organised by the CAS SN for both parties to the conflict. Such concerns notably remained non-
manifest among members of Abbala tribe who expressed complete satisfaction with the 
established mechanism.784  
 
Undeniably, a separate report noted that the JRM “duplicated the functions of already existing 
frameworks and bodies”. It listed, as part of such frameworks and bodies, Darfur’s indigenous 
reconciliation mechanism: the “Judiyya”.785 In the light of such perceived “duplication of 
functions” it should be appropriate to question the rationale behind what seems like the 
calculated fencing of the “Judiyya” process from efforts tailored towards the reconciliation of 
the warring Beni Hussein and Abbala tribes. Bearing in mind that a Judiyya process never 
involves Ajaweed mediators from among the parties in conflict. In so doing, the process is 
regarded as neutral, reliable and effective.  
 
Be that as it may, CAS SN once again resigned to channelling support to the JRM through its 
capacity building programme. UNAMID may have judged this step to be appropriate based on 
                                                     
782 UNAMID, "Title Withheld: Not for Circulation." 5 
783 UNAMID, "Report on conflict between Beni-Hussein and Abbala tribes." 4  
784 UNAMID, " Title Withheld: Not for Circulation" 5  
785 UNAMID, "Dynamics of Conflict between the Beni Hussein and the Northern Rezeigat." 1  
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the confronting exigency for CAS to promote peaceful co-existence among conflicting parties. 
At the same time, UNAMID is cognisant of fact that such engagements challenge the mission’s 
principle of “neutrality”. 
 
9.7.5 CAS maps out the path towards Reconciliation 
Lederach noted: 
“That the engagement of the conflicting groups assumes an encounter, not only of 
people but also of several different and highly interdependent streams of activity. He 
further averred “Reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting 
locked in a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. People need 
opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma and loss and their 
grief at that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of the 
injustice experienced… Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of 
encounter where concerns about the past and the further can meet” 
 
UNAMID’s CAS may have understood these salient issues as captured by Lederach when it 
noted some of the significant themes on which the Reconciliation Conference should be based 
on, so that the envisaged peace becomes attainable and durable. 
• That the conference must ensure to address the conflict as a resource-based conflict 
instead of focusing attention on tribal dimensions. 
• That the issue of ownership of the gold mines must be addressed especially in the face 
of opposing views expressed by both parties. (The Beni Hussein lay claims to the gold 
mines based on the traditional system of land ownership. The Abbala tribes maintain 
the same view of the goldmine area as expressed by the government. “That all people 
regardless of tribal affiliation, should have equal access to the gold”786   
• The need for both sides to apologize and express remorse, as this can facilitate inter-
tribal dialogue and smoothen the part towards the reconciliation of both parties. 
• That genuine reconciliation can be achieved if the imbalance in power between both 
tribes is adequately managed, so as to circumvent the exploitation of the weaker tribe: 
The Beni Hussein. 
                                                     
786 Lederach, “Building Peace”, 26-27  
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• That the Reconciliation Conference must ensure the payment of the “diya” to the 
victims. In so doing resurgence in the conflict will be averted.787  
Against the backdrop of ensuring that both parties are engaged in fruitful deliberations during 
the Reconciliation Conference, CAS proceeded to conduct 2 separate reconciliation workshops 
for the Beni-Hussein and the Abbala in El-Sereif and in 5 Arab settlements in the localities of 
Kutum and Kabkabiya. According to a report from CAS, the workshops: 
“Sensitized participants on peaceful co-existence and imparted knowledge on conflict 
analysis, conflict management, negotiation, and meditation” 
… it also aimed at convincing the youths to choose dialogue over retaliation.788  
 
CAS conducted these workshops from April 9 to 11, 2013 in preparation for the Conference 
slated for April 17. The Reconciliation Conference was however rescheduled for May the 15. 
Again CAS, with the aim to build on its ground laying efforts towards the Reconciliation 
Conference, conducted four preparatory reconciliation workshops for 167 women and youths 
of the Beni Hussein and for 155 women and youths of the Abbala tribe, held in El-Sereif and 
Kabkabiya respectively. The workshops objective was to: “develop constructive views about 
reconciliation and to sustain dialogue between the tribes” 789.   
Lamentably, the Reconciliation Conference was postponed indefinitely. As at 2014 when the 
researcher visited CAS SN, there were no reports stating whether or not the conference 
eventually held.   
 
9.7.6 Conclusion 
CAS posits that: 
“It is worth recognizing the vigour and responsiveness of the Native Administration in different 
parts of Darfur in containing the Abbala- Beni Hussein conflict.” It claims that it is “an 
attestation that capacity building programmes (through workshops, seminars and meetings) by 
Civil Affairs are succeeding in invigorating local mechanism to decisively engage in conflict 
management and reconciliation at the local level” 790 
                                                     
787 UNAMID, Title Withheld: Not for Circulation, 6-7 
788 UNAMID, “Conflict between the Beni Hussein and the Abbala”, 1 
789 ibid 
790 UNAMID, “Report on conflict between the Beni-Hussein and Abbala tribes”, 4  
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These assertions were made with respect to the Beni Hussein – Abbala conflict of 2013. It may 
therefore not be applicable to the other four conflicts analysed in this study. Especially where 
CAS ostensibly became constrained towards organizing the same peace building programmes 
for the parties in conflict. Similarly, assertions like these constitute CAS own assessments of 
the programmes it organized in honour of the conflict. There is no way of measuring whether 
this same optimistic opinion resonates with Darfuris at all levels of the affected population or 
even with the government of North Darfur, as co actor in the process to reconcile both parties 
to the conflict.  
 
When I discussed with a former Minister of Darfur during my 2014 visit. He responded to my 
question:  
“Do tribal leaders have a role to play in the current conflict”?  
 
By clarifying on the types of conflicts that have played out on Darfur’s terrains since 2003. He 
wanted me to understand that these wars were not tribal but political. They are political because 
they have been fomented by the government to fragment Darfur and divert the people’s 
attention from the oppressive regime in Khartoum, as controlled by citizens from riverine 
Sudan. 791 
 
“They want to make us busy with the wars, so they can fulfil what they have in their hearts.” 
792 
 
It is on the basis of this notion that the former Minister argues against the efficacy of indigenous 
mechanism and its custodians in the current conflict. He underscored that:  
 
“No tribal leader has power over their people anymore. They are weakened… and the 
horizons of their people are opened to see… it was a factor in the past. Not anymore”.793  
 
When I investigated further to know if indigenous mechanisms and their custodians could play 
a role if empowered to tackle the kinds of conflict that have prevailed since 2003” 
                                                     
791 Khalil A. Abdulkarim, Personal interview, UNAMID headquarters El-Fasher Northern Darfur, April 21, 
2014. 
792 Abdulkarim, “Do tribal leaders have a role to play in the current conflict”? 
793 ibid 
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His response was as quoted: 
“In the past, the Native Administrator was the unique person. He was the teacher, the 
police and the judge. What role can he play in the modern system of governance? He 
continues to be the head of the clans under him, but in matters of conflict he is not 
effective at all. Not even the Ajaweed is useful… Ajaweed will not solve a political 
issue. Ajaweed solves social issues. The conflict has been politicised and for these you 
need political tools”794 
 
It is in the same light that the Director Peace Research Institute University of Khartoum, who I 
interviewed during my visit in 2014, argued, when confronted with the same question:  
 
Researcher: “What in your opinion is the role of indigenous leaders in Darfur’s current 
conflict”?   
 
He started by explaining to me that the problem in Darfur can no longer be delineated as a rift 
between pastoralist and sedentary farmers because it had mutated to a civil war in which the 
government is involved.   
He responded further as quoted below: 
“Definitely they have a role to play (Indigenous mechanisms) but you cannot put all of 
this in one basket… Traditional authority lost the kind of clout it had. The youths no 
longer listen to their leaders… in fact the youths accuse the traditional leaders of being 
co-opted by the government… There is something wrong with the mechanism. 
Personally, I am not waiting for any miracle out of this mechanism”795 
 
In my last question to him, I wanted to inquire if traditional mediators like the Ajaweed, had a 
role to play in reconciling the parties in Darfur’s conflict even on the level of the tribes. 
The respondent contended in this light: 
 
“We have a lot of tribal conflicts where these mechanisms have not worked even between the 
same tribes…  You cannot think of reconciliation when the war is still on. Darfur is an active 
zone of conflict. Any strategy for post war scenario is misleading.796  
                                                     
794 Abdulkarim, “Do tribal leaders have a role to play in the current conflict”? 
795 Munzoul A. Assal, Personal interview, Khartoum, Sudan April 13, 2014. 
796 Assal, “The role of indigenous leaders in Darfur’s current conflict” 
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My interview with the head of the humanitarian section also corroborates all of the above 
assertions from a different perspective. 
In response to my question: “What role can Darfur’s indigenous peace-making mechanisms 
play in the current conflict”?  
My respondent made me understand that indigenous mechanisms can be applied to tribal 
conflicts. However, it is difficult to confirm that indigenous mechanisms alone can address the 
kind of conflicts, which have erupted since 2013.  In terms of accountability for example, my 
respondent stated that:  
“It is a challenge for human rights to draw the line between principles underlying 
modern and informal views of accountability”. 797 
 
She made me understand that a good number of Darfuris no longer wish to be conformed to 
justice as defined by indigenous conception. Where the payment of the diya is tantamount to 
justice served and conflict resolved.  Most of the victims seek  justice the formal way.  
 
She noted that the payment of the “diya” is becoming commercial. On that account, it had 
started to lose its potency as a viable tool for conflict resolution. 
Finally, my respondent avowed that the kind of conflicts that have erupted since 2003 are 
characterized by human rights violations which traditional mechanisms and custodians cannot 
address.  
“Traditional systems are not gender sensitive. How then do you apply that kind 
of traditional framework for conflict resolution to a human right violation such 
as rape, which in the case of the conflict after 2003 has become rampant?”798  
 
It is amidst these conflicting views that CAS builds on the hope that its initiatives can impact 
positively on Darfur’s indigenous mechanism. CAS is mandated to assume its position at the 
centre of these occurrences. CAS as the external peace actor stands at the vantage position to 
access to what degree an impact is being made in relation to durable peace and reconciliation. 
However, it remains questionable.  
 
                                                     
797 The head of humanitarian section (Names withheld by researcher), Personal interview, UNAMID 
headquarters El-Fasher Northern Darfur, April 13, 2014. 
798 Head of humanitarian section, “The role of indigenous peace -making mechanisms in Darfur’s conflict”  
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Observers outside the entire scenario or even Darfuri’s as evidenced in my key interviews, may 
be in the best position as well, to draw such conclusions.  Nonetheless, a conclusion based on 
the CAS statement at the beginning of this concluding section, see prospects in Darfur’s 
indigenous mechanisms based on programmes organised to elevate custodians to the level 
where they can be perceived as adequately equipped to tackle the nature of the conflicts which 
have emerged in the unfolding years since 2003.  
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis set out predominantly to investigate into the prospects of indigenous peace-making 
mechanisms in modern conflicts. Using Darfur as the case, the research unpacks its overarching 
question by examining the interface at the local level, between Darfur’s indigenous peace-
making institution and the AU-UN hybrid peace operation. In addition to the main research 
question, the study also addressed the binary objectives of the study. The first aimed to 
understand: How the international community has responded to the exigency for durable peace 
in Darfur, since the conflict erupted in 2003.This task was ventured into with the intention to 
focus specific attention on mainstream peace-making processes and strategies applied in the 
de-escalation of the conflict prior to the arrival of UNAMID in 2008.  
 
The second objective centred on gaining insight into whether the current peace actor adopts a 
“comprehensive model” that is geared towards securing durable peace for the province. As 
noted in the chapter on conflict transformation, the fulfilment of examined pre-conditions, 
creates the enabling environment for transformation to occur in a protracted conflict like that 
of Darfur. In this light, a mandate based on the complementarity of mainstream and indigenous 
approaches, as reflected in the peace actor’s “multidimensional” framework, was investigated. 
Based on findings, the study surmises that UNAMID’s CAS recognizes Darfur’s indigenous 
peace-making methods. CAS currently operationalizes the mandate for grassroot intervention 
by cooperating with tribal leaders and corollary processes towards achieving reconciliation, 
stability and order.        
  
It is worthy of note that the assumptions underlying the school of conflict transformation served 
as the investigative tool, which the research hinged on to examine what may constitute the gap 
created by mainstream approaches applied by the international community at the initial stages 
of response to the Darfur conflict in 2003. John Paul Lederach’s model on “Protracted Internal 
Conflicts”799 constituted the framework employed in the analysis of interventions strategies 
applied to a real-time protracted conflict. It also provided the link to the empirical chapters of 
the thesis.  
                                                     
799 John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive 
Framework," in Conflict Transformation, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 
201-222 
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The remainder of the conclusion chapter will unfold in this manner: Section one illuminates on 
the thesis central findings, with the aim to understand what implications these findings may 
have on the prospects for indigenous peace-making in Darfur.  Section two unearths inferences 
drawn from the frameworks and theories applied in the study. The third section concludes on 
the practicability for conflict transformation in Darfur. The final section provides concluding 
thoughts, pending questions, limitation and sheds light on probable future research areas.  
  
10.1 Central findings 
The thesis examined five major and minor conflict eruptions within the scope of the study: 
2003-2014. These five conflicts tested for the operationalization of Lederach’s propositions in 
real-time conflict scenarios. As the thesis found, UNAMID operates within a “comprehensive 
framework” as advanced by Lederach. This sanctions the integration, into the peace process, of 
all levels of the affected population and authorizes within a single framework, the application 
of conventional and non-conventional approaches to peace. Accordingly, the study provided 
illumination on the implementation of UNAMID’s mandate on the grassroot, as performed in 
conjunction with the selected stakeholder for the research: Native Administration (NA) and its 
integral parts. The study reveals the NA’s diminishing legitimacy. Of major essence 
nonetheless, is to understand how the peace actor responds to and manages the issue of 
legitimacy on ground. Does UNAMID capitalize on the declining authority of Darfur’s 
indigenous mechanisms to impose its initiatives for peace on conflict eruptions on the 
grassroot?  Or has Lederach’s proposition for the empowerment of “contextual resources” and 
a revival thereof, found validity in the interactions between CAS and Darfur’s indigenous actors 
and processes? The thesis based on empirical evidence concludes in affirmation of the second 
question.  
 
Firstly, the study found that the attitude of CAS (with specific reference to SN in northern 
Darfur) towards Darfur’s peace-making institution corresponds with the elicitive approach to 
peace, as expounded by Lederach.800 This approach places the external actor on the path 
towards “discovery”, so that peace initiatives are geared towards the “solidification” of models 
that emerge from the resources available within the conflict setting”801. In addition, such an 
                                                     
800 See, John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Syracuse University Press, 1995), 55. 
801 Ibid. 
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approach to peace-making enables the peacemaker to recognize “indigenous knowledge as a 
“valued resource”. The study contingent on “Conflict one”802 substantiates this claim with the 
successful employment of the Ajaweed and Judiyya as a “valued resource” in the restoration of 
harmony within the Korma locality of northern Darfur.  
 
In examining conflicts four and five, the thesis reveals similarly that SN’s grassroot 
engagements are tilted to the quest for “discovery and the “solidification of contextual 
resources”. In conflict four for example, CAS adopted the workshop approach to peace. Diana 
Francis differentiates between two types of workshops: the training and the dialogue 
workshops.803 CAS SN relies on both. The dialogue workshop organised for 30 Native 
Administrative leaders in 2013, is one prominent example. That workshop was tagged 
“Strengthening Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms”. Chapter 9 documents the 
outcome of that workshop. The employment of the workshop approach by CAS SN may be 
misinterpreted by some, as evidence on the grassroot, of the external peace actor’s imposition 
of non-conforming intervention strategies on the grassroot.  This technique on the contrary, 
conforms to the proposition to re-empower tribal leadership within the locality of the conflict 
and demonstrates the creation of “space” by CAS SN, for conflict parties to engage in dialogue 
and ultimately reconciliation. In deed prior to the 2013, CAS SN had been involved with 
organising workshops as well as meetings geared towards the restoration of social harmony. It 
engaged Native Administrative leaders of the Zaghawa and Birgid tribes, in 2011.  
 
Conflict five provided empirical evidence with respect to UNAMID’s activities towards the 
solidification of Darfur’s indigenous mechanisms.  Further investigation exposed some factors 
that militate against the successful implementation of UNAMID’s mandate (for conflict 
resolution and reconciliation) in partnership with actors on level 3 of the affected population. 
Such challenges were initially highlighted by the thesis in conflict 2 and became even more 
outstanding in conflicts 3 and 5.  The thesis found that indigenous mechanisms became 
inapplicable to the conflict in the Kutum and Alwaha localities (conflict 2). The conflict defied 
the capacity of indigenous mechanisms and actors, on grounds of its political characterizing. It 
must be noted that tribal conflicts in Darfur tend to demonstrate political undercurrents. Such 
conflicts are considered to be emblematic of the GoS biases and firm support towards one of 
                                                     
802 See, chapter 9 for details on the conflict 
803 See, Diana Francis, People, Peace, and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action (London: Pluto Press, 
2002), 22 -23 
 376 
the parties to the conflict. In most cases the favoured have been members of Arab tribal groups. 
Such illicit support takes the form of manipulation. New initiatives are superimposed on 
indigenous peace-making so that they are rendered absolutely redundant.     
 
Conflict 2 also unveils a measure of inconsistency in the attitude of the government towards 
conflicts that bear its atrocious imprints and those of intra-Arab characterizing as in conflict 5. 
In conflict 2, the government imposed stringent regulations on the “space” for grassroot 
reconciliation. It is such restrictions that putatively handicapped the activities of CAS in the 
conflict and ostensibly precipitated its disengagement from the indigenous peace actors.  In 
contrast conflict 5 evidences the creation of frameworks that were non-complimentary to the 
available mechanisms on ground. The establishment of the Joint Reconciliation Mechanism 
(JRM) for peace purportedly duplicated the functions of indigenous peace processes. It was 
assumed to be a government tactics to fence out indigenous peace-making mechanisms and 
strip the reconciliation process of all neutrality. The reader must be reminded that regardless of 
the distinctive feature of conflict five: conflict between two Arab groups, the government still 
found an ally in that conflict. This was captured in the GoS support that was ostensibly tilted 
towards the Northern Rizeigat.   In stark contrast to conflict 2, where UNAMID was required 
to seek the consent of the north Darfur government to participate in the peace process, conflict 
5, saw the government itself officially extend the hand of cooperation to the external 
international actor.  
 
The result from conflict 3 tended to vary. Indigenous mechanisms were applicable to the point 
where hostilities derived from competition over land. When they mutated to a politically 
motivated conflict indigenous actors and mechanisms became inconsequential to the search for 
peace and reconciliation. CAS refrained from intervening in conflict 3. It cited the proliferation 
of arms as justification. Such inaction tends to reveal some of the constraints of an organization 
whose mandate derives from chapter VII of the UN Security Council.  
 
 
10.2 Prospects of indigenous mechanism in Darfur’s conflict 
 
What are the implications of these findings on the prospects of achieving conflict 
transformation in partnership with indigenous actors, and how does this investigation sum up 
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the most significant component in the transformation agenda? “Reconciliation”. The thesis, 
based on its findings, categorically arrives at the following conclusion: 
 
Firstly, it is evident that the “reconciliation space,” is controlled by the GoS. This is specifically 
the situation in the northern part of Darfur where this research was conducted. This means that 
regardless of a “multidimensional” intervention framework, UNAMID cannot operate in full 
capacity. It is assumed that the GoS is cognizant of the resilience demonstrated by indigenous 
mechanisms, notwithstanding pitfalls such as the waning legitimacy of tribal authority and a 
paucity of viable formal state apparatuses for conflict resolution. This awareness tends to propel 
the GoS into profusely and calculatedly obstructing the prospects for conflict resolution and 
stable peace based on Darfur’s indigenous methods. Should the GoS sanction UNAMID with 
the full leverage to implement its mandate through initiatives that empower tribal leaders for 
example, Darfurians might gradually transcend conflict. It may then become conceivable to 
anticipate relational change and reconciliation; which advocates have identified as the core 
element of conflict transformation.       
 
Second, as long as weapons remain in the hands of the youths and a transition to non-violent 
change remains far-fetched as a result, tribal leadership is compromised. A step in the direction 
to restore the diminishing legitimacy of tribal leadership in Darfur is, among other factors, to 
ensure that both sides of the conflict: the armed movements and the government-backed militias 
alike, surrender to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program 
supported by UNAMID. It is impossible to envisage a weapon free Darfur if the DDR process 
concentrates entirely on confiscating arms from one side of the warring parties. In recent times, 
extant literature has focused exclusively on publishing stories of the successful disarmament 
process of rebel groups.804      
 
Third, should tribal conflicts maintain a political undertone, the Native Administration and its 
integral parts unfortunately cannot suffice as adequate mechanism for peace to prevail in 
Darfur. Under such circumstances UNAMID’s efforts to incorporate indigenous mechanisms, 
re-empower them and extract dividends for the peace process, becomes crippled. The agenda 
for reconciliation ostensibly becomes scotched, as the government-backed adversary may never 
fully submit to or adhere to the demands of a reconciliation processes defined along indigenous 
                                                     
804 See, Zurab Elzarov, "DDR in Darfur: Progress Challenges and Outlook," Security Sector Reform Resource 
Centre, last modified May 7, 2015, http://ssresourcecentre.org 
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lines. Likewise, should the government perceive such politically motivated conflicts as 
occasion to create self-engineered mechanisms that supplant the existing ones, it automatically 
grants itself easy access to steer proceedings to its favour. Even the manipulation of handpicked 
loyalists becomes overly simplified. Such cases tend to demonstrate the GoS efforts at 
suffocating the quest for justice. It follows that when parallel mechanisms are created for 
intervention in tribal conflicts, the potentials for peace and reconciliation in its pristine form, 
as may be administered by neutral members of the Ajaweed, is neglected. In so doing, the 
prospects for durable peace also become undermined.  
 
Fourth, there are attestations to secretly organized peace deals as evidenced in chapter eight of 
this study. This implies that interference in reconciliation processes by the “third hand”805 is 
perceived as a serious impediment to peace in Darfur. The government must therefore revert to 
the stance on non-biased intervention; it must distance itself from directly influencing the 
outcome of reconciliation processes. The neutrality of the government and its role as 
implementer of outcomes deriving from Ajaweed mediation processes delineates the position 
of the government particularly during colonial administration. In deed this constraint to stable 
peace, mirrors accurately the concerns of the Ajaweed elders I was privileged to interview in 
2014.  
Should the government’s interference hugely persist, Darfurians would be left with basically 
two options: either to adopt clandestine means of securing their own peace, on the premise that 
the people are tired of the war and wish for a better future or surrender to the government’s 
manipulations and remain at war amidst age-long resolution mechanism, which are capable in 
a redefined manner, to deliver peace and harmony to Darfur’s rural configuration. Should 
Darfurians cower to endless fighting instead, the GoS would have gained upper hand. 
Ultimately, this would give credence to the assertions of one of my respondents:   
“They want to make us busy with the wars, so they can fulfil what they have in their 
hearts”. (See chapter 8).  
 
Fifth, the re-empowerment of indigenous actors in Darfur (to that level where diminished 
legitimacy is fully restored and perceived as efficacious to grassroot peace-making as in the 
days of old) does not singlehandedly lie within the jurisdiction of the external actor: UNAMID. 
Lederach’s propositions have found validity to the extent that UNAMID evinces the authorised 
                                                     
805 As coined by one of the anonymous key Informants of the study 
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incorporation of “contextual resources” –track III actors into the peace process. This is 
sufficient on the policy level, but inadequate to engender conflict transformation in Darfur. 
From the era of the sultans and during the condominium, the Native Administration prior to its 
abolition derived full legitimacy from the government of the day. This study demonstrated that 
UNAMID requires the full backing of the government to implement the mandate of peace and 
reconciliation at least on the level of intertribal rivalry. On the one hand this implies that the 
mission cannot act in isolation towards the achievement of the ultimate goal. On the other hand, 
it can be interpreted as compelling the mission to submit to the devices of the government. 
Observers may perceive such unwarranted loyalty as overly yielding to the GoS on issues where 
autonomous action sanctioned by Chapter VII, is necessitated. UNAMID based on that, might 
risk compromising UN intervention principles of neutrality, and may lose the confidence of 
Darfuris. At that point, the purpose for authorizing intervention on the grassroot is ultimately 
defeated.  
 
Finally, that unavoidable question: Under what circumstance can indigenous methods become 
effective and relevant to the search for durable peace in African contemporary conflicts. The 
three cases of conflict earlier examined in this study provide the platform for comparison and 
conjecturing.  
 
In the case of Darfur nonetheless, since this hybrid mission is the first of its kind, the study 
recommends that future hybrid missions glean a lesson from this experience. Authorizers must 
critically evaluate a conflict to determine prior to intervention whether indeed a “conflict 
transformation approach” or a multidimensional framework as the case may, appropriately 
tackles or manages on-ground realities to the extent that peace in its durable form is attained.        
 
10. 3 Theories and Frameworks: implication for the conflict in Darfur 
10.3.1 Conflict Management and Resolution theories 
This research evolved from theoretical and conceptual underpinnings and culminated with the 
establishment of a correlation of the findings with the empirical data gathered by the researcher 
in Darfur. To critically comprehend the rationale behind the instruments employed (by the 
international community) in the search for peace in Darfur and in pursuit of addressing the 
second objective of the research, it was significant for the researcher (I) to engage in a 
theoretical exploration of assumptions underlying two fields of inquiry: Conflict Management 
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and Conflict Resolution. The study shows that each field tends to proffer intervention 
mechanisms in consonance with its conception of conflict and in conformity with underlying 
principles guiding intervention.806  
 
 Correspondingly, the thesis reveals that assumptions undergirding both fields have been at play 
in the Darfur crisis. Theoretical foundations aligned with CM principles ostensibly informed 
the intervention tools initially applied to the conflict. Informal mediation in its classical state 
centric capacity, became evident in the initial response to the conflict as administered by Idriss 
Derby of Chad. That peace talk terminated with the signing of the Abeche Agreement in 2003.  
Ceasefire violations from the GoS and the movements precipitated the signing of the N’djamena 
Ceasefire Agreement in 2004. Both agreements amounted to a temporary cessation of 
hostilities. Nonetheless, there was an almost immediate resurgence of the violence. The study 
noted that the 2004 N’djamena Agreement failed to effectively address the aggression but 
constituted the basis on which the instrument of peacekeeping was introduced to the conflict.  
 
Similarly, the response by AMIS notably conformed to the traditional kind of peacekeeping. 
The study observed that the mandate was restricted to monitoring the ceasefire agreement. On 
the initial capacity of 120 military observers and 350 troops, the impact of a military 
intervention could hardly be fathomed 807 Even when the AU’s assumed the obligation to 
moderate the inter-Sudanese peace talks and eventually the Abuja mediation, the emerging 
authorization for an upgraded mandate proved ineffective towards securing the lives of Darfuri 
citizens from the heinous acts of violence meted out by the Janjaweed but also by the armed 
movements. AMIS unfortunately grappled with a plethora of challenges and thus became 
another demonstration of inadequate mandates authorized in the face of a complex 
humanitarian crisis. AMIS regardless of its timely response ostensibly lacked the capacity by 
every standard to deliver a successful peacekeeping operation.  
 
In the meantime, formal consultations administered by AU representatives, pooled the GoS and 
the movements once again to the negotiating table in Abuja. That mediation process eventually 
birthed the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. A thorough interrogation of the peace 
process revealed some lapses in the final stages of the proceedings that lead up to the moment 
of signing. The thesis detected a change in strategy as the AU and its international partners 
                                                     
806 See chapter 3 for details. 
807 Flint and De Wall, The New History, 174 
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resorted to applying the “deadline diplomacy” tactics, where threats and sanctions played a vital 
role towards forcibly securing the consent of the rebel movements.  In the final analysis, the 
Minni Minawi faction of the SPL/A became the only signatory with the GoS to the Darfur Peace 
Agreement. The process was denied its natural flow; it drifted towards imposing an outcome 
on the parties and deprived the parties the ownership of the peace process. The mediation 
process was compelled to terminate and, on that note, considered a failure by the document’s 
non-signatories. Darfuri’s whose adversity continued to know no bounds also rejected the DPA. 
808 The study concludes that up till that point formal mediation had proved to be inadequate in 
the search for peace in Darfur. In the aftermath of the DPA, the 2011 Doha Document for Peace 
in Darfur and other attempts at official mediation have unsuccessfully translated to peace and 
stability of any kind. 
 
     In like manner, when Problem Solving Workshops are applied to conflicts characterized by 
protractedness, scholars and practitioners who organize them aim towards enhancing 
communication between the conflicting parties. Their ultimate goal is focused on altering 
attitudes and perceptions that have obstructed efforts at resolving the conflict.  This factor, but 
also the shortcomings of the DPA, as observed by the study, was the motivation for applying 
PSW as a strategy of the field of conflict resolution to the Darfur crisis. The thesis illuminates 
on two of such Problem-Solving Workshops organized in 2009 and 2011 by the Sudan Task 
Group in Siena Italy. The organizing scholars from the George Mason University in the US 
responded to the crisis first, by creating a neutral environment for “enhancing communication” 
(among splintered groups) ruined due to the process of fragmentation.  In attendance were 
representatives of faction whose division occurred in the aftermath of the 2006 DPA.  
 
The study discovered that changes from the workshop were transferable to the Doha talks, 
which commenced in February 2009. The Liberation and Justice Movement emerged as a 
coalition group formed from a number of smaller factions.  Although the changes from the 2009 
workshop proved insufficient towards the bigger picture of peace and stability in Darfur and 
also inadequate to elicit a comprehensive peace document, the study observed that such changes 
sufficed to attract the consent of the only signatory to the Doha talks: Dr. Tijani Sese the 
erstwhile leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement.  
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The workshop organised in 2011, targeted civil society groups. The organizers understood the 
imperative for Darfur’s peace process to engage other levels of society. On that account, mid-
level actors comprising representatives from the academia as well as non-governmental NGO 
became participants of the number two workshop. The study has identified this effort as a 
course charted in the right direction. It is a contribution towards the transformation of altered 
perceptions and attitudes; nonetheless it was impossible to deduce either the indirect or direct 
impact of the second workshop on the peace process or on the conflict on ground in Darfur.  
 
By examining theoretical underpinnings (from both fields) that have inspired intervention in 
the Darfur crisis, the study successfully threated the objective to comprehend how the 
international community initially responded to the Darfur crisis. Presently, the Darfur crisis has 
remained a recipient of mainstream forms of intervention. UNAMID as the current peace actor 
follows up on formal mediation to ensure that all parties in conflict participate in the negotiation 
of a peaceful settlement. It also continues to administer peacekeeping albeit in its 
multidimensional form. While these instruments of intervention continue to be applied to the 
Darfur conflict, there is no gainsaying the fact that inadequacies have continued to abound 
which, bolster the plausibility of the debates emerging from the school of conflict 
transformation around the early 1990s.  
 
10. 3. 2 Contextualising analytical frameworks 
10.3.2a. Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflict  
The Darfur conflict was located within the post-cold war discourse even when the conflict had 
not erupted in the immediate aftermath of the cold war. This characterisation derives from the 
notion that decades after the termination of the cold war, the patterns exhibited by the Darfur 
conflict are akin to the defining features of those kinds of conflicts captured by Edward Azar. 
In his seminal contribution to the conception of protracted conflicts, the author delineated three 
salient characteristics of such conflicts, which ultimately unfolded on the African conflict 
terrain, most notably after his death. One assertion from the author underscores this vividly. 
 He states that: The blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors, the 
lack of either a clear starting or terminating point and fundamentally, the presence of 
prolonged violence. 809 
                                                     
809 See, Edward Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1990).  
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The Darfur conflict ostensibly manifests these features to a large extent. While it is possible to 
trace the overt expression of the Darfur crisis to the year 2003, the fresh eruption of inter-tribal 
wars on the grassroot level since 2012 nonetheless reveals a complex dimension that obscures 
the capacity to predict a “terminating point” especially not of conflict that prevail on the tribal 
level.  
 
The conflict in like manner exhibits blurred demarcations between internal and external sources 
and actors”. The study provides validation in this regard by identifying the erstwhile Libyan 
leader: Muammar Gaddafi, as one prominent external actor in the Darfur conflict. His impact 
on the conflict traces back to the 1970s. This was around the period when Darfur endured a 
devastating famine. Consumed by an Arab supremacist agenda, Gaddafi pursued the institution 
of an ideology that penetrated deep. Darfur in need of aid myopically embraced the path to own 
destruction. The human “need” for relief ostensibly unlocked the gates for the flow of arms into 
Darfur. 810It was noted further that the infiltration into Darfur, of Chadian insurgent groups, 
aggravated tensions on an already volatile terrain by providing safe sanctuaries for such conflict 
exacerbating agents. The formation of FROLINAT: Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad 
(Chad National Liberation Front) under the leadership of Ibrahim Abatcha was a typical 
example.    
 
Also, contingent on the author’s framework, the study concluded that it is correct to dub the 
Darfur crisis as a “protracted” conflict. This conclusion derives from drawing a parallel between 
the “Genesis Component” and the Darfur crisis. Going by Azar, three components: The 
Genesis, Dynamics and Outcome serve as preconditions to the emergence of protracted social 
conflict. The thesis found the elements underpinning the “Genesis”811 component to be largely 
coherent with the conditions that fuelled the Darfur conflict albeit with identified divergences. 
“Land” was pinpointed as Darfur’s ‘basic need’ because land as a depleting resource, 
constitutes one “precondition” that almost accurately portrays the core underlying cause of 
aggression in Darfur. On the one hand, climatic conditions have precipitated land exhaustion 
as well as competition over its scarcity. On the other hand, the un-assuaged “land” need and the 
“landless status” of non-landowning tribes in Darfur has ostensibly fomented profound 
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discontentment among affected tribes.  The GoS has therefore capitalized on such grievances 
and discontentment.  It has exploited these avenues successfully and has most notably relied on 
land enticements to lure specifically Abbala Arabs, recognized as prominent Janjaweed 
members, into fighting the counter-insurgency war against the Darfur’s rebel movements.  
 
In like manner, Azar’s framework illuminates on the “communal content” precondition as a 
legacy of colonialism which has haunted a number of post-colonial societies and indeed British 
colonies like the Sudan. Reinforced by the policy of divide and rule, such ethnic configurations 
have perpetuated violent aggression, where one political entity perceived to exercise dominance 
over the other.   While the thesis found no rational link between the Darfur case and Azar’s 
“communal content” “precondition”, a representation of the British “indirect rule”, redesigned 
to suit the Darfur case, as well as the pursuit of a “conservative policy” in the region, ostensibly 
created imprints which in modern day discourses are termed “legacies of colonialism”.  Many 
years after independence successive post-colonial Sudanese, regimes have notably propagated 
the inequity and marginalization agenda in the peripheries, with no exception to the Darfur 
region 
 
10.3.2b.  Across border affiliations 
The thesis found that the Darfur crisis strongly demonstrated one major defining feature of the 
conflicts that prevailed in the postcolonial phase of Africa’s history, as delineated by Araoye812: 
“the interconnectedness of conflicts”. He noted that across frontiers affiliations merged with 
conflict drivers to fuel and escalate conflict in the originating state. The empirical chapters 
evidence such across border affiliations among the Zaghawa in Chad whose ethnic loyalties lie 
with the Zaghawa in Darfur, most notably with the rebel movement by the name of JEM (Justice 
and Equity Movement). 
 
10. 4 Applying Transformatory peace building to Darfur 
The transformation approach to intervention in protracted conflicts was adopted by the study 
as an analytical model utilized in testing the applicability of its underlying assumptions in 
Darfur’s protracted conflict. As considered in the third theoretical chapter proponents of the 
field advocate for an inclusive approach to peace. Scholars view the transformation approach 
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as complementary to other conventional strategies. They acknowledge as significant to a peace 
process the input obtainable from “all” levels of actors within the society. (See chapter four for 
details) Most significantly the study advanced that conflict transformation makes the case for 
the inclusion of track III actors. In accordance with this line of argument, the study noted that 
all levels of the Darfuri population have been drawn into the peace process,813 with the aim to 
extract their relevant quota as part of the task to building peace from below.  
 
Beyond the notion of “limitation and termination” viewed as the desired out come in conflict 
management and conflict resolution, the study notes that attention is also directed at relational 
change as aligned with conflict transformation. This intervention strategy relies on indigenous 
peace-making actors and cultural resources, whose prerogative it is to mend broken relations 
and deliver the most significant component for relational change: reconciliation. These efforts 
may be conceived in line with the restorative kind of justice. Complementarity within Darfur’s 
conflict scenarios is reflected in the pooling together of track I, track II, and track III strategies 
and actors to accomplish the demands of a single intervention framework for sustainable peace.  
 
10.4.1 Lederach’s Comprehensive Framework for peace  
In order to establish the merits of a Transformatory approach to peace, the thesis relied on 
propositions expounded by one of its major proponents: John Paul Lederach. The three 
propositions as listed below, constitute the core message of the author’s “comprehensive 
framework.”814 They formed the basis on which UNAMID’s modus operandi in Darfur was 
examined.  
1. Establishing and infrastructure of peace 
2. Building a peace constituency 
3. Long term and short-term perspectives (See chapter four) 
 
In line with proposition one, the study established that via it’s supporting components, 
UNAMID in contrast to AMIS, operates from top to bottom through its political affairs 
component, but also from bottom to top. CAS as one of UNAMID’s supporting components 
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effectuates bottom up intervention in Darfur by focusing specifically on grassroot intervention. 
CAS accomplishes this task in conjunction with level 3 actors of the affected population in 
Darfur. The study identified matching stakeholders located on level 3, however for their role 
on the grassroot level of Darfur’s inter-tribal conflict, members of the institution of the Native 
Administration and its integral components were selected as the most significant stakeholders 
for the study’s analysis. A multidimensional approach by UNAMID in Darfur poses as an attest 
to the legality of the “Space” which CAS has created for the Native Administration. It also 
endorses the treatment of such actors as legitimate to the peace process.  
 
The second proposition underscores the essence of drawing on human and cultural resources 
available within the conflict terrain. In societies where such resources have been undermined, 
Lederach recommended the “empowerment” of attendant actors and the revival of pragmatic 
aspects of cultural peace-making. In the case of Darfur, the researcher conceives of such activity 
as a “re-empowerment effort”, especially considering the status of indigenous mechanisms in 
times past.  These actors and accompanying methods are perceived to possess the capacity to 
contribute to the transformation of the conflict. UNAMID as established by the study, 
recognizes the role of the Ajaweed elders in reconciliation. The hybrid mission at the same time 
attests to the relevance of the Judiyya mechanism as integral to the fulfilment of its mandate to 
restore broken relationships on the grassroot level in Darfur.815 Nonetheless, the Judiyya and 
its custodians and indeed the entire institution of the Native Administration have suffered a 
crisis of diminishing legitimacy traceable to its initial abolition in 1970. UNAMID has therefore 
adopted a number of initiatives aimed at re-instating the institution’s undermined authority 
within the community. In this regard, the study validates based on empirical findings the role 
of CAS in the re-empowerment process of Darfur’s Native Administration through techniques 
such as reconciliation and dialogue workshops, meetings and conferences. 816The thesis finds 
that such efforts portray the potential to inject confidence into the system. It also changes the 
perception and attitudes of tribal leaders at war with each other as well as yields the gains as 
evidenced in chapter 9.   
 
Most notably also and despite the weakening of its umbrella institution, the Ajaweed mediators 
have maintained relevance as reliable peacemakers. Similarly, a seemingly constant 
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predilection for the Judiyya peace process cannot be discounted 817This proves to be the case 
where formal institutions have failed to sufficiently address the needs of its citizens, and in so 
doing have created the vacuum for society to fall back on an age long heritage for peace-
making. The Darfur case has not been exempted. Accordingly, it is not out of place for the study 
to assume that CAS ‘s cooperation with Darfur’s “contextual resources” denotes the 
international community’s estimation of the proceeds derivable from the adoption of a 
“culturally sensitive” approach to peace in Darfur. It illustrates an ostensible connection 
between UNAMID’S mandate and Lederach’s “comprehensive framework “and demonstrates 
a palpable enthusiasm on the part of the international peace actor to support Darfur on the path 
towards transcending conflict and achieving transformation.  
 
Proposition 3 advocates for short and long-term perspectives when planning intervention in 
conflicts characterized by protractedness. The thesis demonstrated that the intervention 
framework authorized by the AU conformed to short-term perspectives that focused on 
achieving negative peace.  AMIS was therefore restricted to monitoring the ceasefire agreement 
between the GoS and the rebel movements. Proposition three suggests according to Lederach 
that a “comprehensive framework” accords equal prominence to both short term and long-term 
perspectives.818  
In contrast to AMIS, UNAMID’s operational mandate derives from a framework that makes 
provision for both perspectives as well as incorporates different approaches to peace as may be 
aligned with different timeframe perspectives. Intervention through the political affairs 
component of UNAMID majorly involves actors on level 1 and focuses on advancing mediatory 
talks, and based on agreements reached, supports military action geared towards terminating 
the effects of unabated violent attacks on the citizens of Darfur. On one hand, that level of 
intervention falls within short-term perspectives albeit functioning as part of a continuum of 
strategies embedded in the current multidimensional framework hinged on the longer duration 
perspective. On the other hand, a long-term commitment as captured by the study, constitutes 
those activities of UNAMID’s component: CAS, tailored towards creating the enabling 
environment on the grassroot level, for protagonists of intertribal disputes to converge on a 
neutral space, seeking to accomplish the re-learning of a culture of peace through dialogue. 
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From a larger perspective, UNAMID duration of stay in Darfur may be considered. The hybrid 
mission made its debut on Darfuri soil in January 2008 following the authorization of resolution 
1769 by the UN Security Council in July 2007. On June 29, 2017 resolution 2363 extended the 
mission’s stay for another year.819 In 2017 UNAMID will be close to marking 10 years in 
Darfur. The thesis finds that the authorizers of UNAMID recognize, the significance attached 
to investing longer time frames in a protracted internal conflict like Darfur.  UNAMID’s 
continued stay in Darfur (with reference to its new form) is indicative of the international 
community’s grasp of the structural violence that engendered the conflict in the first place but 
most importantly also, connotes a clear discernment of the deep-rooted patterns that have 
accrued from prolonged violence, those which cannot be transformed within a short period of 
time. This understanding mirrors Lederach’s recommendations for longer time frames to be 
contemplated when seeking to stabilize conflicts characterized by intransigence and longevity. 
It is assumed that a long duration time frame furnishes CAS with the opportunity to establish 
“an infrastructure for peace as well as build a peace constituency”820 Ultimately, it implies that 
when UNAMID finally departs from the terrain of conflict, the anticipated positive peace, 
should remain relatively sustainable, reliant on the resources from within.  
  
10. 5 “Contextual Resources”  
When the study referred to “contextual resources”, it alluded to actors and processes significant 
to peace-making in Darfur. Accordingly, the study examined the evolution of Darfur’s peace-
making institution through the phases of its history.  A peace-making and governing institution 
was traceable the era of the sultans. The period of the sultanate represents the years when Darfur 
prevailed as an autonomous state.  Despite a strong ambition to centralize the state and 
withdraw absolute power from the Fur chiefs, the sultans succeed in configuring the state to 
exist in alignment with systems established in the pre-sultanate phase of Darfur, albeit with 
modifications to suit their own purpose. The traditional land tenure system known as the 
Hakura, which set the modalities for land ownership in Darfur became one avenue through 
which the sultans obtained the loyalty of the Fur chiefs.  The thesis uncovered the pivotal role 
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of the tribal chiefs within the sultanate. This was noticeable from around the 15th and 16th 
century. During the sultanate, tribal chiefs oversaw judicial matters and maintained law and 
order contingent on the tenets of Darfur’s customary law. With the arrival of the British a 
number of changes were effected to Darfur’s peace-making and governing institution, however 
from that point on the institution became christened with the appellation of “Native 
Administration”. The adoption of the indirect rule model favoured and elevated the institution 
of the Native Administration. The colonialist relied heavily on the institution but bolstered the 
capacity of tribal chiefs to provide security for Darfur. They resolved conflicts and became 
significant in judicial and financial affairs of Darfur under the British. The thesis found that the 
legitimacy, in which the Native Administration basked, soon began to diminish and deteriorate. 
This was the undoing from the Nimeiri administration in 1970. The study found that from that 
point on till date, the Native Administration has remained in a position of struggle, striving to 
gather the momentum it lost years ago.  
 
Postcolonial governments sought to fill the vacuum created by the Native Administration with 
modern governing institutions. However, Darfur’s semi modern configuration saw a people 
maintain relative loyalty to a peace-making and governing institution connected to the people’s 
cultural heritage. The thesis also found that the relevance of the Ajaweed and the Judiyya 
towards peace and reconciliation was preserved. The Diya retained relatively its effectiveness 
in the resolution of tribal conflicts and was accepted as the medium for compensation by 
defaulters. However, controversies over the Diya tend to abound as projected by the 
Humanitarian affairs of UNAMID. Chapter 9 illuminated on the emerging conflict of interest, 
which portrays the Diya’s inadequacy in addressing human right violations according to 
international standard, especially considering the scale of the violence that has occurred.  
 
In any case, this was the status quo of Darfur’s peace-making heritage when the war erupted: 
relatively effective yet undermined and perceived as an institution which houses corrupt leaders 
who also putatively face co-option by the current ingaz regime. The thesis identified that the 
strength and legitimacy of tribal chiefs and eventually the Native Administration as a whole, 
lay in the firm support it obtained from the sultanate and the condominium. According to 
Lederach therefore, it is wisdom for the international peace actor to engage in the revival of 
peace-making mechanisms within the host environment. In order to map out the path towards 
sustainability, an empowerment of such mechanisms should fall in place. In the case of Darfur, 
the study concludes that the system should to be re-empowered. This enables indigenous actors 
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to assume the position of efficient and credible custodians of peace, which it maintained in the 
era of the sultanate and the condominium. It must also shun manipulation in the hands of the 
current regime. It is against these findings that the thesis concludes that the current status 
of Darfur’s Native Administration cannot sufficiently on its own contribute to the current 
crisis in Darfur.  
 
10 .6 African Indigenous peace-making: dividends for contemporary conflicts   
A good number of African societies maintain a peace-making culture that is in conformity with 
the restorative kind of justice.  Accordingly, the thesis has established that the imperative for 
relational change in the aftermath of conflict constitutes the missing link between the 
custodians-cum-mechanisms of peace-making in African traditional societies and the conflict 
transformation school of thought.  The study endorses in alignment with the transformation 
approach, the essence for reconciliation in internal conflicts. This affirmation is based on the 
understanding that prolonged conflicts engender fear, hurt and trauma (residues of conflict). 
Such negative psychological impacts tend to present an even greater need for intervention 
strategies that seek to avert a relapse into violence.  
 
In the case of prolonged internal violence, fighting may be forestalled by creating a platform 
for reconciliation, where parties can “let go” so as to embrace a restoration of broken 
relationships. The thesis points out that when an external peace actor’s draw on a model that 
acknowledges the imperative for relational change, such intervention approach tends to 
automatically (via the component of “reconciliation”) establish a connection to contextual 
apparatuses and actors charged with the obligation to reconcile conflicting parties. Most 
notably, when such a framework is applied to an African conflict, it may be interpreted as the 
external actor’s hand stretched forth in partnership to that institution of peace-making tasked 
with the constant obligation to preserve harmonious relations within the society.  
 
Accordingly, reconciliation geared towards societal coherence as the thesis underscores, 
remains the hallmark of African communities. This is the case precisely with a good number of 
semi-modern societies, where formal structures exist, but where society continues to rely 
heavily on a cultural peace-making heritage. This stated fact aligns with the transformation 
school’s advocacy for “inclusive peace”. It provided the basis for the study’s probing into three 
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selected cases of conflicts.821 The objective was to establish or refute the relevance of 
indigenous peace-making mechanisms in African contemporary conflicts, terminated or on-
going. The thesis arrived at the conclusion that pragmatic aspects of indigenous mechanisms 
still hold potentials for building peace in a good number of African societies beset by conflict.  
 
 
10. 7 Final thoughts, pending questions, lessons learned, limitations and contributions  
UNAMID is authorized to function under chapter VII of the UN Security Council, and on a 
territory of aggression, where the host government lackadaisically assumes its responsibility to 
protect its citizens but has given its consent to intervention by the international community. 
One question remains pending: 
What explanations justify UNAMID’s submission to the GoS regulations that impose 
restrictions on its ability to protect citizens of the war and ultimately restore stability? The 
answer to this question goes beyond the purview of this thesis, however they uncover terrains 
for scholarly investigation. Be that as it may, this dissertation has attempted to penetrate 
significant aspects within the study’s scope of analysis. UNAMID’s presence in Darfur is 
indicative of the international community’s intention to stabilize the conflict and effect durable 
change in line with the peace building agenda. Although the study does not cover the entire 
spectrum of UNAMID’s activities in this regard, this research may be viewed as an attempt to 
merge theoretical underpinnings in the field of peace building with empirical research on the 
grassroot.  
 
The study has produced a piece of information with the capacity to advance furthermore, the 
existing body of empirical knowledge within the evolving field of conflict transformation. 
Extant literature documenting the international community’s response to the Darfur crisis in the 
early aftermath of the conflict’s eruption, informed either about the mediation processes in 
Abuja and Doha or reported on military intervention as conducted by AMIS. There has been 
no scholarly attempt from without the conflict terrain, to analyse, document and expose to the 
outside world, the merits of an inclusive, bottom up approach to peace as demonstrated by the 
activities of CAS’s in partnership with indigenous actors. There is therefore a dearth in the 
literature that examines grassroot intervention in Darfur around the salient issue of resolving 
tribal fights, restoring social coherence in communities on ground Darfur and the ultimate goal 
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of achieving relational transformation. In fact, the Darfur conflict seems to be a forgotten one. 
This ostensible information gap, due in part to restricted access into the region, is the deficit 
this thesis has sought to address in the smallest way possible.  
 
Also, the study as noted earlier, specifically revealed the extent to which Lederach’s 
“comprehensive framework” can be operationalized in a real-time conflict like Darfur. In the 
first place, the endorsement of a “multidimensional framework” by the UN Security Council 
evidences the link between scholarly research and the practitioner’s practice. A hybridized 
intervention is emblematic of existing institutional endeavour on the trajectory of 
transformation.  The challenges surrounding implementation nonetheless reveals the herculean 
task of achieving sustainable peace for Darfur. This is an indication that the practice of 
transformation stretches far beyond policy enactment, even when change commences with such 
initial steps. The study arrives at the conclusion that Lederach’s propositions may have gained 
institutional acknowledgement as UNAMID’s strategy for intervention. The transformation 
story, either of success or failure in Darfur regardless, is still a daunting work in progress. This 
conclusion does not however imply that the same propositions, when tested in or applied to 
other African conflicts for example, will yield similar results. Ostensibly, Darfur does exhibit 
peculiar impediments that may be non-existent in other conflicts around the continent.  
 
The study is without doubt a contribution to on-going debates among African scholars now 
vociferously underscoring the merits of exploring and recognizing the African conception of 
peace building as an appendage to the normative agenda underlying international intervention 
in Africa. 822These discussions have continued to accentuate the saliency of African indigenous 
peace-making mechanisms, while recommending a “re-enabling”823 of traditional structures to 
harness extant potentials of peace-making, so that in conjunction with conventional strategies 
internal conflicts might be on the part to sustainable peace.  
 
The question of “generalization” does therefore bare the limitation of the thesis: that the study 
focuses on one state: North Darfur, out of the current five. The findings of this study cannot 
therefore, be judged as a comprehensive investigation into Lederach propositions. Even when 
Civil Affairs Sections cut across the Darfur states and indigenous actors and mechanisms 
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remain homogenous in nature; conflict dynamics tend to present a measure of divergence. The 
vacuum of knowledge and information from the central, east, west, and south Darfur therefore 
begs to be filled.  
 
Finally, the recent drawdown of contingents in Darfur in accordance with resolution 2363 was 
authorised with the objective to effectuate the transition of UNAMID into a full-fledged peace-
building mission. This exposes the conflict terrain to deeper scholarly investigation into the 
international community’s peace building agenda for Darfur.  Indeed, this thesis has served as 
a stepping-stone for further research into the prospects for transforming the conflict based on a 
mandate that will now focus largely on level 3 of the conflict in Darfur.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1 
Lederach’s Pyramid (Diagram One) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
     Level 1 
      Top Leadership 
• Military Political leaders 
• Highly Public/ 
High visibility 
• Positional/High stakes 
 
 
     Level 2 
      National Leaders 
• Respected in sectors 
• Ethnic/ Religious 
Leaders 
• Academic/Intellectuals 
• Humanitarian leaders 
• Prestigiously respected 
 
 
     Level 3 
      Grassroots 
• Local Leaders 
• Indigenous NGOs 
• Community developers 
• Local health officials 
• Refugee camp leaders 
 
 
     Peace-making focus 
•  High level 
negotiations 
• Cease fire 
• Visible, Clout in 
mediation 
• Single personality 
 
 
     Peacemaking focus 
•  Problem-solving 
workshops 
• Training in conflict 
resolution 
• Peace Commissions 
• Insider-partial teams 
 
 
     Peace-making focus: 
• Local peace commissions 
• Grass-roots training 
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Appendix 2 (Diagram two)  
Lederach’s Comprehensive Framework as an Analytical Tool for Comprehending 
UNAMID’s Grassroot Intervention Strategy for Darfur   
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